Madhya Pradesh High Court

Smt. Nidhi Agrawal vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 25 July, 2025

          NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:34380




                                                                 1                               WP-5820-2022
                              IN     THE       HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                     AT JABALPUR
                                                          BEFORE
                                               HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
                                                     ON THE 25th OF JULY, 2025
                                                  WRIT PETITION No. 5820 of 2022
                                                 SMT. NIDHI AGRAWAL
                                                         Versus
                                      THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
                           Appearance:
                              Shri Ramakant Awasthi, learned counsel for the petitioner.
                              Shri B.D. Singh, learned counsel for caveator.

                              Shri Yogesh Dhande, learned Government Advocate for respondent/State.

                                                                     ORDER

By way of this petition, challenge is made to order Annex.P/1 dated 03/03/2022, whereby the services of the petitioner who was working on contractual basis on the post of District Community Mobilizer has been terminated by passing a stigmatic order.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the order Annex.P/1 amounts to glaring failure of principles of natural justice in as much as the petitioner was not given proper opportunity of hearing being heard before passing of the said order and that the documents demanded by her have also not been provided. It is vehemently argued that the order is founded and motivated by allegation of the petitioner demanding bribe from one Smt. Saroj Prajapati and her husband Shri Anand Prajapati. The audio clip was produced before the authority and which the authority has held to be substantiated which could not be done without any forensic examination by the authority.

3. It is contended that the petitioner was initially issued a notice dated 29/09/2025 (Annex.P/3) on the allegation of demand of bribe as revealed

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2 WP-5820-2022 from the audio clip which went viral in the district. The charge of work being done by the petitioner was withdrawn from her on same date vide order Annex.P/4 and then the petitioner had replied to the show cause notice wherein the petitioner had clearly submitted that the petitioner has been working since last 7 years on the post of District Community Mobilizer and there are no complaints against the petitioner and that the audio clip does not have the voice of the petitioner.

4. Counsel for the petitioner further relied on affidavit given by the said lady Smt. Saroj Prajapati stating therein that the audio which is circulating does not contain her own voice. The affidavit dated 01/10/2021 was vehemently relied by the counsel for the petitioner so also the panchnama containing same averments prepared by the said complainant Smt. Saroj Prajapti.

5. It is contended that thereafter without conducting any enquiry by not giving the petitioner any opportunity to rebut the charges against her, the impugned order has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice. Reliance is placed on judgment of this Court in the case of Rahul TripathiVs. Rajeev Gandhi Shiksha Mission. Bhopal reported in (2001) 3 MPHT 397 to submit that the case depicts a glaring failure of principles of natural justice.

6. It is contended that though the petitioner was given another show cause notice vide Annex.P/22 dated 01/02/2022 and the petitioner had denied the allegation in her reply vide Annex.P/23, but the authority was under

obligation to carry out independent enquiry, in which the petitioner had to be given chance to participate and also that without the forensic examination of the audio clip, no conclusion could have been drawn on the basis of such audio clip once the other person who was alleged to be speaking with the petitioner in the audio clip, as well as the petitioner, both had denied the voices to be of them.

7. Per contra, counsel for the respondent/NHM has vehemently argued that it is not a case where there is failure of principles of natural justice in as much as initially show cause notice Annex.P/1 was given to the petitioner which was replied by her. She took the defence that the voice in the audio clip does

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3 WP-5820-2022 not belong to her and also relied on an affidavit and panchnama of Smt. Saroj Prajapati with whom the petitioner is alleged to be speaking in the audio clip.

8. It is contended that the said Smt. Saroj Prajapti thereafter appeared before the Collector and got her statements recorded as well as the statements of her husband recorded and affirmed in the statements Annex.R/1 that the voice indeed is of her and that previously she had given affidavit under pressure of the petitioner because she has to deal with the petitioner each day being District Community Mobilizer. It is further contended that on the second page of the affidavit Annex.P/4 which is filed by the respondents as Annex.R/3, the petitioner herself has identified the said person Smt. SarojPrajapati which indicates that it is the petitioner who was instrumental in getting the said affidavit procured. Reliance is placed on copy of said affidavit at page 11 of the reply, to contend that this affidavit was brought about by the petitioner herself as she has identified the deponent Smt. SarojPrajapati.

9. It is further contended that in fact vide Annexure R/6, an FIR has been registered against the petitioner at instance of Smt. Saroj Prajapati which indicates that the allegations against the petitioner are true. It is further contended that the allegations against the petitioner were not limited to the audio clip going viral but extended to a number of illegalities being committed by the petitioner as per the allegations mentioned in detail in the show cause notice against termination vide Annex.P/22 and therefore, it cannot be said the termination has been ordered only on the basis of alleged audio clip. Therefore, the impugned order Annex.P/1 is defended by the respondents.

10. Heard.

11. The facts of the case indicate that initially some report was made that the petitioner has demanded some money from one Smt. Saroj Prajapati and when the audio clip went viral, then the petitioner procured an affidavit of Smt. Saroj Prajapati, in which she stated that the voice in the audio clip is not of her. The petitioner also in her initial reply Annex.P/5 denied that the voice

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4 WP-5820-2022 in the audio clip is not her. The respondents carried out a detailed enquiry as the Collector wrote to the National Health Mission, Bhopal to conduct a detailed enquiry against the petitioner and thereafter, a three member State Level Committee of Officers was appointed to enquire against the petitioner vide Annex.R/8 dated 17/11/2021. The said committee conducted a detailed enquiry at the ground level and found the petitioner involved in several other gross corrupt practices which are detailed in the enquiry report Annexure R/9 which has been prepared after taking statements of a number of field employees who are low paid employees holding the post of Asha workers, Supervisors, Sehat Sakhis, etc.

12. Upon a perusal of the aforesaid enquiry report Annex.R/9 and R/9-A, it is evident that the petitioner was found to be threatening a member of field level workers and extorting money from them. She also used to supply used good for being distributed to beneficiaries in the field and also that she used to give threats to the low paid workers that she is the person working as District Community Mobilizer and they would have to deal with the petitioner only and therefore, they have to work as per the petitioner and should buckle under her demand. Upon perusal of the enquiry report at page 33 to 38 of the reply of the respondents, various such instances mentioning small amounts being extracted and extorted by the petitioner from field level employees and statements of a number of such employees are annexed to the said enquiry report.

13. The petitioner was given a show cause notice against termination of services which she replied by Annex.P/23. In the said notice Annex.P/22 as many as 12allegations were levelled against the petitioner and one of the allegations was of demand of bribe which was as per the audio clip being circulated. The said allegation was at Sr.No.1 in the final notice Annex.P/22 which contained 11 other allegations.

14. The petitioner has denied the said allegation which was at Sr.No.1 in the show cause notice in her reply Annex.P/23 in the following manner

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5 WP-5820-2022 अिधरो पत आरोप:

आपके ारा आशा चयन ख ड तर से कया जाना है पर तु आपके ारा जला तर पर आशा का चयन कया गया, तथा आशा चयन के िलए ामसभा ारा चयिनत य से रािश क मांग क गई। इस संबंध म जला कले टर को भी मय सीड िशकायत क गयी।

उ र:

महोदया जी, अनुरोध है क जस आशा के संबंध म मय सीड िशकायत ा हुई है उपरो संबंध मे संबंिधत आशा के ारा वंय मी डया के सम अपना कथन तुत करने के साथ-साथ ततसंबंध म पंचनामा एवं शपथ प तुत कया गया है । आशा िनयु क कायवाह , वकासख ड तर पर ामसभा, ाम पंचायत रोहिनया के अनुमोदन उपरांत लॉक मे डकल ऑ फसर मानपुर ारा आदे श मांक / बीएमओ / 2020/210, मानपुर दनांक 11.05.2020 से क गई है ।उ या म ड सीएम एवं जले का कोई ह ता ेप नह ं है ।

अवलोकनाथ प रिश -0 1 से 0 6 , अतः प अिधरो पत आरोप िनराधार एंव आस य होने के कारण से वलो पत करने क कृ पा कर।

15. It is evident from perusal of the said reply that now the petitioner came to know that the beneficiary from whom the petitioner had demanded money i.e. (Smt. Saroj Prajapati) has now given statement before the Collector that her earlier affidavit was extracted under pressure of the petitioner and therefore, she did not raise any averment in the reply that the audio clip does not contain her voice. This important denial is missing in the reply to allegation No.1. Therefore, the petitioner has given up her denial to her voice being there in the audio clip. There now remains nothing to be enquired by a forensic examination of the audio clip. This time she modified her defence to the extent that she did not have any role in the selection process and therefore, the allegations are unfounded.

16. Therefore, now the petitioner cannot argue that the audio clip was not sent for forensic examination and that no regular enquiry was conducted giving her opportunity of cross-examining Smt. Saroj Prajapati. This could have been raised by the petitioner if the petitioner had continued with her denial of her voice not being there in the audio clip. The petitioner on the contrary abandoned the said stand in the subsequent reply to the final show cause notice.

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6 WP-5820-2022

17.It is settled in law that opportunity of hearing is not an unruly horse and this Court would not mechanically set aside every order on the question of denial of opportunity of hearing. In Natwar Singh Vs. Director of Enforcement, reported in 2010 (13) SCC 255, it has been held as under:

26 [Ed.: Para 26 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./3/2011 dated 10-1-2011.] . Even in the application of the doctrine of fair play there must be real flexibility. There must also have been caused some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with and so forth. Can the courts supplement the statutory procedures with requirements over and above those specified? In order to ensure a fair hearing, courts can insist and require additional steps as long as such steps would not frustrate the apparent purpose of the legislation.

27. In Lloyd v. McMahon [1987 AC 625 : (1987) 2 WLR 821 : (1987) 1 All ER 1118 (HL)] , Lord Bridge observed: (AC pp. 702 H-703 B) "My Lords, the so-called rules of natural justice are not engraved on tablets of stone. To use the phrase which better expresses the underlying concept, what the requirements of fairness demand when anybody, domestic, administrative or judicial, has to make a decision which will affect the rights of individuals depends on the character of the decision-

making body, the kind of decision it has to make and the statutory or other framework in which it operates. In particular, it is well established that when a statute has conferred on anybody the power to make decisions affecting individuals, the courts will not only require the procedure prescribed by the statute to be followed, but will readily imply so much and no more to be introduced by way of additional procedural safeguards as will ensure the attainment of fairness."

28. As Lord Reid said in Wiseman v. Borneman [1971 AC 297 : (1969) 3 WLR 706 : (1969) 3 All ER 275 (HL)] : (AC p. 308 C) "... For a long time the courts have, without objection from Parliament, supplemented procedure laid down in legislation where they have found that to be necessary for this purpose."

29. It is thus clear that the extent of applicability of the principles of natural justice depends upon the nature of inquiry, the consequences that

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7 WP-5820-2022 may visit a person after such inquiry from out of the decision pursuant to such inquiry.

18.InMohd. Sartaj Vs. State of U.P., reported in 2006 (2) SCC 315 , it was held as under :-

14. However, in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1980) 4 SCC 379] this Court has also observed as under: (SCC p. 395, para 24) "In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs."

18. In Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan [(2000) 7 SCC 529 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 965 : AIR 2000 SC 2783] this Court considered the question whether on the facts of the case the employee can invoke the principle of natural justice and whether it is a case where, even if notice has been given, result would not have been different and whether it could be said that no prejudice was caused to him, if on the admitted or proved facts grant of an opportunity would not have made any difference. The Court referred to the decisions rendered in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [(1999) 6 SCC 237] , the exceptions laid down in S.L. Kapoor case [(1980) 4 SCC 379] and K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India [(1984) 1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62 : AIR 1984 SC 273] where it has been laid down that not mere violation of natural justice but de facto prejudice (other than non-issue of notice) has to be proved. The Court has also placed reliance in the matter of State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717] and Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. [(1996) 5 SCC 460] where the principle has been laid down that there must have been some real prejudice to the complainant. There is no such thing as merely technical infringement of natural justice. The Court has approved this principle and examined the case of the employee in that light. In Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd. [(2005) 5 SCC 337 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 689] this Court has

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8 WP-5820-2022 held that the principles of natural justice are required to be complied with having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It cannot be applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. The principle of natural justice, it is trite, is no unruly horse. When facts are admitted, an enquiry would be an empty formality. Even the principle of estoppel will apply. In another recent judgment in State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi [(2006) 1 SCC 667 : JT (2006) 1 SC 19] while considering the argument that the principle of natural justice had been ignored before terminating the service of the employees and, therefore, the order terminating the service of the employees was bad in law, this Court has considered the principles of natural justice and the extent and the circumstances in which they are attracted. This Court has found in Neeraj Awasthi case [(2006) 1 SCC 667 : JT (2006) 1 SC 19] that if the services of the workmen are governed by the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, they are protected under that law. Rules 42 and 43 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules lay down that before effecting any retrenchment the employees concerned would be entitled to notice of one month or in lieu thereof pay for one month and 15 days' wages for each completed year of service by way of compensation. If retrenchment is to be effected under the Industrial Disputes Act, the question of complying with the principles of natural justice would not arise. The principles of natural justice would be attracted only when the services of some persons are terminated by way of a punitive measure or thereby a stigma is attached. Applying this principle, it could very well be seen that discontinuation of the service of the appellants in the present case was not as a punitive measure but they were discontinued for the reason that they were not qualified and did not possess the requisite qualifications for appointment.

19. In SBI Vs. M.J. James, reported in 2022 (2) SCC 301 , it was held as under:-

28. Traditional English law recognized and valued the rule against bias that no man shall be a judge in his own cause i.e. nemodebetessejudex in propriacausa; and the obligation to hear the other or both sides as no person should be condemned unheard i.e. audialterampartem. To these, new facets sometimes described as subsidiary rules have developed, including a duty to give reasons in support of the decision. Nevertheless, time and again the courts have emphasised that the rules of natural justice are flexible and their application depends on facts of each case as well as the statutory provision, if applicable, nature of right affected and the consequences. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [A.K. Kraipak v. Union

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9 WP-5820-2022 of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262] the Constitution Bench, dwelling on the role of the principles of natural justice under our Constitution, observed that as every organ of the State is controlled and regulated by the rule of law, there is a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a quasi-judicial or administrative power are those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the body of persons or tribunal appointed for that purpose. When a complaint is made that a principle of natural justice has been contravened, the court must decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision in the facts of the case.

29. Legal position on the importance to show prejudice to get relief is also required to be stated. In State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364] a Division Bench of this Court distinguished between "adequate opportunity" and "no opportunity at all" and held that the prejudice exception operates more specifically in the latter case. This judgment also speaks of procedural and substantive provisions of law embodying the principles of natural justice which, when infracted, must lead to prejudice being caused to the litigant in order to afford him relief. The principle was expressed in the following words :

(SCC p. 389, para 32) "32. Now, coming back to the illustration given by us in the preceding paragraph, would setting aside the punishment and the entire enquiry on the ground of aforesaid violation of sub-clause (iii) be in the interests of justice or would it be its negation? In our respectful opinion, it would be the latter. Justice means justice between both the parties. The interests of justice equally demand that the guilty should be punished and that technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion failure of justice are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. Principles of natural justice are but the means to achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a counterproductive exercise."

30. Earlier decision in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237] examined the expression "admitted and undisputable facts", as also divergence of legal opinion on whether it is necessary to show "slight proof" or "real likelihood of prejudice"; or legal effect of "an open and shut case", with reference to the

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10 WP-5820-2022 observations in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379] and elucidates in the following words : (M.C. Mehta case [M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237] , SCC pp. 245-47, paras 22-23) "22. Before we go into the final aspects of this contention, we would like to state that cases relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases there is a considerable case law and literature as to whether relief can be refused even if the court thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of "real substance" or that there is no substantial possibility of his success or that the result will not be different, even if natural justice is followed. See Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn. [Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn., (1971) 1 WLR 1578 (HL)] . (per Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University [Glynn v. Keele University, (1971) 1 WLR 487] , Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority [Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority, (1980) 1 WLR 582 (CA)] where such a view has been held. The latest addition to this view is R. v. Ealing Magistrates' Court, ex p Fannaran [R. v. Ealing Magistrates' court, ex p Fannaran, (1996) 8 Admn LR 351] (Admn LR at p. 358) (see de Smith, Suppl. p. 89) (1998) where Straughton, L.J. held that there must be "demonstrable beyond doubt" that the result would have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. McMahon [Lloyd v. McMahon, 1987 AC 625 : (1987) 2 WLR 821 (HL)] (WLR at p. 862) has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of natural justice. The New Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant [McCarthy v. Grant, 1959 NZLR 1014] however goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is "real likelihood -- not certainty -- of prejudice". On the other hand, Garner Administrative Law (8th Edn., 1996, pp. 271-72) says that slight proof that the result would have been different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin [Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40 : (1963) 2 WLR 935 (HL)] , Megarry, J.

in John v. Rees [John v. Rees, 1970 Ch 345 : (1969) 2 WLR 1294] stating that there are always "open and shut cases" and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J. has said that the "useless formality theory" is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that "convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms". More recently Lord Bingham has deprecated the "useless formality" theory in R. v. Chief Constable

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11 WP-5820-2022 of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p Cotton [R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p Cotton, 1990 IRLR 344] by giving six reasons. (See also his article "Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?" 1991 PL, p. 64.) A detailed and emphatic criticism of the "useless formality theory" has been made much earlier in "Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow" by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL, pp. 27-63) contending that Malloch [Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn., (1971) 1 WLR 1578 (HL)] and Glynn [Glynn v. Keele University, (1971) 1 WLR 487] were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn., 1996, p. 323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., p. 596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. de Smith (5th Edn., 1994, Paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn., 1994, pp. 526-30) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a "real likelihood" of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their "discretion", refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364] , Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. [Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P., (1996) 5 SCC 460] that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived.

23. We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the "useless formality" theory and leave the matter for decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch as, in the case before us, "admitted and indisputable" facts show that grant of a writ will be in vain as pointed [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379] out by Chinnappa Reddy, J."

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31. In State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh [State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 706 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 847] referring to the aforesaid cases and several other decisions of this Court, the law was crystallised as under : (SCC para 42) "42. An analysis of the aforesaid judgments thus reveals:

42.1. Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audialterampartem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused.

42.2. Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also in public interest.

42.3. No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice.

42.4. In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person.

42.5. The "prejudice" exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice."

20. Therefore, in the present case it is evident that by the petitioner abandoning her plea of the voice in the audio clip not being her, is not entitled to now argue at this stage that the respondents did not conduct a

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13 WP-5820-2022 forensic examination of the audio clip or that they did not permit the petitioner to cross-examine Smt. Saroj Prajapti and that in the enquiry she was not allowed to cross-examine the departmental witnesses who were deposing against the petitioner.

21. In view of the above, it has to be held that not conducting regular enquiry did not prejudice the petitioner at all because the authority has considered the matter impartially and reached to a just and proper conclusion.