[Cites 16, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sarthak Landcon Pvt. Ltd. Through ... vs Akila Bi Through Power Of Attorney ... on 28 November, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PAVAN KUMAR DWIVEDI
ON THE 28th OF NOVEMBER, 2025
MISC. APPEAL No. 7145 of 2025
SARTHAK LANDCON PVT. LTD. THROUGH AUTHORISED
SIGNATORY BALRAM MATHUR
Versus
AKILA BI THROUGH POWER OF ATTORNEY MOHABBAT AND
OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Amit Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate with Shri Arjun Agrawal
- Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Vishwajit Joshi - Advocate for respondent No.1.
ORDER
The appellant/defendant No.5 has filed this appeal under Order 43
Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code challenging the
order dated 10.07.2025 passed by the learned trial Court in RCS No. 1359-
A/2023 whereby the application filed by respondent No.1/plaintiff under
Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 CPC was allowed.
2. The facts in brief are that the respondent No.1/plaintiff filed a
civil suit for declaration of title, declaring the registered sale deed dated
07.10.2021 (executed in favour of appellant/defendant No.5) null and void
and for permanent injunction against appellant/defendant No.5 with respect
to the land situated in Survey No. 123/1, 124, 125/1 and 129/1 admeasuring
total 1.191 hec. in village Mayakhedi, Tehsil and District Indore. The
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respondent No.1/plaintiff averred in her plaint that an agreement to sale was
executed on 22.09.1992 between her husband Mohabbat Ali and Mangu
Singh (who was father of respondents No. 2, 3 and 4) with respect to
aforesaid suit land. It was also averred that the entire sale consideration was
paid by Mohabbat Ali to Mangu Singh and said Mangu Singh delivered
possession of the entire suit property to Mohabbat Ali. As there was very
good relation between the said two persons, the registered sale deed was not
executed. However, Mangu Singh and after him, the defendants No. 1 to 3
and 4 never disturbed the peaceful possession of Mohabbat Ali (husband of
plaintiff). Even after the death of those two persons, there was no dispute. It
has further been stated in the plaint that the suit was claimed to be filed for
the reason that one Girish Jain came along with some goons for taking
forcible possession of the suit property and when complaint about the same
was presented in the Police Station Lasudia, he produced sale deed dated
07.10.2021 with respect to sale of a part of the suit land. Thus, the plaintiff
came to know about execution of a sale deed, hence the suit was filed.
3. The plaintiff, with respect to this sale deed dated 07.10.2021,
averred that the same was executed without receiving sale consideration and
respondent No.1-Bane Singh's name is not mentioned in the same i.e. he is
not one of the executant of the sale deed as the Bane Singh was also having
his share in the property as one of the legal heirs of Late Mangu Singh thus
the same is not valid. It has further been averred that the sale deed has been
executed by delivering paper possession as the possession of the property is
with the plaintiff and for all these reasons, it was pleaded that the sale deed is
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null and void and for the reason that all the ingredients of a sale are satisfied
in the case of plaintiff i.e. possession has been delivered, entire sale
consideration has been paid and thus, plaintiff is the title holder of the suit
property as such, the relief of declaration of title on the suit property,
declaration of sale deed dated 07.10.2021 as null and void and for permanent
injunction against the defendant No. 1 with respect of alienation and
construction on the property was prayed for. Significantly, the specific
performance of the agreement to sale was not sought. It may be profitable to
point out here that the so-called agreement to sale dated 22.09.1992 is an
unregistered document.
4. Along with plaint, an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 was
also filed by respondent No.1/plaintiff thereby praying for temporary
injunction. The appellant/defendant No.5 filed its reply to the application for
temporary injunction in which it raised doubts about the genuineness of the
purported agreement to sale and even on the receipt of possession. It was
pointed out in the reply that the alleged agreement was typed on a stamp
paper obtained on 12.06.1990 in which Mangu Singh is shown as seller and
Mohabbat Ali is shown as purchaser. Thus the agreement is dated 12.06.1990
as apparent on page No. 2. The agreement was notarized. However, the third
page of the agreement would show that the date of agreement is 17.08.1992.
The stamp of notary would show that it was notarised on 18.08.2002 by one
notary Chandra Singh Patel. It is thus clear that this agreement to sale has
different dates on its different pages which are totally out of line with each
other.
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5. The appellant also stated in its reply that in the agreement, the
name of executants are mentioned as Mangu Singh, Bane Singh, Meherban
Singh and Dilip Singh, however it contains signatures of Mangu Singh and
Dilip Singh only. Thus, it was stated that the document is not a genuine
document and the same has been presented to the Court after 31 years of its
purported execution. Thus, there is complete absence of any prima facie
case. It was further stated in the reply that on 23.11.2005, another sale deed
was executed by deceased defendant No.4 (wife of Mangu Singh) and
defendant Nos. 2 and 3 (sons of Mangu Singh) in favour of Mohabbat Ali -
the husband of plaintiff for a part of Survey No. 123/1 admeasuring 1.28
hec. This piece of land was subsequently sold by plaintiff and 08 other
members of her family by registered sale deed dated 22.02.2025 to M/s
Omax Ltd. for which no dispute has been raised by any of the parties. As
such, the entire suit property which also contains the aforesaid parcel of land
of Survey No. 123/1 was sold by the family of the plaintiff herself and no
dispute has been raised about the same. In fact, the Survey No. 123/1 was
admeasuring in total 2.493 hec. out of which an area of 1.282 hec. was sold
by the plaintiff and her family to Omax Ltd. which is the holding company of
the appellant and some portion of Survey No. 123/1 admeasuring 0.809 hec.
was sold by the defendant No. 2 to 4 to one Anil Patidar vide sale deed dated
25.11.2005. The remaining portion of Survey No. 123/1 i.e. 0.402 hec. has
been sold to the appellant by the original defendants No. 2 to 4 which has
been put to challenge. As such, the same defendants No. 2 to 4 sold some
part of the property to one Anil Patidar of Survey No. 123/1 and some
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property to appellant. However, plaintiff has put to challenge the sale deed
which has been executed in favour of appellant and the sale deed executed in
favour of Anil Patidar has not been disputed whereas, as per her story she is
the title holder of the entire property contained in Survey No. 123/1, thus, the
appellant tried to show the malefic intent of the plaintiff / respondent No.1.
6. Significantly, even the land of Survey No. 129/1 admeasuring
0.024 hec. has also been sold by original defendants No. 2 to 4 to one Dr.
Shefali Jain way back on 08.02.2010. It has also not been challenged by the
plaintiff till date. As such, the entire story of plaint is not only concocted but
a complete fabrication of lies.
7. The trial Court after considering the rival submissions allowed
application filed by plaintiff under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 and restrained the
appellant defendant No. 5 from alienating the suit property in any manner till
the pendency of the suit vide order dated 10.07.2025. Being aggrieved by
this, the defendant No.5 has filed this appeal.
8. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant would contend that the
consideration which found favour with the learned trial Court was that Bane
Singh who is one of the legal heirs of Mangu Singh is not one of the
executants of the sale deed and for absence of his signatures the validity of
the sale deed was found doubtful. He also submits that in the possession
receipt and in agreement to sale dated 22.09.1992, there is a mention of
delivery of possession and for this reason possession of the plaintiff was
found proved and consequently the application was allowed. Learned Senior
Counsel submits that the learned trial Court has gone to the extent that it by
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its own, explained in para 7 that in the plaint the agreement dated 17.08.1992
has wrongly been mentioned as 22.09.1992 which shows the pre-disposition
of mind of the trial Court. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that
appellant has purchased the suit property vide a valid instrument i.e. a
registered sale deed and there is a presumption in law in favour of the
contents of the sale deed which cannot be dispelled even prima facie based
on an instrument (agreement to sale) purportedly executed 31 years ago and
which has not been registered and which has three different dates at three
different places and even all the executants of the purported agreement has
not put their signatures on the same. He submits that in view of different
dates and as it is unregistered instrument, the same is completely unreliable.
His submission is that in view of the fact that for the portion of land in same
survey number, same persons i.e. defendants No. 2 to 4 executed the sale
deed to some other persons and which has not been challenged by the
plaintiff/respondent no.1, the entire story created in the present matter fades
into insignificance. He submits that prima facie the suit for declaration of
title based on an agreement to sale in absence of relief for specific
performance of agreement is not maintainable and in view of the settled
position of law, once the suit itself is not maintainable, there is no prima
facie case and if there is no prima facie case, then other two ingredients for
grant of temporary injunction i.e. irreparable loss and balance of
convenience are not required to be seen.
9. In support of his submissions, learned Senior Counsel places
reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the cases of
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Bajesingh & Another vs. Leelabai & Another, 2023 SCC OnLine MP 753;
Maya Devi vs. Lalta Prasad, (2015) 5 SCC 588; Kashi Math Samsthan &
Anr. vs. Shrimad Sudhindra Thirtha Swamy & Anr., (2010) 1 SCC 689 as
well as a recent judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Ramesh
Chand vs. Suresh Chand & Anr. in Civil Appeal No. 6377 of 2012.
10. Replying to the submissions of learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant, the counsel for respondent no.1 submits that defendants No. 2 to 4
- Bane Singh etc. remained ex-parte before the trial Court who were the
persons who could have defended the valid execution of the sale deed. In
their absence, the prima facie case of respondent No.1 cannot be denied as
the fact of execution of agreement to sale cannot be disputed by the appellant
defendant No. 5.
11. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 further submits that the
agreement to sale dated 22.02.1992 contains all the ingredients of a valid sale
i.e. entire sale consideration has been paid, possession was delivered, the
agreement is in writing and it is duly notarized. As such, the respondent No.1
plaintiff has established its prima facie case of having her title in the suit
property and in absence of any contrary document to show that the plaintiff
is not in possession of the suit property, she deserves to be protected till the
pendency of the suit. He further points out that in the statement recorded in
the Police Station Lasudia, it has come on record that the plaintiff is in
possession of the suit property. He further points out that the
appellant/defendant No. 5 had earlier filed an application under Order 7 Rule
11 of the Code of Civil Procedure that was rejected by the learned trial Court
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vide order dated 18.12.2024. He thus submits that the rejection of application
filed under Order 7 Rule 11 would show the existence of prima facie case of
the plaintiffs and all these points which are being raised here were in the
consideration in that application also, hence the present appeal deserves to be
dismissed as prima facie case has already been proved in Order 7 Rule 11
proceedings. He submits that complicated issues about enforceability of
rights pursuant to agreement to sale and the validity of agreement itself are
to be decided at the appropriate stage after recording of evidence. He further
points out that the sale deed in favour of the appellant was executed without
delivering actual possession. He thus submits that the order passed by the
trial Court is in accordance with law which does not deserve to be interfered
with, hence prays for dismissal of the appeal.
Heard learned counsel for the parties. Perused the record.
12. The entire case of the respondent no.1/plaintiff is based on an
unregistered agreement supposedly executed on 12.06.1990 as is evident
from first two pages of the agreement which would show that the stamp
paper was obtained at No. 4753 on 12.06.1990. The second page of the said
agreement would show at the bottom the date of execution as 12.06.1990 and
then a stamp is affixed on the left side margin which would again show the
date as 12.06.1990. However, the third page of the agreement would then
show the date of 17.08.1992 and then it was shown to be notarized on
18.08.2002 as would be evident from page 3 of the agreement. Then the
possession receipt (kabja raseed) would show that the possession was
delivered on 20.08.1992 however, contrary to possession receipt, the
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agreement would show in para 4 that the possession is delivered on the date
of execution of agreement, as already stated, the agreement on page 2 shows
the date of execution as 12.06.1990 and on page 3 as 17.08.1992. As such,
there are three different dates i.e. 12.06.1990, 17.08.1992 and 20.08.1992.
This entire conundrum of different dates creates a complete hazy picture of
the agreement to sale and consequently raises serious doubts on
the genuineness of instrument. Significantly this is an unregistered
document.
13. The learned trial Court while granting temporary injunction has
heavily placed reliance on the fact that in the registered sale deed dated
07.10.2021 executed in favour of appellant/respondent No. 5, the name of
respondent No.2 / defendant No. 1 Bane Singh is not present. Thus, it raised
doubts on the validity of the sale deed. However, the said person Bane Singh
is not the plaintiff nor his representative or legal heir has come to this Court
but the suit has been filed by a third person claiming the title based on an
unregistered agreement to sale executed 31 years ago claiming title only on
the basis of the said document. As such, whether Bane Singh was having
share in the property which was sold to the appellant/defendant No. 5 and
whether any of his rights were violated, could have been considered on a
plea instituted by the said person i.e. Bane Singh. This cannot be a ground
for granting any relief to the plaintiff who is not claiming her title through
Bane Singh.
14. The entire case of the plaintiff is based on an unregistered
agreement to sale. The fulcrum of the entire plaint of respondent No. 1 is that
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all the ingredients of sale are present in the transaction. As such, in order to
examine this issue we need to consider the question that what will constitute
a valid sale of an immovable property.
15. The 'Transfer of Property' is defined under Section 5 of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which reads as under :
5. "Transfer of property" defined .--In the following sections
"transfer of property" means an act by which a living person
conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other
living persons, or to himself, [or to himself] and one or more
other living persons; and "to transfer property" is to perform such
act.
[In this section "living person" includes a company or association
or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, but nothing
herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force
relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or
bodies of individuals.]''
16. The 'Sale' has been defined in Section 54 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 which provides as under :
'54. "Sale" defined .--"Sale" is a transfer of ownership in
exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-
promised.
Sale how made. --Such transfer, in the case of tangible
immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and
upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing,
can be made only by a registered instrument.
In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value less than
one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a
registered instrument or by delivery of the property.
Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the
seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession
of the property.
Contract for sale.--A contract for the sale of immoveable property
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is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms
settled between the parties.
It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such
property.'
17. It is thus clear that for a tangible immoveable property of the
value of Rs. 100 upwards, instrument of conveying the title/ownership
registration is essential. As such, the necessary ingredients, on conjoint
reading of Sections 5 and 54, for a valid sale would be conveying property
by one living person to another and that conveyance must be in exchange for
a price and the conveyance must be by a registered instrument. In the present
case, the registration of instrument is completely absent.
18. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bajesingh (supra) in para
9, 10 and 11 has held as under :
''09. Admittedly plaintiff is the recorded owner of the suit land. Though defendant
No.1 contends that an agreement to sale was executed in his favour by plaintiff on
15.08.1990 but no claim for specific performance of contract on its strength was
instituted by him. Even the claim which was instituted by him before Civil Judge
Class-II, Narisinghgarh, District Rajgarh was dismissed by judgment and decree
dated 13.08.2015. Thus, possession of defendant No.1 over the suit land is without
any legal title, though may not be by way of encroachment but is instead under an
agreement to sale. Since no steps have ever been taken by defendant No.1 for
specific performance of contract dated 15.08.1990 and the suit instituted by him has
already been dismissed in the year 2015, he is not entitled for the protection
available under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. Plaintiff being owner
of the suit land is entitled to recover possession from defendants 1 and 2 provided
her claim for the same is within time.
10. The claim would be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act which
provides for period of limitation for a suit for possession of immovable property
based on title. The period prescribed therein is 12 years which begins to run when
possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. In the present case
possession of defendant No.1 to begin with was under an agreement to sale which
can only be permissive possession and cannot be treated to be hostile or adverse.
There is no specific plea by defendants 1 and 2 in their written statement as to when
and in what manner their permissive possession became hostile or adverse to the
plaintiff. On the contrary defendants 1 and 2 have claimed to be the owner of the
suit land under the agreement dated 15.08.1990. The period of limitation for plaintiff
to institute the suit did not begin to run merely for the reason of defendant No.1
having come in possession on 15.08.1990. The same began to run only on
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14.08.2015 when as per plaintiff she was forcibly dispossessed by defendants 1 and
11. It is well settled that mere agreement to sale is wholly incapable of conveying or
transferring title even if the entire sale consideration is paid thereunder. The Courts
below have hence not committed any error in dismissing the counter claim of
defendants 1 and 2 for declaration of title on the basis of agreement to sale. They
having claimed title under an agreement to sale could not have been held to be the
owners of the suit land by virtue of adverse possession and their claim in that regard
has rightly been dismissed.''
19. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Ramesh Chand
(supra) in para 15, 16 and 17 has held as under :
''15. There is a difference between a sale deed and an agreement for sale, or a
contract for sale. A contract for sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale
of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. While a sale is
a transfer of ownership; a contract for sale is merely a document creating a right to
obtain another document, namely a registered sale deed to complete the transaction
of sale of an immovable property. Section 54 in its definition of sale does not
include an agreement of sale and neither confers any proprietary rights in favour of
the transferee nor by itself create any interest or charge in the property. If after
entering into a contract for sale of property, the seller without any reasonable excuse
avoids executing a sale deed, the buyer can proceed to file a suit for specific
performance of the contract.
16. The scope of an agreement for sale has been highlighted by this court in the case
of Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (2) through Director v. State of
Haryana and Another, (2012) 1 SCC 656, wherein this Court observed that
"16. Section 54 of the TP Act makes it clear that a contract of sale, that
is, an agreement of sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or
charge on such property. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A.
Kamtam [(1977) 3 SCC 247] observed:
32. A contract of sale does not of itself create any interest in, or charge
on, the property. This is expressly declared in Section 54 of the
Transfer of Property Act. (See Ram Baran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra
[AIR 1967 SC 744]). The fiduciary character of the personal obligation
created by a contract for sale is recognised in Section 3 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963, and in Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal
obligation created by a contract of sale is described in Section 40 of the
Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising out of contract and
annexed to the 3 (2012) 1 SCC 656 ownership of property, but not
amounting to an interest or easement therein.
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33. In India, the word 'transfer' is defined with reference to the word
'convey'. ... The word 'conveys' in Section 5 of the Transfer of
Property Act is used in the wider sense of conveying ownership.
***
37. ... that only on execution of conveyance, ownership passes from
one party to another...."
17. In Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra [(2004) 8
SCC 614] this Court held:
"10. Protection provided under Section 53-A of the Act to the proposed
transferee is a shield only against the transferor. It disentitles the
transferor from disturbing the possession of the proposed transferee
who is put in possession in pursuance to such an agreement. It has
nothing to do with the ownership of the proposed transferor who
remains full owner of the property till it is legally conveyed by
executing a registered sale deed in favour of the transferee. Such a right
to protect possession against the proposed vendor cannot be pressed
into service against a third party."
18. It is thus clear that a transfer of immovable property by way of sale
can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a
deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law),
no right, title or interest in an immovable property can be transferred.
19. Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a registered
deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements
of Sections 54 and 55 of the TP Act and will not confer any title nor
transfer any interest in an immovable property (except to the limited
right granted under Section 53-A of the TP Act). According to the TP
Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession or without
possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of the TP Act enacts that
sale of immovable property can be made only by a registered
instrument and an agreement of sale does not create any interest or
charge on its subject-matter."
17. In the instant matter undisputedly, plaintiff claims that there is only an
agreement to sale and there is no sale deed executed in his favour by the father. As
per the settled position of law, this document does not confer a valid title on the
plaintiff as it is not a deed of conveyance as per Section 54 of the TP Act. At best, it
only enables the plaintiff to seek for specific performance for the execution of a sale
deed and does not create an interest or charge on the suit property.''
20. As such, the agreement to sale would not confer a valid title on
the plaintiff. It is not a deed of conveyance at all. The provisions of Section
54 stares on the claim of title of the plaintiff in its full vigour. In fact, this
instrument even if considered to be a validly executed agreement provides an
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actionable claim to the plaintiff so as to seek specific performance of the
agreement.
21. In view of the above analysis of law and the facts of the present
case, this Court is of the considered view that there is no existence of prima
facie case of the respondent No.1/plaintiff.
22. Further, in para 4 of the sale deed executed and registered in
favour of the appellant/defendant no. 5, it has been recorded that the
possession has been delivered to it. Now considering this recital of the sale
deed in juxtaposition to the statement in the unregistered agreement to sale
purportedly executed 31 years' ago, the ratio of law as laid down by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Maya Devi (supra) has to be kept in
mind. The Hon'ble Apex Court in para 16 (Justice Vikramajit Sen while
concurring) has held as under :
''16. There can be no gainsaying that when the probative value of documents is to
be assessed, specially those dealing with the creation of any interest in property or its
transfer, of a value exceeding Rs.100/-, obviously documents which have been duly
registered regardless of whether or not that was legally mandatory, would score over
others.''
23. As such, if keeping in mind for the sake of argument that the
agreement to sale of plaintiff was a valid document and placing it in
juxtaposition to the sale deed executed in favour of appellant/defendant
No.5, then the sale deed being a registered document and agreement to sale
being an unregistered document, sale deed would score over the agreement
to sale. For this reason also, this Court does not find prima facie case in
favour for respondent No.1.
24. A close scrutiny of the impugned order would show, that even
the Trial Court was not sure about the dates of the purported agreement to
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sale as such it presumed in para 7 of the order that in the plaint, the
agreement dated 17.08.1992 has wrongly been mentioned as 22.09.1992 this
is clearly a perverse finding which is not supported even by the averments in
the plaint.
25. As regards the submission of the learned counsel of the
respondent regarding dismissal of the application filed under order 7 rule 11
of the CPC, it would suffice to mention that the two applications, i.e one
under Order 7 Rule 11 and the other under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 have a
completely different criteria of consideration, while in the application in
earlier case is to be considered strictly based on the plaint averments, the
later application has a larger scope of consideration material beyond plaint
averments. Thus, the dismissal of application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC
has no bearing in the present case.
26. With respect to balance of convenience and irreparable loss, the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kashi Math (supra) while considering this
aspect has held in para 16 as under :
''16. It is well settled that in order to obtain an order of injunction, the party who
seeks for grant of such injunction has to prove that he has made out a prima facie
case to go for trial, the balance of convenience is also in his favour and he will
suffer irreparable loss and injury if injunction is not granted. But it is equally well
settled that when a party fails to prove prima facie case to go for trial, question of
considering the balance of convenience or irreparable loss and injury to the party
concerned would not be material at all, that is to say, if that party fails to prove
prima facie case to go for trial, it is not open to the Court to grant injunction in his
favour even if, he has made out a case of balance of convenience being in his favour
and would suffer irreparable loss and injury if no injunction order is granted.
Therefore, keeping this principle in mind, let us now see, whether the appellant has
been able to prove prima facie case to get an order of injunction during the pendency
of the two appeals in the High Court.''
27. It is thus clear that in absence of prima facie case, the Court is
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not required to consider balance of convenience and irreparable loss. As has
already been observed herein above in the opinion of this Court, there is
n o prima facie case in existence in favour of respondent No.1 and for this
reason, the other two tests are not required to be considered.
28. In view of the above findings, the order passed by the trial Court
on 10.07.2025 granting temporary injunction to the respondent No.1 /
plaintiff by allowing her application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 fails the
scrutiny of this court in view of the settled position of law. Consequently, it
is hereby set aside. As a corollary, the application filed by the plaintiff under
Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 is rejected.
29. The findings recorded in this order are only for the purpose of
deciding the issue regarding application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC
which are only prima facie in nature and shall have no impact on the merits
of the case.
The appeal stands allowed in above terms and disposed of.
(PAVAN KUMAR DWIVEDI)
JUDGE
vidya
