[Cites 6, Cited by 0]

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Mahendra Gurjar vs Puja Gurjar on 1 December, 2025

Author: Vijay Kumar Shukla

Bench: Vijay Kumar Shukla

                           NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-IND:35253

                                                                                          1                                 FA-2036-2024

                                     IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                                        AT I N D O R E
                                                                                BEFORE
                                          HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIJAY KUMAR SHUKLA
                                                                                      &
                                         HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE BINOD KUMAR DWIVEDI
                                                               ON THE 1st OF DECEMBER, 2025

                                                            FIRST APPEAL No. 2036 of 2024
                                                                     MAHENDRA GURJAR
                                                                          Versus
                                                                       PUJA GURJAR
                           .............................................................................................................................
                           Appearance:
                                   Shri Anshul Koranne - Advocate for the appellant.
                                   Shri Pradeep Kumar Lalwani - Advocate for the respondent.
                           .............................................................................................................................
                                                                            JUDGMENT

Per: Justice Binod Kumar Dwivedi This appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (for short

hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') has been preferred against the judgment and

decree dated 10.09.2024 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Neemuch

in RCSHM No.101/2023 whereby the divorce petition filed on behalf of the

respondent/wife under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short

'HMA') has been allowed by dissolving the marriage between the

appellant/husband and the respondent/wife.

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2. It is not in dispute that marriage of the appellant and respondent was

solemnized on 28.04.2015 according to Hindu rites and customs in village

Melki, Post Piplone, Tehsil Neemuch, district Neemuch. The case of the

respondent/wife has been that she was only 18 years old on the date of marriage

due to this Gauna was not solemnized. In the year 2019 she got service in RPF

and was on training for two years. After that when she contacted her in-laws,

they refused to accept her and they also pressurized her for leaving the service

for which she was not ready as she wanted to be economically independent. At

the time of marriage, jewelleries and other items which were given by her

relatives were retained by her in-laws. During subsistence of marriage her

husband has contracted second marriage with one Mamta and out of that

wedlock one baby girl was born on 13.04.2023. On the aforesaid grounds

alleging cruelty at the hands of her husband she filed petition for dissolution of

marriage.

3. In reply to the petition, all the allegations were controverted by the

appellant/husband with counter allegations that she deserted the appellant and

had left the matrimonial house with all the Stridhan and never returned back

and now she is employed in the Railway department. After completing her

training, she never came to her matrimonial house. The in-laws never

pressurized her to leave the service. She has levelled false allegations against

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him on the strength of forged certificate with regard to the birth of the girl from

the second marriage of the appellant. The appellant himself filed an application

under Section 9 of the HMA for restitution of conjugal rights which was

allowed on 03.12.2021. Despite that she did not come to live in the company of

the appellant therefore, prays for dismissal of the petition.

4. The learned Family Court on the pleadings of the parties framed

relevant issues and after affording opportunity of adducing evidence by the

impugned judgment and decree dissolved the marriage between the appellant

and the respondent which gives rise to this appeal.

5. Counsel for the appellant submits that the Family Court failed to

appreciate the evidence in right perspective and discarded the evidence led by

the appellant. The judgment suffers from legal and factual error therefore prays

for allowing the appeal and setting aside the impugned judgment and decree

passed by the Family Court.

6. Per contra Counsel for the respondent/wife has vehemently opposed

the prayer and supported the judgment as it is based on due appreciation of

evidence. He further submits that by contracting second marriage during

subsistence of first marriage with the respondent, the appellant has committed

cruelty with the respondent. This act of contracting second marriage in

subsistence of first marriage is not general wear and tear in the family life. It is

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gross act of cruelty which in itself is sufficient to grant a decree of divorce on

the ground mentioned in Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA. There is no possibility

of restitution of conjugal rights in such circumstances. He further submits that

respondent/wife is in service and she can maintain herself therefore, she waives

her right for maintenance/alimony. Therefore, the judgment and decree passed

by the Family Court cannot be interfered by way of this appeal and on these

contentions prayed for dismissal of the appeal.

7. Heard the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties

and perused the record.

8. Before adverting o evidence part we would first take up

provisions for decree of divorce under HMA and exposition of law on the

point by Apex Court. The appellant has filed petition for divorce on the

ground of 'cruelty' and 'desertion'. To appreciate the provisions relating to

decree of divorce on the ground of 'cruelty' and 'desertion', it is befitting to

reproduce relevant provisions of Section 13 of the Act of 1955 which reads,

as under:-

"13. Divorce.- (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party-

(i) .....

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(ia) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or (ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or] ..........

1A) Either party to a marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of this Act, may also present a petition for the dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground-

(i) ....

(ii) that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or upwards after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in a proceeding to which they were parties."

9. The word 'cruelty' has not been defined in the Act of

1955. Indeed, it could not have been defined. It has been used in relation to

human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in

respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct of one

which is adversely affecting the other. The 'cruelty' may be mental or

physical, intentional or unintentional. What is 'cruelty' in one case may not

amount to 'cruelty' in another case. It is a matter to be determined in each

case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case.

10. Hon'ble the Apex Court in case of Ravi Kumar Vs.

Julmidevi reported in (2010) 4 SCC 476 has reiterated that 'cruelty' in

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matrimonial cases may be of so many forms; relevant Paras 19 to 21 may be

reproduced to elucidate the concept of 'cruelty' in matrimonial cases:-

"19. It may be true that there is no definition of cruelty under the said Act. Actually such a definition is not possible. In matrimonial relationship, cruelty would obviously mean absence of mutual respect and understanding between the spouses which embitters the relationship and often leads to various outbursts of behaviour which can be termed as cruelty. Sometime cruelty in a matrimonial relationship may take the form of violence, sometime it may take a different form. At times, it may be just an attitude or an approach. Silence in some situations may amount to cruelty.

20. Therefore, cruelty in matrimonial behaviour defies any definition and its categories can never be closed. Whether the husband is cruel to his wife or the wife is cruel to her husband has to be ascertained and judged by taking into account the entire facts and circumstances of the given case and not by any predetermined rigid formula. Cruelty in matrimonial cases can be of infinite variety--it may be subtle or even brutal and may be by gestures and words. That possibly explains why Lord Denning in Sheldon v. Sheldon [(1966) 2 WLR 993 : (1966) 2 All ER 257 (CA)] held that categories of cruelty in matrimonial cases are never closed.

21. This Court is reminded of what was said by Lord Reid in Gollins v. Gollins [1964 AC 644 : (1963) 3 WLR 176 : (1963) 2 All ER 966 (HL)] about judging cruelty in matrimonial cases. The pertinent observations are : (AC p. 660) "... In matrimonial cases we are not concerned with the reasonable man as we are in cases of negligence. We are dealing with this man and this woman and the

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fewer a prior assumptions we make about them the better. In cruelty cases one can hardly ever even start with a presumption that the parties are reasonable people, because it is hard to imagine any cruelty case ever arising if both the spouses think and behave as reasonable people.

The aforesaid passage was quoted with approval by this Court in N.G. Dastane (Dr.) v. S. Dastane [(1975) 2 SCC 326]."

11. Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) in N.G. Dastane Vs.

S.Dastane reported in (1975) 2 SCC 326, 338 : AIR 1975 SC 1534 : (1975)

3 SCR 967, 978 in para 32 observed as:

"The court has to deal, not with an ideal husband and an ideal wife (assuming any such exist) but with the particular man and woman before it. The ideal couple or a near-ideal one will probably have no occasion to go to a matrimonial court for, even if they may not be able to drown their differences, their ideal attitudes may help them overlook or gloss over mutual faults and failures."

12. In case of Samar Ghosh Vs. Jaya Ghosh reported in

(2007) 4 SCC 511, it has been held that "No uniform standard can ever be

laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some

instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the

cases of "mental cruelty" has been dealt with by the Apex Court. It has also

been held that "The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few

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isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty." It is to

be seen whether the conduct of one of the spouse has been persistent for a

fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that

because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it

extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to

mental 'cruelty'. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the

married life which happens in day-to-day life would not be adequate for

grant of divorce on the ground of mental 'cruelty'.

13. From perusal of the record it is apparent that the respondent/wife

Puja who was petitioner/plaintiff before the Family Court has examined herself

as PW-1 and reiterated the allegation mentioned in her petition. She has

specifically stated that without taking divorce from her, appellant/husband has

contracted second marriage with Mamta and out of that wedlock a baby girl

was born on 13.04.2023. In this regard, she has further stated that when she

raised objection to the appellant/husband, he threatened to kill her. In support of

her contention, she has filed birth certificate of the child Ex.P-1 along with

photographs Article A-2 to A-4. She has also refuted the allegations levelled by

the husband that she did not want to join her in-laws and did not want to live

with her husband. When she was cross examined in para 15 with regard to birth

certificate Article A-1 (Ex.P-1) she has admitted that it does not bear seal of

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any hospital but she has explained that this certificate has been downloaded

online but has refuted the suggestion that it is a forged document. Nothing

adverse has surfaced in her cross examination which could impeach her

testimony.

14. The appellant/husband Mahendra Gurjar has examined himself as

NA-1. Though he has given an evasive answers with regard to the fact that he

has contracted second marriage or out of that marriage baby girl is born and

which is shown in birth certificate. From perusal of the certificate, it is apparent

that it bears last four digits of Aadhar number of the appellant i.e." xxxxx6757"

Ex.P-1 and in this certificate name of the baby girl is mentioned as Bhumika,

female, date of birth 13.04.2023, name of mother Mamta Gurjar and father's

name is mentioned as Mahendra Gurjar. In the record Article A-5 is Aadhar

card of Mahendra Singh Gurjar/appellant which is not in dispute bearing same

last four digits which are on the birth certificate. From the aforesaid it is amply

proved that appellant has contacted second marriage with Mamta, thus

allegation levelled by the respondent/wife is established.

15. Learned Family Court appreciating the aforesaid evidence

available on record came to the conclusion that cruelty has been committed by

the appellant to the respondent which entitles her for decree of divorce along

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with the fact that since last four years no cohabitation has taken place between

the appellant and the respondent.

16. In view of the foregoing discussions and upon careful re-appraisal

of the evidence adduced by both the sides, this Court finds no perversity or

illegality in the findings recorded by the learned Family Court. The allegations

of cruelty have been established by the evidence on record. The

respondent/wife has duly proved that appellant/husband has committed cruelty