Anil K. Narendran, J.
writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the
the provisions of Section 14 of the Securitisation and
Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) and consequential
2. Going by the averments in the writ petition, the
respondent M/s. Vaidhyadharma Herbals, from the 1st
respondent Bank. Respondents 3 and 4, who are partners of the
facilities. 7.70 Ares of property comprised in Sy.No.104/29 in
Block No.13 of Sasthamcottah Village owned by late Babu S. is
one among the properties offered as security. Another property
Block No.14 of Sasthamcottah Village owned by the 3rd
respondent was also offered as security. When there was default
13 of the SARFAESI Act. Seeking assistance of the court to take
25.04.2025 in M.C.No.689 of 2025. Ext.P1 notice dated
appointed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in that proceedings.
the appellant-petitioner, died on 06.08.2025. The 3rd respondent,
10.09.2025. The grievance of the appellant-petitioner is that
M.C.No.689 of 2025. The 3rd respondent filed Ext.P3 application
not to execute that order. It is in such circumstances that the
3. In the writ petition, the 1st respondent Bank has filed
a statement dated 03.10.2025, opposing the reliefs sought for.
writ appeal. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent Bank has
same credit facilities. Paragraph 5 of that statement reads thus;
4. The learned Single Judge, by the judgment dated
contained in paragraph 10 of the judgment. Paragraphs 9 and 10
"9. Section 14 of the Act provides a statutory remedy for
the bank to recover dues from a borrower. Once the
demand notice under Section 13(2) is duly served during
the borrower's lifetime and the mandatory 60-day period
expires without the liability being discharged, the bank's
right to invoke Section 14 proceedings becomes absolute.
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The facts further reveal that nearly two years have elapsed
since the loan account was classified as a Non-Performing
Asset (NPA), yet neither the deceased guarantor nor his
legal heirs have taken steps to settle the debt. This
persistent inaction reinforces the bank's entitlement to
proceed under the Act to enforce its security interest and
recover the outstanding dues.
10. In the present case, as the initial demand notice was
duly served during the borrower's lifetime and the
statutory 60-day period expired without repayment, the
creditor is legally entitled to proceed with the possession of
secured assets without issuing additional notices to the
legal heirs. Based on the facts and circumstances,
supported by relevant judicial precedents, this Court finds
no necessity for issuing a second round of notices under
the Act, given that the procedures under Sections 13(2),
13(4), and 14 were validly initiated and served during the
lifetime of the deceased fifth respondent. Consequently,
while the petitioner remains at liberty to raise any other
contentions regarding procedural illegalities before the
appropriate statutory forum, the specific challenge
regarding the necessity of fresh notice is hereby rejected.
Accordingly, the Writ Petition stands disposed of with the
aforementioned observations."
The judgment of the learned Single Judge is one rendered taking
note of the law laid down by the Division Bench of the Jammu
and Kashmir High Court in Sundri and others v. Jammu and
Kashmir Bank Ltd., Srinagar and another [AIR 2025 J&K
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148] and that of the Division Bench of this Court in Authorised
Officer v. Devi Prasad [2019:KER:49673; 2019 KHC 7606].
5. Challenging the judgment dated 18.11.2025 of the
learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.33994 of 2025, the appellant-
petitioner is before this Court in this writ appeal, invoking the
provisions under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958.
6. We heard arguments of the learned counsel for the
appellant-petitioner and also the learned counsel for the 1st
respondent bank.
7. The learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner would
contend that the judgment dated 18.11.2025 of the learned
Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.33994 of 2025 is one rendered without
properly appreciating the legal and factual contentions raised by
the petitioner and therefore, it is liable to be interfered with in
this writ appeal. The appellant, who is one among the legal heirs
of late Babu S., is legally entitled to resist the measures taken by
the 1st respondent Bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI
Act, in respect of the property having an extent of 7.70 Ares,
devolved upon the legal heirs on the death of late Babu S.
Therefore, the learned Single Judge ought to have quashed the
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proceedings initiated by the 1st respondent Bank under the
provisions of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act.
8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the 1 st
respondent Bank would contend that the reasoning of the
learned Single Judge in relegating the appellant-petitioner to
avail the statutory remedy provided under the SARFAESI Act
against the proceedings initiated by the 1st respondent Bank is
neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting any interference
in this intra-court appeal filed under Section 5(i) of the Kerala
High Court Act, 1958.
9. Having considered the pleadings and materials on
record and also the submissions made at the Bar, we are of the
view that if the appellant-petitioner is aggrieved by the measures
taken by the 1st respondent Bank against the property in
question, his remedy is to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal,
invoking the provisions under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act,
instead of invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
10. In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon
[(2010) 8 SCC 110], a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court
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held that if the 1st respondent guarantor had any tangible
grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) of the
SARFAESI Act or the action taken under Section 14, then he
could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section
17(1) before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The expression 'any
person' used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within
its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any
other person who may be affected by the action taken under
Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate
Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections
17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed
time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to
an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both
expeditious and effective.
11. In Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], on the
facts of the case at hand, the Apex Court noted that the High
Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will
ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved
person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters
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involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public
money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions.
While dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action
taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must
keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and
State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto
themselves, inasmuch as, they not only contain comprehensive
procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution
of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any
aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court
must insist that before availing the remedy under Article 226 of
the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available
under the relevant statute.
12. In South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew
Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], in the context of the challenge
made against the notices issued under Section 13(4) of the
SARFAESI Act, the Apex Court reiterated the settled position of
law on the interference of the High Court invoking Article 226 of
the Constitution of India in commercial matters, where an
effective and efficacious alternative forum has been constituted
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through a statute. In the said decision, the Apex Court took
judicial notice of the fact that certain High Courts continue to
interfere in such matters, leading to a regular supply of cases
before the Apex Court. The Apex Court reiterated that a writ of
certiorari is to be issued over a decision when the court finds
that the process does not conform to the law or the statute. In
other words, courts are not expected to substitute themselves
with the decision-making authority while finding fault with the
process along with the reasons assigned. Such a writ is not
expected to be issued to remedy all violations. When a Tribunal
is constituted, it is expected to go into the issues of fact and law,
including a statutory violation. A question as to whether such a
violation would be over a mandatory prescription as against a
discretionary one is primarily within the domain of the Tribunal.
The issues governing waiver, acquiescence and estoppel are also
primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. The object and
reasons behind the SARFAESI Act are very clear as observed in
Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India [(2004) 4 SCC
311]. While it facilitates a faster and smoother mode of recovery
sans any interference from the court, it does provide a fair
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mechanism in the form of the Tribunal being manned by a legally
trained mind. The Tribunal is clothed with a wide range of powers
to set aside an illegal order, and thereafter, grant consequential
reliefs including repossession and payment of compensation and
costs. Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act gives an expansive
meaning to the expression 'any person', who could approach the
Tribunal.
13. In Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311],
the Apex Court noticed that, in matters under the SARFAESI Act,
approaching the High Court for the consideration of an offer by
the borrower is also frowned upon by the Apex Court. A writ of
mandamus is a prerogative writ. The court cannot exercise the
said power in the absence of any legal right. More
circumspection is required in a financial transaction, particularly
when one of the parties would not come within the purview of
Article 12 of the Constitution of India. When a statute prescribes
a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent that mode shall not
be encouraged by a writ court. A litigant cannot avoid the non-
compliance of approaching the Tribunal, which requires the
prescription of fees, and use the constitutional remedy as an
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alternative. In paragraph 17 of the decision, the Apex Court
reiterated the position of law regarding the interference of the
High Courts in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act by
quoting its earlier decisions in Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar
Thomas [(2003) 10 SCC 733], United Bank of India v.
Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], State Bank of
Travancore v. Mathew K.C. [(2018) 3 SCC 85], Phoenix
ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir [(2022) 5
SCC 345] and Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu
[(2023) 2 SCC 168] wherein the said practice has been
deprecated while requesting the High Courts not to entertain
such cases. In paragraph 18 of the said decision, the Apex Court
observed that the powers conferred under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India are rather wide, but are required to be
exercised only in extraordinary circumstances in matters
pertaining to proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a
statute, more so in commercial matters involving a lender and a
borrower, when the legislature has provided for a specific
mechanism for appropriate redressal.
14. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in
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Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110] and reiterated in
Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], if the
appellant-petitioner has any grievance against the proceedings
initiated by the secured creditor under Section 14 of the
SARFAESI Act, he has to avail the statutory remedy by filing an
application under Section 17 of the said Act before the Debts
Recovery Tribunal, as the expression 'any person' used in Section
17(1) of the Act is of wide import, which takes within its fall, not
only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person,
who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or
Section 14 of the said Act. When the remedies available to an
aggrieved person under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act are both
expeditious and effective, as held by the Apex Court in
Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], the borrower, the
guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action
taken by the secured creditor under Section 14 of the SARFAESI
Act have to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal availing the
statutory remedy provided under Section 17 of the said Act,
instead of invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the appellant-
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petitioner cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of
certiorari to quash the proceedings initiated by the 1st
respondent Bank under the provisions of Section 14 of the
SARFAESI Act and seeking declaratory reliefs in relation to such
proceedings.
15. In such circumstances, we find no reason to interfere
with the judgment dated 18.11.2025 of the learned single judge
in W.P.(C)No.33994 of 2025.
The writ appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.
Sd/-
ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE
Sd/-
MURALEE KRISHNA S., JUDGE
AP
