Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sukhbadan Vishwakarma vs Madhya Pradesh Poorv Kshetra Vidyut ... on 11 July, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:31280
1 WP-15276-2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
ON THE 11th OF JULY, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 15276 of 2021
SUKHBADAN VISHWAKARMA
Versus
MADHYA PRADESH POORV KSHETRA VIDYUT VITRAN CO. LTD.
AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Mr. Sourabh Singh Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner.
Shri Ankit Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondents.
ORDER
The present petition has been filed challenging the penalty order
Annex.P/9, whereby the petitioner has been inflicted with penalty of
reduction to lower stage of pay scale and further withholding next increment
for a period of three years with cumulative effect. this penalty order
Annex.P/9 dated 18/11/2020 has been confirmed in appeal vide order
Annex.P/12 dated 23/03/2021.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the charge
sheet so also the order Annex.P/9 imposing penalty has been passed by the
officers holding current charge of the post and therefore, the orders are
without jurisdiction. It is further argued that apart from the orders and charge
sheet being without jurisdiction, the impugned order Annex.P/9 further
suffers from the vice of it being a non speaking order.
3. It is not disputed between the parties that the charge sheet as well as
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:31280
2 WP-15276-2021
the penalty orders were issued by the officers holding current charge of the
post but holding substantively lower post. Therefore, it has been argued
before this Court that the charge sheet and the penalty order are without
jurisdiction.
4. So far as the issue of competence of the authority on the ground of
the charge sheet and penalty order having been issued by the officer holding
current charge of the post is concerned, the said issue has already been
conclusively decided by the Division Bench of this Court in WA
No.575/2020 (P.S. Dhanwal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.) in the
following manner :
11. In the case at hand the State Government exercising its powers
under Section 49 E of 1960 Act appointed Shri Pradeep Nikhra,
Joint Commissioner, Co-operative (Legal), Bhopal Division, on
deputation, as In-charge Managing Director, M.P. State Co-
operative Bank Ltd., Bhopal by order No. 1-1/2019/15-2 dated
6.2.2019. Though it is contended that the appointment of Shri
Nikhra was as In-charge Managing Director and was thus not a
full fledged Managing Director as could have discharged the
function and powers of the Managing Director, the fact, however,
remains is that said Shri Nikhra was Class I Officer and the
appointment was by the State Government under Section 49 E of
1960 Act, and was thus competent to have exercised the powers
and functions of Managing Director. In Gopalji Khanna (supra)
dwelling on the issue as to whether the power of review available
to the Chairman and Managing Director of the Allahabad Bank
under Regulation 18 of the Allahabad Bank Officer Employees
(Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 could have been
exercised by the Executive Director who in the absence of the
Chairman and Managing Director was entrusted with the current
charge of the duties of offices of the Chairman and Managing
Director, held:
"7. With respect to the second contention, it was submitted by the
learned counsel that the power of review is conferred by
Regulation 18. Only the Chairman and Managing Director are
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:31280
3 WP-15276-2021
specified as reviewing authorities. This statutory power, therefore,
can be exercised by Chairman and Managing Director only as they
are the named authorities under the statutory provision and cannot
be validly delegated to any subordinate authority. Shri Wadhwa,
therefore, could not have validly exercised that power. There is no
substance in this submission. It is really misconceived. Though the
Regulations have been framed in exercise of the powers conferred
by Section 19 the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer
of Undertakings) Act, 1970, by the Board of Directors, they
cannot be equated with a statute. What the Board of Directors
have done by making those Regulations is to regulate the power of
taking disciplinary action against the employees of the bank.
Moreover, this is not a case where the power of Chairman or the
Managing Director came to be exercised by a subordinate official
as a result of delegation of that power. Shri Wadhwa while
exercising the power of review was really discharging the
functions of Chairman and Managing Director as he was then
placed in charge of those offices and was therefore entitled to
perform all the duties and functions of those offices. He did not
exercise that power on the basis that it was delegated to him.
Therefore, the decisions in Barnard Vs. National Dock, Labour
Board, Krishna Kumar Vs. Divisional Assistant Electrical
Engineer and Marathwada University Vs. Seshrao Balwant Rao
Chavan, relied upon by the learned counsel in support of his
contention that statutory power can be exercised by the named
authority only and cannot be further delegated, require no further
consideration. So also, Ramakant Shripad Sinai Advalpalkar Vs.
Union of India and State of Haryana Vs. S.M. Sharma cited by the
learned counsel have no relevance. The question which arose for
consideration in those cases was whether an officer who
substantively holds a lower post and is asked to discharge the
duties of a higher post can be considered as promoted to that
higher post. This Court held that entrustment of current duties
charge of a higher post does not amount to promotion and in such
cases the person continues to hold his substantive lower post and
only discharges the duties of higher post essentially as a stop gap
arrangement.
8. It was next submitted that when a person is entrusted with
charge of current duties of a higher post, he can exercise only
those powers and perform those functions which are available to
the person holding the higher post under executive orders and not
those which are conferred by statutory provisions. In support of
this submission the learned counsel relied upon the decision of this
Court in Ajaib Singh Vs. State of Punjab. In that case what had
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:31280
4 WP-15276-2021
happened was that the Additional District Magistrate, Amritsar
was invested with powers of a District Magistrate under Section
10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and was also put in
charge of the office of the District Magistrate Amritsar, who was
transferred. No order appointing him as a District Magistrate
under Section 10 (1) was passed. While in charge of the office of
the District Magistrate, he passed an order of detention under the
Defence of India Act and Rules, 1962. That order was challenged
on the ground that as the Additional District Magistrate was not
appointed as District Magistrate under Section 10 (1) he did not
have the power to pass a detention order and, therefore, the order
passed by him was without any authority of law and liable to be
set aside. This Court after considering the relevant provisions of
the Defence of India Act and the Rules, 1962 and the drastic
nature of the power and the consequences following from it,
observed that the power of detention could only be exercised by
the State Government or an officer or authority to whom it was
delegated and that the said power could be delegated to an officer
or authority who was not lower in rank than the District
Magistrate. It was then held that even though the Additional
District Magistrate was exercising the powers of the District
Magistrate on there being a vacancy in the office of the District
Magistrate, he was still not the District Magistrate as he was not
appointed as such under Section 10(1) of the Code and therefore,
he had no power to pass the order of detention. Even though
invested with the powers of a District Magistrate he did not
become an officer of the rank of a District Magistrate. In this case
we are not concerned with such a provision and therefore are not
required to consider whether Executive Director of the Bank when
entrusted with the charge of duties of the offices of Chairman and
Managing Director became an officer of the rank of Chairman and
Managing Director. Moreover the power of the employer to take
disciplinary action against his employee including the power to
review an order of penalty, has to be distinguished from the
statutory power to detain a person. Therefore, on the basis of this
decision it cannot be held that the Executive Director who was
merely entrusted with the charge of duties of the offices of
Chairman and Managing Director could not have exercised the
power of reviewing the order of penalty passed by the disciplinary
authority.
11. ... On the contrary this Court has observed therein that the
confirmed holder of a substantive post would be discharging the
functions attached to the post and when some one is placed in that
very post in an officiating capacity or directed to hold charge of
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:31280
5 WP-15276-2021
the post, he would be required to perform the duties and discharge
the functions of the post rendering identical service. In paragraph
10 of the judgment it is further observed as under : ( SCC p.273)
".......it may be that the confirmed holder of the post may be away
and not in a position to discharge the duties and some one may be
appointed in an officiating capacity or may be directed to hold
charge but nonetheless such holder of the post will have to
perform duties and discharge functions attached to the post."
12. After considering the above decisions and Regulations 2(n)
and 18, we are of the opinion that as the Executive Director Shri
Wadhwa was entrusted with the charge of the offices of Chairman
and Managing Director he became entitled to exercise all the
executive powers, perform duties and discharge functions attached
to those offices and, therefore, the order of penalty passed by him
was legal and valid."
12. The decision in Girja Shankar (supra) relied by the
Appellant/Petitioner is of no assistance as the same was, as is
evident from the observation in paragraph 16 thereof, "in situation
like those under Article 311 (1) of the Constitution, which
mandates that "No person who is a member of a civil service of the
Union or an all India service or a civil service of a State or holds a
civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or
removed by a authority subordinate to that by which he was
appointed." Being trite it is that the suspension is not a
punishment, the Appellant/Petitioner is not benefited by the
decision in Girja Shankar (supra).
5. This Court also in WP No.4164/2024 has decided the said issue in
the following manner:-
8. The issue of the incompetence of charge sheeting authority has
been raised on the sole ground that the charge sheeting authority
was holding current charge of the post of the Chief Engineer. It is
clearly admitted by counsel for both the parties that the Chief
Engineer is the competent authority to issue the charge sheet as
per the applicable Rules. However, competence is challenged on
the ground that Shri R.K. Sthapak was holding substantive post of
Superintending Engineer and only current charge of the post of
Chief Engineer. Thus, he could not act as disciplinary authority to
issue the charge sheet, which ought to have been issued by the
disciplinary authority. Counsel for the petitioner had heavily relied
on judgment of coordinate Bench of this Court in WP
No.20351/2020.
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to examine the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:31280
6 WP-15276-2021
issue whether a person who holds for the time being, charge of
office of higher post can exercise the powers of disciplinary
authority vested in the said higher post. The said issue has been
decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court holding that the current
charge holder is entrusted with the charge of office of higher post
and thus, he becomes entitled to exercise all executive powers,
perform duties and discharge functions attached to such office and,
therefore, the order of penalty passed by him as disciplinary
authority remains legal and valid. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Gopalji Khanna Vs. Allahabad Bank and others (1996)
3 SCC 538 has held as under:
"7. Shri Wadhwa while exercising the power of review was really
discharging the functions of Chairman and Managing Director as
he was then placed in charge of those offices and was therefore
entitled to perform all the duties and functions of those offices. He
did not exercise that power on the basis that it was delegated to
him. Therefore, the decisions in Barnard v. National Dock Labour
Board [(1953) 1 All ER 1113 : (1953) 2 WLR 995] , Krishna
Kumar v. Divisional Asstt. Electrical Engineer [(1979) 4 SCC 289
: 1980 SCC (L&S) 1] and Marathwada University v. Seshrao
Balwant Rao Chavan [(1989) 3 SCC 132 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 436] ,
relied upon by the learned counsel in support of his contention
that statutory power can be exercised by the named authority only
and cannot be further delegated, require no further consideration.
So also, Ramakant Shripad Sinai Advalpalkar v. Union of India
[1991 Supp (2) SCC 733 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 115 : (1992) 19 ATC
85] and State of Haryana v. S.M. Sharma [1993 Supp (3) SCC 252
: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1072 : (1993) 25 ATC 594] cited by the
learned counsel have no relevance. The question which arose for
consideration in those cases was whether an officer who
substantively holds a lower post and is asked to discharge the
duties of a higher post can be considered as promoted to that
higher post. This Court held that entrustment of current duties
charge of a higher post does not amount to promotion and in such
cases the person continues to hold his substantive lower post and
only discharges the duties of higher post essentially as a stopgap
arrangement.
8. It was next submitted that when a person is entrusted with
charge of current duties of a higher post, he can exercise only
those powers and perform those functions which are available to
the person holding the higher post under executive orders and not
those which are conferred by statutory provisions. In support of
this submission the learned counsel relied upon the decision of this
Court in Ajaib Singh v. State of Punjab [(1965) 2 SCR 845 : AIR
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:31280
7 WP-15276-2021
1965 SC 1619 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 553] . In that case what had
happened was that the Additional District Magistrate, Amritsar
was invested with powers of a District Magistrate under Section
10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and was also put in
charge of the office of the District Magistrate Amritsar, who was
transferred. No order appointing him as a District Magistrate
under Section 10(1) was passed. While in charge of the office of
the District Magistrate, he passed an order of detention under the
Defence of India Act and Rules, 1962. That order was challenged
on the ground that as the Additional District Magistrate was not
appointed as District Magistrate under Section 10(1) he did not
have the power to pass a detention order and, therefore, the order
passed by him was without any authority of law and liable to be
set aside. This Court after considering the relevant provisions of
the Defence of India Act and Rules, 1962 and the drastic nature of
the power and the consequences following from it, observed that
the power of detention could only be exercised by the State
Government or an officer or authority to whom it was delegated
and that the said power could be delegated to an officer or
authority who was not lower in rank than the District Magistrate. It
was then held that even though the Additional District Magistrate
was exercising the powers of the District Magistrate on there
being a vacancy in the office of the District Magistrate, he was
still not the District Magistrate as he was not appointed as such
under Section 10(1) of the Code and therefore, he had no power to
pass the order of detention. Even though invested with the powers
of a District Magistrate he did not become an officer of the rank of
a District Magistrate. In this case we are not concerned with such
a provision and therefore are not required to consider whether
Executive Director of the Bank when entrusted with the charge of
duties of the offices of Chairman and Managing Director became
an officer of the rank of Chairman and Managing Director.
Moreover the power of the employer to take disciplinary action
against his employee including the power to review an order of
penalty, has to be distinguished from the statutory power to detain
a person. Therefore, on the basis of this decision it cannot be held
that the Executive Director who was merely entrusted with the
charge of duties of the offices of Chairman and Managing
Director could not have exercised the power of reviewing the
order of penalty passed by the disciplinary authority."
10. In the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held
that a person holding the current duty charge of higher post was
really discharging the functions of that higher post as he was
placed in charge of both offices and was therefore, entitled to
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:31280
8 WP-15276-2021
perform all duties and functions of those offices. It was further
held that the judgments in the matter of exercise of statutory
powers have no relevance because disciplinary powers cannot be
deemed to be statutory powers but are really executive powers. In
the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered and
distinguished the case of Hari Chand Aggrawal Vs. Batala
Engineering Co. Ltd. and others AIR 1969 SC 483 and Ajaib
Singh Vs. Gurbachan Singh and others Vs. AIR 1965 SC 1619, on
which the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Girja
Shankar Shukla Vs. SDO, Harda 1973 MPLJ 411 was based.
11. In the present case, it is not the case of petitioner that Shri R.K.
Sthapak was placed in charge of current duties of Chief Engineer
as a stop gap arrangement. It is not in a dispute that he was
regularly holding the current charge of higher post of Chief
Engineer. It is not a case where a person having come in charge as
a stop gap arrangement has exercised the powers vested in the
higher office but it is the case in which Shri R.K. Sthapak was in
fact regularly holding the current charge of higher post. Thus, in
the opinion of this Court Shri R.K. Sthapak was having the power
to act as disciplinary authority and discharge the functions of
disciplinary authority vested in Chief Engineer.
12. The aforesaid issue also cropped up before Division Bench of
this Court in WA No.157/2017. It was a case where the
Superintending Engineer holding current charge of Chief Engineer
in another electricity distribution company of Madhya Pradesh,
suspended an employee discharging the functions of disciplinary
authority vested in Chief Engineer. The aforesaid matter
ultimately went to the Division Bench and the Division Bench in
WA No.157/2017, M.P. Madhyak Kshetra Vidyut Vitran
Company Vs. Vikas Gupta and others decided on 06/04/2017 has
held that a person holding the lower post was given current duty
charge of the post of Chief General Manager by the competent
authority. Thus, he was competent to act as Chief General
Manager and pass an order of suspension. The Division Bench
held as under:
"The challenge in the present appeal is to an order passed by
the learned Single Bench on 15.02.2017 in W.P.No.6335/2016
whereby an order of suspension of the respondent herein on
01.09.2016 was found to be passed by a person who was not
substantively working as Chief General Manager and thus not
competent to pass an order of suspension.
The petitioner was working as Assistant Engineer, Baraghat
City Circle, Gwalior. He was suspended by Shri S.K. Upadhyay
said to be working as Chief General Manager, Gwalior Region.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:31280
9 WP-15276-2021
The challenge to the suspension was on the ground that Shri S.K.
Upadhyay was holding substantive rank of the Deputy Chief
General Manager. Though on 26.02.2016 he was given current
duty charge of the post of Chief General Manager but after his
substantive promotion as Deputy Chief General Manager on
24.06.2016, there was no order of their current duty charge of the
post of Chief General Manager, therefore, order of suspension is
illegal.
The learned Single Bench allowed the writ petition holding
that the present appellants could not clarify as to how the
Managing Director of the appellant-Corporation could have
delegated the authority of discharging of the function of the Chief
General Manager on Shri Upadhyay. After observing so, the
learned Single Bench held as under:
"In view of this fact, it is apparent that when the delegation of
powers exercising the disciplinary authority is clearly vested in a
Chief General Manager or the Executive Director or the Chief
Engineer of the region and admittedly the person who issued
impugned suspension order was not substantively working as
Chief General Manager and who admittedly misrepresented
himself to be Chief General Manager in the impugned order
inasmuch as he was vested with the authority power as Dy. Chief
General Manager and was only authorized to exercise the powers
of Chief General Manager by the Managing Director, the
impugned order cannot be said to have been passed by a
competent authority and, therefore, it deserves to be quashed and
is hereby quashed."
Before this Court, learned counsel for the appellant refers to
Annexure-R/1 dated 26.02.2016 wherein Shri S.K. Upadhyay was
posted against the post of Deputy Chief General Manager on
current charge basis. He was also directed to look after the work of
Chief General Manager. The relevant extract from the order reads
as under:
"Shri S.K. Upadhyay, GM(O&M), Hoshangabad is hereby
posted on current charge basis as Dy. Chief General Manager, O/o
CGM(GR), Gwalior, till further orders. The posting of Shri S.P.
Upadhyay, GM on current charge basis as Dy. Chief General
Manager is without prejudice to affecting the seniority of any
order GM-SE(T&D). He is directed to look after the work of
Chief General Manager (GR), Gwalior and is authorized to
exercise the powers of Chief General Manager, with effect from
01.03.2016 till further orders. Sd/- (Vivek Porwal) Managing
Director".
It is thereafter Shri S.K. Upadhyay was substantively posted
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:31280
10 WP-15276-2021
as Deputy Chief General Manager by an order passed by the Chief
General Manager but there is no order of revocation of order
passed by the Managing Director authorizing Shri S.K. Upadhyay
to exercise the powers of Chief General Manager as well. The
relevant part of order dated 24.06.2016 reads as under:
"Shri S.K. Upadhyay, Dy Chief General Manager (T&D) on
current charge and presently looking after the work of Chief
General Manager (GR), Bhopal is hereby appointed temporarily to
officiate until further orders as Dy. Chief General Manager-Addl.
Chief Engineer and posted at the present place of posting w.e.f. the
date of assuming charge. 2. The above appointment will be on
probation and shall be governed by the provisions contained in
Circular No.01-05/58 dtd 29.04.89 read with 01-05/1/93 dated
18.07.1989, No.01-05/1/1-25473 dtd 21.04.90 No.01-13/1 dtd
09.01.95 and read with Circular No.01-13/3422/19 dated
01.07.05."
The appellants have referred to the delegation of powers on
behalf of Corporation including upon its Managing Director. Part-
A Section-III Clause 7 empowers the Managing Director to entrust
current charge of higher office in the post of Class-I and Class-II
without prejudice to the seniority of the officers. It is thus
contended that the Managing Director has passed an order to
authorize Shri S.K. Upadhyay to exercise the powers of Chief
General Manager by the order dated 26.02.2016, which order has
not been superseded or 5 Writ Appeal No.157/2017 varied in any
manner by Chief General Manager when Shri S.K. Upadhyay was
promoted on substantive basis as the Deputy Chief General
Manager. Since the current duty charge was granted by the
Managing Director of the Corporation in terms of statutory
delegation, therefore, it cannot be said that Shri S.K. Upadhyay
was not competent to pass an order of suspension.
We find that the order passed by the learned Single Bench is
not sustainable. Shri Upadhyay was given current duty charge of
the post of Chief General Manager. The said order has not been
varied in any manner after Shri Upadhyay was promoted
substantially on the post of Deputy Chief General Manger.
Therefore, he was competent to act as Chief General Manger and
pass an order of suspension. We do not find any error in the order
of suspension passed by Shri S.K. Upadhyay on 01.09.2016.
Therefore, the order of the Learned Single Judge cannot be said to
be legal. The same is accordingly set aside.
At this stage, learned counsel for the writ petitioner
(respondent herein) states that he has remedy of filing an appeal
against the order of suspension.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:31280
11 WP-15276-2021
If it is so, the respondent may avail such remedy in
accordance with law.
With the aforesaid liberty, writ appeal stands allowed and
disposed of."
13. The order of coordinate Bench relied by the learned counsel
for the petitioner in WP No.20351/2020 does not take into account
the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gopalji
Khanna Vs. Allahabad Bank and others (1996)3 SCC 538 as well
as the judgement of Division Bench of this Court, wherein it has
been clearly held that a person holding lower post but having
entrusted with regular charge of higher post can exercising powers
of disciplinary authority. It appears that both these orders were not
placed before the coordinate Bench. Thus, this Court finds itself
bound by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as
that of the Division Bench.
6. In view of the above, the grounds raised by the petitioner regarding
competence in authority of the disciplinary authority and charge-sheeting
authority are discarded.
7. Now, this Court proceeds to examine the validity of the penalty
order Annex.P/9 on merits.
8. The petitioner was charge sheeted with four charges, which are
mentioned and reproduced in the penalty order Annex.P/9.
9. Charge No.1 related to the petitioner not taking any interest in
replacement of failed transformers resulting in dissatisfaction among the
consumers.
10. Charge No.2 related to the petitioner not following the prescribed
priority order in the matter of replacement of transformers which had failed.
11. Charge No.3 related to exhibiting negligence in carrying out
maintenance of various distribution transformers.
12. Charge No.4 related to the petitioner committing negligence in
replacement of various failed transformers.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:31280
12 WP-15276-2021
13. The petitioner had replied to the charge sheet vide Annex.P/2 and
the charges were replied on merit and it was contended that the duty of
replacement of transformers lies with the Assistant Engineer whereas the
petitioner was posted as Junior Engineer and his work did not extend to
replacement of transformers.
14. In the additional reply vide Annex.P/3 which was given on
12/11/2020 is in response to the enquiry report, in this reply the petitioner
further raised contention of the charge sheet being issued by incompetent
authority.
15. From perusal of the reply Annex.P/2 it is crystal clear that the
petitioner raised a defence in the enquiry that the responsibility of
replacement of transformers was not on the petitioner. Even with the
petition, various documents like policy and circulars have been placed on
record to indicate that the responsibility of replacement of transformers did
not lie on the Junior Engineer.
16. The Court in exercise of judicial review over penalty order after
departmental enquiry would not go into the merits of the charges. However,
when the penalty order Annex.P/9 is closely scrutinized it is seen that the
said order runs into two and half pages. The first two and half pages are
nothing but reproduction of charge sheet. Thereafter, the event of enquiry
being conducted, report being received, etc. are mentioned. The
consideration of the authority is only that the charges are serious and have
been proved in enquiry and the authority is satisfied that petitioner has to be
inflicted with penalty. Apart from writing these 3-4 lines there is not a single
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:31280
13 WP-15276-2021
word of consideration in the entire penalty order Annex.P/9 though it runs
into two and half pages.
17. Though the enquiry officer might have held the petitioner guilty of
charges and might have upheld the allegation of delinquency of the petitioner
to the charges alleged against him, but enquiry officer is only delegate of the
disciplinary authority and even when the disciplinary authority was agreed to
the enquiry report then also it was bound to give some consideration firstly
on the defence of the petitioner and how it prima facie agrees with the
enquiry report.
18. Secondly, it was obligatory upon the disciplinary authority to have
given some reasoning as to the quantum of penalty. In the entire penalty
order Annex.P/9 there is not a single word and what was the actual loss
caused to the company and what was the responsibility of the petitioner in
the matter. Even arriving at quantum of the penalty, the disciplinary authority
has not written anything but has only written that in the opinion of the
authority, the penalty which is being set out in succeeding paras, is being
imposed.
19. Therefore, it is clear that the order Annex.P/9 suffers from vice of
being utterly non speaking and unreasoned order.
20. The authority while passing the penalty order of drastically
punishing the petitioner with reduction to minimum of the pay scale and
further withholding next three increments with cumulative effect, was
obliged to give some consideration to defence of the petitioner and also
justify the quantum of penalty, though may be in the minimum possible
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:31280
14 WP-15276-2021
words. However, there is not a word of consideration on these aspects and
the authority has simply written in one line that it agrees with the findings of
the enquiry officer.
21. Even the Appellate order Annex.P/12 is utterly a non speaking and
in one para it has simply been written that looking to the charges proved
against the petitioner, the action taken and punishment given to the petitioner
is fully justified. The Appellate order is even more less speaking and
unreasoned than the penalty order.
22. Consequently, the orders Annex.P/9 and P/12 deserve to be and are
hereby set aside on the ground of the orders being non reasoned orders.
23. The matter would now go back to the disciplinary order to pass a
fresh order of penalty by considering the defence of the petitioner and
justifiability of quantum of penalty.
24. Let a fresh order be passed within a period of two months from the
date of production of copy of this order.
25. It is ordered that if the authority decides to pass any penalty order
then the said order will relate back to date of original penalty order i.e.
18/11/2020 and therefore, at this stage, this Court is not passing any order to
restore the pay scale and increments of the petitioner. It will depend on the
outcome as per the fresh order to be passed by the disciplinary authority.
26. With the aforesaid directions, the petition is allowed.
(VIVEK JAIN)
JUDGE
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:31280
15 WP-15276-2021
RS
