Madhya Pradesh High Court
Executive Engineer vs Ramsajeevan Saket on 5 February, 2025
Author: Vishal Mishra
Bench: Vishal Mishra
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:5893
1 W.P. No.21766/2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
ON THE 5th OF FEBRUARY, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 21766 of 2022
EXECUTIVE ENGINEER AND ANOTHER
Versus
RAMSAJEEVAN SAKET
............................................................................................................................................
Appearance:
Shri Ved Prakash Tiwari - Government Advocate for the
petitioners/State.
Shri A.K. Gupta - Advocate for the respondent.
............................................................................................................................................
ORDER
This petition has been filed assailing the Award dated 09/01/2012
passed by Presiding Officer, Labour Court Rewa in case No.23/05 I.D.
Act Ref., whereby claim raised by the respondent herein was allowed
and the removal order was set aside and the respondent was directed to
be reinstated in service. The same is put to challenge by filing this
petition.
2. The record indicates that the Award was passed on 09/01/2012
and the same is put to challenge by filing the present petition on
21/09/2022. The reason assigned for delay in filing the petition is that
the Division No.2 has closed down long back, therefore the impugned
Award could not be challenged in time. It is submitted that now the
matter came to the knowledge of the Officers of Division No.1 and
thereafter they sought permission from the Law Department for filing of
this Writ Petition. The Law Department vide order dated 18/08/2022 has
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not granted permission to the Department for filing Writ Petition but has
observed that if the Department wants to file Writ Petition on its own
risk, then they are free to file the same before this Court.
3. It is argued that when the notice dated 05/05/2022 issued from
Labour Commissioner, Indore was received, then they came to know
about the passing of the impugned Award by the Labour Court.
Thereafter OIC was appointed on 30/08/2022 and the petition was
prepared and filed before this Court. They have further taken a plea with
respect to relaxation being granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in suo
moto Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2020 dated 23/03/2020 considering
the COVID-19 Pandemic.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has vehemently
opposed the contentions and has argued that the Division No.2 is still
functioning. The building in which the Division No.2 was functioning
was closed and the Division No.2 was shifted in new premises, therefore
it is incorrect to say that Division No.2 was closed long back. Even
otherwise, there is no date mentioned with respect to closing of Division
No.2. It is a bi-parte Award passed by the Labour Court. It is further
pointed out that in pursuance to the Award passed by the Labour Court,
respondent has already been reinstated in service and is still working in
the Department. There is no explanation being given by the
petitioners/State for delay from 09/01/2012 till 05/05/2022, therefore the
reasons which are being assigned for delay in filing this petition, cannot
be accepted. He has prayed for dismissal of the instant Writ Petition on
the ground of delay and laches.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. The law with respect to delay and laches is settled by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in large number of cases. Furthermore, condonation of
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delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit
for the government departments.
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case State of Madhya Pradesh
and Others Vs. Bherulal reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654 has held as
under:-
"3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the
government inefficiencies but the sad part is that
the authorities keep on relying on judicial
pronouncements for a period of time when
technology had not advanced and a greater
leeway was given to the Government [LAO v.
Katiji [LAO v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107] ]. This
position is more than elucidated by the judgment
of this Court in Postmaster General v. Living
Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living
Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2
SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012)
1 SCC (L&S) 649] wherein the Court observed
as under : (Postmaster General case [Postmaster
General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3
SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2
SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] , SCC
pp. 573-74, paras 27-30)
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant
with the issues involved including the
prescribed period of limitation for taking
up the matter by way of filing a special
leave petition in this Court. They cannot
claim that they have a separate period of
limitation when the Department was
possessed with competent persons familiar
with court proceedings. In the absence of
plausible and acceptable explanation, we
are posing a question why the delay is to
be condoned mechanically merely because
the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.
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28. Though we are conscious of the fact
that in a matter of condonation of delay
when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a
liberal concession has to be adopted to
advance substantial justice, we are of the
view that in the facts and circumstances,
the Department cannot take advantage of
various earlier decisions. The claim on
account of impersonal machinery and
inherited bureaucratic methodology of
making several notes cannot be accepted in
view of the modern technologies being
used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody including
the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to
inform all the government bodies, their
agencies and instrumentalities that unless
they have reasonable and acceptable
explanation for the delay and there was
bona fide effort, there is no need to accept
the usual explanation that the file was kept
pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red tape
in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation
to ensure that they perform their duties
with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and
should not be used as an anticipated
benefit for the government departments.
The law shelters everyone under the same
light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no
proper explanation offered by the
Department for the delay except
mentioning of various dates, according to
us, the Department has miserably failed to
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give any acceptable and cogent reasons
sufficient to condone such a huge delay."
Eight years hence the judgment is still
unheeded!"
8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa & Anr.
vs. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 has opined as under:-
"54. This Court has consistently rejected the
contention that a petition should be considered
ignoring the delay and laches in case the
petitioner approaches the Court after coming to
know of the relief granted by the Court in a
similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper
explanation for delay and laches. A litigant
cannot wake up from deep slumber and claim
impetus from the judgment in cases where some
diligent person had approached the Court within
a reasonable time."
9. A Division Bench of this Court in Focus Energy Ltd. (M/s) vs
Government of India, (DB) reported in I.L.R. (2011) M.P. 53 relying
upon judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :
"10. Thus, facts stated supra leads to irresistible
conclusion that appellant is guilty of delay and
laches. Its conduct disentitles it to any relief. In
New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and
Others, AIR 2007 SC 1365 the Supreme Court
has held that delay and laches are relevant
factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. In
Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder
Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48 the Supreme Court has
observed that discretionary relief can be
provided to one who has not by his act or
conduct given a go-bye to his rights. Equity
favours a vigilant rather than an indolent
litigant. In the State of Haryana v. Aravali
Khanij Udyog, (2008) 1 SCC 663 it has been
held that where third party rights are created,
the High Court should not interfere. Similarly, in
Shiba Shankar Mohapatra (supra) it has been
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held that the Court exercising public law
jurisdiction does not encourage agitation of stale
claims where the right of third parties
crystallizes in the interregnum."
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. vs K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as
follows:
"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is
to be borne in mind by the High Court when they
exercise their discretionary powers under Article
226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case
the High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if there is such negligence
or omission on the part of the applicant to assert
his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of
time and other circumstances, causes prejudice
to the opposite party. Even where fundamental
right is involved the matter is still within the
discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga
Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and
Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769] .
Of course, the discretion has to be exercised
judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes
Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper
Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492]
(PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in
Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC
1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant
Regular Motor Service [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR
1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated:
"Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity
is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where
it would be practically unjust to give a remedy
either because the party has, by his conduct done
that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent
to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and
neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that
remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in
which it would not be reasonable to place him if
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the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are
most material. But in every case, if an argument
against relief, which otherwise would be just, is
founded upon mere delay, that delay of course
not amounting to a bar by any statute of
limitation, the validity of that defence must be
tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances always important in such
cases are, the length of the delay and the nature
of the acts done during the interval which might
affect either party and cause a balance of justice
or injustice in taking the one course or the other,
so far as it relates to the remedy.
11. It is further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Ashok Kumar vs District Magistrate, Basti reported in (2012) 3 SCC
311 that :-
"10. ... It is time and again, stated that a party
who has slept over his right since is not entitled
to the discretionary relief of the High Court."
12. The reasons assigned for condonation of delay does not disclose
that what happened between 09/01/2012 to 05/05/2022 as it was the bi-
parte order. The contention that the Division No.2 has closed long back
does not gather confidence as the same is disputed by the respondent's
counsel. Even otherwise, there is no date regarding closure of Division
No.2 mentioned in the grounds taken for condonation of long delay in
approaching the Court. It is further reflected that the Law Department
vide letter dated 18/08/2022 had not granted permission to the
Department for filing the petition. Under these circumstances, the delay
is not properly explained by the petitioner.
13. If the aforesaid settled legal proposition of law is applied to the
facts and circumstance of the present case, this Court is of the view that
the reasons assigned by the Authorities seeking condonation of delay in
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approaching the Court do not gather confidence to enable this Court to
condone the long delay of almost more than a decade. Therefore, this
Court refrains from condoning the delay in approaching the Court.
14. Under these circumstances, no relief can be extended to the
petitioner. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed on the ground of delay
and laches.
(VISHAL MISHRA)
JUDGE
Shbhnkr
