Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rampal Singh vs The State Of M.P. on 22 May, 2025
1 WP-3631-2011 & WP-2440-2010
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ASHISH SHROTI
ON THE 22nd OF MAY, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 3631 of 2011
RAMPAL SINGH
Versus
STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS
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Appearance:
Shri Arun Katare - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri B.M. Patel - Govt. Advocate for the State.
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WITH
WRIT PETITION No. 2440 of 2010
RAMPAL SINGH
Versus
STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS
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Appearance:
Shri Arun Katare - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri B.M. Patel - Govt. Advocate for the State.
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Whether approved for reporting: Yes/No.
Reserved for order on: 05/05/2025
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ORDER
(Passed on 22/05/2025)
The petitioner had initially filed W.P. No.2440 of 2010
challenging the order dated 07.08.2009 (Annexure P/3) passed by
respondent no.4 whereby the punishment of compulsory retirement
2 WP-3631-2011 & WP-2440-2010
from service and recovery of a sum of Rs.6,70,000/- was inflicted upon
the petitioner on account of misconduct found proved in the
departmental enquiry. The petitioner has also challenged the order dated
22.10.2009 (Annexure P/2) passed by respondent no.3 and order dated
01.04.2010 (Annexure P/1) passed by respondent no.2 whereby his
appeal and the mercy appeal filed against the order of punishment has
been dismissed.
[2]. During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, the review
application filed by the petitioner was favorably considered and vide
order, dated 28.04.2011, passed by respondent no.2, the aforesaid order
of punishment has been modified to reduction of amount equal to one
increment for a period of two years and recovery of amount of
Rs.6,70,000/-. Challenging this order, dated 28.04.2011, the petitioner
filed Writ Petition No.3631 of 2011. Both the writ petitions are,
therefore, being decided by this common order.
[3]. The facts necessary for decision of this case are that the petitioner
at the relevant time was holding the post of Head Constable. There was
a grain shop/dry canteen run by the Battalion in order to provide various
commodities at cheaper rate to its members. The petitioner was
deployed at the aforesaid grain shop from time to time. To be precise, he
was deployed in the grain shop from 01.07.2000 to 15.09.2002, then
from 05.01.2003 to 16.05.2004 and lastly from 01.11.2004 to
15.09.2005.
[4]. Certain financial irregularities were noticed by the respondents in
management of shop. A special internal audit was, therefore, conducted
in respect of the accounts of said grain shop for the period from
01.01.2000 to 18.08.2007. The auditors of the PHQ submitted their
3 WP-3631-2011 & WP-2440-2010
report and reported shortage of funds. The report dated 26.03.2008 has
been brought on record as Annexure P/4. The recommendations were
accordingly made to conduct the departmental enquiry against the
persons who have been deployed in the grain shop during the aforesaid
period.
[5]. Taking note of the aforesaid audit report, the respondent no.4
decided to conduct a common enquiry in respect of the illegalities found
and accordingly a common charge-sheet was issued on 28.03.2009
(Annexure P/5). The charge-sheet was issued to as many as five
employees including the petitioner. The five incumbents were Head
Constable Rampal Singh, Head Constable Brahmpal Singh, P.C.
Laxman Prasad Soni, Section Commander Jai Singh Bhadoriya and
Section Commander Nathuram Verma. The petitioner submitted his
reply to the aforesaid charge-sheet on 11.04.2008 (Annexure P/6). From
perusal of the reply, it is revealed that instead of giving reply on merits
of the allegations, he raised various technical objections to the charge-
sheet. The reply since was not found satisfactory, the respondent no.4
appointed one Mr. R.K. Arushiya, Deputy Commandant, 29th Battalion,
SAF as Inquiry Officer.
[6]. The Inquiry Officer conducted the departmental enquiry and
submitted his report on 05.01.2009 wherein, he found the petitioner as
also two others guilty of charges leveled in the charge-sheet. So far the
petitioner is concerned, he was held liable for shortage of an amount of
Rs.6,70,000/-. The Inquiry Report was accordingly submitted before the
respondent no.4 who forwarded the same to the petitioner on
25.03.2009 and asked for his explanation. After having received the
explanation from the petitioner, the impugned order dated 07.08.2009
4 WP-3631-2011 & WP-2440-2010
(Annexure P/3) was passed whereby, the punishment of compulsory
retirement from service and also recovery of a sum of Rs.6,70,000/- has
been inflicted upon the petitioner.
[7]. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid punishment, the petitioner filed
the appeal before respondent no.3 which was dismissed on 22.10.2009
(Annexure P/2) and the mercy appeal filed by the petitioner also
suffered dismissal vide order dated 01.04.2010 (Annexure P/1) passed
by respondent no.2. The petitioner had also availed the remedy of
review before respondent no.2. The respondent no. 2 took a lenient view
and modified the punishment of compulsory retirement from service
into the punishment of reduction of amount equal to one increment for a
period of two years and the recovery of Rs.6,70,000/- from the
petitioner. The aforesaid orders of punishment are under challenge in
these two writ petitions.
[8]. Learned counsel for the petitioner, challenging the order of
punishment, submitted that:
i). there is no material available on record against the
petitioner which could have established the charges
leveled against him. He submitted that at best he could be
held liable for shortage of a sum of Rs.41,897/- which is
the shortage pointed-out by the auditors in their report
dated 26.03.2008;
ii). no Presenting Officer was appointed and the Inquiry
Officer himself examined and cross-examined the
witnesses and has thus acted as prosecutor. He placed
reliance upon the judgments rendered in the case of
Ramesh Chand Rathore Vs. State of M.P. & Ors.
reported in 2010(2) MPLJ 245 and also in the case of
Ram Prakash Gaya Prasad Vs. State of M.P. & Ors.
reported in 2008(4) MPLJ 35;
iii). the joint inquiry conducted against five employees is
unsustainable as the same is in violation of Rule 18 of
5 WP-3631-2011 & WP-2440-2010
The M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control &
Appeal) Rules, 1966. He submits that since there was no
order directing joint inquiry passed by the Competent
Authority, the Inquiry in question is illegal.
iv). even though he demanded certain documents to
establish his defence by making applications, brought on
record as Annexure P/9 to P/12, however, documents
were not supplied to him. In support of his contention, he
relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Roop
Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors. reported
in (2009) 2 SCC 570 and State of M.P. Vs. Shatrughan
Lal & Ors. reported in (1998) 6 SCC 651.
[9]. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents supported
the impugned action of the respondents and submitted that there is no
rule which mandates the appointment of Presenting Officer. Therefore,
the contention of the petitioner that the enquiry is vitiated on account of
non-appointment of Presenting Officer is unacceptable. He further
submitted that the documents relied upon by the Inquiry Officer in order
to establish the charges were duly supplied to the petitioner during the
course of inquiry. The petitioner has failed to show the prejudice caused
to him because of non-supply of the demanded documents and,
therefore, the inquiry cannot be held vitiated on account of non-supply
of documents. He further submitted that the respondent no.4 was
competent to initiate the departmental enquiry against all the five
employees including the petitioner. Thus, the common charge-sheet
having been issued by respondent no.4 is legal and valid. Referring to
Rule 18 of C.C.A. Rules, learned counsel for the respondents submitted
that the Rule does not contemplate issuance of any order directing for
common inquiry. He further submitted that the respondent no.2 has
already taken a lenient view in the matter and has modified the
6 WP-3631-2011 & WP-2440-2010
punishment of compulsory retirement to that of reduction of amount
equal to one increment for a period of two years on the assurance of the
petitioner that he would deposit the amount of recovery. However,
having after the order of modified punishment is passed, he challenged
the modified punishment also before this Hon'ble Court contrary to his
commitment. He further submitted that the enquiry officer has assigned
cogent reasons for holding petitioner guilty based upon evidence
collected during enquiry. Therefore, petitioner's submission that there is
no material available to held charges proved against him, is
unacceptable. He thus prays for dismissal of the writ petitions.
[10]. Considered the arguments and perused the record.
[11]. The main ground which is vehemently argued by the learned
counsel for the petitioner is that the respondents failed to appoint
Presenting Officer. The enquiry Officer himself acted as prosecutor
inasmuch as he himself examined and cross-examined the witnesses. As
per his submission, this has vitiated the entire enquiry and on this
ground alone, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed.
[12]. In this regard, admittedly the enquiry in question has been
conducted under M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal)
Rules, 1966. Rule 14 provides for the procedure to be adopted for
conducting enquiry. Rule 14(5)(c) is relevant and is reproduced
hereunder:
"(c) Where the disciplinary authority itself inquires into
any article of charge or appoints an inquiring authority for
holding an inquiry into such charge, it may, by an order,
appoint a Government servant or a legal practitioner, to
be known as the "Presenting Officer" to present on its
behalf the case in support of the articles of charge."
[13]. The use of word 'may' in Rule 14(5)(c) makes it clear that the
7 WP-3631-2011 & WP-2440-2010
appointment of presenting officer is discretionary and is not mandatory.
[14]. The issue as to whether the disciplinary authority is mandatorily
required to appoint a Presenting Officer in a departmental enquiry, has
been considered by the Apex Court as also by this Court in various
cases. In the case of Union of India vs. Ram Lakhan Sharma reported
in (2018)7 SCC 670, while dealing with the similar issue, the Apex
Court held as under:
"28. When the statutory rule does not contemplate
appointment of Presenting Officer whether non-
appointment of Presenting Officer ipso facto vitiates the
inquiry? We have noticed the statutory provision of Rule
27 which does not indicate that there is any statutory
requirement of appointment of Presenting Officer in the
disciplinary inquiry. It is thus clear that statutory
provision does not mandate appointment of Presenting
Officer. When the statutory provision does not require
appointment of Presenting Officer whether there can be
any circumstances where principles of natural justice can
be held to be violated is the broad question which needs
to be answered in this case. We have noticed above that
the High Court found breach of principles of natural
justice in Enquiry Officer acting as the prosecutor against
the respondents. The Enquiry Officer who has to be
independent and not representative of the disciplinary
authority if starts acting in any other capacity and
proceeds to act in a manner as if he is interested in
eliciting evidence to punish an employee, the principle of
bias comes into place."
[15]. The issue also came up for consideration before the Division
Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Naseem Siddiqui
reported in 2004 SCC Online MP 678. The Division Bench, considered
the rule which is pare-materia to Rule 14(5)(c) of Rules of 1966. The
Division Bench held thus:
"Rule 9(9)(c) of the Rules relied on by the Railway
administration is extracted below for ready reference:
8 WP-3631-2011 & WP-2440-2010
"Where the disciplinary authority itself inquires
into an article of charge or appoints a Board of
Inquiry or any other inquiring authority for
holding an inquiry into such charge, it may, by an
order in writing, appoint a Railway or any other
Government servant to be known as 'Presenting
Officer' to present on its behalf the case in
support of the articles of charge."
*** *** ***
One of the fundamental principles of natural justice is that
no man shall be a judge in his own cause. This principles
consists of seven well recognised facets : (i) The
adjudicator shall be impartial and free from bias, (ii) The
adjudicator shall not be the prosecutor; (iii) The
complainant shall not be an adjudicator; (iv) A witness
cannot be the Adjudicator. (v) The Adjudicator must not
import his personal knowledge of the facts of the case
while inquiring into charges, (vi) The Adjudicator shall
not decide on the dictates of his superiors or others, (vii)
The Adjudicator shall decide the issue with reference to
material on record and not with reference to extraneous
material or on extraneous considerations. If any one of
these fundamental rules is breached, the inquiry will be
vitiated.
*** *** ***
A domestic inquiry must be held by an unbiased person
who is unconnected with the incident so that he can be
impartial and objective in deciding the subject matters of
inquiry. He should have an open mind till the inquiry is
completed and should neither act with bias nor give an
impression of bias. Where the Inquiry Officer acts as the
Presenting Officer, bias can be presumed. At all events, it
clearly gives an impression of bias. An Inquiry Officer is
in position of a Judge or Adjudicator. The Presenting
Officer is in the position of a Prosecutor. If the Inquiry
Officer acts as a Presenting Officer, then it would amount
to Judge acting as the persecutor. When the Inquiry
Officer conducts the examination-in-chief of the
prosecution witnesses and leads them through the facts so
as to present the case of the disciplinary authority against
the employee or cross-examines the delinquent employee
or his witnesses to establish the case of the
employer/disciplinary authority, evidently, the Inquiry
9 WP-3631-2011 & WP-2440-2010
Officer cannot be said to have an open mind. The very
fact that he presents the case of the employer and supports
case of the employer is sufficient to hold that the Inquiry
Officer does not have an open mind.
*** *** ***
But there is however a clear and real distinction between
an Inquiry Officer acting as the Presenting Officer, and an
Inquiry Officer putting some questions to any witness to
clarify the evidence or ascertain the truth. While the first
would vitiate the inquiry, the second would not. We may
refer to a few relevant decisions on this aspect.
*** *** ***
We may summarise the principles thus:
(i) The Inquiry Officer, who is in the position of a Judge
shall not act as a Presenting Officer, who is in the position
of a prosecutor.
(ii) It is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to
appoint a Presenting Officer in each and every inquiry.
Non-appointment of a Presenting Officer, by itself will
not vitiate the inquiry.
(iii) The Inquiry Officer, with a view to arrive at the truth
or to obtain clarifications, can put questions to the
prosecution witnesses as also the defence witnesses. In
the absence of a Presenting Officer, if the Inquiry Officer
puts any questions to the prosecution witnesses to elicit
the facts, he should thereafter permit the delinquent
employee to cross-examine such witnesses on those
clarifications.
(iv) If the Inquiry Officer conducts regular examination-
in-chief by leading the prosecution witnesses through the
prosecution case, or puts leading questions to the
departmental witnesses pregnant with answers, or cross-
examines the defence witnesses or puts suggestive
questions to establish the prosecution case employee, the
Inquiry Officer acts as prosecutor thereby vitiating the
inquiry.
(v) As absence of a Presenting Officer by itself will not
vitiate the inquiry and it is recognised that the Inquiry
Officer can put questions to any or all witnesses to elicit
the truth, the question whether an Inquiry officer acted as
a Presenting Officer, will have to be decided with
10 WP-3631-2011 & WP-2440-2010
reference to the manner in which the evidence is let in
and recorded in the inquiry."
[16]. The similar issue has been considered by Coordinate Bench of
this Court in the case of Santosh Sondhia Vs. State of M.P. & another
reported in 2023(2) MPLJ 404 and also in the case of Pappu Singh Vs.
Union of India & others passed in W.P. No.1303 of 2013. The view
similar to the case of Naseem Siddiqui is reiterated. The judgment relied
upon by the counsel for the petitioner in the case of Ramesh Chand
Rathore (supra) and Ram Prakash Gaya Prasad (supra) in fact also
approves the aforesaid view taken in Naseem Siddiquie case and on
facts of the case, this court held that the enquiry officer acted as
prosecutor inasmuch as he conducted actual cross-examination of
witness and also that of delinquent.
[17]. The issue raised by counsel for petitioner is thus squarely covered
by Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Naseem
Siddiqui (supra). The ratio of the judgment has been reproduced above
in extenso. What comes out loud and clear from the aforesaid judgment
is that the non-appointment of Presenting Officer would not ipso facto
vitiate the enquiry. In order to vitiate the enquiry, the delinquent is
required to show that the enquiry Officer himself acted as prosecutor
inasmuch as he himself done examination-in-chief of the prosecution
witnesses and lead them through the facts so as to present the case of
the Disciplinary Authority against the employee or cross-examines the
delinquent employee or his witnesses to establish the case of the
employer/Disciplinary Authority.
[18]. In the case in hand, except raising the objection in the writ
petition, the petitioner has not justified the same by detailing the action
of Enquiry Officer to demonstrate that he acted as prosecutor. The
11 WP-3631-2011 & WP-2440-2010
learned Government Advocate has produced copy of enquiry record
before this court. It is revealed from the record that as many as 12
prosecution witnesses were examined in enquiry. The statement of each
witness is recorded as it is (as stated by witnesses) and they were cross-
examined by the delinquents thereafter. The deposition is not in
question-answer form but is narration of actual statement given by
witnesses. It is seen that the Enquiry Officer has not put any question to
them much less any leading question. Therefore, it is incorrect on the
part of petitioner to say that the Enquiry Officer cross-examined the
witnesses or for that matter acted as prosecutor. It is thus found that the
enquiry officer in the instant case has not acted as prosecutor. The
enquiry, therefore, cannot be held vitiated on this ground. Therefore, the
objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard
is unacceptable on facts of the present case. The same is hereby
rejected.
[19]. Another objection raised by counsel for the petitioner is about
non-supply of demanded documents in relation to the applications filed
as Annexure P/9 to P/12. In this regard, the legal position is well settled.
It is to be seen as to whether the charges are proved based upon the
documents relied upon by the prosecution or not? If the delinquent
raises an objection about non-supply of documents, he is required to
establish the relevancy of such documents and the prejudice caused to
him because of non-supply of such documents.
[20]. The issue is considered by Apex Court in the case of State Bank
of India Vs. Tarun Kumar Banerjee reported in (2000) 8 SCC 12.
The Apex Court held in para-8 as under:
"8. It is submitted that even if evidence is withheld, the
conclusion of the enquiry officer would be correct is a
12 WP-3631-2011 & WP-2440-2010
perverse approach. We do not think so. What is stated
therein is that when sufficient evidence was produced to
conclude one way or the other, the evidence not produced
will not be of any significance unless there was such
evidence which was withheld would have tilted the
evidence adduced in the course of domestic enquiry. No
such evidence is forthcoming in this case. Therefore, this
argument deserves to be rejected."
[21]. Thus, even if certain documents are not produced, if the material
on record is sufficient to establish charges, the enquiry would not vitiate
because of non-supply of documents.
[22]. Again, the Apex Court considered the issue about non-supply of
documents to delinquent, in the case of Union of India Vs. Alok
Kumar reported in (2010) 5 SCC 349 wherein the Apex Court held as
under:
"83. Earlier, in some of the cases, this Court had taken the
view that breach of principles of natural justice was in
itself a prejudice and no other "de facto" prejudice needs
to be proved. In regard to statutory rules, the prominent
view was that the violation of mandatory statutory rules
would tantamount to prejudice but where the rule is
merely directory the element of de facto prejudice needs
to be pleaded and shown. With the development of law,
rigidity in these rules is somewhat relaxed. The instance
of de facto prejudice has been accepted as an essential
feature where there is violation of the non-mandatory
rules or violation of natural justice as it is understood in
its common parlance. Taking an instance, in a
departmental enquiry where the department relies upon a
large number of documents majority of which are
furnished and an opportunity is granted to the delinquent
officer to defend himself except that some copies of
formal documents had not been furnished to the
delinquent. In that event the onus is upon the employee to
show that non-furnishing of these formal documents have
resulted in de-facto prejudice and he has been put to a
disadvantage as a result thereof."
[23]. From the aforesaid legal position, it comes out that in order to
vitiate the enquiry, the petitioner was required to establish the relevancy
13 WP-3631-2011 & WP-2440-2010
of documents demanded by him and the de-facto prejudice that has been
caused to him because of non-supply of such documents. However,
except referring to the application demanding documents and raising an
objection regarding non-supply of documents, no averment has been
made in writ petition demonstrating the relevancy of demanded
documents and the prejudice caused to him because of such non-supply.
Further, he has also failed to demonstrate as to how the evidence relied
upon by the Enquiry Officer is insufficient to hold the charges proved.
[24]. The judgment of Apex Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi
(supra), relied upon by counsel for petitioner, was a case were the Apex
Court explained the manner in which the documents are required to be
proved in departmental enquiry and held that mere production of
document is not sufficient and the contents of document should be
proved by examining witnesses. This issue is not involved in the case in
hand. Further, the Apex Court judgment in the case of Shatrughan Lal
(supra), again relied upon by petitioner's counsel, was a case where the
documents relied upon in the charge sheet were not supplied to the
delinquent and, therefore, the interference was made. However, in the
present case, the document relied upon in charge sheet were supplied to
the petitioner. However, his grievance is that the documents demanded
by him were not supplied. Thus, the facts of the case before Apex Court
were different and does not help the petitioner.
[25]. In view of the discussion of facts and law made above, the
objection raised by learned counsel for petitioner regarding non-supply
of documents is not acceptable and the same is hereby rejected.
[26]. Yet another ground raised by counsel for petitioner is that the
joint enquiry conducted against five employees is illegal and is in
14 WP-3631-2011 & WP-2440-2010
violation of provisions of Rule 18 of CCA Rules. He submitted that in
absence of order for conducting joint enquiry by Competent Authority,
the enquiry conducted is illegal. In this regard, Rule 18 of CCA Rules
provides as under:
"18- Common proceedings.
(1) Where two or more Government servants are
concerned in any case, the Governor or any other
authority competent to impose the penalty of dismissal
from service on all such Government servants may make
an order directing that disciplinary action against all of
them may be taken in a common proceeding :
Note. - If the authorities competent to impose the penalty
of dismissal on such Government servants are different,
an order for taking disciplinary action in a common
proceeding may be made by the highest of such
authorities with the consent of the others :
[Provided that the powers conferred on the Governor
under this rule shall in case of Judicial Officers, be
exercised by the Chief Justice.] [Added by Notification
No. 06-3-98-3-I, dated 20th May, 1998.]
(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 12,
any such order shall specify :
(i) the authority which may function as the disciplinary
authority for the purpose of such common proceeding;
(ii) the penalties specified in Rule 10 which such
disciplinary authority shall be competent to impose; and
(iii)whether the procedure laid down in Rule 14 and Rule
15 or Rule 16 shall be followed in the proceedings"
[27]. Thus, the rule only contemplates that the authority competent to
impose penalty of dismissal from service on all such Government
servants, may make an order directing common proceedings to be
conducted against all of them. The provisions of Rule 18 have been
considered by coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Rajendra
15 WP-3631-2011 & WP-2440-2010
Singh Kushwaha Vs. State of M.P. & Ors. reported in 2017(1) MPLJ
193. This court held as under:
"8. It is not in dispute that respondent No. 4-Senior
Superintendent of Police is the disciplinary Authority and
competent to impose penalty of dismissal in relation to
Head Constables and Constables. Respondent No. 4 has
served the charge-sheet upon the petitioner and other
three constables and upon consideration of the reply has
taken a decision to constitute enquiry against the
petitioner, as well as, three constables and, accordingly,
appointed the Presenting Officer and the Enquiry Officer.
As such, the joint enquiry held against the petitioner
cannot be faulted with, disputing the authority of
respondent No. 4. The judgment relied upon by the
counsel for the petitioner in the case of Jagdish (supra) is
clearly distinguishable on facts. In that case, though the
appointing Authority in relation to the petitioner therein
i.e. Excise Officer was the State Government, but the
Excise Commissioner had taken a decision to hold the
joint enquiry and, therefore, he was not found to be
competent to inflict the penalty of dismissal and,
accordingly, the order of joint enquiry was quashed. The
other judgment cited by the petitioner in the case of Vinay
Sharma(supra) is also of no assistance to the petitioner as
the facts are again distinguishable."
[28]. The requirement of rule is thus that the authority directing for
common proceedings, should be competent to impose punishment of
dismissal from service on all incumbents against whom the proceedings
are conducted. Had it been a case where the authority issuing charge
sheet is different than the one competent to impose penalty of dismissal
from service, a specific order for common enquiry was necessary.
However, in a case like present one where the authority who issued the
charge sheet and the one competent to impose penalty of dismissal, is
same, non-issuance of order for holding common enquiry would not
vitiate the enquiry. It is not the petitioner's case that the Commandant,
who issued the charge-sheet, was not competent to impose punishment
16 WP-3631-2011 & WP-2440-2010
of dismissal on any of the five delinquents. The issuance of common
charge-sheet against five incumbents itself amount to making an order
directing common proceedings to be conducted. Merely because a
separate order for issuance of common charge-sheet is not issued, the
enquiry cannot be held to be vitiated particularly when no such
objection is raised at the time of issuance of common charge-sheet.
Thus, the petitioner cannot succeed on this ground also.
[29]. The objection raised by petitioner's counsel in this regard is also
liable to be and is hereby rejected.
[30]. The submission of learned counsel for petitioner that there was no
material in enquiry to hold petitioner guilty of charges is also not
acceptable. From the enquiry report, it is seen that various witnesses
were examined and documents exhibited in support of charges. The
findings of enquiry officer are based upon detailed appreciation of oral
and documentary evidence. The petitioner has failed to plead and
establish that findings recorded by enquiry officer are perverse or based
on "no evidence". Thus, this contention of petitioner's counsel also
stands rejected.
[31]. The next issue to be considered in this case is relating to relief
prayed for by petitioner in para 7(ii) of the writ petition. It is gathered
from the records that the petitioner was initially retired compulsorily
vide order, dated 07.08.2009. This order of punishment was modified in
review by respondent no.2 vide order, dated 28.04.2011. The
reinstatement of petitioner was with the condition of pre-deposit of
Rs.6.70 lakh. This led to passing of interim order in this writ petition
and modification of the same by Division Bench and ultimately the
petitioner was reinstated in service in March' 2012. Thus, the petitioner
17 WP-3631-2011 & WP-2440-2010
would be entitled to permissible amount of pension from the date of his
compulsory retirement i.e. 07.08.2009 till the order of modified
punishment was passed on 28.04.2011. There is nothing on record to
show as to whether the pension was paid to the petitioner during the
period he was suffering punishment of compulsory retirement. Thus, if
the pension is not paid to the petitioner, he is held entitled to amount
equal to the amount of pension which would have been paid to him for
the period from 07.08.2009 till 28.04.2011 as a result of his compulsory
retirement.
[32]. Further, since the petitioner's reinstatement was subject to his
depositing the amount of recovery and admittedly he did not deposit the
amount until this court permitted him to deposit the same in
installments, therefore, he cannot claim salary for the period from
28.04.2011 till March' 2012. However, for this period also, since he was
suffering order of compulsory retirement, he is entitled to amount equal
to amount of pension payable to him as a compulsory retired employee.
[33]. Resultantly, the order of punishment, dated 28.04.2011, is upheld.
The petition so far as it relates to challenge to the said order is
dismissed. The respondents are, however, directed to pay to the
petitioner, amount equal to amount of pension for the period from
07.08.2009 till 28.04.2011, if not already paid. Further, the respondents
are also directed to pay to the petitioner amount equal to amount of
pension payable to petitioner for the period from 29.04.2011 till March'
2012 i.e. date of reinstatement in service. The aforesaid amount shall be
paid to him together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum till the
actual date of payment.
(ASHISH SHROTI)
Vpn/- JUDGE
