Madhya Pradesh High Court
Chhalla Bai @ Sarla Devi vs The State Of M.P. on 7 April, 2025
Author: Anuradha Shukla
Bench: Anuradha Shukla
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:16749
1 CRA-304-1998
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE ANURADHA SHUKLA
ON THE 7 th OF APRIL, 2025
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 304 of 1998
CHHALLA BAI @ SARLA DEVI
Versus
THE STATE OF M.P.
Appearance:
None for the appellant.
Shri K. S. Patel - Panel Lawyer for the State.
Reserved on : 20.03.2025
Pronounced on : 07.04.2025
JUDGMENT
The appellant herein has preferred the instant criminal appeal under
Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 for having been
aggrieved by the judgment dated 31.1.1998 passed in Sessions Trial
No.24/1994 by First Additional Sessions Judge, Seoni, convicting the
appellant for an offence of Section 304-B IPC and sentencing her to rigorous
imprisonment for seven years without imposing any fine.
2. The facts relevant for the decision of this criminal appeal are that Nitin,
son of appellant, was married to deceased Meena Bai while the daughter of
appellant was married to the brother of Meena Bai; Meena Bai was married
to Nitin in the year 1991; she was being continuously harassed by appellant
for demand of dowry and on account of cruelty committed by appellant,
Meena Bai set her ablazed on 14.11.1993; she was taken to hospital where
her dying declaration was recorded; Meena Bai later succumbed to her
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injuries, therefore a criminal case was registered against the appellant. After
completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed and the appellant was
convicted and sentenced as aforesaid after conclusion of trial.
3. The grounds raised in this criminal appeal are that the judgment delivered
by the court below is contrary to law and also against the facts and evidence
available on record; there were material contradictions in the testimony of
prosecution witnesses and there was no corroboration from any independent
witness; from the statements of Sumitra Bai (P.W.6), Jhalkan Singh (P.W.7)
and Randeep (P.W.8) it is evident that no cruelty was committed by appellant
regarding demand of dowry; deceased was insisting to live with her parents
but her in-laws were not ready for this proposal and this resulted into the
incident; there was no evidence regarding any specific demand of dowry and
the dowry items that were given to the deceased were never collected by the
appellant or her family; the finding given by the trial court that dying
declaration was proved is bad in law and facts; the deceased was hundred per
cent burnt and was in shock, therefore she was not in a fit state to give dying
declaration; the presumption available under Section 113B of Indian
Evidence Act was not attracted here; although the family members of
deceased were present at the time of treatment but none of them made any
complaint to the police regarding dowry demand or cruelty for any such
demand; the learned trial court also committed error in placing reliance on
the documents of Exs.P-3, P-4 and P-5. It was, therefore, prayed that the
appeal should be allowed and the accused should be acquitted.
4. Learned counsel for the State has supported the impugned judgment and
the finding of conviction of appellant recorded by the trial court on the
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ground that it is based upon reliable evidence available on record and has
submitted that there is no reason to doubt the prosecution case, therefore the
appeal is requested to be dismissed.
5. The case was taken up for final arguments, but no one appeared on behalf
of appellant to argue the matter. Since the appeal was admitted for final
hearing, hence applying the ratio laid down in the case of Bani Singh and
others v. State of U. P., AIR 1996 SC 2439 , the final arguments on behalf of
State were heard for decision of this appeal and record of the trial court was
perused.
6. In this case of conviction for dowry death, this fact is established from
prosecution evidence that victim Meena Bai had herself immolated on
14.11.1993 and in post-mortem report, Ex.P-14, Dr. B. P. Namdeo (P.W.12)
has opined that victim Meena Bai died due to shock caused by second and
third degrees burns which were all over her body i.e. she was burnt hundred
per cent. Admittedly, the place of incident was the matrimonial house of
Meena Bai where she was living with her husband and in-laws, including her
mother-in-law i.e. the present appellant. It is also an admitted fact that victim
was married in the year 1991, therefore she died an unnatural death within
seven years of her marriage.
7. The evidence available on record is now to be examined to search for the
cause which led deceased Meena Bai to immolate herself. According to
prosecution, the answer lies in the dying declaration of Meena Bai recorded
as Ex.P-9 by Naib Tahsildar A. K. Richhariya (P.W.13) and also in two
letters written by Meena Bai to her younger brother, marked as Exs.P-3 and
P - 5 . These letters were reportedly written on 12.9.1993 and 20.9.1993
respectively.
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8. The dying declaration and the letters written by victim Meena Bai reveal
that she was being harassed by appellant, b u t they do not speak of any
physical torture. Letter of Ex.P-3 merely reveals that no one in the
matrimonial house was on talking terms with the victim and no specific
allegation has been made in that letter against the appellant. The letter of
Ex.P-5 again repeats the same thing that no one in the matrimonial house
was having conversation with the victim, however, it was further mentioned
that appellant was demanding a vehicle and a fan resulting into every day's
quarrel. Thus, the letter of Ex.P-5 discloses that a demand was being made
by appellant of a vehicle and a fan and this demand was the cause of dispute
between appellant and victim. The letter is silent about the nature of quarrel
and also about the alleged ill-behaviour that victim was facing regarding this
demand.
9 . Ex.P-9 is the dying declaration which reveals that appellant was in the
habit of mocking the victim for not bringing dowry and, by using abusive
language, she was in the habit of reminding the victim that despite making
promise, father of victim did not give the vehicle to appellant's son. The se
statements suggest that victim was being harassed by her mother-in-law i.e.
appellant for demand of dowry by using abusive language and by making
sarcastic remarks, therefore the cruelty was of mental disposition and no
angle of physical cruelty was involved here.
10. Jhalkan Singh (P.W.7) is the father of deceased. His examination-in-
chief reveals that victim had two grievances - first, that her husband was not
having the food cooked by her, and, second, that her mother-in-law was not
used to talk her politely. This witness has denied the existence of any other
cause of tension between appellant and deceased. It is strange that despite
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being the father of deceased, this witness made no allegations about the
demand of dowry that was reportedly being made by appellant and which
was the alleged cause of suicide committed by the daughter of this witness.
11. Sumantra Bai (P.W.6) is the mother of deceased and, according to her,
victim used to be harassed by her in-laws as there was a demand of TV and
scooter in dowry from the victim. According to this witness, she came to
know of this demand through the letters written by deceased. The cross-
examination of this witness reveals that at the time of marriage, curfew was
imposed on account of death of the then Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi
and for this reason, only a part of dowry items was taken by the groom's
party and rest of the items remained with the bride's party forever. This
witness doesn't claim that the groom's party was dissatisfied with the quality
of remaining dowry items or they purposely left them with the bride's party.
12. It seems unnatural that, on the one hand, groom's side was dissatisfied
with the dowry given and, on the other, it was not keen to take the entire
dowry along with the marriage party. Further, this witness claimed that
demand was being made for scooter and TV but neither the letters written by
deceased nor her dying declaration makes any mention about the demand of
TV in dowry. This witness is also silent about any demand of vehicle or TV
being made to her or to any of her family members. Statements of father of
deceased i.e. Jhalkan Singh (P.W.7) also become very relevant here as he too
has not claimed any such demand ever being to him by appellant or any of
her family members.
13. Randeep (P.W.8) is the brother of deceased and he too claims that he
came to know about the demand of dowry and harassment of his sister only
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through the letters written by her. Although he claims that he used to go to
the matrimonial house of his sister and, therefore, had personal knowledge
about the relationship of victim with her husband and also with the appellant
but beyond this, he makes no disclosure about having personal knowledge on
the issue. He is completely silent about any demand of dowry ever made to
him by the appellant or any other family members.
14. In terms of aforesaid analysis of testimony of close relatives of deceased,
i.e. mother Sumantra Bai (P.W.6), father Jhalkan Singh (P.W.7) and brother
Randeep (P.W.8), it is evident that no demand was ever made by appellant or
any of her family members to any of these witnesses regarding any dowry
items. The mother and the brother have made allegations about demand of
dowry only on the basis of letters received from the deceased, while the
father is silent on any kind of demand of dowry. It becomes relevant here to
refer to the police statements of mother Sumantra Bai (P.W.6) given on
18.12.1993 and marked as Ex.D-1. These statements reflect that for almost a
year since marriage, Meena Bai stayed in her parental house and on account
of some dispute she was not being taken to her matrimonial house. They
further reveal that during this period, the husband of Meena Bai used to visit
her parental house but would not have any conversation with Meena Bai. It is
claimed that he used to put a demand of scooter and TV before other persons
but strangely he was not arrayed as accused. These statements further reveal
that about five-six months prior to the incident, Meena Bai was taken to her
matrimonial house by her husband through Samaj Panchayat but she was
sending letters for last two-three months prior to her death asking her brother
to take her to the parental house. Incidentally, the major part of this police
statement (Ex.D-1) has been denied by maker during her court testimony as
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P.W.6 and this reflects that she was making best efforts to hide the true and
complete story and give a totally different colour to it.
15. Let us now examine whether the conviction of appellant for dowry death
can be upheld on the sole evidence of dying declaration (Ex.P-9) and the
letter (Ex.P-5) written by deceased. Both these documents reveal that this
harassment never became physical and a persistent brawl was going on
between them while other members of matrimonial house were not engaging
in any conversation with the victim. It is a common feature that family
members get engaged in quarrel, therefore, it needs to be examined whether
this dispute was of such a nature that could be categorized as causing mental
cruelty to the victim.
16. The undertone of two letters written by deceased to her brother, marked
as Exs. P-3 and P-5, is that she was not keen to live in her matrimonial house
any longer and was insisting and even threatening her brother to come to her
matrimonial house and take her to the parental house or otherwise she would
leave the matrimonial house and would not return even to the parental house.
It appears that finding no response from her brother, she took the drastic step
to immolate herself. In her dying declaration, victim denied the suggestion of
being harassed by her husband. Her reply was that her husband was
affectionate to her while the statements of her close relatives reveal that her
relationship with husband was very strained. This message can also be read
from the two letters written by her which reveal that husband of deceased
was not having any conversation with her causing anguish to her.
17. From the above analysis it is reflected that victim Meena Bai was not
speaking whole truth at the time of giving dying declaration. ( Irfan alias
Naka v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC Online SC 1060 ) . In this citation, the
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Hon'ble Apex Court considered juristic theory regarding the acceptability of
a dying declaration and observed that such a declaration is made in extremity
when a party is at a point of death and it is assumed that every motive to
falsehood is silenced and the party is induced to speak only the truth,
notwithstanding the same, grave caution needs to be exercised in considering
the weight to be given to this species of evidence. It further observed that on
a death-bed a person is so solemn and serene that requirements of oath and
cross-examination are dispensed with while accepting the veracity of his
dying declaration but the court must insist the dying declaration should be of
such a nature as to inspire full confidence in its truthfulness and correctness.
It is further observed that t he court should always be on guard to see that
statement of deceased was not a result of either tutoring or prompting or a
product of imagination and for this, the case law of Laxman v. State of
Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 was also relied upon.
18. After considering the legal and factual aspects involved in the case, it can
be safely concluded that prosecution has not successfully established that
victim Meena Bai was treated with cruelty for demand of dowry by appellant
soon before her death. Hence, the conviction of appellant under Section 304
IPC is hereby set aside and the appeal is allowed .
19. Let a copy of this judgment along with its record be send to the trial
Court for information and necessary compliance.
(ANURADHA SHUKLA)
JUDGE
ps
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