Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sonpal vs Narena @ Ramnarayan on 18 June, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:12573
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 18th OF JUNE, 2025
SECOND APPEAL No. 3231 of 2024
SONPAL
Versus
NARENA @ RAMNARAYAN AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Mr. Jai Prakash Mishra - Advocate for the appellant.
Mr. A.K. Nirankari - Govt. Advocate for the State.
JUDGMENT
This second appeal under Section 100 of CPC has been filed against
the judgment and decree dated 07.11.2024 passed by Third District Judge,
Ambah, District Morena in RCA No.08/2020 and the judgment and decree
dated 07.02.2020 passed by Third Civil Judge, Class-II, Ambah, District
Morena in Regular Civil Suit No.15A/2019.
2. The facts necessary for adjudication of this appeal in short are that
the plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction in
respect of Survey No. 1862 area 0.53 hectare and Survey No. 1941 area 1.08
hectare situated in Village Bareh, Tahsil Ambah, District Morena. It is the
case of the plaintiff that the property in dispute was ancestral property.
Initially the said land was recorded in the name of Lalhans. After his death,
name of his legal representatives namely Patirama and Sarvati were
recorded. Plaintiff Narena is also the son of Lalhans, but since he was minor,
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therefore, his name was not mutated, whereas plaintiff is the real brother of
Patirama (As per family tree as mentioned in plaint, Lalhans had two sons
namely Chhote and Vedari. Sarvati, Patirama and Narena are sons of Chhote
whereas Vedari is alleged to have expired issueless). It was further alleged
that the father of the defendant namely Vijay Singh got his name mutated in
the revenue records in a clandestine manner by playing fraud, whereas Vijay
Singh is not the member of Joint Hindu Family and, thus, it was pleaded that
father of the defendant Vijay Singh did not acquire any right or title in the
property. It was alleged that 4 bigha and 1 biswa land was got mutated by
Vijay Singh in his name, whereas remaining 2 bigha and 2 biswa land was
mutated in the name of Patirama. Patirama died issueless in the year 1970
and since plaintiff was the real brother of Patirama and, therefore, his name
was mutated in the revenue record. The plaintiff was taken by his maternal
uncle and aunt to Surat where he was brought up. Later on, Vijay Singh,
after getting the plaintiff declared as dead, got the entire land, i.e., 7 bigha
and 11 biswa of land mutated in his name and, thereafter, executed a Will in
favour of defendant Sonpal and Tatiya. Later on, Tatiya expired. It was
alleged that defendants Sonpal and Tatiya got their names mutated in the
revenue record by order dated 26.05.2002 passed by Tahsildar, Ambah in
Case No. 06A 6/2001-02. In the year 2013, the plaintiff came back from
Surat and started residing in his Village - Hathi Ratipura along with family
and started cultivating the disputed land. On 01.01.2019 when the plaintiff
was keeping watch over his crop, then the defendant came to the spot along
with the persons having muscle power and threatened that the plaintiff
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should not come to the disputed land otherwise he would be killed. When the
plaintiff replied that the property in dispute is an ancestral property, then
fight took place. Later on, when the plaintiff obtained the certified copy of
the Khasra, then he found that father of the defendant namely Vijay Singh
has already got the lands mutated in the revenue record. On 12.2.2019, the
defendant again came to the spot and abused the plaintiff and had a fight
with him. On 14.2.2019 also, a fight took place with the defendant and, thus,
the suit was filed for declaration of title and permanent injunction.
3. The appellant / defendant filed his written statement and admitted
that his name is mutated in the revenue records. It was claimed that the name
of father of the plaintiff was Chhote and name of father of Chhote was
Khushali and not Lalhans. Lalhans had only one son Vedari who had expired
issueless. Vijay Singh had purchased the property in dispute by registered
sale deed executed by Vedari in his favour. Vijay Singh had also executed a
Will in favour of the defendant and his brother and, accordingly, on the basis
of Will executed by Vijay Singh, names of the defendant and his brother
were recorded in the revenue records and, accordingly, the suit was
contested.
4. The trial Court after framing issues and recording evidence decreed
the suit and held that the plaintiff is the owner of Survey No. 1571 (new
number 1941) total area 2 bigha and 2 biswa situated at Village Barehi,
Tahsil Ambah, District Morena and also held that the plaintiff is entitled to
get the mutation in favour of the defendant set aside and permanent
injunction was also granted in respect to two bigha and two biswa of land
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forming part of Survey No. 1941 (new number) situated at Village Bareh,
Tahsil Ambah, District Morena.
5. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial
Court, the appellant preferred an appeal. The appellate Court allowed the
application filed by the appellant / defendant under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC
and relied upon the sale deed by holding it to be a public document but did
not consider that in absence of formal proof of the sale deed, whether the sale
deed can be relied upon or not. The court below also did not exercise his
power under Order 41 Rule 28 of CPC.
6. Be that whatever it may.
7. The aforesaid observation is being made in order to clarify that on
account of dismissal of this appeal, it should not be presumed that this Court
has approved the findings recorded by the appellate court with regard to
application filed by the appellant under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. In paragraph
29 of the impugned judgment, it is mentioned that as per Khasra Panchsala
of Samvat 2020-24 (Exhibit P-3), the property was recorded in the name of
Bedariya S/o Lalhans and Chhota and Patirama was shown to be in
possession in Column No. 14. Thereafter, in the Khasra Panchsala of Samvat
2025, i.e., year 1968-69 (Annexure P-4), name of Patirama and Vijay Singh
was recorded in respect of Survey Nos. 1571 area 6 bigha and 3 biswa part of
which 4 bigha and 1 biswa was recorded in the name of Vijay Singh. From
Samvat 2026 to 2030, Khasra Panchsala (Exhibit P-5), the name of Patirama
was recorded in respect of 2 bigha and 2 biswa of land, whereas name of
Vijay Singh was recorded in respect of 4 bigha and 1 biswa of land. It was
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held that the defendant has failed to prove that on what basis the mutation
was done and without any order by the Tahsildar, the name of Vijay Singh
could not have been recorded in the revenue record. It was further held that
the mutation entries do not confer any title and they are made for fiscal
purposes only.
8. However, from the sale deed filed by the defendant along with an
application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, it was held that 1 bigha of
land was purchased by Vijay Singh from Patirama and, accordingly, it was
held that the defendant is entitled for 1 bigha and 2 biswa of land in the light
of the sale deed dated 04.07.1977, which was taken as an additional evidence
in exercise of Power under 41 Rule 27 CPC.
9. As the plaintiff has not filed any appeal against the impugned
judgment, therefore, this Court cannot disturb the findings recorded by the
appellate court in respect of application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC as
well as reliance on sale deed filed along with the application filed under
Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. Therefore, that question is left open in case if any
appeal is filed by respondent No. 1 / plaintiff.
10. So far as the leftover land is concerned, the appellant has failed to
prove that on what basis the name of Vijay, i.e., father of the appellant, was
recorded in revenue records. When Vijay Singh had no right, then even the
appellant would not inherit or succeed any right in property. The name of
Vijay Singh was recorded in the revenue records without any order by the
competent authority. Mutation entry is merely an entry for fiscal purposes
and not a document of title.
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11. It is well established principle of law that this Court in exercise of
power under Section 100 of CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact
unless and until they are found to be perverse.
12. The Supreme Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali
reported in (2010) 12 SCC 740 has held as under:-
"13. A second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous
findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence.
The High Court should not entertain a second appeal unless it
raises a substantial question of law. It is the obligation on the court
of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not to
frustrate it by ignoring the same.
14. In Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Kumar & Bros. [(1998) 6 SCC
748 : AIR 1998 SC 2730], this Court held that existence of the
substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code and entering into the
question as to whether the need of the landlord was bona fide or
not, was beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court as the issue can
be decided only by appreciating the evidence on record.
15. There may be a question, which may be a "question of fact",
"question of law", "mixed question of fact and law" and
"substantial question of law". Question means anything inquired;
an issue to be decided. The "question of fact" is whether a
particular factual situation exists or not. A question of fact, in
the realm of jurisprudence, has been explained as under:
"A question of fact is one capable of being answered by way
of demonstration--a question of opinion is one that cannot be
so answered. The answer to it is a matter of speculation
which cannot be proved by any available evidence to be right
or wrong."
(Vide Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., p. 69, cited in
Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao v. Balasaheb Vikhe Patil
[(1994) 1 SCC 682], at SCC p. 705, para 34.)
16. In RBI v. Ramakrishna Govind Morey [(1976) 1 SCC 803 :
AIR 1976 SC 830] this Court held that whether the trial court
should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently, is not a
question of law or a substantial question of law and, therefore, the
second appeal cannot be entertained by the High Court on this
ground.
17. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann [(2001) 4 SCC 262]
this Court held that the question whether the lower court's finding
is perverse may come within the ambit of substantial question of
law. However, there must be a clear finding in the judgment of the
High Court as to perversity in order to show compliance with the
provisions of Section 100 CPC. Thus, this Court rejected the
proposition that scrutiny of evidence is totally prohibited in the
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second appeal.
18. In Sheel Chand v. Prakash Chand [(1998) 6 SCC 683 : AIR
1998 SC 3063] , this Court held that question of reappreciation of
evidence and framing the substantial question as to whether the
findings relating to the factual matrix by the court below could
vitiate due to irrelevant consideration and not under law, being
question of fact cannot be framed.
19. In Rajappa Hanamantha Ranoji v. Mahadev Channabasappa
[(2000) 6 SCC 120] this Court held that it is not permissible for
the High Court to decide the second appeal by reappreciating the
evidence as if it was deciding the first appeal unless it comes to the
conclusion that the findings recorded by the court below were
perverse.
20. In Jai Singh v. Shakuntala [(2002) 3 SCC 634 : AIR 2002 SC
1428] this Court held that it is permissible to interfere even on
question of fact but it has to be done only in exceptional
circumstances. The Court observed as under : (SCC pp. 637-38,
para 6)
"6. ... While scrutiny of evidence does not stand out to be
totally prohibited in the matter of exercise of jurisdiction in
the second appeal and that would in our view be too broad a
proposition and too rigid an interpretation of law not worthy
of acceptance but that does not also clothe the superior courts
within jurisdiction to intervene and interfere in any and every
matter--it is only in very exceptional cases and on extreme
perversity that the authority to examine the same in extenso
stands permissible--it is a rarity rather than a regularity and
thus in fine it can be safely concluded that while there is no
prohibition as such, but the power to scrutiny can only be had
in very exceptional circumstances and upon proper
circumspection."
21. In P. Chandrasekharan v. S. Kanakarajan [(2007) 5 SCC 669]
this Court reiterated the principle that interference in the second
appeal is permissible only when the findings are based on
misreading of evidence or are so perverse that no person of
ordinary prudence could take the said view. More so, the Court
must be conscious that intervention is permissible provided the
case involves a substantial question of law which is altogether
different from the question of law. Interpretation of a document
which goes to the root of title of a party may give rise to a
substantial question of law.
22. In Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti
Garvali [(2007) 11 SCC 668 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 964] this
Court considered the scope of appeal under Section 30 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and held as under : (SCC pp.
679-80, paras 39-40 & 42)
"39. Section 30 of the said Act postulates an appeal directly
to the High Court if a substantial question of law is involved
in the appeal.
40. A jurisdictional question will involve a substantial
question of law. A finding of fact arrived at without there
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being any evidence would also give rise to a substantial
question of law. ...
***
42. A question of law would arise when the same is not
dependent upon examination of evidence, which may not
require any fresh investigation of fact. A question of law
would, however, arise when the finding is perverse in the
sense that no legal evidence was brought on record or
jurisdictional facts were not brought on record."
Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Anathula
Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy [(2008) 4 SCC 594] .
23. In Rishi Kumar Govil v. Maqsoodan [(2007) 4 SCC 465] this
Court while dealing with the provisions of Section 21(1)(a) of the
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972 and Rule 16 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, held that the bona fide
personal need of the landlord is a question of fact and should not
be normally interfered with.
24. There is no prohibition to entertain a second appeal even on
question of fact provided the Court is satisfied that the findings of
the courts below were vitiated by non-consideration of relevant
evidence or by showing erroneous approach to the matter.
[Vide Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh [(1992) 1 SCC 647 : AIR
1992 SC 1604] , Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan [(1996) 5 SCC
353] , Satya Gupta v. Brijesh Kumar [(1998) 6 SCC 423] ,
Ragavendra Kumar v. Prem Machinery & Co. [(2000) 1 SCC 679
: AIR 2000 SC 534] and Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd.
[(2000) 4 SCC 285] ]25 [Ed. : Para 25 corrected vide Official
Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./68/2010 dated 9-7-2010.] . Thus, the
law on the subject emerges to the effect that second appeal under
Section 100 CPC is maintainable basically on a substantial
question of law and not on facts. However, if the High Court
comes to the conclusion that the findings of fact recorded by the
courts below are perverse being based on no evidence or based on
irrelevant material, the appeal can be entertained and it is
permissible for the Court to reappreciate the evidence. The
landlord is the best judge of his need, however, it should be real,
genuine and the need may not be a pretext to evict the tenant only
for increasing the rent."
13. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case,
this Court is of the considered opinion that no substantial question of law as
proposed by the appellant arises in the present appeal.
14. Accordingly, by keeping the right of the plaintiff to challenge the
findings recorded by the appellate court in respect of application filed under
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Order 41 Rule 27 CPC open, the judgment and decree dated 07.11.2024
passed by Third District Judge, Ambah, District Morena in RCA
No.08/2020 and the judgment and decree dated 07.02.2020 passed by Third
Civil Judge, Class-II, Ambah, District Morena in Regular Civil Suit
No.15A/2019 are hereby affirmed.
15. Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
AKS
