Madhya Pradesh High Court
Subham Chaturvedi vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 2 May, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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1 WP No. 2397 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 2nd OF MAY, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 2397 of 2025
SUBHAM CHATURVEDI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Alok Kumar Sharma - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Sohit Mishra - Government Advocate for State.
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed
seeking the following reliefs:-
"(i) That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the present
petition and may further be pleased to direct the respondents to decide the
application/claim of petitioner for compassionate appointment within a
fixed time frame as deemed appropriate by this Hon'ble Court and they
may further be directed to grant the appointment to the petitioner on a
suitable post on compassionate basis.
(ii) Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper
may also be given to the petitioner along with costs."
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2. It is submitted by counsel for petitioner that maternal grand-mother of
petitioner was working as Peon and she was not having any son and her
husband had also expired. Therefore, she adopted the petitioner who was the
son of her daughter. It is submitted that written adoption deed was also
executed on 16.12.2009. Grand mother of petitioner/adopted mother of
petitioner expired on 01.03.2016. On that date petitioner was only 13 years of
age and was minor and accordingly, he could not file any application for
appointment on compassionate ground. He attained majority in the year 2019
and accordingly, application for appointment on compassionate ground was
made on 15.07.2024, but the said application is still pending and has not been
decided so far. Thus, it is prayed that respondents be directed to decide the
application because delayed decision on the application would frustrate the
very purpose of appointment on compassionate ground.
3. Per contra, the petition is vehemently opposed by counsel for State. By
referring to the adoption deed, it is submitted that said adoption deed mentions
that adoption was already done much prior thereto and adoption deed was
executed on 16.12.2019 by way of acknowledgment of adoption deed. It is
submitted that in the entire adoption deed, date of actual adoption of petitioner
has not been mentioned. It is also not mentioned that all the rituals which are
required as per Section 11 of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act were
performed.
4. Furthermore, as per clause 3.2 of the Policy for appointment on
compassionate ground, application should have been filed within a period of
one year from attaining majority. It is clear that petitioner attained majority on
12.10.2021 whereas application for appointment on compassionate ground was
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filed on 15.07.2024 whereas application should have been filed by 12.10.2022.
Thus, it is prayed that petitioner is not entitled for appointment on
compassionate ground.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
6. Section 11 of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act reads as under:-
"11. Other conditions for a valid adoption. In every adoption, the
following conditions must be complied with:-
(i) if the adoption is of a son, the adoptive father or mother by whom the
adoption is made must not have a Hindu son, son's son or son's son's son
(whether by legitimate blood relationship or by adoption) living at the
time of adoption;
(ii) if the adoption is of a daughter, the adoptive father or mother by
whom the adoption is made must not have a Hindu daughter or son's
daughter (whether by legitimate blood relationship or by adoption) living
at the time of adoption;
(iii) if the adoption is by a male and the person to be adopted is a female,
the adoptive father is at least twenty-one years older than the person to be
adopted;
(iv) if the adoption is by a female and the person to be adopted is a male,
the adoptive mother is at least twenty-one years older than the person to
be adopted;
(v) the same child may not be adopted simultaneously by two or more
persons;
(vi) the child to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption
by the parents or guardian concerned or under their authority with intent
to transfer the child from the family of its birth 2[or in the case of an
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abandoned child or child whose parentage is not known, from the place
or family where it has been brought up] to the family of its adoption:
Provided that the performance of datta homam shall not be essential to
the validity of adoption."
7. Section 11(6) provides that a child to be adopted must be actually given
and taken in adoption by parents or guardian concerned or under their authority
with intend to transfer a child from family of his birth to the family of his
adoption. If the adoption deed is considered, then it is not mentioned that actual
custody of child was given to grand mother of petitioner. It is merely
mentioned that after adoption, sweets have been distributed and adoption has
been done with consent of parents of child. It is nowhere mentioned that actual
custody of child was given and taken in adoption.
8. Be that whatever it may be.
9. In the adoption deed, it was also mentioned that at the time of adoption
of petitioner, no documentary evidence was created, therefore, on 16.12.2009
adoption deed was executed but in the entire adoption deed, it is nowhere
mentioned that when actual adoption was done. Furthermore, petitioner was
taken in adoption by his own maternal grand mother and in the adoption deed it
is mentioned as under:-
"यहक मझ दत गकह आय 60 वर ह च ह चक मझ दत गह ई पत
नह gS और मर पक भ फफ ह च हह अ एव मर पररव र मम वश बल o`f) कलय ई
व ररस भ नह ह फलसवरप मझ पत ग द लन आवशय हई ह ग द कलय ज न व ल
मर पत पत ह कजस महन कहनद ररक ररव ज अनस र अपन पक वश बल o`f) ह
ग द ल कलय ह ।"
10. Be that whatever it may be.
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11. Since the adoption deed does not confer to the mandatory requirement as
provided under Section 11 of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, therefore,
this Court is of considered opinion that petitioner has failed to prove that he
was validly taken in adoption by his maternal grand mother.
12. Furthermore, according to mark-sheets filed by petitioner himself, his
date of birth is 13.10.2003. As per clause 3.2 of Policy for appointment on
compassionate ground, if aspirant is minor on the date of death of employee,
then he can make an application for appointment on compassionate ground
within a period of one year from the date of attaining majority. Thus, it is clear
that petitioner had attained majority on 12.10.2021 and in the light of clause 3.2
of Policy for appointment on compassionate ground, he should have made an
application for appointment on compassionate ground by 12.10.2022 whereas
application for appointment on compassionate ground was made on
13.07.2024. Thus, it is clear that even otherwise application filed by petitioner
was barred by time.
13. The Supreme Court in the case of The State of West Bengal Vs.
Debabrata Tiwari & Ors. by judgment dated 03.03.2023 passed in Civil
Appeal Nos.8842-8855/2022 has held as under :-
"7.1. . . . . . .
v. There is a consistent line of authority of this Court on the
principle that appointment on compassionate grounds is given only for
meeting the immediate unexpected hardship which is faced by the
family by reason of the death of the bread earner vide Jagdish Prasad
vs. State of Bihar, (1996) 1 SCC 301. When an appointment is made on
compassionate grounds, it should be kept confined only to the purpose
it seeks to achieve, the idea being not to provide for endless
compassion, vide I.G. (Karmik) vs. Prahalad Mani Tripathi, (2007) 6
SCC 162. In the same vein is the decision of this Court in Mumtaz
Yunus Mulani vs. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 384, wherein
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it was declared that appointment on compassionate grounds is not a
source of recruitment, but a means to enable the family of the deceased
to get over a sudden financial crisis.
vi. In State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. Sajad Ahmed Mir, AIR
2006 SC 2743, the facts before this Court were that the government
employee (father of the applicant therein) died in March, 1987. The
application was made by the applicant after four and half years in
September, 1991 which was rejected in March, 1996. The writ petition
was filed in June, 1999 which was dismissed by the learned Single
Judge in July, 2000. When the Division Bench decided the matter, more
than fifteen years had passed from the date of death of the father of the
applicant. This Court remarked that the said facts were relevant and
material as they would demonstrate that the family survived in spite of
death of the employee. Therefore, this Court held that granting
compassionate appointment after a lapse of a considerable amount of
time after the death of the government employee, would not be in
furtherance of the object of a scheme for compassionate appointment.
vii. In Shashi Kumar, this Court speaking through Dr. D.Y.
Chandrachud, J. (as His Lordship then was) observed that
compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule that
appointment to any public post in the service of the State has to be
made on the basis of principles which accord with Articles 14 and 16 of
the Constitution. That the basis of the policy is that it recognizes that a
family of a deceased employee may be placed in a position of financial
hardship upon the untimely death of the employee while in service. That
it is the immediacy of the need which furnishes the basis for the State to
allow the benefit of compassionate appointment......
8. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in
approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary
relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained
succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. vs.
Prosper Armstrong, (1874) 3 PC 221 as under:
"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an
arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his
conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent
to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has,
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though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party
in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if
the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these
cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every
case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be
just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of
that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the
length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the
interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of
Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as
it relates to the remedy."
Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief to
a party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the grant of relief
to a person by the High Court in the exercise of its power under Article
226 of our Constitution, came up for consideration before a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. vs. M. R. Meher,
President, Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450. In the said
case, it was regarded as a principle that disentitled a party for grant of
relief from a High Court in the exercise of its discretionary power
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
In State of M.P. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 this Court
restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements in the
following words:
"9. ... the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not
ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent
and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the
Petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High
Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its
writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is premised on a
number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a
belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to
cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train
new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after
unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only
hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It
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was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights
in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the
High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such
jurisdiction."
While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of limitation
provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution,
ordinarily, a writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time, vide
Jagdish Lal vs. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538; NDMC vs. Pan
Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278.
9. Further, simply because the Respondents-Writ Petitioners submitted
their applications to the relevant authority in the year 2005-2006, it
cannot be said that they diligently perused the matter and had not slept
over their rights. In this regard, it may be apposite to refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal vs. Shiv Charan Singh
Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, wherein the following observations
were made:
"19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that
even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of
representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it
does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of
action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission
of representation to the competent authority does not arrest
time."
(emphasis by us)
10. Applying the said ratio to the facts of the present case, we hold that
the Respondents-Writ Petitioners, upon submitting their applications in
the year 2006-2005 did nothing further to pursue the matter, till the
year 2015 i.e., for a period of ten years. Notwithstanding the tardy
approach of the authorities of the Appellant-State in dealing with their
applications, the Respondent-Writ Petitioners delayed approaching the
High Court seeking a writ in the nature of a mandamus against the
authorities of the State. In fact, such a prolonged delay in approaching
the High Court, may even be regarded as a waiver of a remedy, as
discernible by the conduct of the Respondents Writ Petitioners. Such a
delay would disentitle the Respondents-Writ Petitioners to the
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discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Further, the
order of the High Court dated 17th March, 2015, whereby the writ
petition filed by some of the Respondents herein was disposed of with a
direction to the Director of Local Bodies, Government of West Bengal
to take a decision as to the appointment of the Respondents-Writ
Petitioners, cannot be considered to have the effect of revival of the
cause of action.
***
13. The sense of immediacy in the matter of compassionate
appointment has been lost in the present case. This is attributable to the
authorities of the Appellant-State as well as the Respondents-Writ
Petitioners. Now, entertaining a claim which was made in 2005-2006,
in the year 2023, would be of no avail, because admittedly, the
Respondents-Writ Petitioners have been able to eke out a living even
though they did not successfully get appointed to the services of the
Municipality on compassionate grounds. Hence, we think that this is
therefore not fit cases to direct that the claim of the Respondents-Writ
Petitioners for appointments on compassionate grounds, be considered
or entertained."
14. The Supreme Court in the case of Canara Bank Vs. Ajithkumar G.K.
decided on 11/2/2025 in Civil Appeal No. 30532/2019 has held as under:-
11. Decisions of this Court on the contours of appointment on
compassionate ground are legion and it would be apt for us to
consider certain well-settled principles, which have crystallized
through precedents into a rule of law. They are (not in sequential
but contextual order):
a) Appointment on compassionate ground, which is offered on
humanitarian grounds, is an exception to the rule of equality in the
matter of public employment [see General Manager, State Bank of
India v Anju Jain (2008)8 SCC 475].
b) Compassionate appointment cannot be made in the absence of rules
or instructions [see Haryana State Electricity Board v. Krishna Devi
(2002)10 SCC 246)].
c) Compassionate appointment is ordinarily offered in two
contingencies carved out as exceptions to the general rule, viz. to meet
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the sudden crisis occurring in a family either on account of death or of
medical invalidation of the breadwinner while in service [see V.
Sivamurthy v. Union of India (2008)13 SCC 730].
d) The whole object of granting compassionate employment by an
employer being intended to enable the family members of a deceased or
an incapacitated employee to tide over the sudden financial crisis,
appointments on compassionate ground should be made immediately to
redeem the family in distress [see Sushma Gosain v. Union of India
(1989)4 SCC 468].
e) Since rules relating to compassionate appointment permit a sidedoor
entry, the same have to be given strict interpretation [see Uttaranchal
Jal Sansthan v. Laxmi Devi (2009)11 SCC 453].
f) Compassionate appointment is a concession and not a right and the
criteria laid down in the Rules must be satisfied by all aspirants [see
SAIL v. Madhusudan Das (2008)15 SCC 560].
g) None can claim compassionate appointment by way of inheritance
[see State of Chattisgarh v. Dhirjo Kumar Sengar (2009)13 SCC 600].
h) Appointment based solely on descent is inimical to our constitutional
scheme, and being an exception, the scheme has to be strictly construed
and confined only to the purpose it seeks to achieve [see Bhawani
Prasad Sonkar v. Union of India (2011)4 SCC 209].
i) None can claim compassionate appointment, on the occurrence of
death/medical incapacitation of the concerned employee (the sole bread
earner of the family), as if it were a vested right, and any appointment
without considering the financial condition of the family of the deceased
is legally impermissible [see Union of India v. Amrita Sinha (2021)20
SCC 695)].
j) An application for compassionate appointment has to be made
immediately upon death/incapacitation and in any case within a
reasonable period thereof or else a presumption could be drawn that
the family of the deceased/incapacitated employee is not in immediate
need of financial assistance. Such appointment not being a vested right,
the right to apply cannot be exercised at any time in future and it cannot
be offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over [see
Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Anil Badyakar (2009)13 SCC 112)].
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k) The object of compassionate employment is not to give a member of a
family of the deceased employee a post much less a post for post held by
the deceased. Offering compassionate employment as a matter of course
irrespective of the financial condition of the family of the deceased and
making compassionate appointments in posts above Class III and IV is
legally impermissible [see Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana
(1994)4 SCC 138].
l) Indigence of the dependents of the deceased employee is the first
precondition to bring the case under the scheme of compassionate
appointment. If the element of indigence and the need to provide
immediate assistance for relief from financial destitution is taken away
from compassionate appointment, it would turn out to be a reservation
in favour of the dependents of the employee who died while in service
which would directly be in conflict with the ideal of equality guaranteed
under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution [see Union of India v. B.
Kishore (2011)13 SCC 131].
m)The idea of compassionate appointment is not to provide for endless
compassion [see I.G. (Karmik) v. Prahalad Mani Tripathi (2007)6
SCC 162].
n) Satisfaction that the family members have been facing financial
distress and that an appointment on compassionate ground may assist
them to tide over such distress is not enough; the dependent must fulfil
the eligibility criteria for such appointment [see State of Gujarat v.
Arvindkumar T. Tiwari (2012)9 SCC 545].
o) There cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time as the
applicant becomes a major after a number of years, unless there are
some specific provisions [see Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar (2000)7
SCC 192].
p) Grant of family pension or payment of terminal benefits cannot be
treated as substitute for providing employment assistance. Also, it is
only in rare cases and that too if provided by the scheme for
compassionate appointment and not otherwise, that a dependent who
was a minor on the date of death/incapacitation, can be considered for
appointment upon attaining majority [see Canara Bank (supra)].
q) An appointment on compassionate ground made many years after the
death/incapacitation of the employee or without due consideration of
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the financial resources available to the dependent of the
deceased/incapacitated employee would be directly in conflict with
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution [see National Institute of
Technology v. Niraj Kumar Singh (2007)2 SCC 481].
r) Dependents if gainfully employed cannot be considered [see Haryana
Public Service Commission v. Harinder Singh (1998)5 SCC 452].
s) The retiral benefits received by the heirs of the deceased employee
are to be taken into consideration to determine if the family of the
deceased is left in penury. The court cannot dilute the criterion of
penury to one of "not very well-to-do". [see General Manager (D and
PB) v. Kunti Tiwary (2004)7 SCC 271].
t) Financial condition of the family of the deceased employee, allegedly
in distress or penury, has to be evaluated or else the object of the
scheme would stand defeated inasmuch as in such an eventuality, any
and every dependent of an employee dying-inharness would claim
employment as if public employment is heritable [see Union of India v.
Shashank Goswami (2012)11 SCC 307 , Union Bank of India v. M. T.
Latheesh (2006)7 SCC 350 , National Hydroelectric Power
Corporation v. Nank Chand (2004)12 SCC 487 and Punjab National
Bank v. Ashwini Kumar Taneja (2004)7 SCC 265].
u) The terminal benefits, investments, monthly family income including
the family pension and income of family from other sources, viz.
agricultural land were rightly taken into consideration by the authority
to decide whether the family is living in penury. [see Somvir Singh
(supra)].
v) The benefits received by widow of deceased employee under Family
Benefit Scheme assuring monthly payment cannot stand in her way for
compassionate appointment. Family Benefit Scheme cannot be equated
with benefits of compassionate appointment. [see Balbir Kaur v. SAIL
(2000)6 SCC 493]
w) The fixation of an income slab is, in fact, a measure which dilutes the
element of arbitrariness. While, undoubtedly, the facts of each
individual case have to be borne in mind in taking a decision, the
fixation of an income slab subserves the purpose of bringing objectivity
and uniformity in the process of decision making. [see State of H.P. v.
Shashi Kumar (2019)3 SCC 653].
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x) Courts cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic
consideration [see Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha
Ramchandra Ambekar (1994)2 SCC 718].
y) Courts cannot allow compassionate appointment dehors the statutory
regulations/instructions. Hardship of the candidate does not entitle him
to appointment dehors such regulations/instructions [see SBI v. Jaspal
Kaur (2007)9 SCC 571].
z) An employer cannot be compelled to make an appointment on
compassionate ground contrary to its policy [see Kendriya Vidyalaya
Sangathan v. Dharmendra Sharma (2007)8 SCC 148].
It would be of some relevance to mention here that all the decisions
referred to above are by coordinate benches of two Judges.
29. The second sub-issue pertains to the real objective sought to be
achieved by offering compassionate appointment. We have noticed the
objectives of the scheme of 1993 and construe such objectives as
salutary for deciding any claim for compassionate appointment. The
underlying idea behind compassionate appointment in death-in-harness
cases appears to be that the premature and unexpected passing away of
the employee, who was the only bread earner for the family, leaves the
family members in such penurious condition that but for an appointment
on compassionate ground, they may not survive. There cannot be a
straitjacket formula applicable uniformly to all cases of employees
dying-in-harness which would warrant appointment on compassionate
grounds. Each case has its own peculiar features and is required to be
dealt with bearing in mind the financial condition of the family. It is
only in "hand-to-mouth" cases that a claim for compassionate
appointment ought to be considered and granted, if at all other
conditions are satisfied. Such "hand-to-mouth" cases would include
cases where the family of the deceased is 'below poverty line' and
struggling to pay basic expenses such as food, rent, utilities, etc.,
arising out of lack of any steady source of sustenance. This has to be
distinguished from a mere fall in standard of life arising out of the death
of the bread earner.
30. The observation in Kunti Tiwary (supra) noted above seems to
assume significance and we draw inspiration therefrom in making the
observation that no appointment on compassionate ground ought to be
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made as if it is a matter of course or right, being blissfully oblivious of
the laudable object of any policy/scheme in this behalf.
31. Thus, examination of the financial condition to ascertain whether
the respondent and his mother were left in utter financial distress
because of the death of the bread earner is not something that can be
loosely brushed aside."
15. Thus, it is clear that if dependents of deceased employee can survive for
considerable long time, then that by itself is sufficient to hold that very purpose
of appointment on compassionate ground has been frustrated. The appointment
on compassionate ground cannot be treated as an alternative mode of direct
recruitment. It is by way of an exception so that dependents of deceased
employee can survive and face the financial hardship on account of untimely
death of their bread winner. The maternal grand mother of petitioner was aged
about 60 years on the date of execution of adoption deed i.e. in the year 2009.
16. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, this Court
is of considered opinion that no case is made out warranting any direction to
the respondents to decide the application for grant of appointment on
compassionate ground.
17. Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
Rashid
