Madhya Pradesh High Court
Santram Sharma vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 15 May, 2025
Author: Vishal Mishra
Bench: Vishal Mishra
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:23606
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
ON THE 15th OF MAY, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 16947 of 2025
SANTRAM SHARMA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Amareshwar Pathak - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri A.S.Baghel - Government Advocate for the respondents/State.
ORDER
The present petition has been filed seeking the following reliefs :-
"a. That, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the
respondents by issuing a writ of mandamus or any other
writ that the date of appointment i.e. 05.09.1983 as
daily wager service be also entered in his service book
records.
b. That, the respondents be directed to compute whole
length of service of petitioner including the length of
service rendered as daily wager in computing the length
of qualifying service of petitioner in fixing the pension
amount.
c. That, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the
respondents to treat the service of the petitioner as
regular from the date of initial appointment in 1983.
d. Alternatively, the benefit may be granted from
07.05.1990, in parity with similarly placed employees
who were granted regularisation as per the order dated
07.05.1990.
e. Pass such other and further orders as may be deemed
just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the
case."
It is pointed out that a circular has been issued by the Government
dated 14.08.2023 which gives a cause of action to the petitioner for getting
the benefits of fourth time pay scale. However, he submits that he is only
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falling short of six days in completion of 35 years. Therefore, this petition
has been filed.
The grounds taken by the petitioner is that similarly situated
employees were regularised prior to the petitioner on 07.05.1990 and the
petitioner has been regularised on 06.06.1990. Therefore, the case of the
petitioner should have been considered by the authorities for regularisation
from 07.05.1990. The fact remains that the order passed regarding
regularisation of the petitioner has not been put to challenge by almost 35
years. He has kept quite and accepted the order and continued to work on the
regularised post. Now he is filing this petition after 35 years seeking
preponement of date of regularisation as the similarly situated employees
were regularised a month prior to the petitioner. The fact remains that there is
substantial delay in approaching the Court. Even otherwise, there is no
challenge to order dated 06.06.1990 by which the petitioner was regularised.
Under these circumstances, no relief can be extended to the petitioner.
The law with respect to the sleeping litigant has been considered by
the Court in catena of cases. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Esha
Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy
and Ors. reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, has held as under :-
"21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can
broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented,
nonpedantic approach while dealing with an application for
condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to
legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in
their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to
the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be
applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the
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technical considerations should not be given undue and
uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate
causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the
counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bonafides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof
should not affect public justice and cause public mischief
because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the
ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate
the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a
totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and
a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former
doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may
not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict
approach whereas the second calls for a liberal
delineation.21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a
party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors
to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental
principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of
balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said
principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal
approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the
grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should
be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face
such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with
fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to
the technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm
of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning
and not on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given some
acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more
guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:-
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be
drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner
harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone
delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis
on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not
be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual
philosophy which is basically subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard
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being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious
effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the
adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate
institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-
serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be
exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of
course, within legal parameters."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa & Anr. vs.
Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 has opined as under:-
"54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a
petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in case
the petitioner approaches the Court after coming to know of the
relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot
furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. A litigant
cannot wake up from deep slumber and claim impetus from the
judgment in cases where some diligent person had approached the
Court within a reasonable time."
A Division Bench of this Court in Focus Energy Ltd. (M/s) vs
Government of India, (DB) reported in I.L.R. (2011) M.P. 53 relying upon
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :
"10. Thus, facts stated supra leads to irresistible conclusion
that appellant is guilty of delay and laches. Its conduct
disentitles it to any relief. In New Delhi Municipal Council v.
Pan Singh and Others, AIR 2007 SC 1365 the Supreme Court
has held that delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise
of equitable jurisdiction. In Municipal Council, Ahmednagar
v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48 the Supreme Court has
observed that discretionary relief can be provided to one who
has not by his act or conduct given a go-bye to his rights.
Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant. In the
State of Haryana v. Aravali Khanij Udyog, (2008) 1 SCC 663
it has been held that where third party rights are created, the
High Court should not interfere. Similarly, in Shiba Shankar
Mohapatra (supra) it has been held that the Court exercising
public law jurisdiction does not encourage agitation of stale
claims where the right of third parties crystallizes in the
interregnum."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpn.
Ltd. vs K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as follows:
"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in
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mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate
case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary
powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of
the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the
lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the
opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the
matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out
in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports
[(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course, the
discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in
Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5
PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this
Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC 1450]
and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor
Service [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] . Sir Barnes
had stated:
"Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an
arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his
conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent
to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has
though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other
party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to
place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material.
But in every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that
delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of
limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon
principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always
important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the
nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking
the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."
It is further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok
Kumar vs District Magistrate, Basti reported in (2012) 3 SCC 311 that :
"10. ... It is time and again, stated that a party who has
slept over his right since is not entitled to the
discretionary relief of the High Court."
If the abovementioned judgments with respect to delay and latches are
applied to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the petitioner has slept
over his right for a considerable period of more than 35 years. Even no
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judgment is placed before this Court or no sufficient ground has been pointed
out in Para 4 of the petition to substantiate the arguments of delay in
approaching the Court.
This Court is of the considered view that directing the representation to
be considered and decided will amount to reopening the issue again after a
lapse of more than 35 years, as the petitioner himself has chosen not to
challenge the order dated 06.06.1990 and accepted the same 35 years back.
Under these circumstances, this Court does not deem it appropriate to
entertain the present writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed on the
ground of delay and latches.
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.
(VISHAL MISHRA)
JUDGE
AM
