Vinod vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh
2024 Latest Caselaw 16331 MP

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Vinod vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 31 May, 2024

Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar

Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar

                           1



IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
             AT G WA L I O R
                        BEFORE
  HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR

               ON THE 31st OF MAY, 2024

        MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 16855 of 2024

BETWEEN:-
1. VINOD S/O SHRI RAMVILESH @ RAMVILAS,
   AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS, OCCUPATION:
   AGRICULTURE R/O BARETHA KA PURA
   POLICE STATION MAHARAJPURA DISTRICT
   GWALIOR (MADHYA PRADESH)
2. MANOJ GURJAR S/O SHRI RAJENDRA
   SINGH,   AGED     ABOUT     30  YEARS,
   OCCUPATION: AGRICULTURE R/O GRAM
   BARETHA BAHADURPUR DISTT GWALIOR
   (MADHYA PRADESH)
3. BHURA S/O SHRI CHHOTE SINGH, AGED
   ABOUT      28   YEARS,     OCCUPATION:
   AGRICULTURE R/O GRAM KACHCHHPURA
   BAHADURPURA       DISTRICT     GWALIOR
   (MADHYA PRADESH)
4. BALARAM S/O SHRI MOHAN SINGH, AGED
   ABOUT     33    YEARS,     OCCUPATION:
   AGRICULTURE R/O BARETHA KA PURA
   DISTRICT GWALIOR (MADHYA PRADESH)
5. BHARAT SINGH S/O SHRI AJMER SINGH,
   AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, OCCUPATION:
   AGRICULTURE     R/O    GRAM    BARETHA
   DISTRICT GWALIOR (MADHYA PRADESH)
6. LAL SINGH S/O SHRI SUMER, AGED ABOUT 33
   YEARS, OCCUPATION: AGRICULTURE R//O
   BARETHE KA PURA BAHADURPUR DISTRICT
   GWALIOR (MADHYA PRADESH)
7. THAN SINGH S/O SHRI GOPAL SINGH, AGED
   ABOUT     38    YEARS,     OCCUPATION:
   AGRICULTURE R/O GRAM BARETHA KA
   PURA   BARETHA      DISTRICT   GWALIOR
   (MADHYA PRADESH)
                           2



   DEEPENDRA SINGH S/O SHRI RAJENDRA SINGH, AGED
   ABOUT 36 YEARS, OCCUPATION: AGRICULTURE R/O
8.
   GRAM BARETHA POST BAHADURPUR DISTRICT
   GWALIOR (MADHYA PRADESH)
   JITENDRA SINGH S/O SHRI CHHOTELAL, AGED
   ABOUT 29 YEARS, OCCUPATION: AGRICULTURE R/O
9.
   GRAM KACHHPURA BARETHA DISTRICT GWALIOR
   (MADHYA PRADESH)
                                        .....PETITIONERS
(SHRI ABDHESH SINGH TOMAR- ADVOCATE FOR PETITIONERS )

AND
1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH INCHARGE POLICE
   STATION THROUGH POLICE STATION MAHARAJPURA
   DISTRICT GWALIOR (MADHYA PRADESH)
2. RAJKUMAR S/O SHRI MATADEEN, AGED ABOUT 43
   YEARS, OCCUPATION: AGRICULTURE R/O PUTTO
   SINGH KA PURA KESHAR KHERIYA BARETHA
   BAHADURPUR     DISTRICT   GWALIOR   (MADHYA
   PRADESH)
3. GAURAV S/O SHRI RAJKUMAR, AGED ABOUT 19
   YEARS, OCCUPATION: AGRICULTURE R/O BARETHA
   KA PURA BAHADURPUR DISTT GWALIOR (MADHYA
   PRADESH)
4. GULSHAN GOUD S/O SHRI GANESH GOUD, AGED
   ABOUT 29 YEARS, OCCUPATION: AGRICULTURE R/O
   BARETHA KA PURA BAHADURPUR DISTT GWALIOR
   (MADHYA PRADESH)
5. NEHA GOUD D/O SHRI RAJKUMAR GOUD, AGED
   ABOUT 21 YEARS, OCCUPATION: AGRICULTURE R/O
   BARETHA KA PURA BAHADURPUR DISTT GWALIOR
   (MADHYA PRADESH)
6. JAGMOHAN S/O SHRI RAMDEEN, AGED ABOUT 56
   YEARS,    OCCUPATION:     AGRICULTURE     R/O
   KACHHPURA BARETHA BAHADURPUR DISTRICT
   GWALIOR (MADHYA PRADESH)
7. SUMIT S/O SHRI DHRUV SINGH, AGED ABOUT 19
   YEARS,   OCCUPATION:    ADHYYAN   R/O   GRAM
   KACHHPURA BAHADURPUR DISTRICT GWALIOR
   (MADHYA PRADESH)
8. VINAY GOUD S/O SHRI BHAWANI PRASAD GOUD, AGED
   ABOUT 21 YEARS, OCCUPATION: ADHYYAN R/O
   AARAMIL BIRLANAGAR DISTRICT GWALIOR (MADHYA
   PRADESH)
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                                                          .....RESPONDENTS
(SHRI PPS VAJEETA- PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FOR RESPONDENT
NO.1- STATE AND SHRI ANKUR TIWARI- ADVOCATE FOR
RESPONDENTS NO.2 TO 8- COMPLAINANTS)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Reserved on                  :         21-05-2024
               Pronounced on                  :         31-05-2024
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       This petition having been heard and reserved for order, coming
on for pronouncement this day, Justice Sanjeev S. Kalgaonkar
pronounced the following:
                                  ORDER

This petition under Section 482 of CrPC has been filed by

petitioners seeking quashment of FIR pertaining to Crime No.897 of

2023 registered by PS Maharajpura, District Gwalior for the offences

punishable under Sections 395, 294, 336, 427, 147, 148, 149, 201 of

IPC, Section 11/13 of MPDVPK Act and Sections 130, 177(3) of

Motor Vehicles Act with all consequential proceedings thereto.

(2) As per the case of prosecution, Rajkumar son of Ramdeen

Goud reported to PS Mahrajpura that on 21-10-2023 around 09:30 in

the morning, Bhura Kushwah, Vinod Kushwah, Balram Kushwah,

Than Singh Kushwah, Lal Singh Kushwah and Deependra Gurjar

were dismantling his latrine (toilet). When he objected to destruction

of latrine, the accused stated abusing him in filthy language. When he

tried to video-graph the incident on his mobile, Bhura snatched his

mobile and smashed it on ground. Vinod assaulted him with lathi.

He entered his house and closed the gate from inside. All the accused

started pelting stones on his house. Window panes of his house got

damaged. One of stones struck on his head. He sustained injury. His

son Gaurav, nephew Vinay, Sumit, Gulshan, brother Jagmohanand

daughter Neha also sustained injuries. Deependra and Manoj fired

gunshots at his house. Thereafter, all the accused went to his shop.

Vinod Kushwah took out Rs.10,000/- from cash box of the shop. All

the accused damaged his Ford Figo Car. Thereafter, the accused

went to shop of his brother, Kamlesh. Lal Singh and Bhura took

Rs.25,000/- from cash box of the shop. The accused damaged fridge,

LED TV, CCTV camera and DVR of the shop. Thereafter, the

accused damaged Astar Car, bullet motorcycle, Glamer motorcycle

and Discover motorcycle. The accused damaged motor and pipes of

water boring. Accused were threatening to kill them. On such

allegations, PS Maharajpura registered FIR at Crime No. 897 of 2023

for offences punishable under Sections 395, 294, 336, 427, 147, 148,

149, 201 of IPC, Section 11/13 of MPDVPK Act and Sections 130,

177(3) of Motor Vehicles Act against Bhura Kushwah, Vinod

Kushwah, Balaram Kushwah, Than Singh Kushwah, Lal Singh

Kushwah, Deependra Singh Gurar and Manoj Singh Gurjar

(petitioners). Injured were forwarded for medico-legal examination.

Statements of the witnesses were recorded. The accused were

arrested. Relevant recoveries were made. Panchnama of damage

caused by the accused was prepared. On completion of investigation,

Final Report was submitted. Trial is underway.

(3) During pendency of this petition, applications (IA No.8258 of

2024 and IA No. 8259 of 2024) under Sections 320(1) and 320(2) of

CrPC were filed for granting permission to compound offence along-

with affidavits of petitioners and respondents No. 2 to 8/complainant

party stating therein that they have resolved the dispute amicably and

they do not wish to pursue the matter anymore.

(4) Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that both the parties

have amicably settled the dispute, therefore, FIR at Crime No.897 of

2023 along-with all subsequent proceedings deserves to be quashed.

Learned Counsel relaying on judgment of Supreme Court in case of

Dharmendra Singh and Others vs. State of MP and Another,

Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) No. 216 of 2024 decided on 16 th of

April, 2024 and judgments of coordinate Bench of this Court in

cases of Umesh Singh Rajawat vs. The State of MP and Others,

MCRC No.3483 of 2024 decided on 20th of March, 2024 and

Ramavtar Prajapati vs. The State of MP and Another, MCRC

No.1822 of 2024 decided on 6th of February, 2024, contends that

even in non-compoundable cases on the basis of compromise,

criminal proceedings can be quashed so that valuable time of the

Court can be saved and utilized in other material cases.

(5) Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents No.2

to 8/complainant party does not dispute the factum of compromise

between the parties.

(6) This Court vide order dated 01-05-2024 had directed the

parties to appear before the Principal Registrar of this Court for

recording of their statements and for verification of factum of

compromise. The Principal Registrar has submitted his report on 06-

05-2024 and verified the factum of compromise.

(7) Heard both the parties on IA No.8258 of 2024 and IA No.

8259 of 2024 and main petition filed under Section 482 of CrPC and

perused the record.

(8) The Supreme Court in case of State of Haryana vs. Ch. Bhajan

Lal, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 after an elaborate consideration of

the matter and after referring to its various earlier decisions, has

observed in para 108 as under:-

''108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-

cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding

against the accused.

(6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously Instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.''

(9) The Supreme Court in case of Narinder Singh v. State of

Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 laid down following guiding principles

for exercise of inherent powers-

"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the

criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention ofCorruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has

collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7.While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial

court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime".

(10) In light of aforementioned proposition of law, the fact situation

of present case is examined.

(11) As per the prosecution, the accused in furtherance of common

object, not only caused injuries to the family of complainant i.e.

Rajkumar, Gurav, Vinay, Sumit, Gulshan, Jagmohan and Neha but

also caused damaged their shop, vehicles, fridge, LED TV and motor

of boring. The incident occurred at public place in public view. It has

ramification on public order. The accused had acted in a cruel and

anti-social manner rampaging the shop and vehicles of the

complainant party. Compounding of such offence would have

adverse social effect. Continuation of criminal proceedings against

petitioners cannot be said to be abuse of process of Court. Rather, to

stifle or to scuttle the proceedings at initial stage of trial, in

aforementioned circumstances, by invoking inherent jurisdiction

under Section 482 of CrPC, would itself be an abuse of process of

Court.

(12) Considering the aforementioned aspects of the matter, the

benefit of precedent relied upon by petitioners, cannot be extended

for the reason of material difference in the facts and circumstance of

present case.

(13) It is not a fit case for exercise of inherent jurisdiction under

Section 482 of CrPC for quashment of FIR with all consequential

proceedings thereto in view of compromise between the petitioners

and respondent No.2. Accordingly, IA No.8258 of 2024 and IA No.

8259 of 2024 are rejected and as also, the petition filed under Section

482 of CrPC is dismissed.

A copy of this order be sent to the concerned Police Station

and Court concerned for information.

(SANJEEV S. KALGAONKAR) JUDGE 31/05/2024

MKB

MAHENDR Digitally signed by MAHENDRA BARIK DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH GWALIOR, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH GWALIOR, 2.5.4.20=8c6d4d6122d7ee987e457a3bec5922cacbc050c998981397a35

A BARIK d9758a2b55074, postalCode=474001, st=Madhya Pradesh, serialNumber=AB90F893988F10D718DA01F8065D87F25DDC9B6C8C3 FF0E5E280DD36D476F6BA, cn=MAHENDRA BARIK Date: 2024.06.02 05:58:39 +05'30'