Madhya Pradesh High Court
Dhanpat@Dhanpati vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 31 July, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:16117
1 FA-1891-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 31st OF JULY, 2025
FIRST APPEAL No. 1891 of 2024
DHANPAT@DHANPATI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Mr. Yash Sharma - Advocate for appellant.
Mr. Sanjay Singh Kushwaha - Govt. Advocate for respondent No. 1 /
State.
Mr. Alok Bandhu Shrivastava - Advocate for respondent No. 2.
JUDGMENT
This first appeal under Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation & Resettlement Act,
2013 (in short "Act, 2013) has been filed against the award dated 31.08.2024
passed by District Judge, Vijaypur, District Sheopur in MJC No. 05/2022, by
which reference made under Section 64 of the Act, 2013 has been dismissed
on the ground of limitation, as well as on the ground that appellant has failed
to prove as to how the compensation awarded by the L.A.O. is on the lower
side.
2. It is submitted by counsel for appellant that in another reference
case, arising out of same acquisition proceedings, award dated 31.08.2024
was passed by the same judge in MJC No. 66/2022. Said award was
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challenged by the appellant by filing F.A. No. 1890/2024. Today this Court,
by passing separate order in First Appeal No. 1890/2024, has set aside the
award dated 31.08.2024, passed by District Judge, Vijaypur, District
Sheopur, and has remanded the matter back. Case in hand is also covered by
the reasoning assigned by this Court in F.A. No. 1890/2024.
3. Aforesaid submission made by counsel for appellant is not
controverted by counsel for respondents.
4. Heard learned counsel for parties.
5. This Court in F.A. No. 1890/2024 (Ramjilal vs. The State of
Madhya Pradesh and Others) has held as under:-
"This first appeal under Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation &
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation & Settlement Act, 2013 (in
short "Act, 2013") has been filed against the award dated 31.08.2024 passed by
District Judge, Vijaypur, District Sheopur in MJC No. 66/2022.
2. The facts necessary for disposal of present appeal, in short, are that 2250 sq.
ft. of land belonging to appellant forming part of Survey No. 160, along with
two two-storey house, was acquired for the purposes of construction of Broad
Gauge Railway Line. Award was passed on 07.01.2021. It appears that on
07.10.2021, appellant made an application for reference under Section 64 of
Act, 2013. Matter was referred to the District Court for adjudication. By
impugned award dated 31.08.2024, reference has been dismissed on the ground
of limitation, as well as on the ground that appellant has failed to prove as to
how the compensation amount awarded by the L.A.O. is on lower side.
3. Challenging the award passed by Reference Court, it is submitted by counsel
for appellant that reference was made within the period of limitation. Even
otherwise, period of limitation was extended by the Supreme Court in the case
of In Ref: Cognizance for extension of limitation. It is further submitted that
even otherwise, Reference Court did not consider the evidence led by the
parties to adjudicate as to whether compensation amount awarded by L.A.O.
was in accordance with law or not.
4. Per contra, appeal is vehemently opposed by counsel for respondents.
5. Heard learned counsel for parties.
6. Reference Court framed the following issues:-
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" (i) Whether the valuation of 2250 sq. ft. of land was not done by
L.A.O.?
(ii) Whether the valuation done by L.A.O. in respect of the house is on
the lower side?
(iii) Whether the appellant is entitled for payment of compensation
amount at the commercial rate?
(iv) Whether the reference is within a period of limitation?
(v) Whether appellant is entitled for compensation as claimed by him
in his application under Section 64 of Act, 2013, and lastly
(vi) Relief and expenses?"
7. The Reference Court has decided the question of limitation primarily on the
ground that a general notification under Section 21 (1) of Act, 2013 was issued
on 10.08.2020, and objections were invited, and since no objections were
received within the prescribed period, therefore, award was passed.
8. Although it was contended by counsel for appellant that objection was filed,
but that is not very material for adjudication of the question of limitation.
Section 64 (2) of Act, 2013 reads as under:-
" 64. Reference to Authority.- ......
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to
the award is taken:
Provided that every such application shall be made-
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the
Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from
the date of the Collector's award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from
the Collector under section 21, or within six months from the date of the
Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire:"
From the plain reading of Section 64 (2) of Act, 2013, it is clear that for
adjudicating the question as to whether reference application was within the
period of limitation or not, the circumstances as mentioned in Sections 64 (2)
(a), and 64 (2) (b) are to be seen.
9. It is not the case of anybody that appellant was present or represented before
the Collector at the time when the award was made. Therefore, the period of
limitation of six weeks, as provided in Section 64 (2) (a) of Act, 2013 would
not apply to the facts of the case.
10. It is not the case of anybody that notice under Section 21 (1) of Act, 2013
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was ever served upon the appellant. Therefore, period of six weeks from the
date of receipt of notice from the Collector under Section 21 (1) of Act, 2013
would also not apply.
11. Now, the only question for consideration is as to whether reference
application was within a period of six months from the date of the Collector's
award or not?
12. The Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwan Das v. State of U.P. , reported
in (2010) 3 SCC 545, has held that the words "from the date of the Collector's
Award" have to be interpreted from the date of knowledge of the Collector's
Award. In the case of Bhagwan Das (supra), it has been held as under:-
" 25. Invariably, the land-loser is required to make an application
under Section 18 of the Act to get the market value as compensation.
The land-loser does not get a right to seek reference to the civil court
unless the award is made. This means that he can make an application
seeking reference only when he knows that an award has been made.
26. If the words six months from the "date of the Collector's award"
should be literally interpreted as referring to the date of the award and
not the date of knowledge of the award, it will lead to unjust and absurd
results. For example, the Collector may choose to make an award but not
to issue any notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, either due to
negligence or oversight or due to any ulterior reasons. Or he may send a
notice but may not bother to ensure that it is served on the landowner as
required under Section 45 of the Act. If the words "date of the
Collector‟s award" are literally interpreted, the effect would be that on
the expiry of six months from the date of award, even though the
claimant had no notice of the award, he would lose the right to seek a
reference. That will lead to arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination
between those who are notified of the award and those who are not
notified of the award.
27. Unless the procedure under the Act is fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory, it will run the risk of being branded as being violative of
Article 14 as also Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. To avoid
such consequences, the words "date of the Collector's award" occurring
in proviso (b) to Section 18 requires to be read as referring to the date of
knowledge of the essential contents of the award, and not the actual date
of the Collector‟s award.
28. The following position therefore emerges from the
interpretation of the proviso to Section 18 of the Act:
(i) If the award is made in the presence of the person interested (or his
authorised representative), he has to make the application within six
weeks from the date of the Collector's award itself.
(ii) If the award is not made in the presence of the person interested
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(or his authorised representative), he has to make the application seeking
reference within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector
under Section 12(2).
(iii) If the person interested (or his representative) was not present
when the award is made, and if he does not receive the notice under
Section 12(2) from the Collector, he has to make the application within
six months of the date on which he actually or constructively came to
know about the contents of the award.
(iv) If a person interested receives a notice under Section 12(2) of the
Act, after the expiry of six weeks from the date of receipt of such notice,
he cannot claim the benefit of the provision for six months for making
the application on the ground that the date of receipt of notice under
Section 12(2) of the Act was the date of knowledge of the contents of the
award.
29. A person who fails to make an application for reference within
the time prescribed is not without remedy. It is open to him to make an
application under Section 28-A of the Act, on the basis of an award of
the court in respect of the other lands covered by the same acquisition
notification, if there is an increase. Be that as it may.
30. When a person interested makes an application for reference
seeking the benefit of six months‟ period from the date of knowledge,
the initial onus is on him to prove that he (or his representative) was not
present when the award was made, that he did not receive any notice
under Section 12(2) of the Act, and that he did not have the knowledge
of the contents of the award during a period of six months prior to the
filing the application for reference. This onus is discharged by asserting
these facts on oath. He is not expected to prove the negative. Once the
initial onus is discharged by the claimant/person interested, it is for the
Land Acquisition Collector to establish that the person interested was
present either in person or through his representative when the award
was made, or that he had received a notice under Section 12(2) of the
Act, or that he had knowledge of the contents of the award.
31. Actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the award
can be established by the Collector by proving that the person interested
had received or drawn the compensation amount for the acquired land,
or had attested the mahazar/panchnama/proceedings delivering
possession of the acquired land in pursuance of the acquisition, or had
filed a case challenging the award or had acknowledged the making of
the award in any document or in statement on oath or evidence. The
person interested, not being in possession of the acquired land and the
name of the State or its transferee being entered in the revenue municipal
records coupled with delay, can also lead to an inference of constructive
knowledge. In the absence of any such evidence by the Collector, the
claim of the person interested that he did not have knowledge earlier will
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be accepted, unless there are compelling circumstances not to do so."
13. All the aforesaid aspects were not considered by the Reference Court, and
it appears that Reference Court was swayed away by the proceedings which
were conducted by the L.A.O. for drawing an award. Thus, finding given by
Reference Court on the question of limitation is erroneous, and accordingly, it
is hereby set aside.
14. So far as quantum of compensation is concerned, although it was not
required on the part of Reference Court to adjudicate the said question after
holding that reference is barred by time, but still a general observation has been
made in paragraph 17 of the impugned Award that appellant has not proved
anything to show as to how the amount of compensation assessed by L.A.O. is
on a lower side. This is not the method for calculating the market value of the
property which has been acquired.
15. Appellant had examined the Valuer, who had valued the construction
which was standing on the 2250 sq. ft. of land. Therefore, the general
observation made by Reference Court in respect to the quantum of
compensation is also hereby set aside.
16. Before parting with this order, this Court would like to observe that
Reference Court did not consider that even otherwise the period of limitation
was relaxed by the Supreme Court in the case of In Ref: Cognizance for
extension of limitation in view of Covid-19 pandemic, which was recalled by
order dated 10.01.2022.
17. Under these circumstances, impugned award dated 31.08.2024 passed by
District Judge, Vijaypur, District Sheopur in MJC No. 66/2022 is hereby set
aside. Matter is remanded back to the District Judge, Vijaypur, District
Sheopur, to decide the aforesaid questions in accordance with law.
18. With aforesaid observation appeal is allowed. Liberty is granted to
appellant that in case if he wants to file certain more documents, then he can do
so, and if such application is filed, then it would be decided by Reference
Court in accordance with law.
19. No order as to cost.
20. Since matter has been remanded back, therefore, it is held that appellant is
entitled for refund of court-fee, and it shall be refunded to appellant in person
only."
6. Accordingly, this appeal is also allowed in the terms and conditions
of order passed by this Court in F.A. No. 1890/2024, and the impugned
award dated 31.08.2024 passed by District Judge, Vijaypur, District Sheopur
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in MJC NO. 05/2022 is hereby set aside, and matter is remanded back to the
Reference Court for adjudication of the lis in accordance with law.
7. Liberty is granted to appellant that in case if he wants to file certain
more documents, then he can do so, and if such application is filed, then it
would be decided by Reference Court in accordance with law.
8. No order as to cost.
9. Since matter has been remanded back, therefore, it is held that
appellant is entitled for refund of court-fee, and it shall be refunded to
appellant in person only.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
AKS
