The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs M/S Kakda Stone Crushers Through ...
2021 Latest Caselaw 390 MP

                                    1                               SA-575-2020
        The High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
                    SA-575-2020
  (THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS Vs M/S KAKDA STONE CRUSHERS THROUGH
                          PROPEIETOR SMT. KIRAN GOYAL)


Jabalpur, Dated : 02-03-2021
       Shri Sudesh Verma, learned Govt. Advocate for the appellants/State.

       Shri Rakesh Jain, learned counsel for the respondent No.1.
       The instant Second Appeal preferred under Section 100 of C.P.C. by
the appellants/State is filed belatedly.
       The office note indicates that there is delay of 1406 days in preferring

this appeal, condonation of which, has been sought vide I.A.No.2703/2020
which is taken up and considered alongwith reply to the same filed by the sole
respondent.
       Facts

revealed by the appellants/State for seeking condonation of said delay are that certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree dated 13.01.2016 was received by the appellants/State and OIC (General Manager, DTIC) for the purpose of filing this appeal was appointed on 04.04.2017. The application further elicits that on 09.05.2017, the OIC was instructed to take appropriate steps, however, no steps were taken by the OIC. The application

thereafter, without explaining as to what transpired for a period of almost two and half years, states that after joining of new incumbent on the post of General Manager, DTIC sometime in the year 2019 - 2020, the factum of Second Appeal not having been filed by the previous OIC was detected. The new OIC thereafter informed the higher official about the said default. The application further reveals that on 07.02.2020 an explanation was sought from the previous OIC as to why disciplinary action be not taken against him. I.A. thereafter concludes by stating that without further loss of time, the new OIC approached office of Advocate General leading to filing of this Second Appeal on 18.02.2020.

From the aforesaid factual matrix, it is evident that there is no explanation whatsoever from the appellants/State about the period from May, 2 SA-575-2020 2017 to 2019-2020. I.A. also does not disclose as to what further action was taken against the previous OIC except stating that a mere explanation was sought from the said official.

No doubt, the application for condonation of delay needs to be dealt with liberally, but not when there is no explanation at all for the period as long as for two and half years. The State as compared to a common litigant

though deserves a little more laxity in matters of condonation of delay, but the same needs to be based on cogent and justifiable reasons and not merely on sympathy or whims.

The Apex Court in one of its recent pronouncement has come down very heavily on the State in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh & others Vs. Bherulal (Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 9217, 2020 and dismissed SLP preferred by State on 15/10/2020. The relevant extract of which is reproduced below:

"œ2. We are constrained to pen down a detailed order as it appears that all our counseling to Government and Government authorities have fallen on deaf ears i.e., the Supreme Court of India cannot be a place for the Governments to walk in when they choose ignoring the period of limitation prescribed. We have raised the issue that if the Government machinery is so inefficient and incapable of filing appeals/petitions in time, the solution may lie in requesting the Legislature to expand the time period for filing limitation for Government authorities because of their gross incompetence. That is not so. Till the Statute subsists, the appeals/petitions have to be filed as per the Statues prescribed.

3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the Government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government (Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC

107). This position is more than elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. v. Living Media India 3 SA-575-2020 Ltd. & Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 563 where the Court observed as under:

'œ12) It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of

condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

13) In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural redtape in the process.

The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay 4 SA-575-2020 except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.' Eight years hence the judgment is still unheeded!

4. A reading of the aforesaid application shows that the reason for such an inordinate delay is stated to be only "Âœdue to unavailability of the documents and the process of arranging the documents"Â. In paragraph 4 a reference has been made to "bureaucratic process works, it is inadvertent that delay occurs"Â​.

5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be propounded that if there is some merit in the case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by. If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in any case. It is really a bar of limitation which can even shut out good cases. This does not, of course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court in an appropriate case to condone the delay.

6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorized earlier as "certificate cases"Â. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the concerned officer responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straight away counsels appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the 5 SA-575-2020 Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.

8. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, we consider appropriate to impose costs on the petitioner State of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand) to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited in four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officers responsible for the delay in filing the special leave petition and a certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time.

9. The special leave petition is dismissed as time barred in terms aforesaid.

10. We make it clear that if the aforesaid order is not complied within time, we will be constrained to initiate contempt proceedings against the Chief Secretary.

11. A copy of the order be placed before the Chief Secretary, State of Madhya Pradesh."

In view of the above discussion and in total absence of any explanation from the State in regard to the period of more than two and half years, this Court sees no reason to allow the I.A.

Accordingly, I.A. No.2703/2020 for condonation of delay stands dismissed.

As a necessary consequences, this Second Appeal also stands dismissed for being barred by limitation.

(SHEEL NAGU) JUDGE

sj

Digitally signed by SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Date: 2021.03.04 16:19:35 +05'30'