Madhya Pradesh High Court
Pramada Estates India Pvt Ltd Through ... vs State Of Mp on 21 July, 2025
Author: Vishal Mishra
Bench: Vishal Mishra
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:32838
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
ON THE 21st OF JULY, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 27857 of 2025
PRAMADA ESTATES INDIA PVT LTD THROUGH DIRECTOR SHRI
OMPRKASH MULCHAND
Versus
STATE OF MP AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Aditya Khandekar - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Suyash Thakur - Government Advocate for respondents/State.
ORDER
This petition has been filed seeking the following reliefs:-
"(i) That, the Hon'ble Court be pleased to call for the entire
record of the case.
(ii) Issue a writ(s) of mandamus, order (s) or direction (s)
commanding the respondents to compensate the petitioner in a
time bound manner, as per Kandika 144 of M.P. Nazul Bhumi
Nivartan Nirdesh 2020.
(iii) Direct the respondents to decide his representation and
compensate the petitioner in a time bound manner.
(iv) Grant such other relief as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and
proper in the interest of justice."
It is submitted that the petitioner has filed an
application/representation (Annexure P/6) to the respondent No.2, which is
pending consideration. An innocuous prayer is made to direct the authority to
consider and decide the pending case expeditiously.
The learned counsel for the State has raised the plea of delay in latches
in filing of this petition.
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So far as the aspect of delay in latches is concerned, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of H.P., (2022) 7 SCC
508 has held has under:-
16. Given the important protection extended to an individual vis-
à-vis their private property (embodied earlier in Article 31, and
now as a constitutional right in Article 300-A), and the high
threshold the State must meet while acquiring land, the question
remains -- can the State, merely on the ground of delay and
laches, evade its legal responsibility towards those from whom
private property has been expropriated? In these facts and
circumstances, we find this conclusion to be unacceptable, and
warranting intervention on the grounds of equity and fairness.
17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State's actions, or
lack thereof, have in fact compounded the injustice meted out to
the appellants and compelled them to approach this Court, albeit
belatedly. The initiation of acquisition proceedings initially in the
1990s occurred only at the behest of the High Court. Even after
such judicial intervention, the State continued to only extend the
benefit of the Court's directions to those who specifically
approached the courts. The State's lackadaisical conduct is
discernible from this action of initiating acquisition proceedings
selectively, only in respect to the lands of those writ petitioners
who had approached the court in earlier proceedings, and not other
landowners, pursuant to the orders dated 23-4-2007 (in Anakh
Singh v. State of H.P. [Anakh Singh v. State of H.P., 2007 SCC
OnLine HP 220] ) and 20-12-2013 (in Onkar Singh v. State
[Onkar Singh v. State, CWP No. 1356 of 2010, order dated 20-12-
2013 (HP)] ), respectively. In this manner, at every stage, the State
sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring land required for
public use in the manner prescribed by law.
18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches which
conclude either way as contended by both sides in the present
dispute--however, the specific factual matrix compels this Court
to weigh in favour of the appellant landowners. The State cannot
shield itself behind the ground of delay and laches in such a
situation; there cannot be a "limitation" to doing justice. This
Court in a much earlier case -- Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant
Regular Motor Service [Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular
Motor Service, (1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] , held :
(AIR pp. 335-36, para 11)
"11. ... 'Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his
conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to
a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the
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remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material.
But in every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of
course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the
validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases,
are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during
the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of
justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as
relates to the remedy'."
19. The facts of the present case reveal that the State has, in a
clandestine and arbitrary manner, actively tried to limit disbursal
of compensation as required by law, only to those for which it was
specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to all those who are
entitled. This arbitrary action, which is also violative of the
appellants' prevailing Article 31 right (at the time of cause of
action), undoubtedly warranted consideration, and intervention by
the High Court, under its Article 226 jurisdiction. This Court, in
Manohar [State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126] -- a
similar case where the name of the aggrieved had been deleted
from revenue records leading to his dispossession from the land
without payment of compensation held : (SCC pp. 128-29, paras
6-8)
"6. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants, we
are satisfied that the case projected before the court by the
appellants is utterly untenable and not worthy of emanating from
any State which professes the least regard to being a welfare State.
When we pointed out to the learned counsel that, at this stage at
least, the State should be gracious enough to accept its mistake
and promptly pay the compensation to the respondent, the State
has taken an intractable attitude and persisted in opposing what
appears to be a just and reasonable claim of the respondent.
7. Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights available
to the citizens are declared by the Constitution. Although Article
19(1)(f) was deleted by the Forty-fourth Amendment to the
Constitution, Article 300-A has been placed in the Constitution,
which reads as follows:
'300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by
authority of law.
--No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of
law.'
8. This is a case where we find utter lack of legal authority
for deprivation of the respondent's property by the appellants who
are State authorities. In our view, this case was an eminently fit
one for exercising the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution."
20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi [Tukaram Kana Joshi v.
Maharashtra Industrial Development Corpn. (MIDC), (2013) 1
SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491 : (2012) 13 SCR 29] while
dealing with a similar fact situation, this Court held as follows :
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(SCC p. 359, para 11)
"11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches
extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities
pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a
wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues,
claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar
cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay
down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy,
even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32
or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different
scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State took over
possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any
sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of
the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with
the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any
other permissible statutory mode."
21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this Court finds that the
contentions raised by the State, do not inspire confidence and
deserve to be rejected. The State has merely averred to the
appellants' alleged verbal consent or the lack of objection, but has
not placed any material on record to substantiate this plea. Further,
the State was unable to produce any evidence indicating that the
land of the appellants had been taken over or acquired in the
manner known to law, or that they had ever paid any
compensation. It is pertinent to note that this was the State's
position, and subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as
well, in the other writ proceedings.
22. This Court is also not moved by the State's contention that
since the property is not adjoining to that of the appellants, it
disentitles them from claiming benefit on the ground of parity.
Despite it not being adjoining (which is admitted in the rejoinder-
affidavit filed by the appellants), it is clear that the subject land
was acquired for the same reason--construction of the Narag
Fagla Road, in 1972-1973, and much like the claimants before the
Reference Court, these appellants too were illegally dispossessed
without following due process of law, thus resulting in violation of
Article 31 and warranting the High Court's intervention under
Article 226 jurisdiction. In the absence of written consent to
voluntarily give up their land, the appellants were entitled to
compensation in terms of law. The need for written consent in
matters of land acquisition proceedings, has been noted in fact, by
the Full Court decision of the High Court in Shankar Das [Shankar
Das v. State of H.P., 2013 SCC OnLine HP 681] itself, which is
relied upon in the impugned judgment [Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of
H.P., 2013 SCC OnLine HP 3773]
23. This Court, in Vidya Devi [Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., (2020)
2 SCC 569 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 799] facing an almost identical
set of facts and circumstances -- rejected the contention of "oral"
consent to be baseless and outlined the responsibility of the State :
(SCC p. 574, para 12)
"12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the
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State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without
the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this
Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial
Development Corpn. [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra
Industrial Development Corpn. (MIDC), (2013) 1 SCC 353 :
(2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491 : (2012) 13 SCR 29] wherein it was held
that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition,
requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State
being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate
to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar
[State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012)
3 SCC (Civ) 769] held that the right to property is now considered
to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human
right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of
individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health,
employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi-faceted
dimension."
24. And with regard to the contention of delay and laches, this
Court went on to hold : (Vidya Devi case [Vidya Devi v. State of
H.P., (2020) 2 SCC 569 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 799] , SCC pp. 574-
75, para 12) "12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay
and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be
rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a
continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the
judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter
of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and
reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend
upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed,
and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation
prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional
jurisdiction to do substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction
with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it. [P.S.
Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC
(L&S) 22] "
25. Concluding that the forcible dispossession of a person of their
private property without following due process of law, was
violative [ Relying on Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius
Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627 : 2005 Supp (3) SCR 388; N.
Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 517; Delhi
Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011) 9 SCC 354 :
(2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 673 : (2011) 12 SCR 191 and Jilubhai
Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596 :
1994 Supp (1) SCR 807.] of both their human right, and
constitutional right under Article 300-A, this Court allowed the
appeal. We find that the approach taken by this Court in Vidya
Devi [Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., (2020) 2 SCC 569 : (2020) 1
SCC (Civ) 799] is squarely applicable to the nearly identical facts
before us in the present case.
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Therefore, in view of the aforesaid pronouncement by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, it is clear that the State authorities cannot take shelter of plea
of delay.
Under these circumstances, this petition is disposed off directing the
respondent No.2 to consider and decide the pending
application/representation (Annexure P/6) by a self contained speaking order
within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this
order.
Needless to mention that this Court has not expressed any opinion on
the merit of the case.
(VISHAL MISHRA)
JUDGE
sj
