Madhya Pradesh High Court
Bhagwan Das Yadav vs The State Of M.P. on 26 June, 2025
Author: Maninder S. Bhatti
Bench: Maninder S. Bhatti
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:27787
1 WPS-5632-2004
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MANINDER S. BHATTI
ON THE 26th OF JUNE, 2025
WRIT PET. (SERVICE) No. 5632 of 2004
BHAGWAN DAS YADAV
Versus
THE STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Gulab Kali Patel - Advocate assisted with Shri KBS Bedi - Advocate for the
petitioner.
Shri K.V..S. Sunil Rao - Panel Lawyer for the State.
ORDER
This petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India has
been filed for the following reliefs:
"1. That the record of the case pertaining to the
petitioners may kindly be called for the kind perusal of
this Hon'ble Court.
2. That the impugned order Annexure P/10 dated
22/11/1997 Annexure P/11 dated 06/07/1998 and
Annexure P/15 dated 01/06/2004 may kindly be
quashed by a writ of certiorari.
3. That further a writ of mandamus be issued
commanding the respondent to reinstate the petitioner in
service with all back wages and pecuniary benefits.
4. That further the petitioner be given his due
seniority, benefits of promotion and other incidental
which accrue by continuity in service.
5. That the petitioner be also given his difference of
suspension allowances and the petition be allowed with
cost as such.
6. The Hon'ble High Court may be further pleased
to pass any other appropriate order or direction in the
facts and circumstances of the case with cost."
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:27787
2 WPS-5632-2004
2. The facts as elaborated in the memorandum of petition reveal
that the petitioner was appointed on the post of constable and in compliance
of order dated 30/01/1996 (Annexure P/1), he was deputed with former
MLA Shri Kapoor Chand Guhara as his security Guard. The petitioner was
suspended vide order dated 03/04/1996 (Annexure P/2) as Crime No.21/1996
under Sections 302/147/148/149, 120B of IPC was registered against him.
Later on a charge sheet was also issued containing charges that the petitioner
without prior sanction of leave, remained absent and had gone to his village
without surrendering his ammunition, thus, violated paragraph 64 of Police
Regulation (General Condition) and Sub Rule 1 and 2 of Rule 3 of MP Civil
Service (Conduct) Rules, 1965. Enquiry ensued in passing of impugned
orders and thus, assailing the orders impugned dated 22/11/1197 (Annexure
P/10, dated 06/07/1998 (Annexure P/11) and dated 01/06/2004 (Annexure
P/15), this petition has been filed.
3. Counsel for the petitioner contends that it is a case where the
petitioner was confronted with the charge-sheet in which three charges were
levelled. As per charge No.1, the petitioner while on duty on 20/03/1996 as
the Security Guard of former MLA Shri Kapoor Chand Guhara, availed leave
without any authority and remained unauthorizedly absent. The petitioner's
conduct was careless and negligent and during the said period of leave, he
was in possession of ammunition, thus, the petitioner was guilty of violation
of paragraph 64 of Police Regulation (General Condition) and Sub Rule 1
and 2 of Rule 3 of MP Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1965. Counsel
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:27787
3 WPS-5632-2004
contends that in the present case, departmental action was initiated on an
allegation that the petitioner herein was made accused in a case which was
registered as Crime No.21/1996 under Sections 302/147/148/149, 120B of
IPC. As per the allegation in the said criminal case, the petitioner was guilty
of committing murder of the victim on 23/03/1996. The department then
issued the charge-sheet to the petitioner, as according to the department, the
petitioner was supposed to be on duty assigned to him with former MLA
Shri Kapoor Chand Ghuhara, however, the petitioner remained absent and
committed offence on 23/03/1996.
4. It is contended by the counsel that in the criminal case, during
course of trial, statement of former MLA Kapoor Chand Ghuhara was
recorded and he clearly stated that the petitioner herein was with him on duty
and his statement was discussed by the trial Court in paragraph 26 of the
judgment. The petitioner ultimately was acquitted by the trial Court. The trial
Court while acquitting the petitioner, concluded that the prosecution failed to
prove the allegation beyond reasonable doubt and the chain of circumstances
which was found basis to implicate the present petitioner, was only giving
rise to the suspicion. The present petitioner was thus acquitted and it was a
judgement of clean acquittal. It is contended by the counsel that during the
course of Departmental Inquiry also, statement of former MLA Kapoor
Chand Ghuhara was recorded and again the said witness clearly stated that
during the course of inquiry the petitioner was with him from 01/03/1996 to
24/03/1996.
5. Counsel contends that the aforesaid testimony of Kapoor Chand
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:27787
4 WPS-5632-2004
Ghuhara has been disbelieved by the Inquiry Officer as well as the
Disciplinary Authority and according to them the said testimony was not
trustworthy and was made in order to extend undue favour to the present
petitioner. Resultantly, the impugned order of dismissal was passed. It is
contended by the counsel that the the very basis, which was made
instrumental to issue charge-sheet against the petitioner, did not survive any
further as the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case. It is thus
contended by the counsel that the order of dismissal deserves to be set aside.
In support of his contention, counsel has placed reliance in the judgment of
Apex Court on the case of Ram Lal Vs. The State of Rajasthan reported in
Civil Appeal No.7935/2023 decided on 04/12/2023. Counsel has also placed
reliance on the case of Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police reported
in 1999 (2) SCC 10 and G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. reported in
(2006) 5 SCC 446 .
6. Per contra, counsel for the State submits that the present petition
filed by the petitioner deserves to be dismissed. It is contended by the
counsel that the proof which is required in a departmental inquiry and in
criminal case is entirely different. In a criminal case the charges are required
to be proved beyond reasonable doubt whereas in a departmental inquiry, the
principle of preponderance of probability prevails. The petitioner having
been acquitted in the criminal case, cannot claim reinstatement as a matter of
right. The dismissal order cannot be interfered with on the ground that the
petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case. It is contended by the counsel
that the interference with the departmental inquiry and its outcome is limited
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:27787
5 WPS-5632-2004
in the present case as no eventuality exists to interfere with the impugned
order and the departmental inquiry having been conducted in accordance
with law. It is contended by the counsel that it was within the wisdom of the
Disciplinary Authority to evaluate the testimony of former MLA Kapoor
Chand Ghuhara and the testimony of said witness was disbelieved by the
Disciplinary Authority inasmuch as, Kapoor Chand Ghuhara had deviated
from his original version of statement given under Section 161 of Cr.P.C.
Thus, no interference is warranted with the impugned order.
7. No other point is pressed or argued by the parties.
8. Heard rival submissions of the parties and perused the record.
9. The present petitioner was deputed as a Security Guard with
former MLA Kapoor Chand Ghuhara. A Charge-sheet was issued to the
petitioner on the ground that the petitioner who was supposed to be on his
assigned duty with former MLA on 23/03/1996, committed the offence
under the aforesaid sections and was arrested as well. Accordingly, following
charges were levelled against the petitioner:
:: आरोप ::
दनांक 20-3-96 को ी कपूर च घुवारा, पूव वधायक क सुर ा डयुट म
तैनात रहते हुये िनयमानुसार अवकाश वीकृ त कराये बना अनुप थत होकर अपने
मूल गृह ाम-पथरगुवं ा भाग जाना । इस कार सुर ा डयुट म ग भीर लापरवाह
दिशत करना ।
2. उ समय म कत य पर उप थत नह ं होते हुये भी शासक य आ स
ए यूनेशन अपने पास रखना। इस कार कत य के ित लापरवाह एवं उदासीनता
का प रचय दे ना ।
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:27787
6 WPS-5632-2004
3. इस कार पुिलस रे यूलेशन के परा 64 हू ँ सामा य शत हू ँ एवं म०५०
िस वल लेवा हू ँ आचरण हू ँ िनयम 1965 के िनयम 3-1-828 का उ लंटॉन करना ।
10. A perusal of the aforesaid charges reveal that the petitioner on
20/03/1996 was not on duty with former MLA and left without there being
any sanctioned leave, to his house at village Pathargawan and thereby was
guilty of negligence in performance of his duties. The other allegation was
that the petitioner while proceeding on unauthorized absence was in custody
of government ammunition, and thereby was guilty of paragraph 64 of Police
Regulation (General Condition) and Sub Rule 1 and 2 of Rule 3 of MP Civil
Service (Conduct) Rules, 1965.
11. In order to ascertain the aforesaid controversy, if the record is
perused, it would reveal that the petitioner was deputed as a Security Guard
with former MLA. The petitioner who was supposed to be with former MLA,
according to respondents, committed the offence of murder on 23/03/1996. It
is undisputed that now the petitioner has been acquitted from the charges and
thus, the question which requires consideration in the present case as to
whether in a case where the key witness in the departmental inquiry as well
as in the prosecution is same, thus, the acquittal of the petitioner would have
any bearing on the disciplinary proceedings and its outcome or not? In the
present case the statement of former MLA was recorded before the trial
Court on 22/03/1999 and the statement of the same witness was recorded in
departmental inquiry on 17/07/1997. Both the statements have been brought
on record by the petitioner as Annexure P/6 as well as Annexure P/16 to the
rejoinder. The statement which was recorded during the departmental inquiry
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:27787
7 WPS-5632-2004
reveal that Kapoor Chand Ghuhara stated that the present petitioner was with
him on 23/03/1996 and further admitted in cross-examination that the
petitioner was on duty from 01/03/1996 to 24/03/1996. The statement of
Kapoor Chand Ghuhara which was recorded by the trial Court on 28/03/1999
further reveals that the present petitioner was with him on 22/03/1996 and he
stayed in the following night with him only and on 23/03/1996 he was with
the said witness in Dongiri and then on 24/03/1997 the petitioner came to
Tikamgarh along with the said witness. Therefore, in both the statements, the
said witness supported the stand of the petitioner that on 23/03/1996 he was
with the said witness.
12. Thus, it is thus has to be examined as to whether the disciplinary
authority fell in error in not appreciating the material available on record.
The disciplinary authority proceeded to pass the impugned order while
observing that the testimony of former MLA Kapoor Chand Ghuhara was not
trustworthy and according to the authority the said statement was given in
order to extend favour to the present petitioner. The said finding so arrived at
by the disciplinary authority, in the considered view of this Court is
unsustainable. It is further important to take note of the fact that subsequently
also when the statement of the said witness was recorded on 22/03/1999, he
again supported his previous version only, therefore, in both the statements,
the witness maintained his version that the present petitioner was with him
on 23/03/1996. It is also undisputed that, subsequently the present petitioner
was acquitted vide judgement dated 24/01/2004 (Annexure P/13).
13. It is trite that the Court in exercise of powers of judicial review,
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:27787
8 WPS-5632-2004
is precluded from appreciating the evidence which has been relied upon by
the authorities but where there is ignorance by the Disciplinary Authority of
material evidence, this Court cannot lay its hands off. The Court is required
to find out whether there exists some evidence so as to support the findings
regarding the culpability of employee concerned. The Apex Court in the case
of Deputy General Manager and Ors. Vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava reported in
(2021) 2 SCC 612 has held in paragraph 28 as under:
"28. The Constitutional Court while exercising its jurisdiction
of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the
Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at
in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of
malafides or perversity, i.e., where there is no evidence to support
a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably
and with objectivity could have arrived at that findings and so long
as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by
the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained."
14. The Apex Court in the case of United bank of India Vs.
Vishwajeet Bhattacharya reported in 2022 13 SCC 329 held in paragraph 21
as under:
"21. The bank is correct, when it contends that an appellate
review of the materials and findings cannot ordinarily be
undertaken, in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Yet, from H.C. Goel onwards, this court has consistently ruled that
where the findings of the disciplinary authority are not based on
evidence, or based on a consideration of irrelevant material, or
ignoring relevant material, are mala fide, or where the findings are
perverse or such that they could not have been rendered by any
reasonable person placed in like circumstances, the remedies
u n d e r Article 226 of the Constitution are available, and
intervention, warranted. For any court to ascertain if any findings
were beyond the record (i.e., no evidence) or based on any
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:27787
9 WPS-5632-2004
irrelevant or extraneous factors, or by ignoring material evidence,
necessarily some amount of scrutiny is necessary. A finding of "no
evidence" or perversity, cannot be rendered sans such basic
scrutiny of the materials, and the findings of the disciplinary
authority. However, the margin of appreciation of the court
under Article 226 of the Constitution would be different; it is not
appellate in character."
15. If the impugned orders are tested on the anvil of the aforesaid
decision of the Apex Court, it would be important to take note, that in the
present case the key witness former MLA Kapoor Chand Ghuhara was the
same witness who was there in the departmental inquiry as well as in the
criminal prosecution. The said witness was the sole key witness whose
testimony was important inasmuch as the petitioner was deputed to provide
security to him only. The said witness clearly stated that the petitioner was
with him on 23/03/1996. The said statement was not rebutted even in the
prosecution as well as in the departmental inquiry, therefore, the disciplinary
authority, had ignored the material evidence. It is undisputed that the power
of judicial review with the disciplinary proceedings are limited but when the
disciplinary authority ignores the material evidence, the Courts are not
powerless.
16. The effect of acquittal in a criminal case where the witnesses and
the allegations are identical, was taken note of recently by the Apex Court in
the case of 2024 (1) SCC 175 reported in Ram Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan
and Ors. The Apex Court in the case of Ram Lal (Supra) in paragraph 12 has
held as under:
"12. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the
criminal court are identical or similar, and if the evidence,
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:27787
10 WPS-5632-2004
witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the matter
acquires a different dimension. If the court in judicial review
concludes that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after
full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the
prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, the Court in
judicial review can grant redress in certain circumstances. The
court will be entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it
concludes that allowing the findings in the disciplinary
proceedings to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. Each
case will turn on its own facts. [See G.M. Tank vs. State of
Gujarat & Others, (2006) 5 SCC 446, State Bank of Hyderabad vs.
P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657 and S. Samuthiram (supra)]"
17. Therefore, as the key witness for whose security the petitioner
was deputed, in criminal case as well as departmental inquiry remained firm
in his version that the petitioner was there with him on 23/03/1996, the
disciplinary authority could not have ignored the material evidence in a
purely high handed, mechanical, and capricious manner. The disciplinary
authority while disbelieving the testimony of key witness, has acted in a
callous manner, therefore, in the considered view of this Court, the
impugned orders are unsustainable.
18. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. Vs. Jaipal
Singh reported in (2004) 1 SCC 201 wherein the Court has held in paragraph
4 as under:
"On a careful consideration of the matter and the materials on
record, including the judgment and orders brought to our notice,
we are of the view that it is well accepted that an order rejecting a
special leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons
therefore does not constitute any declaration of law by this Court
or constitute a binding precedent. Per contra, the decision relied
upon for the appellant is one on merits and for reasons specifically
recorded therefore and operates as a binding precedent as well. On
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:27787
11 WPS-5632-2004
going through the same, we are in respectful agreement with the
view taken in [1996] 11 SCC 603 (supra). If prosecution, which
ultimately resulted in acquittal of the person concerned was at the
behest or by department itself, perhaps different considerations
may arise. On the other hand, if as a citizen the employee or a
public servant got involved in a criminal case and it after initial
conviction by the trial court, he gets acquittal on appeal
subsequently, the department cannot in any manner be found fault
with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges, a
person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be
retained in service. Consequently, the reasons given in the
decision relied upon, for the appellants are not only convincing
but are in consonance with reasonableness as well. Though
exception taken to that part of the order directing re-instatement
cannot be sustained and the respondent has to be re-instated, in
service, for the reason that the earlier discharge was on account of
those criminal proceedings and conviction only, the appellants are
well within their rights to deny back wages to the respondent for
the period he was not in service. The appellants cannot be made
liable to pay for the period for which they could not avail of the
services of the respondent. The High Court, in our view,
committed a grave error, in allowing back wages also, without
adverting to all such relevant aspects and considerations.
Consequently, the order of the High Court in so far as it directed
payment of back wages are liable to be and is hereby set aside."
19. The decision in the case of Jai Pal (Supra) reveals that where the
disciplinary action is based on prosecution of the employee in a criminal
case, liability to pay wages cannot be fastened on the employer. Though, in
the present case disciplinary action was not per se based on prosecution but
the charge of unauthorized absence had nexus with the prosecution case as
the alleged offence according to prosecution was committed by the petitioner
on 23/03/1996 i.e., the alleged date of absence of the petitioner. Hence,
under the facts and circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled for any back
wages.
20. Accordingly, the impugned orders Annexure P/10 dated
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:27787
12 WPS-5632-2004
22/11/1997 Annexure P/11 dated 06/07/1998 and Annexure P/15 dated
01/06/2004 stand set aside and the petition stands allowed.
21. As the petitioner has already attained the age of 70 years, he
would be entitled for all retiral benefits. Let the dues be calculated and be
paid to the petitioner within 90 days from the date of communication of
certified copy of this order.
22. Accordingly, this petition stands allowed.
(MANINDER S. BHATTI)
JUDGE
Astha
