Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rajendra Devidas Mandaokar vs The State Of Madhya Smaapradesh on 6 February, 2024
Author: Vishal Mishra
Bench: Ravi Malimath, Vishal Mishra
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPU R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAVI MALIMATH,
CHIEF JUSTICE
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
WRIT APPEAL No.80 OF 2024
BETWEEN:-
RAJENDRA DEVIDAS MANDAOKAR S/O SHRI
DEVIDAS MANDAOKAR, AGED ABOUT 55
YEARS, OCCUPATION: COMPUTER
PROGRAMMER R/O SINGAPURA VILA A-112
OPPOSITE J.K. MEDICAL COLLEGE DANISH
ROAD KOLAR DISTRICT BHOPAL (M.P.)
.... PETITIONER
(SMT. SHOBHA MENON - SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH SHRI
RAHUL CHOUBEY - ADVOCATE)
AND
1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
THROUGH SECRETARY SMALL SCALE
INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT VALLABH
BHAWAN, BHOPAL (M.P.)
2. GOVERNING BODY CENTRE FOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) THROUGH
ITS CHAIRMAN 16-A ARERA HILLS
BHOPAL 462011 (M.P.)
3. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CENTRE FOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) 16-A ARERA
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD
VISHWAKARMA
Signing time: 2/6/2024
5:28:02 PM
2
HILLS BHOPAL (M.P.)
4. ANURADHA SINGHAI, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR CENTRE FOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) 16-A ARERA
HILLS, BHOPAL (M.P.)
5. SECRETARY CENTRE FOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) 16-A ARERA
HILLS BHOPAL 462011 (M.P.)
6. JOHN C. EAPPEN, CENTRE FOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) 16-A ARERA
HILLS BHOPAL 462011 (M.P.)
7. MR. RAJIV SINGHAI PRESENTING
OFFICER, CENTRE FOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) 16-A ARERA
HILLS, BHOPAL (M.P.)
8. MR. V.P. SINGH COMMITTEE MEMBER
AND ENQUIRY OFFICER, CENTRE FOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) 16-A ARERA
HILLS, BHOPAL (M.P.)
9. MR. BASANT SHRIVASTAV, MEMBER
EXPERT BANKING AND FINANCE, CENTRE
FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP
DEVELOPMENT MADHYA PRADESH
(CEDMAP) 16-A, ARERA HILLS, BHOPAL
(M.P.)
10. MR. PRASHANT PANDEY, EXPERT LEGAL
CENTRE FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP
DEVELOPMENT MADHYA PRADESH
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD
VISHWAKARMA
Signing time: 2/6/2024
5:28:02 PM
3
(CEDMAP) 16-A, ARERA HILLS, BHOPAL
(M.P.)
11. SHRI MANOJ KUMAR THAKUR (RETIRED
UPPER COLLECTOR), ENQUIRY OFFICER,
CENTRE FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP
DEVELOPMENT MADHYA PRADESH
(CEDMAP) 16-A, ARERA HILLS, BHOPAL
(M.P.)
.... RESPONDENTS
(BY SHRI BHARAT SINGH - ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE GENERAL
WITH SHRI PANKAJ DUBEY, SHRI SIDDHARTH SHUKLA AND
SHRI ARYADITYA SINGH - ADVOCATES)
WRIT APPEAL No.87 OF 2024
BETWEEN:-
DINESH KUMAR KHARE S/O SHRI R.P. VERMA,
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS, OCCUPATION:
PROJECT COORDINATOR C/O MR. DILIP
JIGYASEE, E-8/70 BHARAT NAGAR, ARERA
COLONY, BHOPAL (M.P.)
.... PETITIONER
(SMT. SHOBHA MENON - SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH SHRI
RAHUL CHOUBEY - ADVOCATE)
AND
1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
THROUGH SECRETARY SMALL SCALE
INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT VALLABH
BHAWAN, BHOPAL (M.P.)
2. GOVERNING BODY CENTRE FOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) THROUGH
ITS CHAIRMAN 16-A ARERA HILLS
BHOPAL (M.P.)
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD
VISHWAKARMA
Signing time: 2/6/2024
5:28:02 PM
4
3. CHAIRMAN CENTER FOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) 16-A ARERA
HILLS BHOPAL (M.P.)
4. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CENTRE FOR
ENTERPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) 16-A ARERA
HILLS BHOPAL (M.P.)
5. ANURADHA SINGHAI EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR CENTRE OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) 16-A ARERA
HILLS BHOPAL (M.P.)
6. SECRETARY CENTRE FOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) 16-A ARERA
HILLS BHOPAL (M.P.)
7. SHRI MANOJ KUMAR THAKUR (RETIRED
UPPER COLLECTOR) ENQUIRY OFFICER
CENTRE FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP
DEVELOPMENT MADHYA PRADESH
(CEDMAP) 16-A ARERA HILLS BHOPAL
(M.P.)
.... RESPONDENTS
(BY SHRI BHARAT SINGH - ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE GENERAL
WITH SHRI PANKAJ DUBEY, SHRI SIDDHARTH SHUKLA AND
SHRI ARYADITYA SINGH - ADVOCATES)
WRIT APPEAL No.90 OF 2024
BETWEEN:-
RAJIV SINGHAI S/O LATE SHRI G.C. SINGHAI
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS, OCCUPATION :
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD
VISHWAKARMA
Signing time: 2/6/2024
5:28:02 PM
5
PROJECT COORDINATOR, R/O A-47, KASTURBA
NAGAR, BHOPAL (M.P.)
.... PETITIONER
(SMT. SHOBHA MENON - SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH SHRI
RAHUL CHOUBEY - ADVOCATE)
AND
1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
THROUGH SECRETARY SMALL SCALE
INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT VALLABH
BHAWAN, BHOPAL (M.P.)
2. GOVERNING BODY CENTRE FOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) THROUGH
ITS CHAIRMAN 16-A ARERA HILLS
BHOPAL 462011 (M.P.)
3. CHAIRMAN CENTRE FOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) 16-A ARERA
HILLS BHOPAL (M.P.)
4. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CENTRE FOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) 16-A ARERA
HILLS, BHOPAL (M.P.)
5. ANURADHA SINGHAI EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR CENTRE FOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) 16-A ARERA
HILLS BHOPAL 462011 (M.P.)
6. SECRETARY CENTRE FOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) 16-A ARERA
HILLS BHOPAL 462011 (M.P.)
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD
VISHWAKARMA
Signing time: 2/6/2024
5:28:02 PM
6
7. MR. V.P. SINGH (HR HEAD) ENQUIRY
OFFICER CENTRE FOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
MADHYA PRADESH (CEDMAP) 16-A ARERA
HILLS BHOPAL 462011 (M.P.)
8. SHRI MANOJ KUMAR THAKUR (RETIRED
UPPER COLLERCTO) ENQUIRY OFFICER
CENTRE FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP
DEVELOPMENT MADHYA PRADESH
(CEDMAP) 16-A ARERA HILLS BHOPAL
462011 (M.P.)
.... RESPONDENTS
(BY SHRI BHARAT SINGH - ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE GENERAL
WITH SHRI PANKAJ DUBEY, SHRI SIDDHARTH SHUKLA AND
SHRI ARYADITYA SINGH - ADVOCATES)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reserved on : 19.01.2024
Pronounced on : 06.02.2024
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
These writ appeals having been heard and reserved for orders,
coming on for pronouncement this day, Hon'ble Shri Justice Vishal
Mishra passed the following:
ORDER
These writ appeals have been filed challenging the common
order dated 26.12.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in
dismissing Writ Petitions No.28558 of 2023, 29048 of 2023 and 29060
of 2023. As the question of fact and law involved herein are similar,
they were heard together and are being disposed off by this common
order.
2. In order to effectively address the issues involved in the said writ
petitions, the facts relevant for adjudication of the present case are
being culled out and taken from WA No.80 of 2024 arising out of the
order passed in WP No.28558 of 2023 (Rajendra Devidas Mandaokar
vs State of M.P. and others).
3. The aforesaid writ petition was filed challenging the order dated
05.04.2022 passed by respondents No.3 to 10, order dated 29.04.2022
(additional charge sheet), order dated 26.10.2023 issued by respondents
No.3 and 4 in File No.Ref./CEDMAP/EDS/2023/205, order dated
27.04.2022 passed by respondent No.8 in File No.Ref./CEDMAP
/EDS/060, order dated 01.07.2023 and consequential action taken by
respondents No.3 and 4 in File No. Ref./CEDMAP/EDS/2023/112 and
order dated 11.10.2023 issued by respondent No.1 in File
No.1873/2023/1/65.
4. The record indicates that on 05.04.2022, a charge sheet was
issued to the petitioner. Challenge to the same is made on the ground
that the same has been issued at the dictates of committee members
who had no jurisdiction whatsoever under the Centre for
Entrepreneurship Development Madhya Pradesh (for brevity
"CEDMAP") Service Rules and Regulations. The active participation
of the committee members in issuance of memorandum of charge sheet
renders it void ab initio. The competent authority for issuance of the
charge sheet being Chairman, was nowhere involved in the matter and
the charge sheet has been issued under the signature of the Executive
Director who is not the competent authority. Therefore, the writ petition
was filed.
5. The petitioner also challenged the supplementary charge sheet
dated 29.04.2022 on similar grounds. It is argued that the manner in
which the supplementary charges are framed is unknown to law. The
petitioner further assailed sustainability of the order dated 27.04.2022
as well as the communication dated 05.05.2022 by which request of the
petitioner for supply of certain documents accompanied with the
request for appointing defence assistant was turned down. The same is
in flagrant violation of principles of natural justice and doctrine of fair
play. The appeal against the order dated 11.10.2023 was rejected by the
authorities. The petitioner further challenged the sustainability of the
communication dated 26.10.2023 issued by the respondent No.2 by
which as many as 35 charges were communicated to him. It is argued
that since the departmental enquiry was already initiated in 2022,
therefore, such an action of issuance of further charges vide
communication dated 26.10.2023 is unsustainable. It is further argued
that the entire departmental proceedings are the outcome of biasness
because the appellant was instrumental in supply the information which
resulted in registration of an FIR against the respondent No.3/4.
Therefore, in a vindictive manner, the petitioner has been made a
scapegoat in the matter and the charge sheets have been issued to him.
Earlier a writ petition being WP No.7852 of 2022 (Rajendra Mandaokar
vs State of M.P. and others) was filed against the order of suspension.
However, as the order was revoked, the petition was dismissed being
rendered infructuous vide order dated 04.07.2022. The writ court has
failed to consider an important aspect of the matter that the regulations
namely The Centre For Entrepreneurship Development Madhya
Pradesh (CEDMP) Staff Regulations, 1991 have been framed for
CEDMAP. Rule 6 provides for composition of Governing Body. Rule 8
stipulates that the State Government Secretary of the Department of
Commerce and Industries shall be the Chairman of the Governing Body
of the Centre. Rule 11 provides for powers and functions of the
Governing Body. It provides that the general superintendence,
management and control of the affairs of the Centre shall vest in the
Governing Body. Chapter II(I) provides for classification of staff, in
which employees from basic pay of Rs.5100/- and above, the
competent authority is 'Chairman' and Appellate Authority is
'Governing Body'. Chapter IV deals with conduct, discipline and
appeal. Rule 55 deals with 'misconduct' and Rule 56 deals with
'imposition of penalties'. The procedure for imposition of major
penalties are set out in Rule 57.
6. It is the case of the appellant that in pursuance to the meeting of
the Governing Body held on 28.09.2012, revision of pay and
classification of employees have been proposed and the same was duly
approved. The employees were classified into four categories i.e. from
Grade Pay of Rs.6500/- and above (Group-I); from Grade Pay of
Rs.5000/- and above but less than Rs.6500/- (Group-II); from Grade
Pay of Rs.3500/- and above but less than Rs.5000/- (Group-III) and
from Grade Pay below Rs.3500/- (Group-IV). The appellant's pay scale
was revised from Rs.8000 - 13500 to Rs.15600 - 39100 + 5400 (GP)
w.e.f. 01.10.2013. The same is evident from communication dated
17.01.2014. Thus, the appellant's existing grade pay is Rs.5400 which
is lower than Rs.6500/- and as such, he falls within Group II and the
competent authority to initiate departmental enquiry against the
appellant is the Chairman for Group I and Group II employees and not
the Executive Director. Hence, the very issuance of the charge sheet
against the appellant is per se illegal.
7. On being noticed, the respondents No.2, 3 and 5 have filed their
reply pointing out the fact that the petitioner was originally appointed
as a computer programmer way back on 17.06.1997 and presently he is
working on the same post. He falls in category (V) of the groups
defined under the definition. In the instant case, the charge sheet has
been issued by the Executive Director who is the competent authority.
The petitioner was having the charge of Nodal Officer (Computer
Programme) in the manpower section where he has committed serious
irregularities and huge misappropriation of funds causing serious
financial loss to the organization, therefore, he was subjected to
departmental enquiry. He was placed under suspension. According to
the respondents, the total loss caused to CEDMAP was approximately
of Rs.9,54,21,957/-, therefore, the charge sheet was issued to the
petitioner and inquiry officer has been appointed in terms of the rules
and with the approval of the Chairman. The charge sheet and list of
documents were provided to the petitioner along with covering letter
dated 26.10.2023 which is suppressed by him. The requirement in
terms of Rule 57 of the Regulations was followed by the authorities and
there is no element of biasness.
8. It is submitted that it is only a charge sheet which has been issued
to the petitioner which is put to challenge and as per the settled
proposition of law, the challenge to charge sheet under Article 226 of
the Constitution is not maintainable in view of the law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs Kunisetty
Satyanarayana reported in (2006) 12 SCC 28. Even otherwise, in the
previous round of litigation, the petitioner-Rajendra Mandaokar himself
claimed that Executive Director is the competent authority which is
reflected from the documents filed by him. The writ court has rightly
assessed the matter and dismissed the same.
9. It is further seen from the records that in pursuance to the order
dated 24.11.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge, an affidavit has
been filed by the respondents on 28.11.2023 pointing out the fact that
earlier charge sheet dated 05.04.2022 and supplementary charge sheet
29.04.2022 have been replaced with a relevant charge sheet dated
26.10.2023 and after issuance of a new charge sheet, earlier charge
sheets issued on 05.04.2022 and 29.04.2022 have lost their
significance. It was fairly conceded that the charge sheet dated
05.04.2022 and 29.04.2022 have been given a decent burial and they
will never be considered in future. The factum of competency of the
authority was taken note of by the writ court. The petitioner has tried to
project himself to be under the grade pay of Rs.5400/- and falling under
Group II employees. The grade pay of the employees was revised from
time to time but there was no corresponding amendment in the
classification of the staff as provided in the service rules and
regulations of the CEDMAP. The record indicates that the petitioner
was placed in the grade pay of Rs.5400/-. Merely because he has been
placed in the grade pay of Rs.5400/- does not entitle him to be an
employee of Grade II in absence of any amendment in the classification
of the staff. The petitioner's stand that the departmental charge sheet
has been issued by an officer higher in rank to the disciplinary authority
is of no help to the petitioner in view of the settled proposition of law
that if the disciplinary authority is lower in rank to that of the authority
who has issued the charge sheet, the punishment can always be
imposed by the disciplinary authority and it is not necessary to go into
the aspect that who has issued the charge sheet in the matter. For this,
reference may be made to the following observations made by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs Hasmukhbhai
Hirabhai Rana reported in (2006) 12 SCC 373, particularly in para 7
thereof :
"7. There is no dispute that the departmental proceeding can
be initiated by a person lower in rank than the appointing
authority. But the final order can be passed only by the
appointing authority or an authority higher than it. The law
relating to initiation (sic of disciplinary proceeding) by a
person lower in rank than the authority competent to pass final
order has been the subject-matter of adjudication in many
cases. (See State of M.P. v. Shardul Singh (1970) 1 SCC 108
and State of U.P. v. Chandrapal Singh [(2003) 4 SCC 670."
10. It is submitted that the Executive Director being the controlling
authority of the petitioner was well within its jurisdiction to issue the
charge sheet to the petitioner in the light of the judgment passed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Inspector General of Police vs
Thavasiappan reported in (1996) 2 SCC 145. The learned writ court has
considered all the relevant aspects of the matter and has dismissed the
writ petitions. On these grounds, prayer is made to dismiss the writ
appeals.
11. Heard learned counsels of the parties and perused the record.
12. The sole question for consideration before this Court is as to
whether the charge sheet has been issued by the competent authority or
not?
13. It is the case of the petitioner himself that he was initially
inducted in the respondent-department as a computer programmer way
back on 17.06.1997 and presently he is on the same post. In terms of
the decision taken by the Governing Body in its 63 rd meeting held on
18.09.2023, the appellant's pay scale was revised from Rs.8000 -
13500 to Rs.15600 - 39100 + 5400 (GP) w.e.f. 01.10.2023 and the
same is evident from the communication dated 17.01.2014. It is argued
that the competent authority of the petitioner for initiating the
departmental enquiry is the Chairman and the appellate authority is
Governing Body. For which, the appellant has drawn attention of this
Court to Classification of Staff in terms of Chapter II(I) of the
Regulations. However, the fact remains that whether the classification
of staff in the department has been amended at any point of time could
not be pointed out by the appellant.
14. The question raised by the petitioner regarding competency of
the authority was considered by the writ court in paragraph 24 of the
impugned order wherein it was clearly mentioned that grade pay of the
employees of the respondent-department was revised from time to time
but there was no corresponding amendment in classification of staff as
provided in Service Rules and Regulations of CEDMAP. Merely
because the petitioner is placed in a particular grade pay does not
entitle him to be placed in Grade-I or II.
15. The counsel appearing for the respondents has drawn attention of
this Court to Rule 27 of the Regulations which deals with "disciplinary
authorities". It reads as under :
"27. Disciplinary Authorities: (1) The Governing Body or the
Executive Director authorised by a Resolution of the
Governing Body shall be the disciplinary authority for
employees belonging to employees Group I and II.
(2) The Executive Director shall be the disciplinary authority
for the rest of the employees.
NOTE: Disciplinary authority means and includes an authority
competent to Centre departmental inquiries and/or impose any
of the punishments specified in Regulation 26 above."
16. A reading of the aforesaid rule makes it clear that the Executive
Director shall be the disciplinary authority for the rest of the employees
except those employees belonging to Group I and Group II for which
the Governing Body or the Executive Director is authorized by a
resolution of the Governing Body. There is no such resolution placed
on record to show that Chairman or Governing Body has been
authorized to be a disciplinary authority insofar as the petitioner's case
is concerned. Therefore, if Rule 27 is taken note of then the Executive
Director shall be the disciplinary authority for the rest of the
employees. The petitioner falls under the category of the rest of the
employees as there is no subsequent classification which could be
pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner. In view whereof, it can
safely be said that the Executive Director who has issued the charge
sheet to the petitioner is the competent authority for issuance of the
charge sheet. The aforesaid aspect was considered by the learned writ
court. The writ court has further gone to the extent of holding that even
if it is presumed for the sake of argument that the charge sheet has been
issued by the incompetent authority, then also the same will not cause
any prejudice to the petitioner because the disciplinary authority can
always look into the merits of the matter and pass penalty order. It is
not the case of the petitioner that the disciplinary proceedings have
been carried out by an incompetent authority.
17. It is well-settled principle of law that a writ petition challenging
the charge sheet is not maintainable. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Kunisetty Satyanarayana (supra) has held as under :
"13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that
ordinarily no writ lies against a charge sheet or show-cause
notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board vs.
Ramesh Kumar Singh and others JT 1995 (8) SC 331, Special
Director and another vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and another
AIR 2004 SC 1467, Ulagappa and others vs. Divisional
Commissioner, Mysore and others 2001 (10) SCC 639, State of
U.P. vs. Brahm Datt Sharma and another AIR 1987 SC 943
etc."
18. In the case of Jagdish Baheti vs High Court of M.P. reported in
(2015) 3 MP LJ 172, a Division Bench of this Court has held as under :
"7. In the case of Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Prabhash
Chandra Mirdha, (2012) 11 SCC 565, the Supreme Court has
held that ordinarily a writ petition does not lie against the
charge-sheet or a show cause notice as it does not give rise to
any cause of action unless the same has been issued by an
authority not competent to initiate departmental proceedings.
The Supreme Court has laid down the law in this regard by
relying on several previous decision, in the following terms:--
"10. Ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a charge
sheet or show cause notice for the reason that it does not give
rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse
order which affects the right of any party unless the same has
been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence to
do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is infringed. In
fact, charge sheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is
only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise
adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance
and cause of action. Thus, a charge sheet or show cause notice
in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed
by the Court. (Vide : State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma,
[(1987) 2 SCC 179]; Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing
Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh, [(1996) 1 SCC 327]; Ulagappa
v. Di v. Commr., Mysore, [(2001) 10 SCC 639]; Special
Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, [(2004) 3 SCC 440]; and
Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, [(2006) 12 SCC
28)].
11. In State of Orissa v. Sangram Keshari Misra, [(2010) 13
SCC 311], this Court held that normally a charge sheet is not
quashed prior to the conclusion of the enquiry on the ground
that the facts stated in the charge are erroneous for the reason
that correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the
disciplinary authority. (See also : Union of India v. Upendra
Singh, [(1994) 3 SCC 357)].
12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect
that chargesheet cannot generally be a subject matter of
challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the
delinquent unless it is established that the same has been
issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary
proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the
charge sheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a
premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not
liable to be quashed on the grounds that proceedings had been
initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a
reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the
delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a
relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing
the proceedings.
...
23. We are of the considered opinion that in view of the law
laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to in the
preceding paragraphs, this Court cannot go into the aforesaid
contention of the petitioner which are based on seriously
disputed question of fact which cannot be enquired into in
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We,
however, make it clear that the petitioner would be at liberty to
raise all these objections and grounds in the departmental
enquiry that is pending against him."
19. In view of the law laid down in the above quoted decisions, the
reliefs prayed for by the appellant cannot be acceded to.
20. The appellant has also raised a ground of biasness by the
authorities on the ground that he was instrumental in supplying the
information which has resulted into registration of an FIR being Crime
No.365 of 2023 lodged by one Rajesh Mishra for the offences under
Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC at Police Station
Maharanapratap Nagar District Bhopal against the respondents No.3
and 4. Therefore, in a vindictive manner, the impugned action has been
taken against the appellant. The aforesaid ground was dealt with the
learned writ court in paragraph 31 of the impugned order. The learned
writ court has further observed that the writ petitioner in WP No.7852
of 2022 himself has claimed that the Executive Director is the
disciplinary authority. Now in the subsequent petition, the petitioner
cannot take a somersault and resile from the earlier statement.
21. In a case titled as Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. vs Girja
Shankar Pant reported in (2001) 1 SCC 182 where Managing Director
had passed an order withdrawing the duties of the General Manager,
there were violations of principles of natural justice and adequate
opportunity was not granted to the said officer to defend himself and
permission to engage a Presenting Officer was not granted and there
were allegations of personal bias, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
as under:
"10. The word "bias" in popular English parlance stands
included within the attributes and broader purview of the word
"malice", which in common acceptation means and implies
"spite" or "ill-will" (Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th Edn.,
Vol. 3) and it is now well settled that mere general statements
will not be sufficient for the purposes of indication of ill-will.
There must be cogent evidence available on record to come to
the conclusion as to whether in fact there was existing a bias
which resulted in the miscarriage of justice".
22. In the case of National Institute of Technology vs U. Dinakar
reported as (2014) 13 SCC 180, it has been held as under :
"25. The bias or mala fide plea is generally raised by an
interested party, the Court cannot draw any conclusion unless
allegations are substantiated beyond doubt. In this connection,
one may refer to the decision in M.V. Thimmaiah v. UPSC
(2008) 2 SCC 119. So far as the allegation of mala fide against
Dr Balaveera Reddy is concerned, though he was impleaded as
a party, no specific allegation was made to substantiate such
allegation. .."
23. Looking to the serious allegations levelled against each one of
the petitioners and the well settled position of law on the subject, the
ground of biasness has no legs to stand. It is for the authorities to look
into the matter and after an enquiry to arrive at a definite conclusion.
Mere stating that the FIR has been lodged against the Executive
Director cannot be a sole ground for quashment of the charge sheet on
the ground of biasness. The petitioner will be having full opportunity to
the reply to the charge sheet and to participate in the departmental
proceedings.
24. The ground taken by the petitioner that he was not granted
opportunity to file his response to the charge sheet is incorrect because
the respondents have produced a letter dated 26.10.2023 pointing out
the fact that the inquiry officer and the presenting officer has been
appointed in the matter before filing and considering the reply of the
petitioner to the charges levelled against the him. The writ court has
already permitted the petitioner to file reply to the charge sheet latest by
15.01.2024 which shall be considered by the competent authority i.e.
Executive Director and thereafter to proceed in the matter, if required.
25. Under these circumstances, none of the grounds raised by the
petitioner are sustainable. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in
an intra-court appeal is limited unless the findings of the learned Single
Judge are perverse. We see no reason to interfere with the impugned
order as the learned writ court upon due consideration of the
submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties has
dismissed the writ petitions. Hence, no relief can be extended to the
appellants.
26. The writ appeals sans merit and are accordingly dismissed. No
order as to costs.
(RAVI MALIMATH) (VISHAL MISHRA)
CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE
VV
