Madhya Pradesh High Court
The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Rajendra on 23 July, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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1
F.A.No.126/2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 23rd OF JULY, 2025
FIRST APPEAL No. 126 of 2025
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
RAJENDRA AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri S.S. Kushwaha - Government Advocate for the State/appellants.
Shri Chetan Kanungo- Advocate for the respondent No.1.
JUDGEMENT
This first appeal under Section 74 of Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
has been filed against the Award dated 30/04/2022 passed by V District Judge,
Gwalior in MJC (Land Acquisition) No.102/2018 by which reference filed by
respondent has been allowed.
2. It is submitted by counsel for the parties that so far as the ground raised
by appellants with regard to the fact as to whether reference was barred by time
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or not and whether respondent had accepted compensation amount without
protest or not is concerned, same has already been decided by this Court by
order dated 23.06.2025 in the case of State of M.P. And Others Vs. Lokendra
Singh in FA. No.264/2021, therefore, for the aforesaid grounds are duly
covered by order passed by this Court in the case of Lokendra Singh (supra).
However, it is submitted by counsel for appellants that Reference Court should
not have awarded compensation amount by relying upon the Collector
guidelines.
3. Per contra, it is submitted by counsel for respondent that so far as the
Collector guidelines issued by Collector can be guidelines for ascertaining
market value and thus, the Reference Court did not commit any mistake by
relying upon the Collector's guidelines.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
5. So far as the question as to whether Reference was barred by time and
whether respondent had accepted compensation amount without any protest or
not is concerned, this Court in the case of Lokendra Singh (supra) has held as
under:
"1. This appeal, under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (for short "the Act") , has been filed against the order/Award
dated 13.07.2020 passed by Additional Judge to the Court of First
Additional District Judge, Gohad, District Bhind in Land Acquisition
MJC Case No. 16 of 2015 by which reference filed by respondent
has been allowed.
2. It is not out of place to mention here that against the award
passed by Land Acquisition Officer, a reference was made under
Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act. By impugned award, the Trial
Court has enhanced the compensation amount. It was informed by
Counsel for the parties, that being dissatisfied by the award passed
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by the Reference Court, the Land owners have also filed First
Appeal.
3. As a general practice, all the appeals arising out of one
judgment and decree or award should be heard analogously, but in
the present case, it was submitted by Counsel for appellant, that the
State has not questioned the quantum of compensation and the appeal
is being pressed only on two grounds i.e., that the reference was
barred by time and since, the respondent/land owner had received the
compensation amount therefore, the reference is not maintainable.
4. In view of the grounds of attack, this Court is of the
considered opinion, that large number of appeals are pending but
since, the question for consideration in both the appeals, i.e., by the
State and the land owners, are not overlapping each other and the
appeal filed by the State can be decided without adversely effecting
the ground regarding quantum of compensation which is the subject
matter of appeal filed by land owner, therefore, the appeal filed by
the State is being decided.
5. The facts necessary for disposal of present appeal, in short,
are that a notification was issued for acquisition of 2.52 hectares of
land for construction of canal and accordingly in Land Acquisition
Case Number 21/2012-13/A-82, Award dated 17/9/2013 was passed
and Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation @ ₹4,30,167
per hectare. Being aggrieved by the said Award, respondent preferred
an application under Section 18 of the Act on 23.08.2014. The matter
was referred by Collector to District Court for answering the
reference. The Additional Judge to the Court of First Additional
District Judge, Gohad, District Bhind by Award dated 13.07.2020
passed in MJC Number 16 of 2015 allowed the reference and
awarded ₹10,50,000/- per hectare by way of compensation.
6. Being aggrieved by the Award passed by the Court below, it
is submitted by counsel for appellant that reference application was
barred by time. It is further submitted that as the respondent had
accepted the compensation amount without any demur, therefore he
is estopped from filing an application under Section 18 of the Act
and relied upon the judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of
State of Punjab Vs. Satinder Singh reported in (1995) 3 SCC 330.
7. Per contra, the appeal is vehemently opposed by counsel for
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respondent. It is submitted that as per the provisions of Section 18(2)
of the Act, the reference application has to be filed within a period of
6 weeks from the date of Award in case the land owner was present.
However, if the Award is passed in absence of land owner, then
reference application could have been filed within a period of 6
weeks from the date of receipt of notice under Section 12 of the Act
or within a period of 6 months from the date of Award of Collector,
whichever is earlier. It is submitted that admittedly neither the
respondent was present at the time of passing of Award nor any
notice under Section 12(2) of the Act was given to respondent.
Immediately after the respondent came to know about the impugned
Award, then he gave an application for supply of certified copy
which was supplied on 1.8.2014 and accordingly on 23.08.2014 an
application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was filed
for making the reference. It is submitted that the words "from the
date of the Collector's award" as mentioned in Section 18(2)(b) of
the Act cannot be given a narrow meaning and it would also include
"from the date of knowledge." It is further submitted that the
respondent has specifically stated that he had received the
compensation amount under protest. It is submitted that even if the
amount is received without any protest, still it cannot be inferred that
the land owner was aware of the contents of award and therefore it is
submitted that the acceptance of compensation amount, whether
under protest or, would not estop the land owner from filing an
application under Section 18 of the Act and relied upon the judgment
passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwan Das &Orsvs
State Of.U.P. (2010) 3 SCC 545, Vijay MahadeoraoKubadevs
State Of Maharashtra (2019) 2 MPLJ 529 (SC).
8. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
Whether reference was barred by time
9. Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act reads as under :
18. Reference to Court.--(1) Any person interested who has
not accepted the award may, by written application to the
Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for
the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the
measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the
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persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the
compensation among the persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to
the award is taken:
Provided that every such application shall be made,--
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the
Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks
from the date of the Collector's award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice
from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section (2); or within
six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever
period shall first expire.
10. Admittedly, the respondent was not present at the time of
passing of award, therefore, Section 18(2)(i) of Land Acquisition
Act, would not apply.
11. Now, the next question for consideration is that whether any
notice was ever given by Collector under Section 12(2) of Land
Acquisition Act or not?
12. The respondent, in para 3 of his application filed under
Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act, had specifically pleaded that no
notice under Section 12(2) of Land Acquisition Act was given. The
appellants did not deny this fact in their written statement. A solitary
stand was taken by the appellants that the respondent was aware of
the award from the date of its pronouncement. The respondent in his
affidavit filed under Order 18 rule 4 CPC had specifically stated that
no notice under Section 12 of Land Acquisition Act was given. The
respondent has examined AwadheshPratap Singh Yadav who has
stated that information regarding passing of award was given by
Kotwar by beat of drum.
13. First of all, it is made clear that no defence was taken by the
appellants in their written statement, that any public notice was given
to the villagers by Kotwar by beat of drums. However, the moot
question for consideration is that whether general notice by beat of
drums can be said to be sufficient compliance of Section 12(2) of
Land Acquisition Act 1894 or not?
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14. The aforesaid question is no more res integra. The Supreme
Court in the case of PremjiNathu v. State of Gujarat, reported in
(2012) 5 SCC 250 has held as under:
15. What needs to be emphasised is that along with the notice
issued under Section 12(2) of the Act, the landowner who is not
present or is not represented before the Collector at the time of
making of award should be supplied with a copy thereof so that
he may effectively exercise his right under Section 18(1) to seek
reference to the court.
16. In Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Land Acquisition Officer,
this Court was called upon to decide whether the expression
"date of award" is to be interpreted with reference to the time
when the award is signed by the Collector or from the date the
affected party comes to know about the same and held as under:
(AIR pp. 1503-04, paras 5-6)
"5. ... Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is in
law no more than an offer made on behalf of the
Government to the owner of the property then the making
of the award as properly understood must involve the
communication of the offer to the party concerned. That
is the normal requirement under the contract law and its
applicability to cases of award made under the Act cannot
be reasonably excluded. Thus considered the date of the
award cannot be determined solely by reference to the
time when the award is signed by the Collector or
delivered by him in his office; it must involve the
consideration of the question as to when it was known to
the party concerned either actually or constructively. If
that be the true position then the literal and mechanical
construction of the words 'the date of the award'
occurring in the relevant section would not be
appropriate.
6. There is yet another point which leads to the same
conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative
decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the
valuation of the property sought to be acquired it is clear
that the said decision ultimately affects the rights of the
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owner of the property and in that sense, like all decisions
which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the
said decision should be communicated to the said party.
The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision,
either actual or constructive, is an essential element
which must be satisfied before the decision can be
brought into force. Thus considered the making of the
award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing
the award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the
Collector; it must involve the communication of the said
award to the party concerned either actually or
constructively. If the award is pronounced in the presence
of the party whose rights are affected by it it can be said
to be made when pronounced. If the date for the
pronouncement of the award is communicated to the
party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date
previously announced the award is said to be
communicated to the said party even if the said party is
not actually present on the date of its pronouncement.
Similarly if without notice of the date of its
pronouncement an award is pronounced and a party is not
present the award can be said to be made when it is
communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the
party affected by the award, either actual or constructive,
being an essential requirement of fair play and natural
justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the
proviso must mean the date when the award is either
communicated to the party or is known by him either
actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it
would be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the
date of the Collector's award' used in the proviso to
Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way."
(emphasis supplied)
17. In State of Punjab v. QaisarJehan Begum, the principle laid
down in Harish Chandra case was reiterated and it was held:
(AIR p. 1607, para 5)
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"5. ... It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in
Harish Chandra case is that the party affected by the
award must know it, actually or constructively, and the
period of six months will run from the date of that
knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean
a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been
made. The knowledge must relate to the essential
contents of the award. These contents may be known
either actually or constructively. If the award is
communicated to a party under Section 12(2) of the Act,
the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the
contents of the award whether he reads it or not.
Similarly when a party is present in court either
personally or through his representative when the award
is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he
knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the
scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award
must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the
award."
(emphasis supplied)
18. In Bhagwan Das v. State of U.P. this Court interpreted
Section 18 and laid down the following propositions: (SCC pp.
553-54, para 28)
"(i) If the award is made in the presence of the person
interested (or his authorised representative), he has to
make the application within six weeks from the date of
the Collector's award itself.
(ii) If the award is not made in the presence of the person
interested (or his authorised representative), he has to
make the application seeking reference within six weeks
of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under
Section 12(2).
(iii) If the person interested (or his representative) was
not present when the award is made, and if he does not
receive the notice under Section 12(2) from the Collector,
he has to make the application within six months of the
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date on which he actually or constructively came to know
about the contents of the award.
(iv) If a person interested receives a notice under Section
12(2) of the Act, after the expiry of six weeks from the
date of receipt of such notice, he cannot claim the benefit
of the provision for six months for making the application
on the ground that the date of receipt of notice under
Section 12(2) of the Act was the date of knowledge of the
contents of the award."
19. The Court in Bhagwan Das then held: (SCC p. 554, paras
30-31)
"30. When a person interested makes an application for
reference seeking the benefit of six months' period from
the date of knowledge, the initial onus is on him to prove
that he (or his representative) was not present when the
award was made, that he did not receive any notice
under Section 12(2) of the Act, and that he did not have
the knowledge of the contents of the award during a
period of six months prior to the filing the application for
reference. This onus is discharged by asserting these facts
on oath. He is not expected to prove the negative. Once
the initial onus is discharged by the claimant/person
interested, it is for the Land Acquisition Collector to
establish that the person interested was present either in
person or through his representative when the award was
made, or that he had received a notice under Section
12(2) of the Act, or that he had knowledge of the contents
of the award.
31. Actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of
the award can be established by the Collector by proving
that the person interested had received or drawn the
compensation amount for the acquired land, or had
attested the mahazar/panchnama/proceedings delivering
possession of the acquired land in pursuance of the
acquisition, or had filed a case challenging the award or
had acknowledged the making of the award in any
document or in statement on oath or evidence. The person
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interested, not being in possession of the acquired land
and the name of the State or its transferee being entered
in the revenue municipal records coupled with delay, can
also lead to an inference of constructive knowledge. In
the absence of any such evidence by the Collector, the
claim of the person interested that he did not have
knowledge earlier will be accepted, unless there are
compelling circumstances not to do so."
* * * *
21. A careful reading of the averments contained in Para 2 of the
application filed by the appellant under Section 18(1) shows
that the notice issued by the Collector under Section 12(2) was
served upon him on 22-2-1985. Thereafter, his advocate
obtained certified copy of the award and filed application dated
8-4-1985 for making a reference to the Court. This implies that
the copy of the award had not been sent to the appellant along
with the notice and without that he could not have effectively
made an application for seeking reference.
22. On behalf of the State Government, no evidence was
produced before the Reference Court to show that the copy of
the award was sent to the appellant along with the notice.
Unfortunately, while deciding Issue 3, this aspect has been
totally ignored by the Reference Court which mechanically
concluded that the application filed on 8-4-1985 was beyond the
time specified in Section 18(2)(b). The learned Single Judge of
the High Court also committed serious error by approving the
view taken by the Reference Court, albeit without considering
the fact that the notice issued by the Collector under Section
12(2) was not accompanied by a copy of the award which was
essential for effective exercise of right vested in the appellant to
seek reference under Section 18(1).
15. The Supreme Court in the case of Vijay
MahadeoraoKubadeVs State of Maharashtra reported in (2018) 8
SCC 266 has also relied upon the judgment passed in the case of
PremjiNathu (Supra).
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16. Thus, it is clear that no notice under Section 12(2) of Land
Acquisition Act was ever served upon the respondent and no copy of
the award was ever supplied to the respondent, therefore, a specific
pleading was made by the respondent, that when he came to know
about passing of award, then on 14-72014, he filed an application for
supply of certified copy and certified copy was supplied on 1-8-2014
and according to the record, the application under Section 18 of Land
Acquisition Act was filed before the LAO on 23-8-2014 and as per
endorsement made on the application, the Collector directed for
taking action on 22-12-2014.
17. Now the only question for consideration is that whether
application was filed within a period of six months from the date of
the Collector's award or not?
18. The moot question for consideration is that whether narrow
interpretation is 4 to be given to the words "from the date of the
Collector's award or the date of knowledge of award would also
mean from the date of the Collector's award?
19. The Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwan Das v. State of
U.P., reported in (2010) 3 SCC 545 has held as under :
25. Invariably, the land-loser is required to make an application
under Section 18 of the Act to get the market value as
compensation. The land-loser does not get a right to seek
reference to the civil court unless the award is made. This
means that he can make an application seeking reference only
when he knows that an award has been made.
26. If the words six months from the "date of the Collector's
award" should be literally interpreted as referring to the date of
the award and not the date of knowledge of the award, it will
lead to unjust and absurd results. For example, the Collector
may choose to make an award but not to issue any notice under
Section 12(2) of the Act, either due to negligence or oversight
or due to any ulterior reasons. Or he may send a notice but may
not bother to ensure that it is served on the landowner as
required under Section 45 of the Act. If the words "date of the
Collector's award" are literally interpreted, the effect would be
that on the expiry of six months from the date of award, even
though the claimant had no notice of the award, he would lose
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the right to seek a reference. That will lead to arbitrary and
unreasonable discrimination between those who are notified of
the award and those who are not notified of the award.
27. Unless the procedure under the Act is fair, reasonable and
non-discriminatory, it will run the risk of being branded as
being violative of Article 14 as also Article 300-A of the
Constitution of India. To avoid such consequences, the words
"date of the Collector's award" occurring in proviso (b) to
Section 18 requires to be read as referring to the date of
knowledge of the essential contents of the award, and not the
actual date of the Collector's award.
28. The following position therefore emerges from the
interpretation of the proviso to Section 18 of the Act:
(i) If the award is made in the presence of the person interested
(or his authorised representative), he has to make the
application within six weeks from the date of the Collector's
award itself.
(ii) If the award is not made in the presence of the person
interested (or his authorised representative), he has to make the
application seeking reference within six weeks of the receipt of
the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2).
(iii) If the person interested (or his representative) was not
present when the award is made, and if he does not receive the
notice under Section 12(2) from the Collector, he has to make
the application within six months of the date on which he
actually or constructively came to know about the contents of
the award.
(iv) If a person interested receives a notice under Section 12(2)
of the Act, after the expiry of six weeks from the date of receipt
of such notice, he cannot claim the benefit of the provision for
six months for making the application on the ground that the
date of receipt of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act was the
date of knowledge of the contents of the award.
29. A person who fails to make an application for reference
within the time prescribed is not without remedy. It is open to
him to make an application under Section 28-A of the Act, on
the basis of an award of the court in respect of the other lands
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covered by the same acquisition notification, if there is an
increase. Be that as it may.
30. When a person interested makes an application for reference
seeking the benefit of six months' period from the date of
knowledge, the initial onus is on him to prove that he (or his
representative) was not present when the award was made, that
he did not receive any notice under Section 12(2) of the Act,
and that he did not have the knowledge of the contents of the
award during a period of six months prior to the filing the
application for reference. This onus is discharged by asserting
these facts on oath. He is not expected to prove the negative.
Once the initial onus is discharged by the claimant/person
interested, it is for the Land Acquisition Collector to establish
that the person interested was present either in person or
through his representative when the award was made, or that he
had received a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, or that he
had knowledge of the contents of the award.
31. Actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the
award can be established by the Collector by proving that the
person interested had received or drawn the compensation
amount for the acquired land, or had attested the
mahazar/panchnama/proceedings delivering possession of the
acquired land in pursuance of the acquisition, or had filed a case
challenging the award or had acknowledged the making of the
award in any document or in statement on oath or evidence. The
person interested, not being in possession of the acquired land
and the name of the State or its transferee being entered in the
revenue municipal records coupled with delay, can also lead to
an inference of constructive knowledge. In the absence of any
such evidence by the Collector, the claim of the person
interested that he did not have knowledge earlier will be
accepted, unless there are compelling circumstances not to do
so.
20. Thus the words from the date of the Collector's award would
also include from the date of knowledge.
21. In the present case, it was specifically pleaded by the
respondent, that after getting information of award, an application
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was filed on 14-7-2014 for supply of certified copy which was
received on 1-4-2014 and as per the record, the application under
Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act was filed before LAO on 23-8-
2014 and on 22-12-2014, an endorsement was made by Collector to
take necessary action. Thus, it is held that the application under
Section 18 of Land Acquisition was filed within six months from the
date of knowledge of impugned award, therefore, the reference is
held to be within the period of limitation.
Whether the respondent had accepted the compensation amount
without protest?
22. It is submitted by Counsel for appellant, that since, the
respondent had received the compensation amount, therefore, the
reference under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act was not
maintainable.
23. Considered the submissions made by Counsel for the
appellant.
24. The appellants in their written statement did not claim that
the respondent has accepted the compensation amount without any
protest. However, the respondent in para 10 of his cross-examination
had admitted that the compensation amount was received under
protest. AwadheshPratap Singh Yadav, who appeared as a
departmental witness did not claim that the compensation amount
was paid. Thus, it is clear that the respondent himself has admitted
that compensation amount was received under protest. Therefore,
now the next question for consideration is that if the land owner has
accepted the compensation amount under protest, then whether a
reference can be made under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act or
not?
25. Section 31 of Land Acquisition Act reads as under :
31. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Court.--(1)
On making an award under Section 11, the Collector shall tender
payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons
interested entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to
them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies
mentioned in the next sub-section.
(2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person
competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the
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title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the
Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the court
to which a reference under Section 18 would be submitted:
Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such
payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount:
Provided also that no person who has received the amount otherwise
than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under
Section 18:
Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability
of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any
compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person
lawfully entitled thereto.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in this section, the Collector may, with
the sanction of 1[appropriate Government], instead of awarding a
money compensation in respect of any land, make any arrangement
with a person having a limited interest in such land, either by the
grant of other lands in exchange, the remission of land-revenue on
other lands held under the same title, or in such other way as may be
equitable having regard to the interests of the parties concerned.
(4) Nothing in the last foregoing sub-section shall be construed to
interfere with or limit the power of the Collector to enter into any
arrangement with any person interested in the land and competent to
contract in respect thereof.
26. Section 31(2) second proviso provides that no person who
has received the amount other than under protest shall be entitled to
make any application under Section 18. As already pointed out, the
respondent, in para 10 of his cross-examination, that the amount of
compensation was received by him under protest. The appellant has
not controverted the said fact by producing documents.
AwadheshPratap Singh Yadav who had appeared as a Departmental
Witness neither refuted the said evidence of the respondent, nor filed
any document to show that compensation amount was received by
respondent without any protest.
27. The Supreme Court in the case of Chandra Bhan v.
Ghaziabad Development Authority, reported in (2015) 15 SCC
343 has held as under :
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11. The principal contention urged by the learned counsel for
GDA was that since the compensation was accepted by the
claimants without any protest, the reference was not
maintainable. In our opinion, this contention is without any
substance for several reasons. In Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab it
was held that since the appellants therein had filed an
application for reference under Section 18 of the Act, it
manifested their intention. Consequently, the protest against the
award of the Collector was implied notwithstanding the
acceptance of compensation.
12. Similarly, in U.P. State Industrial Development Corpn.v.
RishabhIspat Ltd. it was held that (SCC p. 252, para 8) the
question whether the compensation offered was accepted
without protest is essentially a question of fact to be determined
on the basis of the evidence on record. On facts, it was held in
that decision that there was nothing to suggest that the claimants
had accepted the compensation without protest.
13. Insofar as the present appeals are concerned, although the
State/GDA did aver in its written statement that Chandra Bhan
had accepted the compensation without any protest, no issue
was framed in this regard, and, therefore, there was no question
of any evidence having been led to show that the claim was
accepted without any protest. That apart, SLAO gave his award
on 7-12-1990 and Chandra Bhan had filed his objections to the
award and sought a reference within the prescribed time by
making an application under Section 18 of the Act on 11-1-
1991. His conduct clearly shows that the award passed by
SLAO was not accepted without protest.
14. Additionally, we are of the opinion that in cases where a
large number of claimants are involved, there will always be a
few claimants who may accept the award passed by the
Collector. If they are precluded from making a reference for
enhancement of compensation, it could lead to an anomalous
situation where out of very large number of landowners, some
of them, located in scattered pockets would be entitled to the
compensation only as awarded by the Collector while some of
them in other scattered pockets would be entitled to claim
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enhancement of compensation. There would, therefore, be two
distinct class of landowners similarly located and placed but
receiving different amounts of compensation for the acquisition
of the same land. Surely, this cannot be the intention of Section
18 of the Act.
15. In the impugned judgment and order the High Court has laid
emphasis on the fact that since the claimants had accepted the
compensation awarded by SLAO without protest, the reference
under Section 18 of the Act was not maintainable. As we have
found on facts, this is incorrect and the judgment and order
passed by the High Court is, to this extent, unsustainable.
16. The learned counsel for the State/GDA relied upon Ashwani
Kumar Dhingra v. State of Punjab to contend that only a person
who has accepted the compensation under protest is entitled to
ask for a reference. The decision relied upon does not advance
the case of the learned counsel. That was a case decided on its
own facts pertaining to an individual in which one member of
the family was satisfied with the compensation awarded to him
in respect of his parcel of land and other members of the family
were not and had accepted the compensation under protest. The
appellant in the cited case sought to take advantage of the
protest by other members of his family. This Court, in that
context, referred to Section 18 of the Act and held that a person
interested, in order to enable him to seek the remedy of
reference can do so if he does not accept the award made by the
Collector. That was also a case in which only an individual was
affected and not a large number of landowners.
17. The learned counsel also submitted that the protest letter of
Chandra Bhan that has been filed in this Court as a part of the
paper book does not contain any date, thereby implying that the
protest letter was not genuine. We cannot entertain this
submission since it involves a decision on a fact that was not
considered either by the Reference Court or by the High Court.
However, we may only observe that in the written statement
filed by the State/GDA it has not been stated anywhere when
the compensation was accepted by Chandra Bhan (without
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protest) and the quantum thereof. On the contrary, a rather
general averment has been made to the following effect:
"That the claimant(s) has/have accepted the award and has/have
received the amount of compensation without protest as such
the reference is legally not maintainable and is liable to be
dismissed."
18. In the absence of any definitive facts having been pleaded
by the State/GDA, it is difficult to come to the conclusion that
Chandra Bhan and the other claimants had accepted the
compensation without protest.
28. Since, the evidence of respondent has remained unrebutted
that he had received the compensation amount under protest,
therefore, this Court is of considered opinion, that the reference was
maintainable.
29. No other argument was advanced by Counsel for the State.
30. Accordingly, it is held that no illegality was committed by the
reference court by holding that not only the reference was
maintainable, but it was not barred by time.
31. It was informed by the Counsel for the parties, that the Land
Owners have also challenged the award on the question of quantum
of compensation.
32. Therefore, by keeping the question of quantum of
compensation open, the award dated 13.07.2020 passed by
Additional Judge to the Court of First Additional District Judge,
Gohad, District Bhind in Land Acquisition MJC Case No. 16 of 2015
is hereby affirmed. The appeal filed by the State/Appellants is
hereby Dismissed.
33. Office is directed to keep the record of the Reference
Court in the Appeal filed by land owner.
34. No order as to costs."
6. It is next contended by Counsel for Appellant is that the LAO had
properly ascertained the market value of the land , but the reference Court has
relied upon the guidelines issued by the Collector for the purposes of collection
of stamp duty, therefore, illegality has been committed by the Reference Court.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:15607
7. Considered the submission made by Counsel for the Appellant
8. The Supreme Court in the case of Lal Chand Vs. Union of India
reported in AIR 2010 SC 170 has held as under :
Whether the circle rates/guideline value rates can be relied upon to
determine the market value?
28. The appellant relied upon the Notification dated 21-1-1981
issued by the Land Division of the Government of India, Ministry of
Works and Housing, notifying the schedule of market rates of land in
different parts of Delhi and various outlying areas--showing the
minimum rates at Rs 400 per square yard for residential and Rs 800
per square yard for non-residential plots. The question is whether the
same could be relied upon for determination of market value in regard
to land acquisition.
29. When the matter came up before this Court in the earlier round,
the counsel for the appellant had conceded that such rates could not
form the basis for determining the market value of the acquired lands.
In spite of it, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted before us
that though the said circle rates cannot be the basis for determining the
market value, it may be taken note of as one of the relevant pieces of
evidence indicative of the market value.
30. There is some confusion as to whether such basic
rates/guideline value/minimum registration value rates could form the
basis for determining the market value.
31. This Court in Jawajee Nagnatham v. Revenue Divisional
Officer and several cases following it, including Land Acquisition
Officer v. Jasti Rohini, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd.
and Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Bipin Kumar held that market
value under Section 23 of the LA Act cannot be fixed on the basis of
the rates mentioned in the basic valuation registers maintained for the
purpose of detection of undervaluation and collection of proper stamp
duty.
32. In Jawajee Nagnatham the landowners had appealed to the
Andhra Pradesh High Court against the order of the Reference Court,
claiming increase, relying on the market value entered in the basic
valuation register maintained by the Revenue Authorities under the
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Stamp Act, 1899. The High Court rejected the claim based on the
basic valuation register, as such register had no evidentiary value or
statutory basis.
33. In appeals by the landowners, this Court in Jawajee
Nagnatham case held that the basic valuation register was maintained
for the purpose of collecting stamp duty under Section 47-A of the
Stamp Act, 1899 (as amended in Andhra Pradesh); that Section 47-A
conferred no express power to the Government to determine the
market value of the lands prevailing in a particular area, village, block,
district or region and to maintain basic valuation register for levy of
stamp duty in regard to instruments presented for registration; that
there was no other statutory provision or rule having statutory force
providing for maintaining such valuation register; and therefore, such
register prepared and maintained for the purpose of collecting stamp
duty had no statutory base or force and cannot form the basis to
determine the market value of any acquired land under Section 23 of
the LA Act.
34. Jasti Rohini also arose from Andhra Pradesh and followed
Jawajee Nagnatham and held that the basic valuation register had no
statutory basis.
35. The case of U.P. Jal Nigam arose from Uttar Pradesh. In that
case, the landowner filed a writ petition seeking a direction to U.P. Jal
Nigam to pay compensation in regard to lands acquired on the basis of
market value assessed by the Collector, Lucknow. The High Court
allowed the petition and directed the U.P. Jal Nigam to pay
compensation at the rate determined by the Collector, on the basis of
the basic valuation circulars issued for the purposes of stamp duty.
36. This Court in U.P. Jal Nigam case reversed the decision of the
High Court following its earlier decision in Jawajee Nagnatham and
held that the Collector committed an error in determining the market
value on the basis of basic valuation circulars.
37. Jawajee Nagnatham was again followed in Bipin Kumar which
is another case from Uttar Pradesh.
38. All the abovementioned four decisions rejected the value
entered in the basic valuation registers, on the ground that they had no
statutory basis having regard to the provisions of the stamp law
applicable in the respective States (Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh)
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and cannot be the basis for determination of market value under
Section 23 of the LA Act.
39. There is also another set of decisions considering if such circle
rates could be considered as prima facie basis, for the purposes of
ascertaining the market value and determining whether there was any
undervaluation of the instrument for the purposes of stamp duty,
which is a revenue collection exercise. We may refer to one of those
cases, that is, Ramesh Chand Bansal v. District Magistrate/Collector
wherein this Court held: (SCC pp. 67-68, para 5)
"5. ... Reading Section 47-A with the aforesaid Rule 340-A it is
clear that the circle rate fixed by the Collector is not final but is only a
prima facie determination of rate of the area concerned only to give
guidance to the registering authority to test prima facie whether the
instrument has properly described the value of the property. The circle
rate under this rule is neither final for the authority nor to the one
subjected to pay the stamp duty. So far sub-sections (1) and (2) are
concerned they are very limited in their application as they only direct
the registering authority to refer to the Collector for determination in
case the property is undervalued in such instrument. The circle rate
does not take away the right of such person to show that the property
in question is correctly valued as he gets an opportunity in case of
undervaluation to prove it before the Collector after reference is
made."
40. In R. Sai Bharathi v. J. Jayalalitha while examining the issue
in the context of a case relating to disproportionate assets this Court
held: (SCC pp. 40-41, paras 22 & 24)
"22. ... The guideline value is a rate fixed by authorities under the
Stamp Act for purposes of determining the true market value of the
property disclosed in an instrument requiring payment of stamp duty.
Thus the guideline value fixed is not final but only a prima facie rate
prevailing in an area. It is open to the registering authority as well as
the person seeking registration to prove the actual market value of
property. The authorities cannot regard the guideline valuation as the
last word on the subject of market value. ...
* * *
24. This scheme of the enactment and the Rules contemplate that
guideline value will only afford a prima facie basis to ascertain the
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true or correct market value, undue emphasis on the guideline value
without reference to the setting in which it is to be viewed will
obscure the issue for consideration. It is clear, therefore, that guideline
value is not sacrosanct as urged on behalf of the appellants, but only a
factor to be taken note of, if at all available in respect of an area in
which the property transferred lies."
41. It should however be noted that as contrasted from the
assessment of market value contained in non-statutory basic valuation
registers, the position may be different, where the guideline market
values are determined by Expert Committees constituted under the
State stamp law, by following the detailed procedure laid down under
the relevant Rules, and are published in the State Gazette. Such State
Stamp Acts and the Rules thereunder, provide for scientific and
methodical assessment of market value in different areas by Expert
Committees.
42. These statutes provide that such Expert Committees will be
constituted with officers from the Department of Revenue, Public
Works, Survey & Settlement, Local Authority and an expert in the
field of valuation of properties, with the Sub-Registrar of the sub-
registration district as the Member-Secretary. They also provide for
different methods of valuation for lands, plots, houses and other
buildings. They require determination of the market value of
agricultural lands by classifying them with reference to soil, rate of
revenue assessment, value of lands in the vicinity and locality, nature
of crop yield for a specified number of years, and situation (with
reference to roads, markets, etc.).
43. The rates assessed by the Committee are required to be
published inviting objections/suggestions from the members of the
public. After considering such objections/suggestions, the final rates
are published in the gazette. Such published rates are revised and
updated periodically. When the guideline market values, that is,
minimum rates for registration of properties, are so evaluated and
determined by the Expert Committees as per statutory procedure, there
is no reason why such rates should not be a relevant piece of evidence
for determination of market value.
44. One of the recognised methods for determination of market
value is with reference to the opinion of experts. The estimation of
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market value by such statutorily constituted Expert Committees, as
expert evidence can therefore form the basis for determining the
market value in land acquisition cases, as a relevant piece of evidence.
It will be however open to either party to place evidence to dislodge
the presumption that may flow from such guideline market value. We,
however, hasten to add that the guideline market value can be a
relevant piece of evidence only if they are assessed by statutorily
appointed Expert Committees, in accordance with the prescribed
assessment procedure (either streetwise, or roadwise, or areawise, or
villagewise) and finalised after inviting objections and published in
the gazette. Be that as it may.
45. We have referred to this aspect only to show that there are
different categories of basic valuation registers in different States and
what is stated with reference to the stamp law in Andhra Pradesh or
Uttar Pradesh, may not apply with reference to other States where
State stamp laws have prescribed the procedure for determination of
market value, referred to above.
9. It is not the case of the Appellant that the Collector's guidelines were not
issued in accordance with law. Thus in absence of challenge to the correctness
of the Collector's guidelines by the State, this Court is of the considered opinion,
that the Collector's guidelines issued by the State Authority has been rightly
relied upon by the Reference Court.
10. No other argument is advanced by the Counsel for the Appellant.
11. Ex consequenti, Award dated 30/04/2022 passed by V District Judge,
Gwalior in MJC (Land Acquisition) No.102/2018 is hereby affirmed and the
appeal filed by appellants/State is hereby dismissed in the light of terms and
conditions of the judgment passed in the case of Lokendra Singh (supra) as
well as the observation made in respect of application of Collector guidelines.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:15607
(G.S. Ahluwalia)
Judge
Rashid
