Madhya Pradesh High Court
N.K.Gupta vs Chhotelal on 25 November, 2025
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:29051
1 WP-6243-2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
WRIT PETITION No. 6243 of 2014
VED PRAKASH SHARMA
Versus
CHHOTELAL
Appearance:
None for the petitioner.
Shri Hardayesh Kumar Shukla - Advocate for respondent [R-1].
WITH
WRIT PETITION No. 6244 of 2014
VED PRAKASH SHARMA
Versus
KALICHARAN KHATIK
Appearance:
None for the petitioner.
Shri Hardayesh Kumar Shukla - Advocate for respondent [R-1].
WRIT PETITION No. 6283 of 2014
N.K.GUPTA
Versus
CHHOTELAL
Appearance:
None for the petitioner.
Shri Hardayesh Kumar Shukla - Advocate for respondent [R-1].
WRIT PETITION No. 6291 of 2014
SHASHIKANT NAYAK
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: YOGENDRA
OJHA
Signing time: 11/26/2025
5:23:07 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:29051
2 WP-6243-2014
Versus
KALICHARAN KHATIK
Appearance:
None for the petitioner.
Shri Hardayesh Kumar Shukla - Advocate for respondent [R-1].
WRIT PETITION No. 6531 of 2014
LOKENDRA SINGH CHAUHAN
Versus
CHHOTELAL AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri P.D. Bidua - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Hardayesh Kumar Shukla - Advocate for respondent [R-1].
WRIT PETITION No. 6532 of 2014
LOKENDRA SINGH CHAUHAN
Versus
KALI CHARAN AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri P.D. Bidua - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Hardayesh Kumar Shukla - Advocate for respondent [R-1].
WRIT PETITION No. 6599 of 2014
VIKRAM SINGH
Versus
KALI CHARAN AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri P.D. Bidua - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Hardayesh Kumar Shukla - Advocate for respondent [R-1].
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: YOGENDRA
OJHA
Signing time: 11/26/2025
5:23:07 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:29051
3 WP-6243-2014
Heard on : 13.11.2025
Pronounced on : 25 .11.2025
ORDER
Writ Petition No.6243 of 2014 (Ved Prakash Sharma Vs. Chhotelal) is
taken as leading writ petition as the issue involved in this batch of writ
petitions is common, therefore, they all are being decided by this common
order.
2. The petitioners, who were officials of the Municipal Corporation,
Gwalior, have approached this Court seeking quashment of the impugned
order dated 18.09.2014 passed by the Special Judge (Madhya Pradesh
Dacoity Avam Vyapaharan Prabhavit Kshetra Adhiniyam, 1981) in Special
Sessions Trial Nos. 30/2014 and 31/2014, whereby cognizance has been
taken against them for offences under Sections 452, 392, 394, 323 of the IPC
read with Sections 11 and 13 of the MPDVPK Act. The petitioners have also
sought quashment of the entire proceedings arising out of the said special
trials.
3. In brief, the facts of the case are that a private complaint was filed
by the respondent/complainant alleging that he has been a tenant of Shops
No. 23 to 33 of the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior since 1976, and that a
decree dated 26.04.2004 passed by the Sixth Civil Judge, Class-II, restrains
the Corporation from dispossessing him without due process of law. It is
further alleged in the complaint that on 18.07.2013 at about 11:30 AM, the
petitioners along with other co-accused, who are officials of the Municipal
Corporation, visited the shops of the respondent/complainant, forcibly
dispossessed him, took away Rs. 2,000/-, and threatened him with false
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implications if he lodged a complaint. The complainant led oral evidence
under Sections 200 and 202 of Cr.P.C. before the learned Magistrate in
support of the allegations.
4. The respondent/complainant was a licensee of Chabutaras
(platforms) of the Municipal Corporation and was engaged in the business of
selling animal flesh. This Court, in Writ Petition No. 302/2000 (PIL),
directed the Corporation to stop open trading of meat within the municipal
limits. For non-compliance, Contempt Petition No. 148/2008 was filed, in
which this Court again directed the Corporation to prevent open trading of
meat. Routine inspections revealed that the respondent/complainant was
openly carrying on meat trade in Chandra Shekhar Market, Hajeera, Gwalior
--property owned by the Municipal Corporation. He had unauthorizedly
taken possession of shops of the Corporation and commenced open trading
of meat in violation of the Court's directions. It is admitted that the
respondent/complainant was allotted only Chabutara, and not shops, on
monthly licence fee. The civil court decree relied on by him pertains solely to
Chabutaras and not to the shops in question.
5. Accordingly, notices were issued directing the
respondent/complainant to cease open meat trading and to hand over
unauthorized possession of the shops. However, he neither submitted any
reply nor complied with the Court's directions. Consequently, on
17.03.2013, the Municipal Corporation dispossessed him and prepared a
Panchnama, which stands duly recorded in the official documents of the
Corporation. When the respondent/complainant again attempted to take
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forcible possession of the shops by breaking open the Corporation's locks,
an FIR under Section 448 of IPC was lodged against him and others on
30.03.2013.
6. Thereafter, the respondent/complainant filed the present private
complaint alleging an incident dated 18.03.2013. Based on this complaint,
the learned Special Court took cognizance against the petitioners for
offences under Sections 452, 392, 394, and 323 of IPC read with Sections 11
and 13 of the MPDVPK Act, vide impugned order dated 18.09.2014.
Aggrieved by the order dated 18.09.2014 and the proceedings in Special
Sessions Trial Nos. 30/2014 and 31/2014, the petitioners have approached
this Court by filing the present petitions.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned order
dated 18.09.2014 (Annexure P/1), whereby cognizance has been taken
against the petitioners for the offences punishable under Sections 452, 392,
394 and 323 of the IPC read with Sections 11 and 13 of the Madhya Pradesh
Dacoity Avam Vyapaharan Prabhavit Kshetra Adhiniyam, 1981, as well as
the complaint/SPL ST Nos.30/2014 and 31/2014, is wholly without
jurisdiction, illegal, unconstitutional, arbitrary, violative of the principles of
natural justice, capricious, cryptic and therefore liable to be quashed.
8. It is further contended that the learned Special Court has exceeded
its jurisdiction in taking cognizance under the aforesaid provisions. The
Special Court ought to have directed the complainant to obtain prior sanction
from the competent Government under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., as the
alleged acts were committed while the petitioners were discharging their
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public duties. As under Section 410 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956,
every officer or servant in the employment of the Corporation are deemed to
be public servent; therefore, cognizance on a private complaint without
sanction is patently illegal and void. Section 197 Cr.P.C. mandates that when
any offence is alleged to have been committed by a public servant while
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duties, cognizance
cannot be taken without previous sanction of the competent authority.
Admittedly, the petitioners are public servants and were performing their
official duties as Commissioner and other officers of the Municipal
Corporation, Gwalior, at the relevant time. Even if the allegations in the
private complaint are taken at their face value, they prima facie indicate that
the acts complained of were done in the discharge of official duties.
Therefore, the Special Court ought to have ensured compliance with Section
197 Cr.P.C. before taking cognizance.
9. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the
judgment of this Court in Rambabu v. Purshottam, 2007 (II) MPJR 114 ,
wherein, in similar circumstances, the proceedings were quashed due to the
absence of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C.
10. It is further submitted that the petitioners were municipal officers
acting in their official capacity. Under Section 410 of the Municipal
Corporation Act, such officers are deemed to be public servants, and Section
402 of the Act protects them from any suit or proceeding concerning acts
done in the discharge of their official duties. The order passed in Conc.
No.148/2008 was a general order and not specific to the complainant. The
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respondent/complainant was carrying on open meat trade in Chandra
Shekhar Market, Hajeera, Gwalior after unauthorizedly taking possession of
the shops. This was in violation of the directions of this Court. The
respondent was dispossessed with the assistance of police personnel and
Municipal Corporation staff strictly in compliance with the Court's order.
Lastly, it is argued that there are no allegations suggesting that the petitioners
acted out of mala fides.
11. On the other hand, Shri Shukla, learned counsel for the respondent,
submits that there is nothing on record to demonstrate that the petitioners are
Government servants or that their appointments have been made by the
Government. It is further contended that the petitioners have failed to
establish that their services cannot be terminated or their appointments
cancelled without prior permission of the Government. He argued that
section 21 of IPC defines "Public Servant" which reads as under:-
Section 21 "Public Servant" :- The words "public servant" denote a
person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following,
namely:
1. ***
2. Every Commissioned Officer in the Military, Naval or Air
Forces of India;
3. Every Judge including any person empowered by law to
discharge, whether by himself or as a member of any body of
persons. any adjudicatory functions;
4. Every officer of a Court of Justice (including a liquidator,
receiver or commissioner) whose duty it is, as such officer, to
investigate or report on any matter of law or fact, or to make,
authenticate, or keep any document, or to take charge or dispose
of any property, or to execute any judicial process, or to
administer any oath, or to interpret, or to preserve order in the
Court, and every person specially authorized by a Court of Justice
to perform any of such duties;
5. Every juryman, assessor, or member of a panchayat assisting a
Court of Justice or public servant;
6. Every arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or matter
has been referred for decision or report by any Court of Justice, or
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by any other competent public authority;
7. Every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is
empowered to place or keep any person in confinement;
8. Every officer of the Government whose duty it is, as such
officer, to prevent offences, to give information of offences, to
bring offenders to justice, or to protect the public health, safety or
convenience;
9. Every officer whose duty it is as such officer, to take, receive,
keep or expend any property on behalf of the Government, or to
make any survey, assessment or contract on behalf of the
Government, or to execute any revenue process, or to investigate,
or to report, on any matter affecting the pecuniary interests of the
Government, or to make authenticate or keep any document
relating to the pecuniary interests of the Government, or to
prevent the infraction of any law for the protection of the
pecuniary interests of the Government;
10. Every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive,
keep or expend any property, to make any survey or assessment or
to levy any rate or tax for any secular common purpose of any
village, town or district, or to make, authenticate or keep any
document for the ascertaining of the rights of the people of any
village, town or district;
11. Every person who holds any office in virtue of which he is
empowered to prepare, publish, maintain or revise an electoral roll
or to conduct an election or part of an election;
12. Every person
1. in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees
or commission for the performance of any public duty by the
Government;
2. in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporation
established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or a
Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies
Act, 1956 (1 of 1956).
12. On the basis of the aforesaid definition, it was contended that the
petitioners do not fall within any of the categories enumerated in Section 21
IPC. Consequently, they cannot be treated as "Public Servants" for the
purposes of seeking protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. It is therefore
argued that the learned Special Court has not committed any illegality in
passing the impugned order. Accordingly, it is prayed that the present
petitions deserve to be dismissed.
13. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.
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14. The central issue raised in the petitions relates to the absence of
sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is the
submission of the petitioners that they were public servants within the
meaning of law and that all actions alleged in the complaint were undertaken
in discharge of their official duties. Consequently, cognizance could not have
been taken in the absence of mandatory prior sanction by the competent
authority.
15. Section 197 of the Cr.P.C prescribes statutory bar for the court
taking cognizance of offence committed by a person, who is a public servant
while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties . For
convenience and ready reference, the relevant part of the provisions of
Section 197 of Cr.P.C. is reprodued below:-
Section 197. Prosecution of Judges and Public Servant:-
(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a
public servant not removable from his office save by or with the
sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to
have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in
the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance
of such offence except with the previous sanction -
(a) ........
(b)........
(Provided........................)
(2).........
(3)..........
(4)...........
16. Section 410 of Madhya Pradesh Municipal Croporation Act, 1956
prescribes Municipal Officers to be deemed Public Servant, it is reproduced
herein below:-
"410. Councillors and Municipal officers, etc. to be deemed public
servant.
- Every officer or servant in the employ of the Corporation
whether for the whole or part of his time and every Councillor of
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the Corporation shall be deemed to be a public servant within the
meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860."
17. Section 410 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act,
1956 explicitly declares that every officer or servant in the employment of
the Corporation, whether for the whole or part of his time, and every
Councillor, shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of
Section 21 of the IPC. Thus, the submission advanced on behalf of the
respondent that the petitioners do not fall within the definition of "public
servant" is misconceived. Statutory provision provided under Section 410
places the petitioners squarely within the ambit of Section 21 of the IPC.
18. The act of the petitioners was in their official capacity, which was
done in good faith. Section 402 of Madhya Pradesh Municipal Croporation
Act, 1956 clearly stipulates that no suit or prosecution is maintainable
against the authorities or servants for actions done in good faith in the
discharge of their official duties. Section 402 of Madhya Pradesh Municipal
Croporation Act, 1956 is reproduced herein below :-
"402. Indemnity for Act done in good faith. - No suit or
prosecution shall be maintainable against the Corporation or the
Mayor-in-Council, or Councillor or any Corporation Officer or
servant, or any person acting under or in accordance with the
direction of the Corporation or Mayor-in-Council or any
Corporation officer or servant, or of a Magistrate, in respect of
anything in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act
or under any rule or bye-law made thereunder."
19. Once the petitioners are held to be public servants, the next
question is whether the acts complained of have a reasonable nexus with the
discharge of their official duties. The record clearly reflects that all actions
undertaken by the petitioners pertained to enforcement of orders of this
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Court, prevention of unauthorised occupation of municipal property, and
regulation of unlawful open meat trading within municipal limits. These
functions are directly connected with the statutory responsibilities of
municipal officers. Even if the allegations in the complaint are taken at their
face value, the acts attributed to the petitioners were integrally related to the
performance of official duties and arose in the course of discharge thereof.
20. It is well settled that when a public servant is accused of an offence
alleged to have been committed while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of official duties, the bar contained in Section 197 Cr.P.C. is
attracted, and cognizance cannot be taken without prior sanction of the
competent Government. The requirement of sanction is not an empty
formality but a substantive safeguard meant to protect responsible public
officers from vexatious prosecution for acts done in good faith in the course
of official duties. This Court in Rambabu v. Purshottam, 2007 (II) MPJR
114 , has held that where cognizance is taken in the absence of sanction under
Section 197 Cr.P.C., the proceedings are vitiated and liable to be quashed.
21. In the present case, it is undisputed that no sanction under Section
197 Cr.P.C. was obtained prior to taking cognizance. The learned Special
Judge proceeded to take cognizance solely on the basis of the private
complaint, ignoring the statutory protection available to municipal officers
under Section 410 of the Municipal Corporation Act and the mandate of
Section 197 Cr.P.C. The cognizance so taken is therefore without
jurisdiction, illegal and unsustainable in law.
22. In view of the aforesaid discussion, and considering that the
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petitioners were public servants acting in discharge of official duties, the
impugned order dated 18.09.2014 taking cognizance against them stands
vitiated for want of sanction under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. Accordingly,
the impugned order dated 18.09.2014 passed in Special Sessions Trial Nos.
30/2014 and 31/2014 and the entire proceedings arising therefrom are hereby
quashed.
23. The petitions are allowed. No order as to costs.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE)
JUDGE
ojha
