Madhya Pradesh High Court
Dwarka Prasad Jhariya vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 18 July, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
ON THE 18th OF JULY, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 18513 of 2020
DWARKA PRASAD JHARIYA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Krishna Kumar Pandey - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Yogesh Dhande Government Advocate for the respondent-State.
ORDER
By way of this petition, the petitioner is seeking payment of full salary
and allowances for the period of suspension from 16.07 2005 to 04.12 2015.
The said benefits have been denied to the petitioner by the impugned order
Annexure P/17 whereby the pay and allowance of the petitioner for the
aforesaid suspension have been restricted only to the subsistence allowance
already drawn by him and it has further been observed that for all other
purposes except full wages the said period would count as the period spent
on duty.
2. The brief facts for disposal of the present case are that the
petitioner was placed under suspension vide order Annexure P/2 dated
29.09.2005 which was the date on which he was taken in custody in relation
to crime No.62/2005 registered under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468/34 of IPC.
Thereafter the suspension was revoked by the respondents in anticipation of
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conclusion of criminal case. Thereafter the suspension was revoked by the
respondents in anticipation of conclusion of criminal case. The revocation
took place on 04.12.2015 whereas ultimately the petitioner was acquitted in
compromise allowed by this Court in MCRC No. 27628 of 2017 on
31.01.2018.
3. The facts placed on record indicate that the petitioner was alleged
guilty of forging the signature of a newly elected Sarpanch namely Smt.
Savita Singh. The said act of the petitioner had no connection with his duty
as Gram Sevak. It was an act alleged to be done of forging signature of
newly elected Sarpanch in the course of election proceedings. The FIR was
lodged on the complaint of that lady Smt. Savita Singh and it is evident that
the FIR and prosecution was not at the instance of the department or the
employer.
4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Jaipal
Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 121 has relied on an earlier decision in the case of
Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Gujarat Electricity Board, (1996) 11 SCC
603 and has held that in such cases of prosecution there can be no automatic
payment of backwages because the department is under obligation to place
the employee under suspension once he involved in criminal case and he is
arrested on account of criminal charges. In the case of Jaipal Singh (Supra)
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where the prosecution is not at the
instance of the employer, then looking to the statutory obligation of the
employer to place the employee under suspension, the employer cannot be
saddled with liability to pay full wages and allowances for the
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suspension/termination period.
5. In a subsequent case of Raj Narain v. Union of India reported in
(2019) 5 SCC 809 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there is no real
difference between initiation of criminal proceedings by the Department
visa-vis a criminal proceeding lodged by the police. It has been held that the
employer cannot be saddled with full backwages on acquittal of person by
criminal court unless it is found that the prosecution was malicious. The
Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under :-
"6. The decision of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore [Ranchhodji
Chaturji Thakore v. Gujarat Electricity Board, (1996) 11 SCC 603
: 1997 SCC (L&S) 491] was followed by this Court in Union of
India v. Jaipal Singh [Union of India v. Jaipal Singh, (2004) 1
SCC 121 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 12] to refuse back wages to an
employee who was initially convicted for an offence under
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and later acquitted by the
High Court in a criminal appeal. While refusing to grant relief to
the petitioner therein, this Court held that subsequent acquittal
would not entitle an employee to seek back wages. However, this
Court was of the opinion that if the prosecution is launched at the
behest of the department and the employee is acquitted, different
considerations may arise. The learned counsel for the appellant
endeavoured to distinguish the prosecution launched by the police
for involvement of an employee in a criminal case and the
criminal proceedings initiated at the behest of the employer. The
observation made in the judgment in Union of India v. Jaipal
Singh [Union of India v. Jaipal Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 121 : 2004
SCC (L&S) 12] has to be understood in a manner in which the
department would become liable for back wages in the event of a
finding that the initiation of the criminal proceedings was mala
fide or with vexatious intent. In all other cases, we do not see any
difference between initiation of the criminal proceedings by the
department vis-à-vis a criminal case lodged by the police. For
example, if an employee is involved in embezzlement of funds or
is found indulging in demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification, the employer cannot be mulcted with full back wages
on the acquittal of the person by a criminal court, unless it is found
that the prosecution is malicious."
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6. In the present case the petitioner has been acquitted in view of
compromise and was not acquitted on merits. Therefore, no facts can be
made available to the Court whether the prosecution was malicious or not
because the acquittal is in compromise and no trial took place. Therefore
this Court cannot infer that prosecution was malicious, so as to award
payment of full salary for the suspension period in question.
7. Therefore, the petition fails and is dismissed.
(VIVEK JAIN)
JUDGE
MISHRA
