Madhya Pradesh High Court
Home Department (Police) vs Kamal Singh Chundawat on 9 July, 2025
Author: Vivek Rusia
Bench: Vivek Rusia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND: 17221
1 W.A. No. 342/2018 & 3 others
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK RUSIA
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE BINOD KUMAR DWIVEDI
ON THE 9th OF JULY, 2025
WRIT APPEAL No. 342 of 2018
HOME DEPARTMENT (POLICE) AND OTHERS
Versus
UMESH CHOUHAN
Appearance:
Shri Sudeep Bhargava - Dy. A.G. for appellants/State.
Shri Manoj Manav - Advocate for the respondent.
WITH
WRIT APPEAL No. 359 of 2018
HOME DEPARTMENT AND OTHERS
Versus
AZIZ KHAN
Appearance:
Shri Sudeep Bhargava - Dy. A.G. for appellants/State.
Shri L. C. Patne - Advocate for the respondent.
WRIT APPEAL No. 360 of 2018
HOME DEPARTMENT (POLICE) AND OTHERS
Versus
MUKESH CHOUHAN
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VATAN
SHRIVASTAVA
Signing time: 09-07-2025
18:54:14
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND: 17221
2 W.A. No. 342/2018 & 3 others
Appearance:
Shri Sudeep Bhargava - Dy. A.G. for appellants/State.
Shri L.C. Patne - Advocate for the respondent.
WRIT APPEAL No. 361 of 2018
HOME DEPARTMENT (POLICE) AND OTHERS
Versus
KAMAL SINGH CHUNDAWAT
Appearance:
Shri Sudeep Bhargava - Dy. A.G. for appellants/State.
Shri Manoj Manav - Advocate for the respondent
RESERVED ON : 27.06.2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 09.07.2025
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ORDER
Per: Justice Vivek Rusia
The appellants have preferred these writ appeals under Section
2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko
Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 assailing the legality and propriety of the
common order dated 31.08.2017 passed by the writ court (Single Bench)
in Writ Petition Nos. 5535/2016, 5538/2016, 5539/2016 and 5552/2016
whereby the writ petitions filed by the respective respondents have been
allowed and the departmental punishment orders dated 30.11.2014,
23.03.2015 and 27.05.2016 passed against them have been quashed.
2. Regard being had to the similitude in the controversy involved in
the present writ appeals they are being heard analogously and decided
by a common order. For the sake of convenience facts of Writ Appeal
No. 342/2018 are taken which are as follows:
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3. Facts of the case, in short, are as under:-
3.1 The respondent/writ petitioner was serving as a police constable in
the district police force, Neemuch and was subjected to departmental
proceedings pursuant to a complaint alleging that he along with three
other police constables had facilitated the release of one Ghanshyam
Dhakad in exchange for illegal gratification. A preliminary enquiry was
directed vide order dated 26.09.2012 which was conducted, and an
initial report was submitted on 18.10.2012. However, dissatisfied with
the report a further preliminary enquiry was ordered in the result of
which a supplementary enquiry report dated 05.11.2012 was submitted.
Based on this preliminary enquiry report, a common charge sheet dated
07.11.2012 was issued to the respondent and three others to give their
explanation.
3.2 The respondent/writ petitioner submitted his detailed reply but not
being satisfied with the reply, a regular departmental enquiry (No.
7/2012) was directed to be initiated against the respondent and other
three officials. During the departmental enquiry proceedings, all
witnesses brought forth by the appellants turned hostile except the
complainant Ghanshyam Dhakad whereas the five witnesses brought in
defence by the respondent in their testimonies corroborated his stand
that no such event took place.
3.3 The enquiry officer submitted its report dated 27.03.2014 to the
disciplinary authority holding that the charges are proved. However the
disciplinary authority disagreed with these findings and directed the
enquiry officer to record further evidence. Additional statements were
taken and a fresh second enquiry report dated 27.06.2014 was submitted
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on the basis of which a show cause notice dated 29.06.2014 was issued
and a reply to this was filed by the respondents. The disciplinary
authority vide order dated 30.11.2014 inflicted a penalty of stoppage of
one increment with cumulative effect and treated the period during
which the respondent was under suspension as the period spent under
suspension only.
3.4 The aforesaid punishment was later taken up by the Deputy
Inspector General of Police, Ratlam Range (DIG) in the exercise of
revisional powers under Regulation 270 of the Madhya Pradesh
Police Regulations in suo motu and a show cause notice was issued on
30.12.2014 to the writ petitioner. Though the respondent submitted a
detailed reply to the show cause notice but after considering the reply
the DIG vide order dated 23.03.2015 dropped the revisional proceedings
by maintaining the order of punishment.
3.5 Being aggrieved by the order of punishment dated 30.11.2014, the
writ petitioner preferred an appeal before the DIG and vide order dated
23.03.2015, the DIG Ratlam Range dismissed the appeal as well.
Although, there is no provision in M.P. Police Regulation for Constable
to prefer a second appeal the respondent/ writ petition preferred a
second appeal before the DGP which was entertained and vide order
dated 27.05.2016 directed for de-novo enquiry from the stage of
recording of prosecution evidence.
3.6 Being aggrieved, the respondents/ writ petitioners approached this
court by filing writ petitions challenging the orders passed by the
authorities on the grounds of violation of principles of natural justice,
lack of evidence and absence of jurisdiction to invoke second revisional
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powers under Regulation 270. The writ Court analogously heard all the
petitions as they involved identical issues and upon due consideration of
the material on record and after hearing the parties allowed the writ
petitions by a reasoned common order dated 31.08.2017.
3.7 The writ court has held that the findings are perverse and
unsupported by legal evidence and warranting interference. It has
further been held that both preliminary enquiries were conducted ex
parte in breach of natural justice and the enquiry officers' findings were
based solely on the uncorroborated statement of Ghanshyam Dhakad a
person without any supporting seizure, recovery or independent material
and that all other prosecution witnesses had turned hostile and defence
witnesses had already exonerated the petitioners yet the charges were
held proved without cogent reasoning.
3.8 The writ court has also held that the order of the Inspector General
for de novo enquiry was without jurisdiction as Regulation 270 (4) does
not permit the exercise of a second revisional jurisdiction. Thus, the
impugned orders dated 30.11.2014, 23.03.2015 and 27.05.2016 were
quashed by the writ court along with a direction to extend all
consequential benefits flowing from the setting aside of the punishment
orders.
3.9 Against the aforesaid common judgment the state has preferred
these present writ appeals contending that the learned Single Judge had
erred in re-appreciating evidence in writ jurisdiction and that the
disciplinary authority had rightly proceeded on the basis of the materials
available on record.
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Submission of Appellants' counsel.
4. Shri Bhargava, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for
the appellants in all the appeals submitted that the learned Single Judge
had erred in interfering with the punishment orders passed by competent
disciplinary authorities in the exercise of powers under Rule 14 of the
Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1966. Learned Deputy A.G. submitted that the charges against the
respondents all of whom were serving constables in the police force
pertained to serious acts of misconduct which undermined the discipline
of the force.
5. Learned Deputy A.G. submitted that the departmental inquiries
were conducted after the issuance of due notices to the respondents .
Learned Deputy A.G. submitted that the inquiries were held in
substantial compliance with procedural norms and that the punishment
orders reflected due application of mind and proportionality in relation
to the charges proved.
6. Learned Deputy A.G. submitted that the respondents had
themselves approached the authority knowing that the
appellate/revisional powers were not available to them as per provisions
of M.P. Police Regulation and only when once adverse orders were
passed against them that they had raised the issue of jurisdiction before
this court, which is impermissible.
7. Learned Deputy A.G. further submitted that the scope of judicial
review in service matters is limited, and the learned Single Judge
exceeded jurisdiction by re-appreciating findings of fact recorded in
departmental proceedings and substituting the disciplinary authorities
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discretion regarding penalty. Learned Deputy A.G. placed reliance on the
division bench decisions of this court in Manoj Verma vs. State of M.P
reported in 2014 (4) MPLJ 109andW.A. 227/2017inState of M.P vs.
Satyendra Singh Bhadoria. Learned Deputy A.G. lastly submitted that
the respondents were afforded reasonable opportunity and any technical
lapse had not prejudiced them so as to vitiate the proceedings and
prayed that the impugned orders be set aside and the original
punishment orders be restored.
Submission of Respondents' counsel
8. Learned counsel Shri Manoj Manav and Shri L.C. Patne appearing
for the respondents submitted that the learned Single Judge had rightly
set aside the impugned punishment order holding the enquiry findings to
be perverse and unsupported by any legally admissible evidence and in
violation of settled principles of natural justice.
9. Learned counsel submitted that although the disciplinary enquiry
report found the respondent guilty, but the five witnesses examined
during the departmental enquiry had specifically given a clean chit to
the respondent and other officials. The sole adverse material on record
was an unsupported statement made by one Ghanshyam Dhakad a
habitual offender with a criminal background which was not sufficient
to sustain the finding of guilt. Learned Counsel submitted that the
respondents name was not mentioned in any seizure, recovery and no
incriminating material was ever produced during the enquiry.
10. Learned Counsel submitted that the Inspector General of Police
had without any statutory authority invoked Police Regulation 270(4) to
cancel the earlier punishment order and directed a de novo enquiry
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despite the fact that the Deputy Inspector General of Police had already
exercised revisional power under the same provision. The re-exercise of
the same power by a higher authority after a lapse of more than six
months was not only barred by time but also beyond jurisdiction.
11. Learned Counsel submitted that Regulation 270 though enabling
departmental superiors to revise punishments does not confer multiple
or successive jurisdiction upon officers of higher rank once the matter
has been decided. Learned Counsel submitted that the second revision
was initiated after a lapse of six months which is beyond the outer time
limit contemplated under the scheme of Police Regulation 270 rendering
the action void ab initio.
12. Shri Manoj Manav, learned counsel for the respondent submitted
that it is a settled principle that review and revision are not inherent
powers and must be conferred through statutory provision. He placed
reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in
Indrakala Agrawal v. State of M.P. reported in 2021 (2) JLJ 546
wherein it was held that power of review is not inherent and it must be
conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication and that
any amendment, cancellation or re-visitation of a concluded
administrative decision must be tested against the touchstone of express
statutory authorization.
13. Shri L C Patne, learned counsel further submitted that though the
respondents had made the mistake in approaching the authorities
without there being any provision of appeal or revision under Police
regulation however it was the duty of the authority to see whether he
had jurisdiction or not and whether he was exceeding his jurisdiction.
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The mistake made by the authority in exercising his jurisdiction cannot
be made a ground to prejudice the respondents. Learned Counsel further
submitted that the Inspector General of Police could not have reopened
the disciplinary matter after it had been dealt with by the Deputy
Inspector General, and that the resultant punishment order was rightly
set aside by the learned Single Judge.
14. In support of his contention Shri Patne, learned counsel for the
respondent placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Union of India vs. Gyan Chand Chattar reported in (2009) 12 SCC 78
wherein the Court held that once a disciplinary matter has attained
finality it cannot be reopened without specific revisional or appellate
jurisdiction and also relied on the single bench as well as division bench
decision of this court in Angad Singh Rathore v. State of M.P. in W.A.
123/2010 wherein it was categorically held that the second invocation of
Police Regulation 270(4) by a superior officer after the matter had
already been dealt with by a competent disciplinary authority was
impermissible in law and amounted to excess of jurisdiction. Learned
Counsel thus prayed that the writ court had rightly exercised writ
jurisdiction to quash the orders and thus prayed for dismissal of the writ
appeals.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
15. The writ Court has set aside the order of punishment passed by the
Superintendent of Police on merit and set aside the order of DGP on the
ground that the suo-motu power under Regulation 270 cannot be
exercised twice because the DIG had already exercised such power by
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initiating and dismissing the suo-motu revision. By way of this writ
appeal, the State of Madhya Pradesh has challenged the second part of
the order relating to interpretation of regulation 270. Shri Bhargava,
learned Dy. A.G. argued that the Police regulation 270 empowers the
superior authority to initiate suo-motu revision despite the order passed
by the Appellate Authority, hence, the same cannot be treated as second
suo-motu revision. The writ petitioner preferred a second appeal against
the order passed by the D.I.G. whereby his first appeal was dismissed,
therefore, the DGP while entertaining the appeal is also competent to
pass an order of remand.
16. Regulations 216 and 217 of M.P. Police Regulation provide
punishment to Head Constables and Constables. Regulation 221 also
gives power to the Assistant Inspector General or the Superintendent of
Police to inflict the punishments as specified under Regulations 214 and
217 on constables and head constables. A similar power has been given
to DIG also under Regulation 222(c) to punish constables, the
punishments specified in Regulations 214 and 215. Regulation 223 also
gives powers to impose the punishment to the Zonal Inspector General
of Police or any Police Officer equivalent to the rank of Inspector
General of Police. As per Regulation 226, a dismissal is the last resource
and should ordinarily not be inflicted until all other means of correctness
have failed. As per sub-regulation (iv) of Regulation 226 withholding of
increment either temporary or permanent is a suitable punishment for all
cases of serious dereliction of duty, and in the case of a Constable, it is
specifically provided that the constable should not be deprived of more
than or increment at a time.
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17. Regulation 228 provides when and how the departmental enquiry
is to be held in every case of removal, compulsory retirement from
service, reduction in rank, grade or pay or withholding of increment for
a period exceeding one year etc., by the Superintendent of Police. Under
Regulation 229 after the conclusion of the department enquiry, the
Superintendent of Police shall be the competent authority to pass the
final order. Regulation 262 provides a "Remedy of Appeal" according to
which every officer against whom an order may be passed under
Regulation 214 shall be entitled to prefer an appeal against such order to
the authority immediate superior to the officer who passed the order of
punishment and if the appeal is filed by an officer of the rank of
Inspector or equivalent rank and the appeal is rejected by the appellate
authority then he may prefer the second appeal to the State Government.
Therefore, in the case of Head Constables and Constables, there is no
provision for a second appeal under Regulation 262. The petitioners
preferred an appeal before the DIG and the same was dismissed and
under the wrong advice, they preferred the second appeal before the
DGP which ought not to have entertained. Hence, there is no provision
for the Constable to prefer a second appeal rightly held by the writ
court.
18. In this case, the DIG as well as the DGP both exercised the power
under Regulation 270. As discussed above, the DIG entertained the
departmental appeal as well as issued a show cause notice in the
exercise of revisional power under Regulation 271, later on the appeal
was dismissed and the suo-motu proceedings were dropped. Therefore,
in the case of the Constable, this is the last remedy to the constable and
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the last action to be taken by the superior authorities. For ready
reference Regulation 270 is reproduced below:-
"270. (1) Every order of punishment or exoneration, whether original or
appellate shall be liable to revision suo-motu by any authority superior to
the authority making the order.
(2) Every appellate order by a final appellate authority shall be liable to
revision by such final appellate authority on an application made on that
behalf by the person against whom the order has been passed.
Explanation:- For the purpose of this clause the expression "final
appellate authority" means the final authority empowered to hear an
appeal under Police Regulation 262.
(3) The provisions of Regulation 266, 267, 268 and 271 shall be nearly as
may be applied to an application for revision.
(4) The revising authority may for reason to be recorded in writing
exonerate or may remit vary of enhance the punishment imposed or may
order a fresh enquiry of the talking of further evidence in the case;
Provided that it shall not vary or reverse any order unless notice has been
served on the parties interested and opportunity given to them for being
heard.
(5) [Omitted]".
19. As per Regulation 270(1), every order of punishment or
exoneration, whether original or appellate shall be liable to be revision
suo-motu by any authority superior to the authority, who has passed any
order of punishment or exoneration. In the present case, the original
order of punishment is passed by the Superintendent of Police and there
is no order passed by the appellate authority either for punishment or for
exoneration, the appellate authority has only dismissed the appeal. The
Revision by a superior authority is liable to be initiated suo-motu against
the order of punishment or exoneration; in this case, the Superior
authority is the DIG who has exercised the power of suo-motu revision
under Regulation 271 against the order of punishment by Superintended
of Police.
20. As per Regulation 270(2) every appellate order passed by the final
appellate authority shall also be liable to be revised by such appellate
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authority on the application on that behalf by a person. Under this
Regulation, the power of revision has been given to the final appellate
authority to revise its own order on an application made by a person. In
the case of constable, the final appellate authority is the DIG which had
already declined to exercise the power of revision suo-motu as well as
dismissed the appeal. The appellate order passed by the DIG is not liable
to be revised by the Superior Officer under Regulation 270(2), therefore,
the writ Court has not committed any error by holding that the revisional
power cannot be exercised twice. Hence, no case for interference is
made out. As stated above, the writ Court has set aside the order of
punishment by the Superintendent of Police as the same was not
warranted and against such finding there is no ground in the appeal
raised by the appellants, therefore, on merits also the appeal is not liable
to be entertained.
21. In view of above, all these writ appeals are hereby dismissed.
Let a photocopy of this order be kept in the record of connected
writ appeals.
(VIVEK RUSIA) (BINOD KUMAR DWIVEDI)
JUDGE JUDGE
Vatan
