Madhya Pradesh High Court
The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Lateef on 23 April, 2025
Author: Atul Sreedharan
Bench: Atul Sreedharan, Anuradha Shukla
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:18464
1 MCRC-14943-2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ATUL SREEDHARAN
&
HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE ANURADHA SHUKLA
ON THE 23rd OF APRIL, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 14943 of 2018
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Versus
LATEEF
Appearance:
Ms. Shweta Yadav - Deputy Advocate General for the
petitioner/State.
ORDER
Per: Justice Atul Sreedharan
The present petition has been filed by the State which is aggrieved by
the judgment of acquittal dated 11.01.2018 passed by the learned 5 th
Additional Sessions Judge, Khandwa in S.T. No.173/2013, whereby the
respondent was acquitted of the charges under Sections 302/34 read with
section 506 (Part-II) of IPC.
2 . The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
learned Court below has not appreciated the evidence that came on record in
the right perspective. In this case without going deeply into the merits of the
matter, suffice it to say that the deceased had died on account of burns
received by her. The postmortem report reflects that she has suffered
between 90-100% burns. At the time of her admission, her condition was
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2 MCRC-14943-2018
serious. There are three sets of dying declarations; one dying declaration is
the statement given to the Police in the course of investigation which
otherwise would have been a statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C but on
account of demise of the deceased, the same has been considered as a dying
declaration. The second is the statement given to the Executive Magistrate
after the doctor had certified the deceased fit enough to give a statement and
the third is the oral dying declaration given to the mother of the deceased.
The record the case goes to reflect that the statement given by the deceased
to the Police does not bear the time at which it was recorded. The dying
declaration given to the Executive Magistrate is recorded from 10:25 A.M.
onwards till 10:38 A.M. on 28.07.2013, after she was certified fit for giving a
statement. In response to query No.4, when the deceased was asked as to
how she suffered the burns, the deceased has replied that she was preparing
tea on the Stove and the Stove burst, on account of which she received
injuries. She was also asked who the persons at home were during that time,
to which she has stated that her husband, her brother-in-law and her sister-in-
law were present. She was also asked if she has any kind of suspicion on any
person, she stated categorically that she does not have any suspicion on any
person. However, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
learned trial Court failed to appreciate that there was no reason to suspect its
genuineness of the statement given to the Police and the mother of the
deceased, and the learned trial Court should have relied upon the same to
convict the petitioner instead of relying upon the dying declaration given to
the Executive Magistrate. In this regard while going through the records of
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3 MCRC-14943-2018
the trial Court, it appears that the mother of the deceased in cross-
examination has admitted that she was only allowed to meet the deceased
after she had given the dying declaration to the Magistrate. Thus, from the
sequence of events, it is clear that the oral dying declaration implicating the
respondent herein allegedly given by the deceased to her mother was after
she had given the dying declaration to the Executive Magistrate in which she
has absolved the respondent. Under the circumstances, the learned trial Court
has rightly appreciated the material on record and has relied upon the dying
declaration given to the Executive Magistrate which was the only dying
declaration which was recorded in accordance with law.
3 . Under the circumstances, this Court has not found any perversity
in the order passed by the learned trial Court while acquitting the respondent
of the charges as aforementioned. Therefore, the petition is dismissed
(ATUL SREEDHARAN) (ANURADHA SHUKLA)
JUDGE JUDGE
b
