Madhya Pradesh High Court
Divicharan Lodhi vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 19 March, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 19th OF MARCH, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 10619 of 2025
DIVICHARAN LODHI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Arvind Kumar Dwivedi - Advocate for applicant.
Dr. Anjali Gyanani - Public Prosecutor for State.
ORDER
This application under Section 528 of BNSS has been filed for quashment
of FIR in Crime No.7/2025 registered at Police Station Kolaras District Shivpuri
for offence under Section 1015(2), 296, 351(2) of BNS and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)
(s) and 3(2) (v-a) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atorcities) Act.
2 . It is submitted by counsel for applicant that applicant had moved an
application for demarcation of land as land belonging to complainant is
contiguous to the land of applicant. Demarcation Panchnama was prepared and
on the basis of demarcation report, applicant has also filed an application under
Section 250 of M.P.L.R. Code, which is pending. Since a dispute with regard to
boundary is pending, therefore, by way of counter-blast and out of
malafides, respondent No.2 has lodged an FIR alleging that on 04.01.2025 at
about 1:00 p.m. he had gone to sprinkle fertilizer in his field. His field is
adjoining to the field of applicant with whom dispute is going on. After noticing
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the respondent, applicant started abusing filthly in the name of mother and sister
and also humiliated him by caste and also alleged that since respondent has
encroached upon the land of applicant, therefore, why he is not leaving the
encroachment. When it was objected by respondent, then applicant gave a lathi
blow on the right side of his head and as a result he sustained injury and blood
started oozing out. One Lathi was given on the back side of his waist. After
hearing his alarm, Rajaram Parihar and Rambabu Parihar intervened in the
matter. While fleeing away, applicant also extended a threat that today he has
survived, but in future he will kill him. It is submitted that since in the
demarcation report, it was found that respondent has encroached upon the land of
applicant, therefore, FIR has been lodged with solitary intention to pressurize
him.
3. Considered the submission made by counsel for applicant.
4 . Applicant has filed a copy of demarcation proceeding along with
demarcation Panchnama. It is clear from the notices which were given by
concerning authority to the neighbouring farmers, no notice was given to
respondent No.2.
5. Be that whatever it may be.
6. The Panchnama merely mentions that parties were made aware about the
location and permanent marks were fixed. Details of demarcation and manner in
which demarcation was carried out, are not mentioned. It is not known as to
mentions some digits, but this document does not contain signature of any of the
witnesses.
7 . Application under Section 250 of MPLR Code is pending and since
Tahsildar has passed the order under Section 129 (4) of MPLR Code, therefore it
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would not be appropriate to pass any further comments with regard to the order
passed by Tahsildar under Section 129(4) of MPLR Code. Therefore, even if it is
presumed that respondent No.2 has encroached upon the land belonging to
applicant, still he has not been disposessed in accordance with law. There is
nothing on record to show that any order under Section 250 of MPLR Code
thereby directing the respondent No.2 to remove his encroachment has ever been
passed. Even otherwise, if an order under Section 250 of MPLR Code is passed
and it is not complied with, then aggrieved party has a remedy of approaching the
competent authority under Section 250 (8) of MPLR Code. Once applicant has
already approached the Tahsildar under Section 250 of MPLR Code, then he is
not authorised to use muscle power to take possession and he has to take
possession in accordance with law.
8. Under these circumstances this Court is of considered opinion that it is
difficult to hold that FIR in question was lodged by way of counter blast or out of
malafide.
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Private
Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, reported in (2021) 19 SCC 401
has held as under:-
"13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the
decision of the Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir Ahmad [King
Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, 1944 SCC OnLine PC 29 :
(1943-44) 71 IA 203 : AIR 1945 PC 18] , the following principles
of law emerge:
13.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in
Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences.
13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the
cognizable offences.
13.3. However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence
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of any kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court
will not permit an investigation to go on.
13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, in the "rarest of rare cases". (The rarest of rare
cases standard in its application for quashing under Section
482CrPC is not to be confused with the norm which has been
formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained
previously by this Court.)
13.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is
sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in
the FIR/complaint.
13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial
stage.
13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a
rarity than an ordinary rule.
13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the
jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate
in two specific spheres of activities. The inherent power of the
court is, however, recognised to secure the ends of justice or
prevent the above of the process by Section 482CrPC.
13.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are
complementary, not overlapping.
13.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would
result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process
should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences.
13.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not
confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its
whims or caprice.
13.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which
must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported.
Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the
court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR.
Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would
be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that
the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it
amounts to abuse of process of law. During or after investigation,
if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the
application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may
file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate
which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance
with the known procedure.
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13.13. The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide, but
conferment of wide power requires the Court to be cautious. It
casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court.
13.14. However, at the same time, the Court, if it thinks fit, regard
being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint
imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by
this Court in R.P. Kapur [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC
OnLine SC 21 : AIR 1960 SC 866] and Bhajan Lal [State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri)
426] , has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint.
13.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged
accused, the Court when it exercises the power under Section
482CrPC, only has to consider whether or not the allegations in
the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not
required to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a
cognizable offence or not and the court has to permit the
investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the
FIR."
10. In the light of judgments passed by the Supreme Court in the cases
of XYZ v. State of Gujarat reported in (2019) 10 SCC 337, State of Tamil
Nadu Vs. S. Martin & Ors. reported in (2018) 5 SCC 718 , Ajay Kumar Das
v. State of Jharkhand, reported in (2011) 12 SCC 319, Mohd. Akram
Siddiqui v. State of Bihar reported in (2019) 13 SCC 350, State of A.P. v.
Gourishetty Mahesh reported in (2010) 11 SCC 226, M. Srikanth v. State of
Telangana, reported in (2019) 10 SCC 373, CBI v. Arvind Khanna reported
in (2019) 10 SCC 686, State of MP Vs. Kunwar Singh by order dated
30.06.2021 passed in Cr.A. No.709/2021, Munshiram v. State of Rajasthan,
reported in (2018) 5 SCC 678, Teeja Devi v. State of Rajasthan reported in
(2014) 15 SCC 221, State of Orissa v. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan, reported in
(2012) 4 SCC 547, S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal reported in (2019) 2 SCC
336, Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460, Padal
Venkata Rama Reddy Vs. Kovuri Satyanarayana Reddy reported in (2012)
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12 SCC 437 and M.N. Ojha v. Alok Kumar Srivastav reported in (2009) 9
SCC 682. Hence, it is clear that this Court can quash the proceedings only if
uncontroverted allegations do not make out an offence.
11. So far malafides are concerned, the same lose importance if the
compalint disclosed cognizable offence.
12. The Supreme Court in the case of Renu Kumari Vs. Sanjay Kumar
and others, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 346 has held as under:-
"9."8. Exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC in a case of this
nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not
confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the
inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of
CrPC. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent
jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order
under CrPC, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii)
to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor
desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the
exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing
with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise.
The courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express
provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of
functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the
doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely
recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All
courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any
express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers
as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course
of administration of justice on the principle of
quandolexaliquidalicuiconcedit, concederevidetur et id sine quo
res ipsaeesse non potest (when the law gives a person anything, it
gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising the
powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of
appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section, though
wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and
only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically
laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex
debitojustitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
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administration of which alone the courts exist. Authority of the
court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made
to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has the
power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the
court to allow any action which would result in injustice and
prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers the court
would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of
court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the
ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the report, the
court may examine the question of fact. When a report is sought to
be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess
what the report has alleged and whether any offence is made out
even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 9. In R.P. Kapur v.
State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866 : (1960) 3 SCR 388] this Court
summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can
and should be exercised to quash the proceedings: (i) where it
manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution
or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in
the first information report or complaint taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no
legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or
manifestly fails to prove the charge. (AIR p. 869) 10. In dealing
with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the
distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or
where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the
accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which,
on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court
would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether
the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a
reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained.
That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not
be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. The court
should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and
should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration
before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands
of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person
needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument
handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring
about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under
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Section 482 CrPC and the categories of cases where the High
Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable
offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court
in State of Haryana v. BhajanLal [1992 Supp (1) SCC335 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] . A note of caution was,
however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and
that too in the rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories
indicated by this Court are as follows : (SCC pp. 378-79, para
102) '(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report
or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.(2) Where the allegations
in the first information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)
of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the
uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case against the
accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where
there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of
the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding
is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act
concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.' 11. As noted above, the powers
possessed by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC are very
wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in
its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision, in
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exercise of this power, is based on sound principles. The inherent
power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.
The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally
refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the
entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence
has not been collected and produced before the Court and the
issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and
cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material.
Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to
cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary
jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata
Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 :
AIR 1993 SC 892] and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar
[AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1].] It would not be proper for
the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light
of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction
would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion
that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to
assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint
cannot be proceeded with. When an information is lodged at the
police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of
the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material
collected during the investigation and evidence led in the court
which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of
mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot
by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. [See
Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar [1990 SuppSCC 686 : 1991
SCC (Cri) 142] , State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1)
SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192] , RupanDeol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal
Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] , State of
Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan [(1999) 2 SCC 651 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 304] ,
State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC 705 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
497] , Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC 397
: 1997 SCC (Cri) 415], SatvinderKaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of
Delhi) [(1999) 8 SCC 728 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1503] and Rajesh
Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri)
401] .]" The above position was again reiterated in State of
Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [(2002) 3 SCC89 : 2002 SCC (Cri)
539] , State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta [(2004) 1 SCC 691 :
2004 SCC (Cri) 353] and State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo
[(2005) 13 SCC 540 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 272] , SCC pp. 547-50,
paras 8-11."
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1 3 . Therefore, it is clear that this Court can quash the FIR only if
uncontroverted allegations do not make out the cognizable offence. Even after
considering the document of quasi-judicial proceedings, this Court is unable to
hold that applicant has acquired any indefeasible right to dispossess the
respondent No.2 by show of muscle power. Furthermore, FIR discloses the
commission of cognizable offence. Respondent No.2 had sustained injury.
14. So far as the contention of applicant that no offence under Section 3(1)
(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2) (v-a) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atorcities) Act is made out is concerned, it is mentioned that in
the FIR that caste related words were also uttered. Investigation is still pending
and this Court cannot quash the investigation thereby killing unborn baby and
restraining the police to collect evidence/material.
15. Considering the totally of facts and circumstances of the case, no case
is made out warranting interference. Application fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
Rashid
