Madhya Pradesh High Court

Jagdish Prasad Malviya vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 9 October, 2025

                                                                         1


                              IN THE           HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                    A T J AB AL P UR
                                                          BEFORE
                                               HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
                                                  WRIT PETITION No. 4084 of 2023
                                                 JAGDISH PRASAD MALVIYA
                                                          Versus
                                         THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
                                                             WITH
                                                  WRIT PETITION No. 12277 of 2020
                                                      SUSHIL THAKUR
                                                          Versus
                                         THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS

                           Appearance:
                             Shri Kailash Chandra Ghildiyal - Senior Advocate with Shri Greeshm Jain and Shri
                           Kapil Sharma - Advocate for the petitioner.

                             Shri Kapil Duggal- Advocate for the respondent No.2.

                                                                   ORDER

(Reserved on : 06.10.2025) (Pronounced on : 09.10.2025)

The present petitions have been filed on identical grounds and revolve on

identical facts. Hence, they are being decided by this common order. For the

sake of convenience, facts shall be taken from W.P. No.4084 of 2023.

2. The petitioners have called into question the charge sheet Annexure P-

1 dated 05.11.2008, so also the consequential order Annexure P-8 dated

28.12.2022, thereby instituting departmental enquiry.

3. It is vehemently argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the

departmental enquiry could not be initiated in the year 2022 with such a delay

of more than 14 years from the date of issuance of charge sheet in the year

2008. It is further argued that earlier the enquiry had been initiated against both

the petitioners and it was wrongly converted into joint enquiry without any

authorization of the competent authority as per Rule 18 of M.P.Civil Services

CCARules, 1966 and therefore, this Court in earlier round of litigation vide

Annexure P-6 passed in W.P. No.26747 of 2018 had set aside the penalty order

of dismissal.

4. To elaborate, it is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that

the petitioner Jagdish Prasad Malviya was Cashier while the petitioner Sushil

Thakur was the Executive Engineer inM.P. Housing and Infrastructure

Development Board and upon allegations that there were

certaindubioustransactions from 20-10-2004 till 19-06-2008 at Bhopal, which

resulted into loss of Rs.45.04 lakhs, which is public money, separate

chargesheets were issued to the petitioners, but without any competent approval

of authority competent to dismiss both the petitioners, the enquiry officer

wrongly converted the independent enquiries into joint enquiry and then penalty

orders were issued of dismissal of the petitioners from service and further

recovery of half of the loss caused was imposed on each of the petitioners. The

total amount of defalcation was found to be Rs.53.54 lakhs in the enquiry. It is

contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that this Court while setting

aside the penalty order in the earlier round of litigation did not grant any liberty

to the respondents to conduct enquiry afresh and the respondents in utterly

unauthorized manner while initiating fresh enquiry have in fact noted in the

order Annexure P-8 that the High Court has directed to conduct fresh

proceedings whereas there is no such direction.

5. It is further contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the

order Annexure P-6 is not on technical ground of enquiry being wrongfully

converted into joint enquiry without approval of competent authority under Rule

18. It is argued that the impugned termination orders were interfered by this

Court in the earlier round of litigation by order Annexure P-6 not only on the

grounds of incompetence of the authority converting the enquiry into joint

enquiry but also on merits,upon being impressed with the arguments of the

counsel for the petitioners therein and the writ petitions were in fact allowed on

all the grounds which were raised therein and not only on the grounds of

incompetence of the authority to conduct joint enquiry. It is, therefore,

contended that the respondent boardcould not have re-initiated the enquiry and

now though separate enquiries have been initiated against the petitioners on the

basis of the same charge sheet of the year 2008, but, since no liberty was

granted by this Court in earlier round of litigation by order Annexure P-6 and

further that the order was not merely on the ground of incompetence but on

merits also, therefore, fresh enquiry cannot be held. It is further contended that

both the petitioners have since retired during pendency of these petitions and

their retiral benefits and gratuity have been held up on account of pendency of

these petitions.

6. Per contra, it is vehemently argued by learned counsel for the Board

that the earlier writ petitions were allowed only on the ground of incompetency

of the enquiry officer in clubbing two enquiries into joint enquiry without

approval of competent authority as per the Rule 18 of CCA Rules. Though in

the last paragraph of the order Annexure P-6, it was noted that looking to the

facts and grounds raised by the petitioner, the termination order is being

quashed, but the entire consideration in the order revolves around the ground

raised by the petitioner that the joint enquiry was without competent approval. It

is further argued that no grounds on merits were raised by the petitioners in the

earlier round of litigation and even if it was raised, then there was no

consideration on merits of the matter and the order could have been said to be

on merits only in case this Court in the order Annexure P-6 had held that the

charges are not made out on merits or that the punishment is shockingly

disproportionate.

7. It is argued that this Court in the order Annexure P-6 had only

considered the issue of delay and the issue of enquiry being converted into joint

enquiry without competent approval and no other ground was considered. It is

further argued that the ground of delay being raised was only noted by this

Court, but the order was not set aside on that ground and it was set aside only on

the ground that joint enquiry was without competent approval.

8. It is argued that there is a huge amount of public money involved in the

matter and there was defalcation of Rs.53.00 lakhs in the matter, which is public

money and the enquiry should not be scuttled in the manner, in which the

petitioners propose to do. It is further argued that the respondents were at liberty

to initiate the enquiry from the same stage from which it was declared vitiated

by this Court and no specific liberty was required to be granted because the

order is not on merits, but only on technical ground. On these grounds, it is

prayed to dismiss the writ petitions.

9. Heard.

10. So far as the question of delay is concerned, the charges relate to the

period 2004 to 2008 and the charge sheet has been issued in the year 2008 itself

and therefore, there is no delay in issuance of the charge-sheet.So far as the

delay of 17 years from the date of issuance of chargesheet till today is

concerned, the initial penalty order was issued by the respondents in the year

2016, which was challenged by the petitioners in separate writ petitions, which

were decided by this Court. Thereafter, the respondents have issued orders

appointing fresh enquiry officer to conduct enquiry from the same stage and the

petitioners have filed these petitions in which stay order was granted by this

Court in the year 2020 and 2023. Looking to the aforesaid factual scenario, as

the charge sheet was issued promptly without any delay and even the penalty

orders were issued in the year 2016 when the petitioners were still in service, it

cannot be said to be an inordinate delay so as to hold that the penalty order

could not be issued in the year 2016. Thereafter, the matter remained pending in

litigation before this Court for almost the entire period after the year 2016 till

date. Therefore, the petitioners cannot seek quashment of the charge sheet on

the point of delay only.

11. So far as the question that in earlier round of litigation this Court had

considered the entire facts of the case and the order is on all grounds and not on

the ground of competence only, the operative part of the order Annexure P-6 is

required to be quoted, which is as under:-

"7. Considered the points raised by both the parties in the writ petition.

8. The main ground which has been raised by the party is noncompliance of Rule 18 of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. Rule 18 lays down that where two or more Government servants are concerned in any case, the Governor or any other authority competent to impose the penalty of dismissal from service on all such Government servants may make an order directing that common disciplinary action against all of them may be taken in a common proceeding. It has been submitted by the respondents in their reply that issue has been resolved vide order dated 11.12.2013 and the objection has been rejected.

9. Considered the order sheets which were placed on record by the respondents. From perusal of the order dated 11.12.2013, it is clear that there is no order by Governor or any other authority competent to impose punishment of penalty to hold common proceeding against all delinquent employees. It is only mentioned in the order sheet that a joint enquiry is proper in the matter and three years had lapsed since initiation of departmental enquiry and some witnesses have also been examined. The application filed by the delinquent employee/petitioner is not bonafide and application is filed with delay and therefore, same is rejected.

10. After reading the order-sheet dated 11.12.2013, it is clear that there was no order passed by the competent authority to conduct common or joint enquiry against the delinquent employees. It is established law that common proceedings cannot be initiated in absence of specific order

to that effect. When joint enquiry is made without permission from the competent authority, then joint enquiry conducted against petitioner is bad in law.

11. Petitioner has relied on the judgments passed in Civil Appeal No.958 of 2010 (Prem Nath Bali vs Registrar, High Court of Delhi and another), W.P. No.12105/2011 (Dr. Nirmal Chand Jain vs The State of Madhya Pradesh and another) and the judgments reported in (2005) 6 SCC 636, P.P. Mahadevan vs MD, T.N. Housing Board and (2006) 5 SCC 88, M.V. Bijlani vs Union of India and others.

All these judgments have been relied upon by the petitioner on the ground of delay in departmental enquiry and quantum of punishment.

12. Respondents have relied on the judgments reported in 2019 SCC OnLine SC 881, Union of India and others vs Sitaram Mishra and another; (1972) 4 SCC 618, Union of India vs Sardar Bahadur and AIR 1963 SC 1723, State of Andhra Pradesh and others vs S. Sree Rama Rao. Aforesaid judgments have been relied upon by the respondents to point out that there is distinction between a criminal trial and departmental enquiry. If petitioner is not an accused in any criminal case, same will not give him any advantage in departmental enquiry. Other judgments are relied upon by the respondents to show when High Court can interfere in the order passed in departmental enquiry. Respondents have relied upon para 15, 18 and 19 of the judgment reported in (1972) 4 SCC 618 and had made a prayer that no interference is called for by this Court and the petition filed by the petitioner may be dismissed.

13. Considered the facts and the case laws filed by the parties. In my considered opinion, there is violation of Rule 18 of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rule, 1966. The violation of the said Rule vitiates the departmental enquiry. From the order sheet dated 11.12.2013, it is clear that there is violation of Rule 18 due to which, departmental enquiry conducted by the respondents stood vitiated being without jurisdiction.

14. Considering the facts, circumstances of the case and the law, writ petition filed by the petitioner is allowed and the impugned orders dated 16.03.2016 and 8.05.2017 passed by the respondents No. 3 and 2, contained in Annexure P/4 and P/6, are quashed. Petitioner will be entitled to all consequential benefits."

12. The entire consideration part of the order revolves on competence of

the authority in carrying out joint enquiry without approval of the competent

authority.Only in para-11 of the order, a passing reference is made on the

judgment cited by the petitioners in the matter of delay. However, no finding

has been given by the Court in para 11. Similarly in para 12 certain judgments

cited by the respondents have been quoted and the contention of the respondents

has been quoted, but no finding has been given. The only finding is given by the

Court in para 13 of the order and the finding is only as regards Rule 18 of M.P.

Civil Services CCA Rules and violation of said rule, which had vitiated the

departmental enquiry.

13. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioners that the wording

used in paragraph 14 that considering the facts, circumstances of the case and

the law, writ petition is allowed, be read to mean that the writ petition was

allowed on all the grounds raised by the writ petitioners, is such a drastic mis-

interpretation which cannot be accepted by this Court. The entire consideration

of the Court to quash the order is in paragraph 13 and the saidconsideration is

only in the matter of incompetence of the authority ordering joint enquiry.

14. It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anand Narain

Shukla v. State of M.P., (1980) 1 SCC 252that once an earlier order is quashed

on a technical ground, then on merits a second enquiry can always be held. In

the said case, the punishment order of reversion was set aside by this High

Court and then fresh proceedings were started on the basis of same old

charges,which were challenged by the employee and the matter ultimately

reached the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as

under:-

"1. The appellant was an Office Superintendent in the office of Agriculture Department. Certain charges were levelled against him. An enquiry was purported to be held. After finding him guilty of some of the charges, he was reverted to a lower rank. He challenged that order by filing a writ petition in the Madhya Pradesh High Court. That writ petition was allowed and the order of reversion was quashed on the ground that the inquiry held was not proper and legal. In view of the order of the High Court, the appellant was reinstated in his original post of Office Superintendent. But shortly after, he was put under suspension and fresh proceedings were started on the basis of the same old charges. In the second proceedings, he has been found guilty of certain charges, the details of which are not necessary to be mentioned in our judgment. He was again reverted and it was also directed in the order that the allowance paid to him during the period of suspension could remain intact. The appellant filed a second writ petition in the High Court to challenge the fresh order of reversion. The High Court has dismissed his writ petition. Hence this appeal in this Court on grant of a certificate by the High Court.

2. Mr D.N. Mukherjee, learned counsel for the appellant urged only two points before us : (1) that after the earlier order of reversion was quashed by the High Court and after the appellant was reinstated, no second enquiry on the very same charges could be held and no second order of reversion could be legally and validly made; and (2) that appellant was entitled to the full salary for the period of suspension.

3. We find no substance in either of the points urged on behalf of the appellant. The earlier order was quashed on a technical ground. On merits, a second enquiry could be held. It was rightly held. The order of reinstatement does not bring about any distinction in that regard. The Government had to pass that order because the earlier order of reversion had been quashed by the High Court. Without reinstating the appellant, it would have been difficult, perhaps unlawful, to start a fresh

enquiry against the appellant. The observations of this Court in the last paragraph of the judgment in State of Assam v.J.N. Roy Biswas [(1976) 1 SCC 234 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 10 : AIR 1975 SC 2277 : (1976) 2 SCR 128] are not applicable to the facts of the present case and do not help the appellant at all.

4. The reduced amount paid to the appellant for the period of suspension was affirmed by making it a part of the order of reversion itself. That being so, the second point urged by the counsel is also of no substance. For the reasons stated above, we dismiss this appeal but since the appellant has already retired from service, we make no order as to costs."

15. The issue has also been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

the case of Devendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma v. State of U.P. AIR 1962 SC

1334, wherein the Hon'bleApex Court has held as under:-

"8. Authorities on which reliance was placed by counsel for the appellants, namely, Dwarkachand v. State of Rajasthan [ILR (1957) Raj 1049] , Kanak Chandra Bairagi v. Supdt. of Police, Sibsagar [ILR (1955) Assam 191] and Mohan Singh Chaudhari v. Divisional Personnel Officer, Northern Railway, FerozeporeCantt. [ILR (1957) Pub 1833] , do not support the plea that the second enquiry is, in the circumstances of the case, barred. An adjudication on the merits by a quasi-judicial body may or may not debar commencement of another enquiry in respect of the same subject-matter. But in this case we are concerned with the scope of the High Court order. The binding effect of a judgment depends not upon any technical consideration of form, but of substance. The High Court in the appeal filed by the appellant in Suit No. 163 of 1954 did not exonerate the appellant from the charges. The High Court decreed the suit on the ground that the procedure for imposing the penalty was irregular, and such a decision cannot prevent the State from commencing another enquiry in respect of the same subject- matter consistently with the provision of Articles 310 and 311. In Dwarkachand case in a previous enquiry the public servant concerned had been exonerated; and in Mohan Singh Chaudhari case [ILR (1957) Pub 1833] a decision by the civil court declaring illegal an order dismissing a public servant by an officer not authorised in that behalf was held binding on all

the parties in proceedings under Article 226 till such decision was set aside in accordance with law. In Kanak Chandra case [ILR (1955) Assam 191] it was held that an order in exercise of powers of revision by the Governor under the authority reserved to him setting aside an order of censure passed by a subordinate authority and dismissing the public servant concerned from service did not amount to a second departmental enquiry. These cases do not lend support to the proposition that after an order passed, in an enquiry against a public servant imposing a penalty is quashed, by a civil court, no further proceeding can be commenced against him even if in the proceeding in which the order quashing the enquiry was passed, the merits of the charge against the public servant concerned were never investigated."

16. In view of the above, it is clear that since the earlier penalty order was

set aside by this Court only on technical ground, therefore, the respondent-

Board was always competent to initiate proceedings from the same stage, they

were held to be vitiated. Now separate enquiries have been instituted against

both the petitioners of these two cases.The petitioners cannot seek undue benefit

of legal process by getting the penalty order quashed on technical ground and

thereafter seeking benefit of the efflux of time spent in legal proceedings.

17. It is a case of defalcation of money of M.P. Housing and

Infrastructure Board by the officials of the said Board. The money is public

money and it is in public interest that enquiry in such a matter is held and

brought to its logical conclusion.

18. Consequently, the petitions are devoid of merits. They deserve to be