Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt. Veena vs Ganpat on 31 July, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:20182
1 MA-2525-2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PAVAN KUMAR DWIVEDI
ON THE 31st OF JULY, 2025
MISC. APPEAL No. 2525 of 2022
TATA AIG GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.
Versus
VEENA JOSHI AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Manoj Jain, learned counsel for the appellant.
Shri Shailendra Carpenter, learned counsel for the respondents.
WITH
MISC. APPEAL No. 3037 of 2022
SMT. VEENA AND OTHERS
Versus
GANPAT AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Shailendra Carpenter, learned counsel for the appellants.
Shri Manoj Jain, learned counsel for the respondent No.3.
ORDER
Both these appeals have been filed under Section 173 of Motor
Vehicles Act being aggrieved by the award dated 28.2.2022 passed by the
2nd Addl.Member MACT, Bagli, District Dewas in Claim Case No.30/2019.
M.A.No.2525/2022 has been filed by the Insurance Company on the ground
of false implication of the vehicle, assessment of income and incorrect
application of multiplier. M.A.No.3037/2022 has been filed by the claimants
alleging inadequacy of the compensation.
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2. Short facts of the case are that on 13.2.2019 deceased Mahesh was
going on his motorcycle to Dewas in relation to his official work, when he
reached ahead of villager Sirolia at around 12.00 - 12.30 in the afternoon
motorcycle No.MP-41-NB-3207 came from behind, which was being rode by
its rider in a very rash and negligent manner and dashed into motorcycle of
deceased Mahesh, because of which he sustained grievous injuries on his
head. He was rushed to MGH Hospital, Dewas through Dial-100 vehicle.
Looking to his serious condition he was referred therefrom to Bombay
Hospital, Indore, where he remained under treatment from 13.2.2019 to
14.2.2019. When he did not show any indication of improvement the doctors
at Bombay Hospital suggested the family members of the deceased Mahesh
to take him to home. Thus, they brought him to Hatpipliya, where Dr. Vijay
Nagar declared him dead. He conducted examination of the dead body and
information to Police Station, Hatpipliya was given on 14.2.2019 itself.
2.1 The claimants/appellants in appeal No.3037/2022 filed claim
petition under Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act claiming compensation for
death of deceased Mahesh. The claims Tribunal after considering the
evidence on record concluded that the appellant has died due to rash and
negligent driving of the offending vehicle and consequently granted
compensation for loss of dependency to the tune of Rs.71,28,428/-; an
amount of Rs.57,710/- for expenditure incurred in treatment; Rs.15,000/- for
funeral expenses and Rs.40,000/- for loss of consortium. As such, a total
amount of Rs.72,41,138.76 was awarded by the claims Tribunal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant/Insurance Company in appeal
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No.2525/2022 submits that the claims Tribunal has wrongly concluded that
the vehicle insured by the appellant-Insurance Company was involved in the
accident. He by referring to FIR (Ex.P/2) submits that the same was lodged
on 25.2.2019, thus by a delay of 12 days. He submits that for this reason it is
a clear case of false implication of the vehicle because there is delay of 12
days in lodging the FIR. He further submits by referring to Ex.P/13
(application for postmortem) that the cause of death was due to falling from
motorcycle and not the accident. He further submits that deceased Mahesh
has died as result of his old ailment of lungs. He submits that Ex.P/25 refers
to an old case of pulmonary embolism on acitrome. He submits that in fact
the real cause of death was not the head injury, but the disease of lungs. He
after doubting involvement of the vehicle and cause of death further submits
that even in case involvement of the vehicle is proved, then also quantum of
compensation is very high. By referring to findings recorded by the claims
Tribunal in para 20 of the award he submits that salary of the deceased was
taken at Rs.98,547/- including the dearness allowance and after deduction of
Income-tax and Professional tax, income of the deceased has been taken at
Rs.84,353/- and a multiplier of 9 has been applied in the same, which
according to the submissions of counsel for the appellant/Insurance
Company is not correct. He submits that the deceased was 58 years of age,
thus in any case he was going to retire after two more years of service, thus
multiplier of 9 should not have been applied and split multiplier should have
been applied i.e. one multiplier during service and another multiplier after
retirement from service. He also points out that after the death his family is
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receiving family pension. Thus, he submits that amount of compensation is
very high; not just and proper in the facts of the present case.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents/claimants/appellants in
the connected appeal No.3037/2022 submits that the claims Tribunal has
rightly concluded that the offending vehicle was involved in the accident. He
submits that argument of the Insurance Company that the FIR was registered
with a delay of 12 days is not correct in view of the fact that the accident has
taken place on 13.2.2019 and the intimation of death was given to the
concerned Police Station on very next day i.e. on 14.2.2019. The Marg case
was registered at No.8/2019 under Section 174 of Cr.P.C.and after
preliminary enquiry FIR was registered on 25.2.2019. It is, thus submitted
that there is no delay in registration of FIR. As regards the period from
13.2.2019 to 14.2.2019 he submits that deceased was being taken care of by
taking him to hospitals first at Dewas and then at Indore after his referral
thereat. Thus, only one day's time spend in the care of injured Mahesh, who
ultimately died due to injuries sustained on head. He further submits that
postmortem clearly provides that cause of death is injury in head. Thus, he
submits that merely wrong history and old ailment of lungs would not change
the cause of death. Ex.P/4 clearly provides the cause of death as head injury.
Thus, there is no scope for speculation of cause of death, it has been
established before the claims Tribunal that Mahesh has died due to severe
head injury.
4.1 As regards retirement of the deceased, learned counsel for the
respondents/claimants submits that it has already been settled by the Hon'ble
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Apex Court in the case of Sarla Verma Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and
another, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121, that for calculating just compensation
method of multiplier should be adopted. He further submits that in the case
o f Puttama and others Vs. K.L.Narayana Reddy and another, reported in
(2013) 15 SCC 45 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that split system
multiplier should not be applied in absence of any specific reason and
evidence on record of the Tribunal. As regards family pension he submits
that pecuniary benefits received by the legal heirs of deceased person cannot
be taken into account for calculating compensation in case of death of a
person in motor vehicle accident. For this purpose he relies on the judgment
of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sebastiani Lakra and others Vs.
National Insurance Co.Ltd.and another, reported in (2019) 17 SCC 465 . He
further relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case
of Helen C.Rebello (Mrs.) and others Vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport
Corporation and another, reported in (1999) 1 SCC 90 . Thus, he submits that
the contention of the appellant regarding involvement of the vehicle and
cause of death as well as the factum of retirement of the deceased after two
years had he not died are not sustainable so as to reverse the findings of the
claims Tribunal.
4.2 As regards the quantum of compensation counsel for the
claimants/appellants submits that the claims Tribunal has not properly
awarded the amount of compensation to the appellants on account of death
of Mahesh. He submits that the claims Tribunal has added 10% in the
income of the deceased, which should have been at 40%. He also submits
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that personal expenses should be deducted at 1/6th, which has been deducted
at 1/3rd. He submits that salary of the deceased for the month of January was
Rs.1,08,060/-, but the claims Tribunal has not taken into account the said
income. Thus, the amount of compensation is very less.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties; perused the record.
6. Counsel for the appellant/Insurance Company while referring to
Ex.P/13 has relied on the words written by Station-in-Charge in the
application for postmortem, which states thus "मोटरसाइ कल से िगरने से िसर पर चोट ".
He submits that it is a case of fall from motorcycle and not of accident. From
bare perusal of Ex.P/13 it can be seen that the same was submitted by the
Station-in-Charge of the Police Station for postmortem of the dead body on
14.2.2019 when he received Marg intimation about the death of Mahesh.
Thus, Marg intimation was subsequently culminated into registration of FIR
on 25.2.2019. It is thus seen that the delay in FIR is explained from the fact
that intimation about the accident was sent on the very next day as soon as
the process of getting the deceased treated was over. It is seen from Ex.P/13
as well as Ex.P/14, which are application for postmortem and the postmortem
report that the cause of death is head injury. The statement of independent
witness Ashok Sendhav (AW-2) is very important in this aspect. He has
stated in his Court statement that he was going from his village to Dewas, in
front of him some motorcycles were also going, when they reached just
ahead of village Sirolia, the rider of motorcycle No.MP-41-NB-3207 rode his
motorcycle in rash and negligent manner and dashed the motorcycle going in
front of the said bike because of which a person sitting on other motorcycle
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sustained grievous injuries. It is also stated by him that he tried to chase the
said motorcycle, but he ran from the spot. There were several persons
gathered at the spot of accident, someone called Dial-100 vehicle, which
took the injured person to Hospital. It is, thus clear that it is not only the
statement of appellant Veena Joshi (AW-1) (claimant/appellant No.1), but
there is also statement of Alok Sendhav (AW-2), which clearly provided
details of accident. The Police had also submitted its final report under
Section 173 of Cr.P.C. finding involvement of the vehicle. Therefore, there is
no reason to interfere with the findings of the claims Tribunal regarding
involvement of the vehicle.
7. The next submission of counsel for the Insurance Company is that
cause of death was not injury on head, but he was suffering from lung
disease, that may be the cause of death. This submission of counsel holds no
water in view of the material available on record, which is clear from the
evidence brought on regard Ex.P/14 that deceased died as a result of head
injury as well as the document Ex.P/24, which is CT BRAIN of deceased
Mahesh, which provides "chronic subdural haemorrhage overlying left
cerebral convexity". Even in the document relied by counsel for the
Insurance Company i.e. Ex.P/25 final diagnosis has been provided for
"Severe head injury with massive SDH old case of pulmonary embolism on
acitrome". It is, thus clear that the death has occasioned due to head injury
caused by accident. Thus, the old ailment of the deceased is of no relevance
in the present case.
8. Further submission of learned counsel for the Insurance Company is
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that the multiplier of 9 should not have been applied in view of the fact that
deceased was already 58 years of age and in any case he was going to retire
from service in two years. It is to be seen that deceased was a salaried
employee, who was indisputably 58 years of age, the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of Sarla Verma (supra) has pointed out that for the person aged 50 to
60 years, multiplier of 9 should be applied. The claims Tribunal has
accordingly applied the multiplier of 9. As regards contention of the
appellant that split multiplier should have been applied, the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Puttamma and others (supra) has held in para 32, 33 and
34 as under:-
"32. For determination of compensation in motor
accident claims under Section 166 this Court always
followed multiplier method. As there were
inconsistencies in the selection of a multiplier, this
Court in Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6
SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri)
1002] prepared a table for the selection of a multiplier
based on the age group of the deceased/victim. The
1988 Act, does not envisage application of a split
multiplier.
33. In K.R. Madhusudhan v. Administrative Officer
[(2011) 4 SCC 689 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 422 : (2011) 2
SCC (Cri) 706] this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 692,
paras 14-15)
"14. In the appeal which was filed by the
appellants before the High Court, the High
Court instead of maintaining the amount of
compensation granted by the Tribunal,
reduced the same. In doing so, the High
Court had not given any reason. The High
Court introduced the concept of split
multiplier and departed from the multiplier
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used by the Tribunal without disclosing any
reason therefor. The High Court has also not
considered the clear and corroborative
evidence about the prospect of future
increment of the deceased. When the age of
the deceased is between 51 and 55 years the
multiplier is 11, which is specified in the 2nd
column in the Second Schedule to the Motor
Vehicles Act, and the Tribunal has not
committed any error by accepting the said
multiplier. This Court also fails to appreciate
why the High Court chose to apply the
multiplier of 6.
15. We are, thus, of the opinion that the
judgment of the High Court deserves to be
set aside for it is perverse and clearly contrary
to the evidence on record, for having not
considered the future prospects of the
deceased and also for adopting a split
multiplier method."
34. We, therefore, hold that in absence of any specific
reason and evidence on record the tribunal or the court
should not apply split multiplier in routine course and
should apply multiplier as per decision of this Court in
Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 :
(2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] as
affirmed in Reshma Kumari [Reshma Kumari v. Madan
Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 :
(2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 826]".
9. It is, thus clear that in the present case also multiplier of 9 is the
correct multiplier and there are no particular reasons or special circumstances
for applying split multiplier.
10. As regards the aspect of the family pension etc., the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Sebastiani Lakra and others (supra) has held in para 12
as under:-
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"12. The law is well settled that deductions cannot be
allowed from the amount of compensation either
on account of insurance, or on account of pensionary
benefits or gratuity or grant of employment to a
kin of the deceased. The main reason is that all
these amounts are earned by the deceased on account of
contractual relations entered into by him with others. It
cannot be said that these amounts accrued to the
dependents or the legal heirs of the deceased on account
of his death in a motor vehicle accident. The
claimants/dependents are entitled to 'just
compensation' under the Motor Vehicles Act as a result
of the death of the deceased in a motor vehicle
accident. Therefore, the natural corollary is that the
advantage which accrues to the estate of the deceased
or to his dependents as a result of some
contract or act which the deceased performed in his life
time cannot be said to be the outcome or result of the
death of the deceased even though these amounts may
go into the hands of the dependents only after his
death."
11. Further in the case of Helen C. Rebellow (Mrs.) and others, the
Hon'ble Apex Court in para 32, 33 and 35 held as under :-
"32. So far as the general principle of estimating
damages under the common law is concerned, it is
settled that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only
by balancing on one hand, the loss to the claimant of the
future pecuniary benefits that would have accrued to
him but for the death with the 'pecuniary advantage
which from whatever source comes to him by reason of
the death. In other words, it is the balancing of loss and
gain of the claimant occasioned by the death. But this
has to change its colour to the extent a statute intends to
do. Thus, this has to be interpreted in the light of the
provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It is very
clear, to which there could be no doubt that this Act
delivers compensation to the claimant only on account
of accidental injury or death, not on account of any
other death. Thus, the pecuniary advantage accruing
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under this Act has to be deciphered, co-relating with the
accidental death. The compensation payable under the
Motor Vehicles Act is on account of the pecuniary loss
to the claimant by accidental injury or death and not
other forms of death. If there is natural death or death
by suicide, serious illness, including even death by
accident., through train, air flight not involving motor
vehicle. would not be covered under the Motor Vehicles
Act. Thus. the application of general principle under the
common law of loss and gain for the computation of
compensation under this Act must co-relate to this type
of injury or deaths, viz, accidental. If the words
"pecuniary advantage' from whatever source are to be
interpreted to mean any form of death under this Act it
would dilute all possible benefits conferred on the
claimant and would be contrary of the spirit of the law.
If the 'pecuniary advantage' resulting from death means
pecuniary advantage coming under all forms of death
then it will include all the assets movable, immovable,
shares, bank accounts, case and every amount
receivable under any contract. In other words, all
heritable assets including what is willed by the deceased
etc. This would obliterate both, all possible conferment
of economic security to the claimant by the deceased
and the intentions of the legislature. By such an
interpretation the tortfeasor in spite of his wrongful act
or negligence, which contributes to the death, would
have in many cases no liability or meagre liability. In
our considered opinion, the general principle of loss and
gain takes colour of this statute, viz., the gain has to be
interpreted which is as a result of the accidental death
and the loss on account of the accident death. Thus,
under the present Act whatever pecuniary advantage is
received by the claimant, from whatever source, would
only mean which comes to the claimant on account of
the accidental death and not other form of death. The
constitution of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal
itself under Section 110 is, as the Section states;
"....for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for
compensation in respect of accidents involving the
death of, or bodily injury to, ....."
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33. Thus, it would not include that which claimant
receives on account other form of deaths, which he
would have received even apart from accidental death.
Thus, such. pecuniary advantage would have no
correlation to the accidental death for which
compensation is computed. Any amount received or
receivable not only on account of the accidental death
but that would have come to the claimant even
otherwise, could not be construed to be the "pecuniary
advantage", liable for deduction. However, where the
employer insures his employee, as against injury or
death arising out of an accident, any amount received
out of such insurance on the happening of such
incidence may be an amount liable for deduction.
However, our legislature has taken not of such
contingency, through the proviso of Section 95. Under
it the liability of the insurer is excluded in respect of
injury or death, arising out of, in the course of
employment of an employee.
---------------
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35. Broadly, we may examine the receipt of the
provident fund which is a deferred payment out of the
contribution made by an employee during the tenure of
his service. Such employee or his heirs are entitled to
receive this amount irrespective of the accidental death.
This amount is secured, is certain to be received, while
the amount under the Motor Vehicles Act is uncertain
and is receivable only on the happening of the event
viz., accident which may not take place at all.
Similarly., family pension is also earned by an
employee for the benefit of his family in the form of his
contribution in the service in terms of the service
conditions receivable by the heirs after his death. The
heirs receive family pension even otherwise than the
accidental death. No co-relation between the two.
Similarly, life insurance policy is received either by the
insured or the heirs of the insured on account of the
contract with the insurer, for which insured contributes
in the form of premium. It is receivable even by the
insured, if he lives till maturity after paying all the
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premiums, in the case of death insurer indemnifies to
pay the sum to the heirs, again in terms of the contracts
for the premium paid. Again, this amount is receivable
by the claimant not on account of any accidental death
but otherwise on insured's death. Death is only a step or
contingency in terms of the contract, to receive the
amount. Similarly any case, bank balance, shares, fixed
deposits, etc. though are all a pecuniary advantage
receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all
these have no co-relation with the amount receivable
under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental
death. How could such an amount come within the
periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as
'pecuniary advantage' liable for deduction. When we
seek the principle of loss and gain, it has to be on
similar and same plane having nexus inter so between
them and not to which, there is no semblance of any co-
relation. The insured (deceased) contributes his own
money for which he receives the amount has no co-
relation to the compensation computed as against
torfeasor for his negligence on account of accident. As
aforesaid, the amount receivable as compensation under
the Act is on account of the injury of death without
making any contribution towards it then how can fruits
of an amount received through contributions of the
insured be deducted out of the amount receivable under
the Motor Vehicles Act. The amount under this Act, he
receives without any contribution. As we have said the
compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act
is statutory while the amount received under the life
insurance policy is contractual."
12. It is, thus clear that while assessing the just and proper
compensation for death of a person in motor vehicle accident the amount
would be paid to the family of a deceased person under Employees Family
Benefit Schemes etc. including the family pension are not to be taken into
account. It is, thus held that even eventually family pension is received by
any of the family members of the deceased, though this fact is not on record,
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this cannot affect the quantum of compensation.
13. As regards contention of the claimants/appellants in appeal
No.3037/2022 regarding income of the deceased it is seen from perusal of
Ex.P/39 that the claims Tribunal has correctly assessed income of the
deceased at Rs.84,353/- because the Income-tax and Professional tax are
deductible from the income. Thus, on this aspect also no fault is found on
determination for loss of dependency by the claims Tribunal. The aspect of
award of amount of compensation on account of loss of consortium it is seen
from the record that appellant No.1 is wife of deceased Mahesh, appellant
No.2 is the son of deceased and claimant No.6 is mother of deceased. Thus,
all three of them are entitled for loss of consortium. It is seen that claims
Tribunal has awarded Rs.40,000/- for consortium. Thus, claimants/appellants
are entitled for an amount of Rs.80,000/- over and above the amount already
awarded by the claims Tribunal.
14. As regards the deduction for personal expenditure at 1/3rd, it is
seen from the record that the deceased was 58 years old, the claimants are
wife, son, mother (at the time of filing claim she was alive). The other
claimants are wife and children of the son of deceased. As such the claims
Tribunal has correctly deducted 1/3rd of the income for personal expenses as
the wife and children of the son of the deceased cannot be taken into account
while counting number of dependents for the purpose of assessing just
compensation.
15. In view of the above, appeal filed by the Insurance Company
M.A.No.2525/2022 fails and is hereby dismissed. The appeal filed by the
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claimants M.A.No.3037/2022 on the question of quantum also fails and to
that extent the said appeal is also dismissed. As regards the amount of
consortium only an amount of Rs.80,000/- is awarded over and above the
amount already awarded by the claims Tribunal. The enhanced amount shall
carry interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of claim application
till its payment.
16. Accordingly, both the appeals stand disposed off.
(PAVAN KUMAR DWIVEDI)
JUDGE
patil
