Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sunny Sen vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 1 August, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:16334
1 W.A. No. 714 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ASHISH SHROTI
ON THE 1st OF AUGUST, 2025
WRIT APPEAL No. 714 of 2024
SUNNY SEN
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri D. S. Rajawat, Advocate for the appellant.
Shri B.M. Patel, Government Advocate for respondents/State.
JUDGMENT
Per: Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
This writ appeal, under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchch
Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeethon Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 has been filed
against the order dated 07.02.2024 passed in W.P. No. 12082/2021.
2. Facts necessary for disposal of the present appeal, in short, are that
father of appellant, namely Sheshnarayan Sen, was working as Assistant
Teacher in the respondent/department. While serving at Government Primary
School, Khutiyavad, District Guna, he died in harness on 25.10.2007. At that
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time, the petitioner was a minor, therefore, no application for grant of
compassionate appointment was made. Later, on 17.10.2019, he moved an
application seeking appointment on compassionate grounds. It was rejected
by order dated 11.12.2019. Being aggrieved by the rejection of his claim,
petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P. No. 12082 of 2021. The
learned Single Judge, by order dated 07.02.2024, dismissed the petition
primarily on the ground that family of the deceased employee was not facing
any financial distress and the application was filed belatedly i.e., almost after
3 years of attaining majority.
3. Challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge, it is
submitted by counsel for appellant that the appellant had filed an affidavit of
himself and his family members in the year 2017, and therefore the finding
recorded by the learned Single Judge that appellant had moved an application
on 17.10.2019 is factually incorrect.
4. Heard learned counsel for the appellant.
5. By order dated 11.12.2019, the application filed by appellant for
appointment on compassionate ground was rejected on the ground that
although father of the petitioner had expired on 25.10.2007, but he moved an
application only on 17.10.2019, whereas he attained majority on 06.12.2016.
The appointment on compassionate grounds is to provide immediate financial
help to the distressed family who might be facing financial crisis because of
untimely death of their breadwinner. Late Sheshnarayan Sen died on
25.10.2007. Petitioner has filed copies of certain affidavits filed by his family
members which are dated 23.12.2017. From the aforesaid affidavits, it is clear
that the eldest sister of petitioner was aged about 25 years, and another elder
sister was aged about 22 years on 23.12.2017 when the so-called affidavits
were executed. If the survivors of the late employee Sheshnarayan Sen were
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facing financial distress, then whesewy sisters of petitioner did not move an
application for their appointment on compassionate ground?
6. Be that whatever it may be.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of The State of West Bengal Vs.
Debabrata Tiwari & Ors. by judgment dated 03.03.2023 passed in Civil
Appeal Nos.8842-8855/2022 has held as under :-
"7.1. . . . . . .
v. There is a consistent line of authority of this Court on the
principle that appointment on compassionate grounds is given only
for meeting the immediate unexpected hardship which is faced by
the family by reason of the death of the bread earner vide Jagdish
Prasad vs. State of Bihar, (1996) 1 SCC 301. When an
appointment is made on compassionate grounds, it should be kept
confined only to the purpose it seeks to achieve, the idea being not
to provide for endless compassion, vide I.G. (Karmik) vs.
Prahalad Mani Tripathi, (2007) 6 SCC 162. In the same vein is
the decision of this Court in Mumtaz Yunus Mulani vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 384, wherein it was declared that
appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of
recruitment, but a means to enable the family of the deceased to get
over a sudden financial crisis.
vi. In State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. Sajad Ahmed Mir, AIR
2006 SC 2743, the facts before this Court were that the government
employee (father of the applicant therein) died in March, 1987. The
application was made by the applicant after four and half years in
September, 1991 which was rejected in March, 1996. The writ
petition was filed in June, 1999 which was dismissed by the
learned Single Judge in July, 2000. When the Division Bench
decided the matter, more than fifteen years had passed from the
date of death of the father of the applicant. This Court remarked
that the said facts were relevant and material as they would
demonstrate that the family survived in spite of death of the
employee. Therefore, this Court held that granting compassionate
appointment after a lapse of a considerable amount of time after the
death of the government employee, would not be in furtherance of
the object of a scheme for compassionate appointment.
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vii. In Shashi Kumar, this Court speaking through Dr. D.Y.
Chandrachud, J. (as His Lordship then was) observed that
compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule that
appointment to any public post in the service of the State has to be
made on the basis of principles which accord with Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution. That the basis of the policy is that it
recognizes that a family of a deceased employee may be placed in a
position of financial hardship upon the untimely death of the
employee while in service. That it is the immediacy of the need
which furnishes the basis for the State to allow the benefit of
compassionate appointment......
8. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person
in approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining
discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief
was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay
Petroleum Co. vs. Prosper Armstrong, (1874) 3 PC 221 as under:
"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an
arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party
has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded
as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and
neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet
put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are
most material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere
delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any
statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be
tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two
circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length
of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the
interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance
of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so
far as it relates to the remedy."
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Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of
relief to a party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the
grant of relief to a person by the High Court in the exercise of its
power under Article 226 of our Constitution, came up for
consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon
Mills Ltd. vs. M. R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay,
AIR 1967 SC 1450. In the said case, it was regarded as a principle
that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High Court in the
exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
In State of M.P. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 this Court
restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements in the
following words:
"9. ... the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not
ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent
and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the
Petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the
High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in
exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is
premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not
ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if
writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may
have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was
pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party
rights in the meantime is an important factor which also
weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to
exercise such jurisdiction."
While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of
limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition should be filed within a
reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal vs. State of Haryana, (1997) 6
SCC 538; NDMC vs. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278.
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9. Further, simply because the Respondents-Writ Petitioners
submitted their applications to the relevant authority in the year
2005-2006, it cannot be said that they diligently perused the matter
and had not slept over their rights. In this regard, it may be apposite
to refer to the decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal vs.
Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, wherein the
following observations were made:
"19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that
even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of
representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance
it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead
cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a
mere submission of representation to the competent
authority does not arrest time."
(emphasis by us)
10. Applying the said ratio to the facts of the present case, we hold
that the Respondents-Writ Petitioners, upon submitting their
applications in the year 2006-2005 did nothing further to pursue the
matter, till the year 2015 i.e., for a period of ten years.
Notwithstanding the tardy approach of the authorities of the
Appellant-State in dealing with their applications, the Respondent-
Writ Petitioners delayed approaching the High Court seeking a writ
in the nature of a mandamus against the authorities of the State. In
fact, such a prolonged delay in approaching the High Court, may
even be regarded as a waiver of a remedy, as discernible by the
conduct of the Respondents Writ Petitioners. Such a delay would
disentitle the Respondents-Writ Petitioners to the discretionary
relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Further, the order of
the High Court dated 17th March, 2015, whereby the writ petition
filed by some of the Respondents herein was disposed of with a
direction to the Director of Local Bodies, Government of West
Bengal to take a decision as to the appointment of the
Respondents-Writ Petitioners, cannot be considered to have the
effect of revival of the cause of action.
***
13. The sense of immediacy in the matter of compassionate
appointment has been lost in the present case. This is attributable to
the authorities of the Appellant-State as well as the Respondents-
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Writ Petitioners. Now, entertaining a claim which was made in
2005-2006, in the year 2023, would be of no avail, because
admittedly, the Respondents-Writ Petitioners have been able to eke
out a living even though they did not successfully get appointed to
the services of the Municipality on compassionate grounds. Hence,
we think that this is therefore not fit cases to direct that the claim of
the Respondents-Writ Petitioners for appointments on
compassionate grounds, be considered or entertained."
8. The Supreme Court in the case of Canara Bank Vs. Ajithkumar
G.K. decided on 11/2/2025 in Civil Appeal No. 30532/2019 has held as
under:-
11. Decisions of this Court on the contours of appointment on
compassionate ground are legion and it would be apt for us to
consider certain well-settled principles, which have crystallized
through precedents into a rule of law. They are (not in
sequential but contextual order):
a) Appointment on compassionate ground, which is offered on
humanitarian grounds, is an exception to the rule of equality in the
matter of public employment [see General Manager, State Bank of
India v Anju Jain (2008)8 SCC 475].
b) Compassionate appointment cannot be made in the absence of
rules or instructions [see Haryana State Electricity Board v.
Krishna Devi (2002)10 SCC 246)].
c) Compassionate appointment is ordinarily offered in two
contingencies carved out as exceptions to the general rule, viz. to
meet the sudden crisis occurring in a family either on account of
death or of medical invalidation of the breadwinner while in service
[see V. Sivamurthy v. Union of India (2008)13 SCC 730].
d) The whole object of granting compassionate employment by an
employer being intended to enable the family members of a
deceased or an incapacitated employee to tide over the sudden
financial crisis, appointments on compassionate ground should be
made immediately to redeem the family in distress [see Sushma
Gosain v. Union of India (1989)4 SCC 468].
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e) Since rules relating to compassionate appointment permit a
sidedoor entry, the same have to be given strict interpretation [see
Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan v. Laxmi Devi (2009)11 SCC 453].
f) Compassionate appointment is a concession and not a right and
the criteria laid down in the Rules must be satisfied by all aspirants
[see SAIL v. Madhusudan Das (2008)15 SCC 560].
g) None can claim compassionate appointment by way of
inheritance [see State of Chattisgarh v. Dhirjo Kumar Sengar
(2009)13 SCC 600].
h) Appointment based solely on descent is inimical to our
constitutional scheme, and being an exception, the scheme has to be
strictly construed and confined only to the purpose it seeks to
achieve [see Bhawani Prasad Sonkar v. Union of India (2011)4
SCC 209].
i) None can claim compassionate appointment, on the occurrence of
death/medical incapacitation of the concerned employee (the sole
bread earner of the family), as if it were a vested right, and any
appointment without considering the financial condition of the
family of the deceased is legally impermissible [see Union of India
v. Amrita Sinha (2021)20 SCC 695)].
j) An application for compassionate appointment has to be made
immediately upon death/incapacitation and in any case within a
reasonable period thereof or else a presumption could be drawn that
the family of the deceased/incapacitated employee is not in
immediate need of financial assistance. Such appointment not being
a vested right, the right to apply cannot be exercised at any time in
future and it cannot be offered whatever the lapse of time and after
the crisis is over [see Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Anil Badyakar
(2009)13 SCC 112)].
k) The object of compassionate employment is not to give a
member of a family of the deceased employee a post much less a
post for post held by the deceased. Offering compassionate
employment as a matter of course irrespective of the financial
condition of the family of the deceased and making compassionate
appointments in posts above Class III and IV is legally
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impermissible [see Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana
(1994)4 SCC 138].
l) Indigence of the dependents of the deceased employee is the first
precondition to bring the case under the scheme of compassionate
appointment. If the element of indigence and the need to provide
immediate assistance for relief from financial destitution is taken
away from compassionate appointment, it would turn out to be a
reservation in favour of the dependents of the employee who died
while in service which would directly be in conflict with the ideal
of equality guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
[see Union of India v. B. Kishore (2011)13 SCC 131].
m)The idea of compassionate appointment is not to provide for
endless compassion [see I.G. (Karmik) v. Prahalad Mani Tripathi
(2007)6 SCC 162].
n) Satisfaction that the family members have been facing financial
distress and that an appointment on compassionate ground may
assist them to tide over such distress is not enough; the dependent
must fulfil the eligibility criteria for such appointment [see State of
Gujarat v. Arvindkumar T. Tiwari (2012)9 SCC 545].
o) There cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time as the
applicant becomes a major after a number of years, unless there are
some specific provisions [see Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar
(2000)7 SCC 192].
p) Grant of family pension or payment of terminal benefits cannot
be treated as substitute for providing employment assistance. Also,
it is only in rare cases and that too if provided by the scheme for
compassionate appointment and not otherwise, that a dependent
who was a minor on the date of death/incapacitation, can be
considered for appointment upon attaining majority [see Canara
Bank (supra)].
q) An appointment on compassionate ground made many years
after the death/incapacitation of the employee or without due
consideration of the financial resources available to the dependent
of the deceased/incapacitated employee would be directly in
conflict with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution [see National
Institute of Technology v. Niraj Kumar Singh (2007)2 SCC 481].
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r) Dependents if gainfully employed cannot be considered [see
Haryana Public Service Commission v. Harinder Singh (1998)5
SCC 452].
s) The retiral benefits received by the heirs of the deceased
employee are to be taken into consideration to determine if the
family of the deceased is left in penury. The court cannot dilute the
criterion of penury to one of "not very well-to-do". [see General
Manager (D and PB) v. Kunti Tiwary (2004)7 SCC 271].
t) Financial condition of the family of the deceased employee,
allegedly in distress or penury, has to be evaluated or else the object
of the scheme would stand defeated inasmuch as in such an
eventuality, any and every dependent of an employee dying-
inharness would claim employment as if public employment is
heritable [see Union of India v. Shashank Goswami (2012)11 SCC
307 , Union Bank of India v. M. T. Latheesh (2006)7 SCC 350 ,
National Hydroelectric Power Corporation v. Nank Chand
(2004)12 SCC 487 and Punjab National Bank v. Ashwini Kumar
Taneja (2004)7 SCC 265].
u) The terminal benefits, investments, monthly family income
including the family pension and income of family from other
sources, viz. agricultural land were rightly taken into consideration
by the authority to decide whether the family is living in penury.
[see Somvir Singh (supra)].
v) The benefits received by widow of deceased employee under
Family Benefit Scheme assuring monthly payment cannot stand in
her way for compassionate appointment. Family Benefit Scheme
cannot be equated with benefits of compassionate appointment. [see
Balbir Kaur v. SAIL (2000)6 SCC 493]
w) The fixation of an income slab is, in fact, a measure which
dilutes the element of arbitrariness. While, undoubtedly, the facts of
each individual case have to be borne in mind in taking a decision,
the fixation of an income slab subserves the purpose of bringing
objectivity and uniformity in the process of decision making. [see
State of H.P. v. Shashi Kumar (2019)3 SCC 653].
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:16334
x) Courts cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic
consideration [see Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha
Ramchandra Ambekar (1994)2 SCC 718].
y) Courts cannot allow compassionate appointment dehors the
statutory regulations/instructions. Hardship of the candidate does
not entitle him to appointment dehors such regulations/instructions
[see SBI v. Jaspal Kaur (2007)9 SCC 571].
z) An employer cannot be compelled to make an appointment on
compassionate ground contrary to its policy [see Kendriya
Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Dharmendra Sharma (2007)8 SCC 148].
It would be of some relevance to mention here that all the decisions
referred to above are by coordinate benches of two Judges.
29. The second sub-issue pertains to the real objective sought to be
achieved by offering compassionate appointment. We have noticed
the objectives of the scheme of 1993 and construe such objectives
as salutary for deciding any claim for compassionate appointment.
The underlying idea behind compassionate appointment in death-in-
harness cases appears to be that the premature and unexpected
passing away of the employee, who was the only bread earner for
the family, leaves the family members in such penurious condition
that but for an appointment on compassionate ground, they may not
survive. There cannot be a straitjacket formula applicable uniformly
to all cases of employees dying-in-harness which would warrant
appointment on compassionate grounds. Each case has its own
peculiar features and is required to be dealt with bearing in mind the
financial condition of the family. It is only in "hand-to-mouth"
cases that a claim for compassionate appointment ought to be
considered and granted, if at all other conditions are satisfied. Such
"hand-to-mouth" cases would include cases where the family of the
deceased is 'below poverty line' and struggling to pay basic
expenses such as food, rent, utilities, etc., arising out of lack of any
steady source of sustenance. This has to be distinguished from a
mere fall in standard of life arising out of the death of the bread
earner.
30. The observation in Kunti Tiwary (supra) noted above
seems to assume significance and we draw inspiration therefrom in
making the observation that no appointment on compassionate
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ground ought to be made as if it is a matter of course or right, being
blissfully oblivious of the laudable object of any policy/scheme in
this behalf.
31. Thus, examination of the financial condition to ascertain
whether the respondent and his mother were left in utter financial
distress because of the death of the bread earner is not something
that can be loosely brushed aside."
9. Thus, it is clear that where the dependents of the deceased employee
have successfully survived for a considerably long time, then that by itself
would frustrate the appointment on compassionate grounds. Admittedly,
father of the petitioner had died on 25.10.2007. Petitioner had attained
majority on 06.12.2016, whereas application for appointment on
compassionate ground was filed on 17.10.2019 i.e. approximately 3 years
after attaining majority. However, as per the policy for appointment on
compassionate grounds, the application should have been filed within a
period of 1 year from the date of attaining majority. Not only the fact that
appellant had applied for appointment on compassionate ground for the first
time on 17.10.2019 is mentioned in the impugned order, but even in the
return it was specifically stated by the respondents that application for
appointment on compassionate ground was filed on 17.10.2019. No rejoinder
was filed by the appellant/petitioner to dispute the said fact. Even otherwise,
now 17 long years have passed from the date of death of the father of the
petitioner, and this by itself is sufficient to refuse the benefit of appointment
on compassionate ground.
10. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, this
Court is of considered opinion that the learned Single Judge did not commit
any mistake by dismissing the writ petition.
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11. Accordingly, writ appeal fails and is, hereby, dismissed.
(G.S. Ahluwalia) (Ashish Shroti)
Judge Judge
(and)
