Madhya Pradesh High Court
Indra Bhan Kewat vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 9 October, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAJENDRA KUMAR VANI
ON THE 9 th OF OCTOBER, 2025
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 6304 of 2024
INDRA BHAN KEWAT
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri R. P. Yadav - Advocate for the appellant.
Smt. Shanti Tiwari - Panel Lawyer for respondent/ State.
ORDER
With the consent of parties, heard finally.
This appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has
been filed being aggrieved by the judgment dated 14.03.2024 passed by 4 th
Additional Sessions Judge, Rewa in Sessions Trial No.165/2020 convicting
the appellant for the charge under Sections 452 of IPC and sentenced to
undergo R.I. for 05 years and fine of Rs.1000/-; under Section 376 of IPC
and sentenced to undergo R.I. for 10 years and under Section 323 of IPC and
sentenced to undergo R.I. for 01 year and fine of Rs.1000/- with default
stipulation.
2. The case of the prosecution in brief is that on 15.08.2020, when
prosecutrix was in her room with her three children, her mother-in-law was
in the other room, accused Indrabhan Kewat came to her house and entered
her room. She told that her husband was not at home and he should leave but
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the accused caught hold, started beating her and committed rape upon her.
Her three children witnessed the incident. When she screamed, her mother-
in-law came and accused/ appellant fled away. When her husband came, she
narrated the incident.
3. The first information report to the incident was lodged by the
prosecutrix on the next day i.e. 16.08.2020 at about 01.36 pm vide Exhibit
P/1. The prosecutrix was sent for medical examination. Dr. Pushpa Patel
(PW.3) medically examined the prosecutrix and proved her report vide
Exhibit P/3. Spot map was prepared vide Exhibit P/4 in front of the
witnesses. Accused was arrested and he was also sent for his medical
examination.
4. After completion of the investigation, the Challan was filed before
the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rewa, which committed the case
to the Court of Sessions where the accused was tried.
5. The accused abjured his guilt and demanded trial by putting his
defense that there is a land dispute between the accused and prosecutrix's
husband and due to the said enmity, the present appellant has been falsely
implicated in this case but he has not examined any witness in his defense.
6. The Trial Court disbelieved the defense put by the accused person
looking to the in-ocular testimony of the prosecutrix and her husband,
supported by the medical evidence and accordingly convicted & sentenced
him as all circumstances supports the story of the prosecution along with the
testimony of the Investigating Officer Rituka Shukla (PW.8).
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7. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that it is a case of the
false implication of the appellant. It is a case of consent. Present appellant is
brother-in-law of the prosecutrix. He is residing adjacent to the house of
prosecutrix. It is also submitted that in the light of admission of prosecutrix
and her husband, there persists a land dispute between the accused and
prosecutrix's husband and because of that he has been falsely implicated. He
also submits that prosecutrix has admitted that after recording her complaint,
the same was not read over to her. The husband of prosecutrix (P.W.2) is not
an eye witness. Incident has been communicated to him by the prosecutrix.
He further submits that as per statement of Dr. Pushpa Patel (P.W.2) on the
date of incident, the prosecutrix was having menstruation and thus, according
to him, rape was not possible during that period. It is further submitted that
there was no external injury on the person of prosecutrix and thus, no offence
under Section 323 of IPC is made out. Further, DNA report is not exhibited
by the prosecution, hence,, it could not be read in evidence. Therefore, it
prima facie appears to be a false case registered against the appellant and
under such circumstances, the conviction and sentence as directed by the
Trial Court may be set aside.
8. Per Contra, learned Panel Lawyer for the State contends that
though DNA report is not exhibited but the entire incident and offence has
been proved by unrebutted testimony of prosecutrix and her husband. It is
submitted that since DNA report has been issued by the Forensic Lab, it
could be read in evidence. It is further submitted that prosecutrix is illiterate
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labour therefore, there may be variation in her statement but that per se is not
sufficient to assume her testimony doubtful. Keeping in view the entire
statement and material on record, prosecution has proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt. Further, the finding as recorded by the Trial Court, after
due appraisal of the testimony of the prosecutrix and her husband (PW.2),
the medical opinion of Dr. Pushpa Patel (PW.2), which finds support from
the testimony of the Investigating Officer Rituka Shukla (PW.8) and
Dr.Saras Sondhiya (PW.5), who performed the MLC (Exhibit P/6) of the
accused and the DNA report, does not warrant any interference by this
Court.
9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, it is apparent that the
first information report to the incident is prompt one as it was lodged by the
prosecutrix on the next day i.e. 16.08.2020 at about 01.36 pm vide Exhibit
P/1. If the statement of the prosecutrix and her husband (PW.2) is visualized
then it would appear that there is no discrepancy with regard to the incident.
10. On travelling through the depositions on record, it is found that
the prosecutrix (PW-1) has categorically stated in her examination-in-chief
that the present appellant under intoxicated condition entered into her house
and torn her saree and blouse and committed rape with her. Her daughter was
also present there but the present appellant was trying to get her ousted.
When her husband returned to home then she narrated the entire incident to
him and thereafter on second day, she lodged the FIR. She put her thumb
impression on the FIR (Ex.P/1) and she also stated that the doctor has
medically examined her for which she has granted her consent as Ex.P/2 and
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Ex.P/3. The police has prepared spot map as Ex.P/4. The statement of
prosecutrix is also supported by the statement of husband of the prosecutrix.
Though prosecutrix and her husband both are illiterate and they use to affix
their thumb impressions, therefore there are some variations in the
statements of these witnesses. The prosecutrix has stated that the police
personnel has obtained her thumb impression on a plain paper which was
blank and that was not read over to her but keeping in view the educational
and social status of the prosecutrix, such variation does not adversely affect
her testimony as in the examination-in-chief she has categorically stated
about the incident and in respect of that incident, she stated to have lodged
the FIR (Ex.P/1) in the police station. She proved the FIR (Ex.P/1) as well as
the medical examination report, which was further corroborated by the
concerned doctor Pushpa Patel (PW-3). Though this witness found no
external injury on the person of the prosecutrix but absence of external injury
does not per se belies the prosecution story. This witness has also stated that
she was in menstruation period but no question was put to this witness by
the defence that since she was in menstruation period, no rape could have
been committed with the prosecutrix. Therefore, in this regard the suggestion
on behalf of the present appellant is not tenable.
11. Though the FIR has been lodged on the second day but the
explanation for delay in lodging the FIR is found to be sufficient as the
prosecutrix was alone at her home at the time of incident and when her
husband returned in the evening then she narrated him the incident and
thereafter on the second day FIR has been lodged. In such kind of sexual
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offences, normally the women and her family members did not disclose the
incident to anyone except the close relatives of the victim. Here keeping in
view the reason for such delay and in the facts and circumstances of the
case, it is found that no inordinate delay has been caused in lodging of FIR.
12. Prosecutrix and her husband have admitted in their cross
examinations that there is a land dispute with the present appellant but they
denied the suggestion given by the defence that because of that dispute they
have lodged a false report against the present appellant. Otherwise also, there
is no indication from the record for such false lodging of FIR against the
present appellant. In this situation, mere persistence of land dispute between
the present appellant and prosecutrix and her husband does not belies the
prosecution story. Other witnesses have also supported the prosecution story.
Therefore, so far as the conviction of present appellant under Sections 452
and 376 of IPC is concerned, it is found to be on cogent basis. All the
ingredients of these offences have been established by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt. However, Section 323 of IPC is concerned, the
present appellant has separately been convicted under this section and
separately sentenced for the same but in the considered view of this Court
since no external injury has been found by the concerned Dr. Pushpa Patel
(PW-3), whatever offence has been committed by the present appellant falls
within the definition of offence under Sections 452 and 376 of IPC.
Therefore a separate conviction and sentence under Section 323 of IPC is not
found to be lawful. Hence, the present appellant is hereby declared acquitted
from the offence under Section 323 of IPC. The conviction and sentence
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under Section 323 of IPC passed against the present appellant by the learned
Trial Court is hereby set aside. The fine amount, if any, already deposited by
the appellant against the offence under Section 323 of IPC be refunded to
him.
13. As regards the offence under Sections 452 and 376 of IPC, the
statement of prosecutrix (PW-1) and her husband (PW-2) coupled with the
statements of other witnesses are sufficient to establish the aforesaid
offences. The testimonies of the witnesses are further corroborated by the
documentary evidence on record, which shows beyond doubt that at the time
of incident, present appellant entered into the house of the prosecutrix and
committed the offence of house tresspass after preparation of assault and
committed rape with the prosecutrix. Therefore, the learned Trial Court has
not committed any error in holding the appellant guilty of the offence under
Sections 452 and 376 of IPC.
14. It is pertinent to mention here that DNA report was received
before passing of the judgment in the Trial Court but the learned Trial Court
has not exhibited such report and not made it a basis for conviction of the
present appellant. However, non-exhibition of such report and not to base it
for conviction of the present appellant, does not dent the case of the
prosecution because the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the
offence under Sections 452 and 376 of IPC by unrebutted testimony of
prosecutrix and her husband (PW-2) along with other corroborated evidence.
Therefore, non-exhibition of such DNA report is not fatal to the prosecution.
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15. In the case of Phool Singh Vs. State of M.P., (2022) 2 SCC 74 ,
the Hon'ble Apex Court while relying upon the various citations has held that
the sole testimony of prosecutrix/victim if found to be trustworthy,
unblemished and credible then her evidence is of sterling quality and the
conviction under Section 376 of IPC can be based on her sole testimony.
Para 8 to 12 of the judgment reads as under :-
"8. In Ganesan [Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573 : (2021) 1
SCC (Cri) 76] , this Court has observed and held that there can be
a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when
the deposition of the prosecutrix is found to be trustworthy,
unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality. In
the aforesaid case, this Court had an occasion to consider the
series of judgments of this Court on conviction on the sole
evidence of the prosecutrix. In paras 10.1 to 10.3, it is observed
and held as under : (Ganesan case [Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10
SCC 573 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 76] , SCC pp. 578-82)
"10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment,
molestation, etc. can there be conviction on the sole evidence of
the prosecutrix, in Vijay [Vijay v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC
191 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 639] , it is observed in paras 9 to 14 as
under : (SCC pp. 195-98)
'9. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand
Jain [State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain,
(1990) 1 SCC 550 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 210] this Court held that a
woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice
to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore,
her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion
as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under : (SCC p.
559, para 16)
"16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with
an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence
Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is
corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a
competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must
receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of
physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must
attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured
complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the
court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing
with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of
the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels
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satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is
no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar
to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for
corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place
implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look
for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of
corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of
evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the
prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of
full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her
evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not
trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the
record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a
strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court
should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence."
10. In State of U.P. v. Pappu [State of U.P. v. Pappu, (2005) 3
SCC 594 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 780] this Court held that even in a case
where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl
habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve
the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that
there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of
injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to
absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be
conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the
court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek
other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get
assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under : (SCC p. 597,
para 12)
"12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having
been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the
crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted
upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a
higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is
injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical
as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of
facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its
face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial,
which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of
corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice,
would do."
11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of
Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316]
, this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment,
molestation, etc. the court is duty-bound to deal with such cases
with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant
discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a
ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case.
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Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction
and it does not require any corroboration unless there are
compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look
for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience.
The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an
injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held
that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even
properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be
given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under : (SCC pp.
394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21)
"8. ... The court overlooked the situation in which a poor
helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three
desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her
from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not
conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being
able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a
ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The
prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the
negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the
credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. ... The courts must,
while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of
rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court
just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is
involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving
sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no
material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even
discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless
the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to
throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. ... Seeking
corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a
rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. ...
Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony
of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of
prudence under given circumstances. ...
***
21. ... The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a
case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant
discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of
a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case.
If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied
upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material
particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place
implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which
may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration
required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the
prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire
case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be
sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations."
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12. In State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra [State of
Orissa v. Thakara Besra, (2002) 9 SCC 86 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1080]
, this Court held that rape is not mere physical assault, rather it
often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim.
The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and,
therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in
the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-
examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity
in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not
seen the commission of the offence.
13. In State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh [State of
H.P. v. Raghubir Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 622 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 674] ,
this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any
other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix
before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be
weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence
and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her
veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid
Khan v. State of M.P. [Wahid Khan v. State of M.P., (2010) 2
SCC 9 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1208] placing reliance on an earlier
judgment in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan [Rameshwar v. State
of Rajasthan, 1951 SCC 1213 : AIR 1952 SC 54 : 1952 SCR 377] .
14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that
the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence
and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the
accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix.'
10.2. In Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana [Krishan
Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130 : (2011) 3
SCC (Cri) 61] , it is observed and held by this Court that to hold an
accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary
evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same
inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy,
unblemished and should be of sterling quality.
10.3. Who can be said to be a "sterling witness", has been dealt
with and considered by this Court in Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of
Delhi) [Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 750] . In para 22, it is observed and held as
under : (SCC p. 29)
'22. In our considered opinion, the "sterling witness" should be
of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore,
be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness
should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any
hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the
witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the
truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would
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be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right
from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the
witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court.
It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution
qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the
version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to
withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever
strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room
for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons
involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have
co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material
such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of
offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion.
The said version should consistently match with the version of
every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to
the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there
should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to
hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if
the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all
other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a
witness can be called as a "sterling witness" whose version can be
accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on
which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version
of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should
remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral,
documentary and material objects should match the said version in
material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence
to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials
for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.' "
(emphasis in original)
9. In Pankaj Chaudhary [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj
Chaudhary, (2019) 11 SCC 575 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 264] , it is
observed and held that as a general rule, if credible, conviction of
the accused can be based on sole testimony, without corroboration.
It is further observed and held that sole testimony of the
prosecutrix should not be doubted by the court merely on basis of
assumptions and surmises. In para 29, it is observed and held as
under : (SCC p. 587)
"29. It is now well-settled principle of law that conviction can
be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires
confidence. [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra [Vishnu v. State of
Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 217] ]. It is
well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that there is no
rule of law or practice that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot
be relied upon without corroboration and as such it has been laid
down that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a
rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any
basic infirmity and the "probabilities factor" does not render it
unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist
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on corroboration except from medical evidence, where, having
regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be
expected to be forthcoming. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K. [State of
Rajasthan v. N.K., (2000) 5 SCC 30 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 898] ]."
10. In Sham Singh v. State of Haryana [Sham Singh v. State of
Haryana, (2018) 18 SCC 34 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 129] , it is
observed that testimony of the victim is vital and unless there are
compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of
her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the
testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an
accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to
be reliable. It is further observed that seeking corroboration of her
statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases
amounts to adding insult to injury. In paras 6 and 7, it is observed
and held as under : (SCC pp. 37-38)
"6. We are conscious that the courts shoulder a great
responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They
must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts
should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get
swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in
the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to
throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If the evidence
of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon
without seeking corroboration of her statement in material
particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place
implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which
may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration
required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the
prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire
case and the court must be alive to its responsibility and be
sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations or
sexual assaults. [See State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of
Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316]
(SCC p. 403, para 21).]
7. It is also by now well settled that the courts must, while
evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape,
no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to
make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is
involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving
sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no
material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even
discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless
the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to
throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent
bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of
sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not
overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and
unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for
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corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty
to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to
convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is
found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before
relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding
insult to injury. (See Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam [Ranjit
Hazarika v. State of Assam, (1998) 8 SCC 635 : 1998 SCC (Cri)
1725] .)"
11. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions to the facts of the case on hand and as observed
hereinabove, we see no reason to doubt the credibility and/or
trustworthiness of the prosecutrix. She is found to be reliable and
trustworthy. Therefore, without any further corroboration, the
conviction of the accused relying upon the sole testimony of the
prosecutrix can be sustained.
12. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that as
there were no external or internal injuries found on the body of the
prosecutrix and therefore it may be a case of consent is concerned,
the aforesaid has no substance at all. No such question was asked,
even remotely, to the prosecutrix in her cross-examination.
Therefore, the aforesaid submission is to be rejected outright.
16. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Pintu @
Prathviraj Koli Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh in Cr.A. No.310 of 2016
decided on 06.03.2025 in para 26 while relying upon the decision of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pattu Rajan Vs. State of T.N. (2019) 4
SCC 771 has held that the value and weight to be attached to a DNA report
is like any other opinion evidence. It cannot be said that the absence of DNA
evidence would lead to an adverse inference against a party, especially in the
presence of other cogent and reliable evidence on record in favour of such
party. Similarly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Lok Mal @ Loku Vs.
The State of Uttar Pradesh in Cr.A. No.325 of 2011 has opined in para 13,
14 and 15 as infra:
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"13. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the
evidence of a prosecutrix in a case of rape is of the same value as
that of an injured witness and conviction can be made on the basis
of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. In the case of State of
Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, the Supreme Court observed as under:
"21... The courts should examine the broader
probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor
contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the
statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal
nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution
case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires
confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking
corroboration of her statement in material particulars.
If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place
implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for
evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony,
short of corroboration required in the case of an
accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be
appreciated in the background of the entire case and
the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be
sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual
molestations."
14. A profitable reference can also be made to the case of
Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat where the
Supreme Court observed as under:
"9..In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the
testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence
of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury.
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Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman
who complains of rape or sexual molestation be
viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses
tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion?"
15. Applying the above said principle of law to the facts of the
present case, we are of the opinion that the testimony of the
prosecutrix is trustworthy and leaves no shadow of doubt to
discredit her case. Moreover, the appellant has failed to cause a
dent in the testimony of the prosecutrix."
17. Having considered the law laid down in the aforesaid cases and to
evaluate the evidence in this case on the touch stone of credibility, it is found
that the evidence of prosecutrix (PW-1) and her husband (PW-2) is
trustworthy, unblemished and credible and is of sterling quality so far as the
conviction of present appellant under Sections 452 and 376 of IPC is
concerned.
18. Ex consequenti, the appeal is partly allowed. The present appellant
stands acquitted of the offence under Section 323 of IPC and imposition of
punishment in the aforesaid section also stands set aside but conviction under
Sections 452 and 376 of IPC stands affirmed. As far as the quantum of
punishment in the aforesaid sections is concerned, there is no ground for
reducing the sentence as under Section 376 of IPC the minimum sentence is
of 10 years R.I. which has been imposed by the Trial Court. Thus, the
imprisonment under Sections 452 and 376 of IPC is also hereby affirmed.
19. The appellant is on bail. He shall surrender before the concerned court
to be sent to serving the remaining jail sentence.
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20. The disposal of the property shall be as per the direction of the trial
Court.
21. Let record of the trial Court be sent to the concerned court along
with copy of this judgment.
(RAJENDRA KUMAR VANI)
JUDGE
mrs. mishra
