Madhya Pradesh High Court
Satish Verma vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 7 November, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
ON THE 7 th OF NOVEMBER, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 14882 of 2024
SATISH VERMA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Maneesh Kholia - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Anshuman Swamy Government Advocate for the respondent-State.
ORDER
By way of this petition, the petitioner has called into question the order
Annexure P/2, whereby the character verification report has been issued against
the petitioner and consequent to the said report Annexure P/2, by the
consequential order Annexure P/3, the candidature of petitioner for appointment
as Constable in M.P. Police has been rejected.
2. The facts of the case indicate that the petitioner was involved in two
different criminal cases. One, at Crime No. 304 of 2013, under Section 457,350
IPC at Police Station Uchhehra, District Satna and the second one was registered
at Police Station Kotwali, District Rewa, at Crime No. 27 of 2015, under Section
420, 34 IPC.
3. From perusal of material placed on record, it is clear that both the
offences were connected with each other. The first offence related to theft of Idol
in a temple and FIR was lodged against unnamed persons. Thereafter, two years
later, attempts were made to sell one metallic lion, and the person with whom deal
was made, found that it is only a brass lion, but was being sold as a golden lion,
and he has been cheated and defrauded by such act, and thus, he lodged FIR in
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District Rewa, in the year 2015, under Section 420, 34 IPC. Lateron, during
course of investigation, it was revealed that the lion was the same that was stolen
with an idol in temple two years ago at Satna.
4. In this second case under Section 420 IPC, memorandum was
given by co-accused Anchal, who was trying to sell metallic lion to the
complainant, and upon memorandum of co-accused Anchal, the petitioner was
roped in the present case under Section 420 IPC, as well as in the earlier case of
theft of Idol, because the co-accused Anchal stated in his memorandum statement
that, there were many accomplices of the said person in both the cases, including
the present petitioner.
5. In sum and substance, the case of petitioner is that, in both the
criminal cases which were, in some manner, related to each other, he was roped in
only on the basis of memorandum statement of co-accused Anchal and petitioner
had no complicity in the matter. It is his case that he has been acquitted after trial
in the case of theft of idol, vide judgment of acquittal placed on record as
Annexure P/4 dated 01.06.2023.
6. The second case under Section 420 has resulted in acquittal by
compromise. It is the case of petitioner that all the accused persons in the said case
had compromised the matter, and the petitioner was one such person from whom
no recovery was made, even he had not made any deal with the complainant of the
case and therefore, the petitioner had to join in the compromise because he was
not expected to face trial alone, once he had no role in the matter and he entered
into compromise under those peculiar facts of the case otherwise he was ready to
face trial and there was no material available against him in the investigation. In
sum and substance, the case of the petitioner is that there was no material against
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the petitioner in both the cases and in one of the cases he has got clean acquittal
and in the other case when all the accused persons had compromised the matter so
he also joined in the compromise and even in the course of investigation nothing
had been collected against the petitioner in the said case so that he can be said to
be a person of tainted character.
7. If in such case merely to prevent continued agony a person enters
into compromise to bury the matter then and there, he cannot be said to have
incurred the disqualification to enter public employment in his entire life.
8. The Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police
& another Vs. S. Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598, considered that when acquittal
can be held to be a honourable acquittal and also that a person of doubtful integrity
cannot be allowed to work in the department.
9. Subsequently, in the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India (2016
(8) SCC 471) the supreme Court has held as under:-
38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them
as far as possible. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we summarise our
conclusion thus:
38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction,
acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after
entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false
mention of required information.
38.2. While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of
candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of
special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information.
38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the government
orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking the
decision.
38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a
criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before
filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to
knowledge of employer, any of the following recourses appropriate to the case
may be adopted:
38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as
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shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would
not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in
its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning
the lapse.
38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial in
nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate services of the employee.
38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral
turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not
a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the
employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may
take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.
38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a
concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider
antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.
38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification
form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts
and circumstances of the case, in its discretion, may appoint the candidate
subject to decision of such case.
38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending
cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer
may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or terminating services as
appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending
may not be proper.
38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time of
filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing authority
would take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime.
38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding departmental
enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal or
dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information in
verification form.
38.10.For determining suppression or false information attestation/verification
form has to be specific, not vague. Only such information which was required to
be specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for but
is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in
an objective manner while addressing the question of fitness. However, in such
cases action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false
information as to a fact which was not even asked for.
38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi,
knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if acquittal had already been
recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature,
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on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable
doubt has been given, then the employer may consider all relevant facts available
as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the
employee. It was further held that even if the employee had made declaration
truthfully of concluded criminal case then also employer still has right to consider
the antecedents.
10. Thereafter, in Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration and
others Vs. Pradeep Kumar and others 2018 (1) SCC 797, the Supreme Court held
that even though acquittal is based on compromise it is open to screening
committee to examine the suitability of the candidate and take appropriate
decision. The Supreme Court has considered the earlier judgment in the case of
Mehar Singh (2013 (7) SCC 685) wherein it has held that the Police Force is a
disciplined Force and compromise and settlement are encouraged to bring about
peaceful and amicable atmosphere in the society and they have to be encouraged
also to reduce the arrears of cases but these considerations cannot be brought in
the cases of public employment in order to maintain integrity and high standard of
the Police Force.
11. In the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Lovkush Meena reported in AIR
2021 SC 1610, the supreme Court has held as under:-
"16. In a similar factual scenario to the extent of recruitment to the posts of
Subedars, Platoon Commandants and Inspectors of Police in pursuance to an
advertisement and disqualification of one of the candidates being assailed
resulted in a judgment of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh &Ors. v.
Abhijit Singh Pawar by a two Judge Bench. Suffice to say, in the factual
context, a case registered in the year 2006 was pending on the date when
affidavit was tendered and within four days the compromise was entered into
between the original complainant and the respondent. An application for
compounding was filed. The compounding was found to be permissible as it
dealt with offences under Sections 294,325/34,323,506 Part II of the IPC and on
discussion of the legal principle enunciated in the earlier judgments, it was
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opined that the earlier judgment in the case of Commissioner of Police v Mehar
Singh it was opined that there is no doubt about the proposition that even after
the disclosure is made by a candidate, the employer would be well within his
rights to consider the antecedent and suitability of the candidate. In this context,
it was held, the employer is entitled to 4(2018) 18 SCC 733 5(2013) 7 SCC 685
take into account the job profile for which the selection is undertaken, the
severity of the charge levelled against the candidate and whether acquittal in
question was an honourable acquittal or was merely on the ground of benefit of
doubt as a result of composition. We may also add that one aspect which was
noticed which is common with the present case is the absence of any suggestion
that the decision was actuated by malafide or suffered on other accounts except
the issue raised of the subsequent circular applicable."
12. In Pramod Singh Kirar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & others
reported in 2023 (1) SCC 423, the Supreme Court considered the case of a
contender for public employment arising from matrimonial dispute under Section
498-A of IPC and held that the offence for which the contender was tried
ultimately resulted in acquittal on account of settlement out of court. In such case
the appellant could not have been denied the appointment on the ground of the
prosecution of the year 2006 when his candidature was being considered in the
year 2013/2014.
In the case of Pawan Kumar Vs. Union of India & another 2023(12) SCC 317,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
"1 7 . One distinguishing factor, as noticed above, is that the criminal
complaint/FIR in the present case was registered post submission of the
application form. We have also taken into account the nature of the allegations
made in the criminal case and that the matter was of trivial nature not involving
moral turpitude. Further, the proceedings had ended in a clean acquittal. As is
clear from para 38 in Avtar Singh [Avtar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC
471 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 425] , all matters cannot be put in a straitjacket and a
degree of flexibility and discretion vests with the authorities, must be exercised
with care and caution taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration,
including the nature and type of lapse. "
13. In the aforesaid case the Supreme Court has considered the position
that though the authorities are at liberty and have a discretion to consider the
candidature of the candidate but that discretion must be exercised with care and
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caution taking all the facts and circumstances of the case into consideration
including the nature and type of lapse of the employee/applicant for employment.
14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Avtar Singh (Supra) though
has upheld the right of the employer to still consider the cases of acquittal on
technical grounds and that are not cases of clean acquittal or are based on
compromise or benefit of reasonable doubt having been given, but in such cases
the employer has to consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents.
15. In the present case in one of the cases there has been a clean acquittal
and the said case could not be read to infer disqualification of the petitioner on the
grounds of character antecedents.
16. So far as the other case is concerned it is a case based upon
compromise and the police authorities still had a power to look into all the facts of
the case. Looking into the facts of the case would mean any alleged act of the
candidate or any material collected against the petitioner during course of trial or
in course of investigation which remains unexplained or which despite ultimate
acquittal is something that may give rise to suspicion in the mind of employer
against the conduct of employee.
17. When testing the impugned order Annexure P/2 that holds the
antecedents of the petitioner not clean and declares him not entitled to be
appointed for employment, no such consideration has been made by the police
authorities. Only the FIR version has been mentioned and it has been mentioned
that the cases are grave. There is not a single word of consideration that what was
the role of the petitioner in the said two cases even as per police investigation
which remained unexplained in trial or which may still give rise to suspicion as to
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character of petitioner. The impugned order Annexure P/2 is utterly silent on that
aspect. It, therefore, cannot be given stamp of approval.
18. Consequently, the orders Annexure P/2 and P/3 are set-aside. The
concerned authorities are directed to reconsider the matter as per law laid down by
the Hon'ble Apex Court and discussed above, within a period of 45 days from the
date of production of copy of this order.
19. Petition is partly allowed and disposed of in the above terms.
(VIVEK JAIN)
JUDGE
MISHRA
