Madhya Pradesh High Court
Shahid Sheikh vs Sheerin on 9 May, 2024
Author: Prem Narayan Singh
Bench: Prem Narayan Singh
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PREM NARAYAN SINGH
ON THE 9 th OF MAY, 2024
CRIMINAL REVISION No. 5968 of 2023
BETWEEN:-
SHAHID SHEIKH S/O WAHID AHMED SHEIKH, AGED
ABOUT 32 YEARS, OCCUPATION: BUSINESS VILLAGE
SONIYA NAGAR KASRAWAD ROAD , MANDLESHWAR
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI VISHAL PATIDAR, ADVOCATE)
AND
1. SHEERIN W/O SHAHID SHEIKH, AGED ABOUT 28
YEAR S, OCCUPATION: NONE VILLAGE SONIYA
NAGAR, KASRAWAD ROAD MANDLESHWAR
(MADHYA PRADESH)
2. MINOR UMED S/O SHAHID SHEIKH THROUGH
NATURAL GUARDIAN MOTHER SHEERIN SHEIKH
W/O SHAHID SHEIKH, AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: NONE SONIYA NAGAR,
KASRAWAD ROAD, MANDLESHWAR, DIST.
KHARGONE (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY SHRI MUTAHIR AHMED KHAN, ADVOCATE)
T h is revision coming on for orders this day, t h e cou rt passed the
following:
ORDER
This criminal revision has been filed under Section 397 and 401 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 19(4) of the Family Court Act,
1985 being crestfallen by the order dated 04.03.2020 passed by the learned
Principal Judge, Family Court, Barwani (M.P.) in MJCR No. 34/2019 by which
the learned Judge has partly allowed the application of the respondents and
awarded maintenance of Rs.5,000/- per month in favour of respondent No.
1/wife and Rs.3,000/- per month in favour of respondent No. 2/son till he
attains the age of majority from the date of order.
2. An application I.A. No. 3083/2024 has also been filed by the petitioner
for condonation of delay in filing this revision. The revision petition is barred by
563 days i.e. approximately one year and nine months.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that an application
filed under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. was preferred by the respondent which was
allowed by the trial Court without giving any opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner and passed an ex-parte order, by directing the petitioner to pay
Rs.5,000/- per month as maintenance to the respondent No.1/wife and
Rs.3,000/- per month to respondent No.2/the minor child from the date of
order. He has also submitted that the petitioner was not having any knowledge
about the proceedings as well as order impugned. Even no notice was served
upon the petitioner regarding proceedings pending against him. The petitioner
came to know about the impugned order when his advocate appeared in some
other case and saw the execution proceedings against the petitioner. Thereafter,
the petitioner immediately contacted his counsel, received the certified copy of
the order from his counsel and filed the present petition before this Court.
4. The delay in filing the present petition is bonafide and of only 563 days
and if the delay is not condoned, the important right of the petitioner will be
affected adversely. On these grounds, it is prayed that delay in filing the appeal
for a period of 563 days may be condoned and application of leave to appeal
be allowed.
5 . On the other hand, counsel for the respondent submits that the
petitioner is supposed to have knowledge about the Court proceedings. The
contention regarding no knowledge of law and proceedings is therefore a futile
attempt to cheat the Court. Hence, such type of arguments cannot be accepted.
It is also contended that an ex-parte order was passed by learned family Court
after issuing proper notices to the petitioner and the petitioner was well aware to
the fact of the case. It is also submitted that the petitioner has not filed the
petition challenging the order of family Court within the limitation period.
Hence, the learned counsel for the respondent prays for dismissal of the
application for condonation of delay and the petition as well.
7. On this aspect, the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
o f Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs and Ors. Vs. Special Deputy
Collector (LA) reported in [2024] 4 SCR 241 decided on 08.04.2024 in
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 31248/2018, wherein the Hon'ble Apex
Court has discussed the point of limitation, of which the extract thereof
reproduced as under :-
23. I n Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer ,
this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The
expression 'sufficient cause' as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act
cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is
writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly
affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as
prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the
law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable
grounds.
2 4 . It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid
decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to
be maintained between adopting liberal (2013) 14 SCC 81 14 | 2 2 approach
and in implementing the statute as it stands.
Paragraph 12 reads as under:
"12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all
its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no
power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
"A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A
Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it
considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory
provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular
party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full
effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which
means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in
such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while
interpreting a statute."
25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide
paragraph 15 went on to observe as under:
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation,
the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In
case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide
on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found
to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot
be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be
justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only
within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the
statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature."
8. In view of aforesaid law, Hon'ble Apex Court has observed the Court
has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to
ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its
operation." but in the case, at hand the appellant has not challenged the
impugned order even after lapse of a period of grace period so granted by
Hon'ble Apex Court and after 94 days from the date of expiration of grace
period.
9. Again, in the case of Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs Vs. State of
A.P. & Ors reported in 2011 (4) SCC 363, Hon'ble Apex Court has observed
as under :-
26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which
could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay
after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such
as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach",
"substantial justice" can not be employed to jettison the
substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the
Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In
our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends
to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a
Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis
between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this
case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate
language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms.
The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language
in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court
in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for
condonation of delay under Section 5 o f the Limitation Act,
the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary
powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers,
have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the
law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic
manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or
predilections can not and should not form the basis of
exercising discretionary powers.
10. In conspectus of the aforesaid law, it is unearthed that the law of
limitation cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bonafide,
are emanated in factual matrix of the case. The Court has no power to extend the
period of limitation on equitable grounds. Liberal attitude may only be adopted
when the parties are able to show their bonafide conduct.
11. In upshot of the aforesaid principles of law and elaborate discussion
and also having perused the record, it is clear that the petition is filed with a
delay of approximately 563 days i.e. approximately one year and nine months.
Similarly. the submission that the petitioner was having no knowledge about the
proceedings is very staggering and unbelievable. It cannot be a ground of delay.
Since the petitioner is unable to explain the said delay day-to-day, this
application for condonation of delay is liable to be and is hereby rejected.
Consequently, the criminal revision also stands dismissed.
(PREM NARAYAN SINGH)
JUDGE
Vindesh
