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Sanjay vs State Of M.P.
2022 Latest Caselaw 8386 MP

Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 8386 MP
Judgement Date : 24 June, 2022

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sanjay vs State Of M.P. on 24 June, 2022
Author: Subodh Abhyankar
                          1
                                          Cr.A. No.712/2007

      IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

                     AT INDORE
                      BEFORE

      HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUBODH ABHYANKAR

                         &

  HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SATYENDRA KUMAR SINGH

              ON THE 24th OF JUNE, 2022

           CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.712 OF 2007

Between:-
SANJAY S/O VISHNU PRASAD KUSHWAHA
AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS
OCCUPATION: CYCLE SHOP
R/O SHOP 51, SABNIS BAG
INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
                                          .....APPELLANT
(BY SHRI LOKESH BHATNAGAR, ADVOCATE)

AND

STATE OF M.P.
THROUGH P.S. AERODROME
INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
                                       .....RESPONDENT

(BY SHRI A. S. SISODIA, GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR STATE)

Cr.A. No.712/2007

Reserved on : 11.02.2022

Delivered on : 24 .06.2022

This appeal coming on for judgment this day, Hon'ble Shri

Justice Satyendra Kumar Singh passed the following:

JUDG MENT

The appellant has preferred this criminal appeal under Section

374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) [in short

"Cr.P.C."] against the judgment dated 25.03.2007 passed by the 13 th

Additional Sessions Judge, Indore (M.P.) in S.T. No.50/2006, whereby the

appellant has been convicted under Sections 364, 302 and 201 read with 34

of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short "IPC") and sentenced as under :-

   S.      Conviction                         Sentence
                           Imprisonment          Fine      Additional
   No.
                                               amount     imprisonment

                                                           in default of

                                                           payment of

                                                               fine

                                                              Cr.A. No.712/2007

     1   302 of IPC         Life                Rs.10,000/- 6 months RI

                            imprisonment
     2   364 of IPC         10 years RI         Rs.2,000/-    3 months RI
     3   201 of IPC         3 years RI          Rs.1,000/-    1 month RI


2.       Prosecution story, in brief is as follows :-

            (i)       That on 03.10.2005, at about 10.00 PM, while

complainant Satyanarayan was standing at square near his

residence 38/2, Jaibhawani Nagar, Indore alongwith his friends

Balli Kushwah, Pappu Ghatge, Pappu Sharma, Manoj Solanki

and brother deceased Kamal making collection for

preparations of Nav Durga puja, appellant Sanjay and co-

accused Mukesh came there and took the deceased Kamal with

them on the motorcycle, which appellant Sanjay was driving

whom deceased referred as his brother-in-law. Deceased

Kamal thereafter did not return home. Next day, on being

enquired about the whereabouts of the deceased, appellant

Sanjay informed that he dropped Kamal outside his house on

the same night. When deceased did not return till late night,

Cr.A. No.712/2007

then at about 23.55 hours, missing person's report (Exhibit-

P/11) was lodged by Rakesh at police station Aerodrome,

Indore. Thereafter, on 05.10.2005, Satynarayan made a

written complaint (Exhibit-P/1) to SHO Police Station

Aerodrome, Indore against the appellant and co-accused

Mukesh on the basis of suspicion as deceased had a fight with

the appellant some 7-8 days prior to the date of incident and

co-accused Mukesh on being inquired about the whereabouts

of the deceased told different version than that of appellant that

he dropped the deceased outside his in-law's house. S.I. Ashok

Rangshahi, on the basis of aforesaid written complaint, lodged

FIR (Exhibit-P/2) against the appellant as well as co-accused

Mukesh for the offences punishable under Section 364 read

with 34 of IPC.

(ii) During investigation, on 06.10.2005, ASI P. S.

Chouhan went to the place of incident, prepared spot map

(Exhibit-P/3), recorded the statements of prosecution witnesses

and made a search for the dead-body of the deceased Kamal.

Cr.A. No.712/2007

On 08.10.2005, S.I. Ashok Rangshahi arrested the appellant

Sanjay, as per arrest memo (Exhibit-P/7) and co-accused

Mukesh, as per arrest memo (Exhibit-P/8). He recorded their

memorandum statements Exhibit-P/11 and P/10 respectively

and thereafter, seized a clutch wire, a broken silver chain, a

pearl necklace, a leather purse containing photographs of

appellant Sanjay and deceased's wife Babitabai alongwith

appellant's license and an amount of Rs.170/- cash on their

instance from Gajarghas near Ralamandal Hills, Indore as per

seizure memo (Exhibit-P/6). On the same day, he also seized a

black coloured rubber sandal on the instance of appellant from

a place near Talainaka, Mhow Phata as per seizure memo

(Exhibit-P/5) and a nylon rope from his house as per seizure

memo (Exhibit-P/4). Identification proceeding was conducted

as per identification memo (Exhibit-P/10) wherein deceased's

brother Ritesh identified the seized broken silver chain and

pearl necklace as the articles of deceased alongwith deceased's

wife photographs. Search of the body of the deceased was

Cr.A. No.712/2007

conducted in Narmada river near Mortakka bridge and also at

Ralamandal Bawdi but the same was not found. After

completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the

Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore who committed the

same to the Court of Sessions Judge, Indore.

(iii) During trial, co-accused Mukesh filed an application

dated 21.02.2006 under Section 307 of Cr.P.C. through jail for

tendering pardon. Learned Trial Court vide order dated

08.03.2006, excluded his trial and directed to record his

statements under Section 307 of Cr.P.C. Thereafter,

statements of co-accused Mukesh were recorded under Section

307 of Cr.P.C. alongwith statements of other prosecution

witnesses.

3. Learned Trial Court considering the material prima-facie

available on record, framed the charges under Sections 364 r/w 34, 302 r/w

34 and 201 r/w 34 of IPC against the appellant, who abjured his guilt and

prayed for trial. In his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.,

the appellant pleaded his false implication in the matter but he did not

Cr.A. No.712/2007

examine any witness in his defense.

4. Learned Trial Court after appreciating the oral as well as

documentary evidence available on record, recorded the findings that

prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant

for the offences punishable under Sections 364, 302 and 201 read with 34

of IPC and sentenced him, as mentioned in para-1 of this judgment. Being

aggrieved with the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence,

appellant has preferred the instant appeal for setting aside the impugned

judgment and discharging him from the charges framed against him.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned

judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is erroneous on both facts and

in law and based on surmises and conjectures. The prosecution has failed

to prove the fact that deceased was subjected to homicidal death as neither

his dead body has been recovered nor anything else is on record to prove

the fact that he had been murdered. Prosecution has also failed to prove

the fact that appellant had been carrying any motive to commit the murder

of the deceased. Complainant Satyanarayan (PW-2), Balli @ Mahesh

(PW-3), Manoj (PW-4), Rajesh (PW-7) and Rakesh (P-11) all are

Cr.A. No.712/2007

interested witnesses and none of them have stated anything material about

the incident except that on the date of incident, appellant alongwith co-

accused took the deceased on his motorcycle and deceased was last seen in

the company of the appellant and co-accused. There are so many material

omissions and contradictions in their testimony. Mukesh (PW-1) himself

is an accused in the case and his statements recorded under 307 of Cr.P.C.

are inconsistent on material issues and has not supported the prosecution

case therefore, without any corroborative evidence, only on the basis of

inconsistent last seen evidence, findings with regard to the involvement of

the appellant in the crime is not sustainable thus, by setting aside the

impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellant may

be acquitted from the charges framed against him. Learned counsel for the

appellant has placed reliance on the judgments passed by Hon'ble the Apex

Court in the cases of [Mohd Younus Ali Tarafdar Vs. State of West

Bengal[(2020) 3 SCC 747], Malaichamy and Another Vs. State of Tamil

Nadu [(2019) 17 SCC 568], Basheer Begum Vs. Mohammad Ibrahim

And Others [(2020) 11 SCC 174]

6. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State,

Cr.A. No.712/2007

while supporting the impugned judgment of conviction and order of

sentence submits that the judgment was passed by the Trial Court after

proper appreciation of evidence available on record. Appellant wanted to

marry deceased's wife and was having motive to commit the murder of the

deceased. Prosecution witnesses very well proved that appellant alongwith

co-accused took the deceased last time and Mukesh (PW-1) in his

statement recorded under 307 of Cr.P.C. specifically deposed that

appellant had told him that he threw the deceased into Narmada river from

Mortakka bridge and committed his murder. Therefore, confirming the

impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appeal filed

by the appellant may be dismissed. Learned counsel for the respondent has

placed reliance on the judgments passed by Hon'ble The Apex Court in the

case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Kashi Ram [(2006) 12 SCC 254], Ranjit

Kumar Haldav Vs. State of Sikkim [(2019) 4 SCC 684], Sanatan Naskar

And Another Vs. State of West Bengal [(2010) 8 SCC 249] and Sanjay

Rajak Vs. The State of Bihar (Cr. A. No. 1070 of 2017 decided on

22.07.2019).

Cr.A. No.712/2007

7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

record.

8. In the present case, there is no direct evidence regarding the

involvement of the appellant in the crime. Prosecution case is based on

circumstantial evidence. Factors to be taken into account in adjudication

of cases of circumstantial evidence as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in the case of Anjan Kumar Sarma vs. State of Assam 2017 (4)

SCC 359 are as follows :-

(1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned 'must' or 'should' not and 'may be' established;

(2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not the explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;

(3) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;

(4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be provided; and

(5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the

Cr.A. No.712/2007

innocence of the accused and must shown that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

9. The circumstance relied upon by the prosecution in this case are

(i) motive for the commission of offence,

(ii) the last seen circumstance and

(iii) the recovery of seized articles.

10. Deceased's wife Babitabai (PW-6) deposed that her marriage

with the deceased was solemnized on 23.05.2005 i.e. about four-five

months before the date of incident. She further deposed that her parents

are residents of Sabnis Bag where appellant also resides near her aunt

(Bua) Laxmibai's house. She deposed that she used to go to her Bua's

house where appellant met her occasionally and at that period of moment,

he had told her that he likes her and wanted to marry with her. She further

deposed that after her marriage, appellant used to come to her in-law's

locality Jaibhawani Nagar as the deceased's uncle Tikam Verma's marriage

was solemnized with Sundersingh's daughter who is a resident of Sabnis

Bag and appellant called his daughter as his sister. She deposed that

appellant tried to talk with her at Jaibhawani Nagar also and had told her

Cr.A. No.712/2007

that he still likes her and wanted to marry with her which she refused

straightaway, as she was already married.

11. Laxmimbai (PW-5) has deposed that Babita Bai is her niece,

while appellant is her neighbour and both used to come at her house.

Sundersingh (PW-9) deposed that appellant resides near his house in

Sabnis Bag and called his daughter as sister. He also deposed that his

daughter is married to Tikam Verma (who is uncle of deceased Kamal and

resident of Jaibhawani Nagar) and appellant used to visit his house as well

as his son-in-law Tikam Verma's house. Appellant has not challenged the

aforesaid statements of both the above witnesses therefore, there is no

reason to disbelieve deceased's wife Babitabai's statement that appellant

met with her prior and after her marriage at her Bua Laxmibai's house and

deceased's uncle Tikam Verma's house and had shown her inclination

towards her saying that he likes her and wanted to marry with her. As

Babitabai was married to deceased therefore, learned Trial Court has not

committed any error in finding this fact as proved that appellant was

having motive to commit murder of the deceased so that he can marry with

his wife Babitabai.

Cr.A. No.712/2007

12. Complainant Satyanarayan (PW-2) deposed that on the date of

incident, at about 9.00-10.00 PM, when he alongwith his brother deceased

Kamal was standing at square near his residence making collections for

preparation of Nav Durga puja, appellant alongwith one more accused

came there and called his brother deceased Kamal and thereafter, Kamal

went with them saying that he will return within 1-2 hours. Balli @

Mahesh (P-3), Manoj (PW-4), Rajesh (PW-7), Shyam Sharma (PW-8),

Rakesh (PW-11) and Pappu @ Kailash (PW-12) all have supported his

aforesaid statement and deposed that at the time of incident, they were

present on the spot and appellant alongwith one more accused took the

deceased on his motorcycle in front of them.

13. Complainant Satyanarayan (PW-2) deposed that when his

brother deceased did not return home, next day morning, he asked the

appellant about his whereabouts, then appellant told him that he left the

deceased in front of his house on the same night. He further deposed that

he waited for the deceased till night and thereafter, got his missing person's

report registered through his brother Rakesh at Police Station Aerodrome,

Indore. Rakesh (PW-11) deposed that when his brother deceased did not

Cr.A. No.712/2007

return home, he alongwith his friends and relatives made search for him

and thereafter, in the same night at about 11.00-11.30 PM, lodged missing

person's report (Exhibit-P/11-A) at Police Station Aerodrome, Indore.

14. Complainant Satyanarayan (PW-2) deposed that when his brother

deceased did not return home on the next day also, then on third day i.e. on

05.10.2005, he made a written complaint (Exhibit-P/1) stating therein

suspicion on the appellant and co-accused Mukesh who took the deceased

with them. SHO Ashok Rangshahi (PW-15) deposed that he, on the basis

of above report (Exhibit-P/1) lodged the FIR (Exhibit-P/2) bearing Crime

No.532/2005 at Police Station Aerodrome, Indore against the appellant and

co-accused Mukesh. During trial of the case, co-accused Mukesh moved

an application under Section 307 of Cr.P.C. through jail authorities for

tendering pardon. In pursuance of which, vide order dated 08.03.2006, his

trial was excluded and he was directed to record his statements under

Section 307 of Cr.P.C. thereafter, his statements were recorded.

15. Mukesh (PW-1) in his statements recorded under Section 307 of

Cr.P.C. has deposed that he and appellant both are residents of same

locality Sabnis Bag and on the date of incident i.e. on 03.10.2005, at about

Cr.A. No.712/2007

8.00-8.30 PM, appellant came to his house and took him on his motorcycle

saying that they have to visit Jaibhawani Nagar. He further deposed that

he alongwith appellant went to Jaibhawani Nagar from where appellant

took the deceased also on his motorcycle and all of them went towards

Kaalaghoda. In this way, statements of the complainant Satyanarayan

(PW-2) with regard to the fact that on the date of incident, appellant

alongwith co-accused took the deceased on his motorcycle, thereafter

deceased did not return home are supported by not only the statements of

prosecution witnesses Balli @ Mahesh (PW-3), Manoj (PW-4), Rajesh

(PW-7), Shyam Sharma (PW-8), Rakesh (P-11), Kailash @ Pappu (PW-

12), but also from the statements of accomplice witness Mukesh (PW-1)

who himself moved an application under Section 307 of Cr.P.C. for

tendering pardon and also by the missing person's report (Exhibit-P/11-

A), written complaint (Exhibit-P/1) and FIR (Exhibit-P/2) therefore, there

is no reason to disbelieve the aforesaid evidence of last seen circumstance

produced by the prosecution. Hence, it is established that on the date of

incident, at about 9.30-10.30 PM, appellant along with one more accused

took the deceased on his motorcycle whereafter, deceased did not return

Cr.A. No.712/2007

home.

16. It has vehemently been argued on behalf of the appellant that

Mukesh (PW-1) in para 22,23 and 24 of his cross-examination specifically

stated that appellant and he himself had not taken the deceased and all the

earlier statements made by him with regard to the incident were given

under pressure. It is further argued that Mukesh has not been granted

pardon also therefore his statements cannot be treated as evidence of an

accomplice and should not be taken into consideration.

17. It is true that in the instant case Mukesh (PW-1) has not been

granted pardon as he after stating the incident in his statement recorded on

08.03.2006 under Section 307 of Cr.P.C. stated in para 22 of his cross-

examination recorded on 15.02.2007 i.e. after about a year that earlier he

had made statements under pressure. In the case of Somasundaram Vs.

State [(2016)16 SCC 355], Hon'ble the Apex Court referring decision

passed in Laxmipat Chorariya Vs. State of Maharashtra[AIR 1968 SC

938] has held that the mere fact that pardon has not been granted by a

Court of law does not make an accomplice cease being an accomplice.

Relevant paras are as follows:

Cr.A. No.712/2007

64. From a perusal of the evidence of PW-10 and PW-

11, it becomes clear that they are accomplice witnesses. It is

also clear that the case of the prosecution heavily rests on

their evidence. Before we proceed to examine the culpability

of A-3 and A-4, it is important for us to examine the

reliability of the evidence of the above accomplices. Section

133 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which deals with the

testimony of accomplice witness, reads as under:

"133. an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice."

65. The High Court, in the impugned judgment and order also considered this aspect at some length. After adverting to judgments of both the Privy Council as well as this Court, the High Court concluded as under:

"29. A deep study on the above approach in law as to the evidentiary value of the deposition of an accomplice, the following settled principles culminate; that an evidence of an accomplice need not necessarily be rejected, that the evidence requires corroboration in material particulars as well as the corroboration of the evidence connecting or tend to connect the accused with the crime, that such accomplice witness is reliable. If the above tests are satisfied, the evidence of an accomplice can be safely relied upon to hold the accused guilty of the offence. Keeping the above principle in mind,

Cr.A. No.712/2007

the evidence of PW-10 and PW-11 should be considered."

66. In the instant case, PW-10 and PW-11 have not been granted pardon by any Court and have been arrayed as prosecution witnesses. This Court has held that the mere fact that pardon has not been tendered by a court of law does not make an accomplice cease being an accomplice. The learned senior counsel Mr. Basant R. has aptly placed reliance upon the case of Laxmipat Choraria v. State of Maharashtra[9], this Court held as under:

" 7......The word accomplice is ordinarily used in connection with the law of evidence and rarely under the substantive law of crimes. Accomplice evidence denotes evidence of a participant in crime with others.

Section 133 of the Evidence Act makes the accomplice a competent witness against an accused person."

13....The witness was, of course, treated as an accomplice. The evidence of such an accomplice was received with necessary caution in those cases. These cases have all been mentioned in In re Kandaswami Gounder AIR1957Mad727, and it is not necessary to refer to them in detail here. The leading cases are : Queen Emperor v. Mona Puna I.L.R. 16 Bom. 661, Banu Singh v.

Emperor I.L.R. 33 Cal. 1353, Keshav Vasudeo Kortikar v. Emperor I.L.R. 59 Bom. 355, Empress v. Durant I.L.R. 23 Bom. 213, Akhoy Kumar Mookerjee v. Emperor I.L.R. 45 Cal. 720, A.V. Joseph v. Emperor I.L.R. 3 Rang. 11, Amdumiyan and others v. Crown I.L.R. 1937 Nag. 315, Gallagher v. Emperor I.L.R. 54 Cal. 52, and Emperor v. Har Prasad, Bhargava I.L.R. 45 All. 226. In these cases

Cr.A. No.712/2007

(and several others cited and relied upon in them) it has been consistently held that the evidence of an accomplice may be read although he could have been tried jointly with the accused. In some of these cases the evidence was received although the procedure of s. 337, Criminal Procedure Code was applicable but was not followed. It is not necessary to deal with this question any further because the consensus of opinion in India is that the competency of an accomplice is not destroyed because he could have been tried jointly with the accused but was not and was instead made to give evidence in the case." (emphasis laid by this Court)

18. In view of the aforesaid legal position, it is clear that statements

of Mukesh (PW-1) can be relied upon subject to the same test of reliability

of the evidence of an accomplice. Mukesh (PW-1) in para 23 of his cross-

examination has admitted his signatures on the application dated

29.12.2005 filed by him through jail authorities for making him approvar

in the case. He also admitted that he again filed second application dated

21.02.2006 through his counsel for the aforesaid purposes. He in his

statements recorded on 08.03.2006 u/S 307 of Cr.P.C. stated about the

incident thereafter on 15.02.2007 i.e. after about a year, all of sudden

during cross-examination, he deposed that his earlier statements were

given by him under pressure , appellant and he himself had not taken the

Cr.A. No.712/2007

deceased on the date of incident. From his aforesaid evidence, it is

apparent that he himself filed applications for making him approvar in the

case and made statements about the incident u/S 307 of Cr.P.C. His

inconsistent statements and silence during examination by the court in

itself sufficient to draw an inference that he changed his earlier version and

was probably win over by the appellant. In these circumstances, his earlier

whole statements made u/S 307 of Cr.P.C. cannot be said to be washed off

and can very well be taken into consideration as corroborative piece of

evidence.

19. Mukesh (PW-1) in his statement recorded u/S 307 of Cr.P.C.

deposed that on the date of incident appellant took him as well as decesed

near Kala ghoda where appellant and deceased consumed liquor thereafter,

appellant took him and deceased near Moretaka bridge, sent him for

bringing prashad and when he returned back, he found deceased missing.

On being asked, appellant told him that he threw the deceased into the

river. As he himself deposed that on the date of incident, he was with the

appellant when he took the deceased on his motorcycle and it has already

been found established from the statements of complainant Satyanarayan

Cr.A. No.712/2007

(PW-1) supported by the statements of not only prosecution witnesses Bali

alias Mahesh (PW-3), Manoj (PW-4), Rajesh(PW-7), Shyam Sharma(PW-

8), Rakesh (PW-11), Kaliash alias Pappu(PW-12) , but also by the

statements of accomplice witness Mukesh (PW-1) and also by the missing

person's report (Ex. P-11) lodged on the date of incident and written

complaint (Ex. P-1) and FIR (Ex. P-2) lodged on next day of the incident

that on the date of incident at about 9:30 -10:30 p.m., appellant alongwith

co-accused took the deceased on his motorcycle whereafter deceased did

not return. In aforesaid circumstances, there is no reasons to disbelieve the

statement made by Mukesh (PW-1) that on the date of incident, he saw the

appellant with the deceased alive together near Mortaka Bridge and

appellant and deceased were seen together alive there also.

20. Complainant Satyanarayan (PW-2) deposed that on the date of

incident, when his brother deceased did not return home next day morning,

he asked appellant about the whereabouts of the deceased then appellant

told him that he had dropped the deceased outside his house on the same

night. Appellant neither in his statement recorded u/S 313 of Cr.P.C. nor

anywhere has given any explanation as to when, where and how he parted

Cr.A. No.712/2007

the company of the deceased. As he fails to offer an explanation on the

basis of facts within his special knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden

cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In this regard

observations made by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of State of

Rajasthan Vs. Kashiram (supra) can be relied upon which are as follows:

23. It is not necessary to multiply with authorities. The principle is well settled. The provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act itself are unambiguous and categoric in laying down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Thus, if a person is last seen with the deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and when he parted company. He must furnish an explanation which appears to the Court to be probable and satisfactory. If he does so he must be held to have discharged his burden. If he fails to offer an explanation on the basis of facts within his special knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden cast upon him

by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself provides an additional

link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. Section 106 does not shift the burden of proof in a criminal trial, which is always upon the prosecution. It lays down the rule that when the accused does not throw any light upon facts which are specially within his knowledge and which could not support any theory or hypothesis compatiable with his innocence, the Court can consider his failure to adduce any explanation, as an additional link which completes the chain. The principle has been

Cr.A. No.712/2007

succinctly stated in Re. Naina Mohd. AIR 1960 Madras, 218.

21. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Thakur Singh (2014) 12 SCC 211 ,

Hon'ble the Apex Court reiterated the principle that burden of proving

guilt of the accused is on the prosecution, but there may be certain facts

pertaining to a crime that can be known only to an accused, the Court held

as under:

22. The law, therefore, is quite well settled that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused is on the prosecution, but there may be certain facts pertaining to a crime that can be known only to the accused, or are virtually impossible for the prosecution to prove. These facts need to be explained by the accused and if he does not do so, then it is a strong circumstance pointing to his guilt based on

those facts.

22. In the instant case, since on the date of incident, deceased was

last seen together alive with the appellant at Jai Bhawani Nagar Square

and also near Mortaka bridge constructed over Narmada River and

thereafter deceased was not seen. Therefore, the facts relevant to the

missing of the deceased being known only to the appellant yet he did not

gave any explanation and chose not to disclose anything. Hence, a very

strong presumption is made out against the appellant that deceased was

Cr.A. No.712/2007

murdered by him.

23. Facts of the case Malaichamy & Another (supra) cited by the

learned counsel for the appellant are entirely different from the facts of the

instant case as in the above case witnesses of last seen circumstance gave

their statements after about a week and they even did not depose that they

saw the victim in the company of the accused persons. In the instant case

appellant's name was mentioned in the missing persons report (Ex. P-11A)

lodged on the next day of the incident and also in written complaint dated

05.10.2005 (Ex. P-1) and in the FIR (Ex. P-2) lodged on the basis of

above written complaint. Statements of almost all the last seen witnesses

u/S 161 of Cr.P.C. were recorded on fourth day i.e. on 06.10.2005 hence

aforesaid judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is of no

assistance.

24. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant as the dead body of

the deceased has not been recovered, therefore it cannot be said that

deceased was subjected to homicidal death and was murdered. From the

statements of ASI P.S. Chouhan(PW-14) and S.I. Ashok Rangshahi(PW-

15), it is true that in the instant case inspite of repeated searches made by

Cr.A. No.712/2007

them as per search memo (Ex.P-9, 14,17 & 18), deceased's dead body

could not be recovered. But as held by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case

of Sanjay Rajak Vs. The State of Bihar(Supra) and also in the case of

Ramanand & ors Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh [1981 AIR 738] that in a

murder case, it is not necessary that body of the victim should be found

and identified i.e. conviction for offence of murder does not necessarily

depend upon corpus deliciti being found. Relevant paras are as follows:

27............In other words, we would take it that the corpus delicti, i.e., the dead-body of the victim was not found in this case. But even on that assumption, the question remains whether the other circumstances established on record were sufficient to lead to the conclusion that within all human probability, she had been murdered by Rama Nand appellant ? It is true that one of the essential ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide required to be proved by the prosecution is that the accused "caused the death" of the person alleged to have been killed.

This means that before seeking to prove that the accused is the perpetrator of the murder, it must be established that homicidal death has been caused. Ordinarily, the recovery of the dead-body of the victim or a vital part of it, bearing marks of violence, is sufficient proof of homicidal death of the victim. There was a time when under the old English Law, the finding of the body of the deceased was held to be essential before a person was convicted of committing his culpable homicide. "I would never convict", said

Cr.A. No.712/2007

Sir Mathew Hale, "a person of murder or manslaughter unless the fact were proved to be done, or at least the body was found dead". This was merely a rule of caution, and not of law. But in those times when execution was the only punishment for murder, the need for adhering to this cautionary rule was greater. Discovery of the dead-body of the victim bearing physical evidence of violence, has never been considered as the only mode of proving the corpus delicti in murder. Indeed, very many cases are of such a nature where the discovery of the dead-body is impossible. A blind adherence to this old "body" doctrine would open the door wide open for many a heinous murderer to escape with impunity simply because they were cunning and clever enough to destroy the body of their victim. In the context of our law, Hale's enunciation has to be interpreted no more than emphasising that where the dead-body of the victim in a murder case is not found, other cogent and satisfactory proof of homicidal death of the victim must be adduced by the prosecution. Such proof may be by the direct ocular account of an eye-witness, or by circumstantial evidence, or by both. But where the fact of corpus delicti, i.e. 'homicidal death' is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence alone, the circumstances must be of a clinching and definitive character unerringly leading to the inference that the victim concerned has met a homicidal death. Even so, this principle of caution cannot be pushed too far as requiring absolute proof. Perfect proof is seldom to be had in this imperfect world, and absolute certainty is a myth. That is why under Section 3, Evidence Act, a fact is said to be "proved", if the Court considering the matters before it, considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case to act upon the supposition that it exists. The

Cr.A. No.712/2007

corpus delicti or the fact of homicidal death, therefore, can be proved by telling and inculpating circumstances which definitely lead to the conclusion that within all human probability, the victim has been murdered by the accused concerned. In the instant case, Circumstances (1) to (5), in their cumulative effect, are not only inconsistent with the innocence of Rama Nand appellant, but ineluctably and rationally compel the conclusion that Sumitra has died and it is Rama Nand appellant who has intentionally caused her death. Circumstance (3) involves an admission by Rama Nand and Shish Ram accused that Sumitra has met an unnatural death. The only difference between the prosecution version and the defence version is as to whether Sumitra committed suicide or had been killed by Rama Nand appellant. It has been found that the story of the suicide set up by the accused is false. The articles Salwar (Ex. P.14) and the shoes (Ex. P-15) do not belong to her. They were planted by the accused to lay a false trail and to mis- direct the investigation. This circumstance taken in conjunction with the others, irresistibly and rationally leads to the conclusion that she has been murdered by Rama Nand appellant and her dead body has been disposed of by the appellants Shish Ram and Kali Datt.

25. In the present case, in order to prove deceased's homicidal death,

prosecution has recovered a silver chain and a pearl necklace said to be

worn by the deceased at the time of incident on the instance of appellant .

As the aforesaid articles were seized from an open place and none of the

prosecution witness neither in his statement recorded u/S 161 of Cr.P.C.

Cr.A. No.712/2007

nor in his statement recorded during trial has stated that deceased had worn

aforesaid chains at the time when he went with the appellant and co-

accused, therefore, this fact appears doubtful that aforesaid articles were

seized from the possession of the appellant and the same were worn by the

deceased at the time of incident as held by the Apex Court in the case of

Mohd Younus Ali Tarafdar Vs. State of West Bengal(supra) cited by the

learned counsel for the appellant.

26. Prosecution has also recovered a clutch wire and nylon rope as

the articles used in the crime on the instance of the appellant from his

possession but there is nothing on record which could connect the same

with the crime therefore the same are also of no relevance as held by

Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Basheer Begum Vs. Mohammad

Ibrahim and Others(supra) cited by the learned counsel for the appellant.

27. So far as the appellant's extrajudicial confession made before

accomplice witness Mukesh (PW-1) and deceased's wife Babita (PW-6) is

concerned, both the above witnesses have supported the prosecution case.

Babita(PW-6) deposed that on the next day of the incident when she was at

her parental house, appellant told her that he threw her husband deceased

Cr.A. No.712/2007

into the river and murdered him. It has been argued on behalf of the

appellant that Babita did not disclose the aforesaid facts till recording of

her statement u/S 161 of Cr.P.C. i.e. till 07.10.2005, therefore the same

cannot be relied upon. This fact has not been challenged that at the time of

incident Babita (PW-6) was at her paternal house and she returned to her

in-laws house after lodging of the report. Admittedly, her marriage was

solemnized 4-5 months back before the incident therefore her conduct with

regard to not disclosing the aforesaid fact cannot be said to be unnatural.

She disclosed the aforesaid facts to the police when her statements were

recorded u/S 161 of Cr.P.C. Her aforesaid statements are supported by the

statements of accomplice witness Mukesh (PW-1) whose statement can

very well be used as corroborative piece of evidence as held earlier.

Appellant has not given any explanation as to when, where and how, he

parted the company of the deceased therefore learned trial Court has not

committed any error in holding this fact as proved that deceased was

subjected to homicidal death and was murdered by the appellant.

28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, prosecution has succeeded in

proving the fact that appellant having motive to commit murder of the

Cr.A. No.712/2007

deceased, took him on his motorcycle with the help of co-accused and was

last seen together with the deceased alive and committed his murder by

throwing him in the river. Hence, the circumstances proved are unerringly

pointing towards guilt of the appellant and we found no fault in the impugned

judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by learned trial Court.

There is no merit in the appeal. Thus, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

29. In view of aforesaid discussions, the impugned judgment of

conviction and order of sentence passed by learned trial Court is hereby

affirmed. This appeal filed on behalf of the appellant is hereby dismissed.

The Registry is directed to send back the Trial Court record

forthwith alongwith copy of this judgment. Let a copy of this order be also

sent to the concerned jail authorities for its speedy compliance and

necessary action.

                     (Subodh Abhyankar)                        (Satyendra Kumar Singh)
                          Judge                                         Judge
                        24.06.2022                                24 .06.2022
  gp/sh

SEHAR HASEEN
2022.06.25
14:02:52
+05'30'
 

 
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