Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 3025 MP
Judgement Date : 20 February, 2023
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
CRA No. 1330 of 2022
(SHIBBU @ TAUFIQ AHMED AND OTHERS Vs THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH)
CRA No. 1162 of 2022
(RAHUL @ TULSIRAM AND ANOTHER Vs THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH)
CRA No. 1718 of 2022
(UMESH SIHOTE ALIAS TEEPU Vs THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH)
Dated : 20-02-2023
Per Virender Singh, J.
Shri Anil Khare - Senior Advocate with Shri Priyank Agrawal for the appellants in CRA No.1330 of 2022.
Shri Ashish K. Tiwari - Advocate for the appellant in CRA No.1162 of 2022.
Ms. Anita Kaithwas - Advocate for the appellant in CRA No.1718 of 2022.
Shri Piyush Jain, Govt. Advocate for the respondent/State.
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Heard on :
(i) I.A. No.3409/2022 which is an application filed under Section 389(1) of CrPC for suspension of sentence on behalf of all the applicants No.1 to 6 namely Shibbu @ Taufiq Ahmed, Lallu @ Ashok, Shashikant @ Shashik, Sikander Pathrot, Suresh @ Gora and Sonu @ Sohan in CRA No.1330/2022.
(ii) I.A. No.1849/2022 which is an application filed under Section 389(1) of CrPC for suspension of sentence on behalf of both the applicants No.1 and 2 namely Rahul @ Tulsiram and Rahul @ Nitin @ Binti in CRA No.1162/2022.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 2/21/2023 10:14:39 AM
(iii) I.A. No.2924/2022 and I.A. No.13614/2022 which are applications filed under Section 389(1) of CrPC for suspension of sentence on behalf of applicant No.2 Sanjay @ Sonu Sihote and applicant No.1 Umesh Sihote @ Teepu respectively in CRA No.1718/2022.
2. Leading the arguments, learned Senior Counsel Shri Khare founded his submissions around the fact that in their deferred cross- examination which was recorded after about four years of recording of their examination-in-chief, star witnesses of prosecution viz. Vishal (PW1), Bhupendra (PW3) and Lokesh (PW5) have entirely not corroborated the prosecution case and the accused-applicants cannot be faulted with for this deferment as that was deferred by the trial Court while considering their (applicants') application under Section 231 of CrPC to grant them permission to cross-examine all the eyewitnesses together. Shri Khare further referred to the several paragraphs of cross- examination of aforesaid eyewitnesses and placed reliance upon the decisions rendered in State of Kerala vs Rasheed (2019) 13 SCC 297, Vikramjit Singh @ Vicky vs State of Punjab (2006) 12 SCC 306 and Babbu alias Babulal vs State of M.P. 1999 SCC Online MP
3. In the judgment of Rasheed (supra), the Apex Court, in para 23, explained the factors to be kept in mind while considering an application under Section 231(2) of CrPC. The said para reads thus -
23. While deciding an application under Section 231(2) CrPC, a balance must be struck between the rights of the accused, and the prerogative of the prosecution to lead evidence. The following factors must be kept in consideration:
(i) possibility of undue influence on witness(es);
(ii) possibility of threats to witness(es);
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(iii) possibility that non-deferral would enable subsequent witnesses giving evidence on similar facts to tailor their testimony to circumvent the defence strategy;
(iv) possibility of loss of memory of the witness(es) whose examination-in-chief has been completed;
(v) occurrence of delay in the trial, and the non- availability of witnesses, if deferral is allowed, in view of Section 309(1) CrPC. These factors are illustrative for guiding the exercise of discretion by a Judge under Section 231(2) CrPC.
4. In the judgment of Vikramjit Singh @ Vicky and Babbu @ Babulal (above), the Apex Court as well as learned Single Judge of this Court considering hostility of the star witnesses after supporting the prosecution case in the examination-in-chief opined that when two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused has to be followed. Shri Khare referred to paragraphs 8, 12, 15 & 22 of Vikramjit Singh's case and para 9 of Babbu @ Babulal (above).
5. Arguments advanced by learned counsel representing the other applicants are more or less the same except that applicants namely Shibbu @ Taufiq, Sikandar Pathrot, Suresh @ Gora, Sonu @ Sohan and Rahul Pathrot are not named in the FIR.
6. The prosecution has opposed the applications.
7. We have heard the rival parties at length and perused the record.
8. The incident, the assault, the injuries to the deceased as well as to the star witnesses viz. Vishal (PW1), Bhupendra (PW3) and Lokesh (PW5) so also their presence on the spot has not been disputed. In their examination-in-chief, all three eyewitnesses named supra have entirely supported the incident as well as involvement of the accused applicants in the alleged incident. Their deferred cross-examination was recorded after about four years. Careful reading of their cross-examination
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reflects that no cause, or to more precisely say, just and proper cause has been assigned by them for taking a U-turn. In their deferred cross examination, the said witnesses have stated that they were at some distance and due to dark, they could not identify the assailants but unchallenged prosecution case is that before assault, the assailants had a talk with the author of the FIR viz. Lokesh (PW5) and that most of them either belong to the same locality or were known to the witnesses even prior to the incident. Lokesh (PW5) has also deposed on this fact in the Court and his testimony on this point has not been substantially challenged.
9. It was a preplanned or premeditated attack made with full preparation and intention to dissuade the complainant to disclose truth before the Court. They committed another offence to screen the offenders from legal punishment for some crime committed earlier.
10. To better understand as to how to deal with such a situation, in this regard, we would like to refer to the landmark decision rendered in Khujji vs. State of M.P., (1991) 3 SCC 627, para 6 whereof is most relevant wherein the Supreme Court has dealt with almost similar situation as exists in the present case. Para 6 reads thus -
"6. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the contesting parties. The fact that an incident of the type alleged by the prosecution occurred on May 20, 1978 at about 8.20 p.m. is not seriously disputed nor is the location of the incident doubted. The evidence of PW 3 Kishan Lal and PW 4 Ramesh came to be rejected by the trial court because they were declared hostile to the prosecution by the learned Public Prosecutor as they refused to identify the appellant and his companions in the dock as the assailants of the deceased. But counsel for the State is right when he submits that the evidence of a witness, declared hostile, is not wholly effaced
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from the record and that part of the evidence which is otherwise acceptable can be acted upon. It seems to be well settled by the decisions of this Court -- Bhagwan Singh v.
State of Haryana (1976) 1 SCC 389, Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa (1976) 4 SCC 233 and Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka (1980) 1 SCC 30 - that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross- examined him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent their version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. In the present case the evidence of the aforesaid two eye-witnesses was challenged by the prosecution in cross-examination because they refused to name the accused in the dock as the assailants of the deceased. We are in agreement with the submission of the learned counsel for the State that the trial court made no effort to scrutinise the evidence of these two witnesses even in regard to the factum of the incident. On a careful consideration of their evidence it becomes crystal clear that PW 4 had accompanied the deceased in PW 3's rickshaw to the place of incident. In the incident that occurred at the location pointed out by the prosecution, PW 4 sustained an injury. His presence in the company of the deceased at the place of occurrence, therefore, cannot be doubted. Immediately after the incident within less than an hour thereof PW 4 went to the police station and lodged the first information report. It is true that the first information report is not substantive evidence but the fact remains that immediately after the incident and before there was any extraneous intervention PW 4 went to the police station and narrated the incident. The first information report is a detailed document and it is not possible to believe that the investigating officer imagined those details and prepared the document Ex. P-3. The detailed narration about the incident in the first information report goes to show that the subsequent attempt of PW 4 to disown the document, while admitting his signature thereon, is a shift for reasons best known to PW 4. We are, therefore, not prepared to accept the criticism that the version regarding the incident is the result of some fertile thinking on the part of the investigating officer. We are satisfied, beyond any manner of doubt, that PW 4 had gone to the police station and had lodged the first information report. To the extent he
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has been contradicted with the facts stated in the first information report shows that he has tried to resile from his earlier version regarding the incident. So also the presence of PW 3 at the scene of occurrence cannot be doubted once the presence of PW 4 is accepted. The trial court did not go so far as to say that both these witnesses were not present at the scene of occurrence or that PW 4 was not injured in the incident but refused to look into their evidence treating their evidence as non-est on their being declared hostile by the prosecution. We think that the approach of the trial court insofar as the evidence of these two witnesses is concerned, is legally unacceptable. The High Court has not endeavoured to assess their evidence since it thought that the conviction of the appellant could be sustained on the evidence of PW 1 Komal Chand. We are satisfied on a close scrutiny of the evidence of the aforesaid two eye-witnesses, PWs 3 and 4, that the deceased and PW 4 came to the place of occurrence in the rickshaw pulled by PW 3. On reaching the spot where the incident occurred they were surrounded by certain persons who were lying in wait and a murderous assault was launched on them. The first to receive the injury was PW 4. When they gauged the intention of their assailants they jumped out of the rickshaw and both ran in different directions. The appellant first tried to chase PW 4 but later he turned to the deceased as he was informed by one of his companions Gopal that the person he was pursuing was not Gulab. Therefore, from the evidence of these two eye-witnesses the fact that the deceased and PW 4 came to the place of occurrence in the rickshaw of PW 3 is established. So also the fact that on their reaching the place of occurrence they were surrounded by some persons and an assault was launched on them in which PW 4 received an injury and Gulab died is clearly established. The only area where they have not supported the prosecution and have resiled from their earlier statements is regarding the identity of the assailants. We will deal with that part of the evidence a little later but the fact remains that the deceased had received three injuries as narrated by PW 12 Dr Nagpal, to which he succumbed on the spot. Once these facts are accepted as proved, the only question which really survives for consideration is whether the appellant was an assailant of the deceased."
Signature Not Verified Signed by: VINOD VISHWAKARMA Signing time: 2/21/2023 10:14:39 AM
11. The judgment of Khujji (supra) has not been considered in both the decisions (Vikramjit and Babbu [above]) referred to by the ld. Senior Counsel and we have noticed that both the decisions referred to by the applicants are clearly distinguishable on facts.
12. Upon consideration of the evidence produced by the prosecution before the trial Court as well as the peculiar facts and circumstances pointed out by the respective counsel of the different applicants, we are of the considered view that no case of suspension of sentence in favour of any of the applicants is made out.
13. Consequently, all the aforesaid I.As are rejected.
(Sheel Nagu) (Virender Singh)
JUDGE JUDGE
vinod
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD
VISHWAKARMA
Signing time: 2/21/2023
10:14:39 AM
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