[Cites 20, Cited by 0]
Kerala High Court
Sajid Pasha vs Abdunnasir. P on 4 February, 2026
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.MANU
WEDNESDAY, THE 4TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2026 / 15TH MAGHA, 1947
RP NO. 48 OF 2026
ARISING FROM THE ORDER DATED 12.12.2025 IN AR NO.8 OF
2025 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
REVIEW PETITIONERS/APPLICANTS:
1 SAJID PASHA
AGED 53 YEARS
S/O.MUSTHAFA KAMAL PASHA, RESIDING AT "PASHA'S
ESTANCIA, VAIDYARANGADI, RAMANATTUKARA,
KOZHIKODE, PIN - 673633
2 DR.ZARINA P.P
AGED 50 YEARS
W/O.SAJID PASHA, RESIDING AT "PASHA'S ESTANCIA,
VAIDYARANGADI, RAMANATTUKARA, KOZHIKODE,
PIN - 673633
BY ADVS.
SMT.M.A.VAHEEDA BABU
SRI.BABU KARUKAPADATH
SMT.ARYA RAGHUNATH
SHRI.KARUKAPADATH WAZIM BABU
SMT.P.LAKSHMI
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
2
SMT.AYSHA E.M.
SHRI.HASHIM K.M.
SHRI.ABUASIL A.K.
SMT.HANIYA NAFIZA V.S.
SHRI.M.I.INSAF MOOPPAN
SHRI.RISHI VINCENT
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 ABDUNNASIR P.
S/O.ABOOBAKKAR P., RESIDING AT KAKKANNTTU HOUSE,
VALIYAPARAMBA P.O, MALAPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 673637
2 REHNA N.
W/O.ABDUNNASIR, RESIDING AT KAKKANNTTU HOUSE,
VALIYAPARAMBA P.O, MALAPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 673637
3 SHEFIN NASIR
S/O MR.ABDUNNASIR P., RESIDING AT KAKKANNTTU
HOUSE, VALIYAPARAMBA P.O, MALAPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 673637
4 NESWA NASIR
D/O.MR.ABDUNNASIR P., RESIDING AT
KAKKANNTTU HOUSE, VALIYAPARAMBA P.O,
MALAPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 673637
5 SHAMSUDEEN P.
S/O.ABOOBACKER P., RESIDING AT KAKKANATTU HOUSE,
ANDIYOORKKUNNU, VALIYAPARAMBA P.O,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 673637
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
3
6 SHAFEEF SHAMSUDEEN P.
S/O.SHAMSUDEEN P., RESIDING AT KAKKANATTU HOUSE,
ANDIYOORKKUNNU, VALIYAPARAMBA P.O, MALAPPURAM
DISTRICT, PIN - 673637
7 AZEEM M K @AZEEM MANNIKKUNNAN
S/O.ABOOBACKER M.K., RESIDING AT
MANNIKKUNNAN HOUSE, CHERIYA PARAMBA,
VELLIANCHERY PO, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 679326
8 MUHAMMED P.V.
S/O.VEERANKUTTY, RESIDING AT RABEEL MANZIL,
VALIYAPARAMBA P.O., MALAPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 673637
9 FASMIN P.M.
S/O.MUHAMMEDKUTTY PEZHUKATTIL MALAYIL,
RESIDING AT MALAYIL HOUSE, PULIKKAL PO,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 673637
10 ABDUL MAJEED
S/O MOOSA P., RESIDING AT NATU KANDATHIL HOUSE,
PERUVAYAL P.O., KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT, PIN - 673008
ADV VIJAY V PAUL - R3 to R10
ADV ANIL SEBASTIAN PULICKEL - R1 & R2
THIS REVIEW PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
29.01.2026, THE COURT ON 04.02.2026 DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
4
S.MANU, J.
--------------------------------------------------
RP No.48 of 2026 in AR No.8 of 2025
-------------------------------------------------
Dated this the 04th day of February, 2026
ORDER
Petitioners in AR No.8 of 2025, rejected by order dated
12.12.2025, have filed this review petition.
2. The arbitration request was rejected as this Court
found that there was no proper request under Section 21 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
3. The petitioners have produced some documents
along with the present review petition to contend that the
disputes between the parties were clear to each of them, as
the same were communicated in clear terms through the
additional documents now produced. Further it is contended
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
that under Section 21 of the Act, the only requirement is a
notice/request seeking arbitration. Petitioners state that
Annexure A3 produced with the memorandum of arbitration
request fulfilled the said purpose and hence the order
rejecting the arbitration request is flawed. According to the
petitioners, the order dated 12.12.2025 in the arbitration
request is liable to be reviewed as errors are apparent on
the face of it.
4. Respondents 1 and 2 filed a detailed counter
affidavit. According to them the review petition is not
maintainable and even if it is assumed as maintainable no
reason justifying review is presented in it.
5. Heard the learned counsel for the review
petitioners, learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 as
also the learned counsel for the respondents 3 to 10.
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners made elaborate
submissions. He relied on various judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court to buttress the contentions. Respective
counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 and respondents 3 to
10 stoutly opposed the review petition and made
submissions with reference to various judgments
particularly to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul
Nirman Nigam Limited and Others [2025 SCC OnLine SC 2578]
and of this Court in Koshy Phillip v. Thomas P. Mathew &
Others [2025 SCC OnLine Ker 13830].
7. In Koshy Phillip's case (Supra) this Court considered
the scope of review in a proceeding under Section 11 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act. This Court relied on the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hindustan
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
Construction Company's case (Supra).
8. In Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. (Supra), the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"11.8. While High Courts, as courts of record, do
possess a limited power of review, such power is
extremely circumscribed in matters governed by the
Arbitration Act. It may be exercised only to correct
an error apparent on the face of the record or to
address a material fact that was overlooked. It
cannot be used to revisit findings of law or
reappreciate issues already decided.
11.9. In Grindlays Bank Ltd v. Central Government
Industrial Tribunal and others, (1980 supp SCC 420)
this Court drew a clear distinction between
procedural review and review on merits, holding that
the latter is impermissible unless expressly provided.
Applied to the Arbitration Act, this means that review
is available only to cure a patent or procedural error
- not to reopen interpretation of the arbitration
agreement.
11.10. Referring to the aforesaid decision in Bharat
Heavy Electricals Limited v. Jyothi Turbopower
Services Private Limited, (2016 SCC OnLine Mad.
4029: 2016 (3) LW 683) in which, one of us (R.
Mahadevan, J.) was a member, the Madras High
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
Court held that while a Tribunal has no inherent
power to undertake a review on merits, it
nonetheless possesses the inherent procedural power
to recall an order terminating the proceedings. It
cannot be that a constitutional court of record lacks
such power, to presume otherwise would amount to a
constitutional fallacy. The Court further observed that
the A&C Act, 1996 is a complete code in itself and is
premised on minimal judicial intervention in arbitral
proceedings. The following paragraphs are apposite:
"18. The learned Arbitrator has also
opined that an order under S.25(a) of
the said Act cannot be construed to be
an award as there is no decision on
merit and thus, it may not be possible to
maintain an appeal under S.34 of the
said Act (reliance was placed on the
decision of the Division Bench of the
Delhi High Court in ATV Projects India
vs. IOC & another, 2013 (200) DLT 553).
The learned Arbitrator thus opined that
since a party cannot be without a
remedy, what should be the remedy in
such a situation needed to be examined.
The Tribunal, while accepting that there
cannot be any power of review inherent
in character, that proposition would
apply to decision on merits. However,
with respect to procedural review, the
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
implied power is available with the
Tribunal to deal with petitions similar to
the ones in the present case. The
observations made by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v.
the Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal,
reported in AIR 1981 SC 806, in latter
part of para 13 were specifically referred
to, which are once again extracted as
under:
"13..............Furthermore, different
considerations arise on review. The
expression 'review' is used in the two
distinct senses, namely (1) a procedural
review which is either inherent or
implied in a Court or Tribunal to set
aside a palpably erroneous order passed
under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a
review on merits when the error sought
to be corrected is one of law and is
apparent on the face of the record. It is
in the latter sense that the Court in Patel
Narshi Thakershi case (AIR 1970 SC
1273) held that no review lies on merits
unless a statute specifically provides for
it. Obviously when a review is sought
due to a procedural defect, the
inadvertent error committed by the
Tribunal must be corrected ex debito
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
justitiae to prevent the abuse of its
process, and such power inheres in
every Court or Tribunal."
"27. We reject the plea of the learned
counsel for the petitioner that on
termination of proceedings under
S.25(a) of the said Act, the Arbitrator
becomes functus officio, as he is a
persona designata. Both the methods of
appointment of Arbitrator are possible,
i.e. by consent or through the process of
Court. The position would not be
different in the two situations. It is not
as if there is a better sanctity to the
appointment of an Arbitrator which
enlarges the power if he is appointed by
mutual consent, while there are
abridged powers if he is not appointed
by the Court."
"29. We are also in agreement with the
views of both the Calcutta and Delhi
High Courts and in view of the aforesaid
finding, that the remedy under Art.226
of the Constitution of India is not really
available as the aforesaid is the
appropriate remedy. The invocation of
jurisdiction of this Court by the
petitioner is, in turn, predicated on a
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
belief that either of the parties aggrieved
have to approach this Court under its
extraordinary writ jurisdiction. However,
we have already explained the remedy
available and any further challenge to an
order which may be passed in such
application would, in turn, depend on the
fate of it. The said Act is a complete
code in itself and the basis is that there
should not be periodic judicial
intervention in arbitration proceedings.
Were a favourable order to be passed
commencing arbitration proceedings, the
option would only be to challenge the
award, if so advised, under S.34 of the
said Act. Similarly, if the application was
to be dismissed, the position would
really be no different."
11.11. The decisions such as Municipal Corporation
of Greater Mumbai and another v. Pratibha
Industries Ltd. and others, ((2019) 3 SCC 203) and
Mohd. Anwar & others v. Pushpalata Jain & others,
(SLP (C) No. 4820 of 2021 dated 05.04.2021)
illustrate this narrow window, where review was
permitted only because the earlier orders had been
passed in ignorance of fundamental facts. These
cases are confined to procedural lapses, not to re-
examining matters of law.
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
11.12. By contrast, in the present case, the High
Court reopened the issue of interpretation of the
arbitration clause based solely on a subsequent
judgment. Such an exercise falls squarely outside
the scope of review jurisdiction. Even assuming that
a review was maintainable, it was filed after an
unexplained delay of nearly three years and was not
founded on any error apparent on the face of the
record or any suppression of material fact.
11.13. Once the S.11 order had attained finality, the
only remedies available to the respondents were to
approach this Court under Art.136 or to raise
objections under S.16 before the arbitral tribunal.
Having chosen neither route, and having
participated in the arbitral proceedings, including
joint applications under S.29A, they were estopped
from reopening the matter through review. A later
judgment cannot revive a concluded cause of action.
11.14. As emphasized in BSNL v. Nortel Networks
(India) (P) Ltd (supra), courts must resist "attempts
to re-enter through the back door what the statute
has shut through the front door". S.11 is intended to
trigger arbitration, not to create multiple stages of
judicial reconsideration.
11.15. For the reasons discussed above, this Court is
of the considered view that the High Court did not
have the jurisdiction to reopen or review its earlier
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
order passed under S.11(6) of the A&C Act. Once the
appointment was made, the court became functus
officio and could not sit in judgment over the very
issue it had already settled. The review order cuts
against the grain of the Act, undermines the
principle of minimal judicial interference, and
effectively converts the review into an appeal in
disguise. Such an exercise cannot stand.
Accordingly, this issue is answered in the negative."
9. This Court in Koshy Phillip's case (Supra) held as
under:
"20...............................................................
In the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Hindustan Construction Company Ltd
(supra), the legal position regarding maintainability
of review is no longer res integra. Though the
Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering a case
arising from a review from an order appointing an
arbitrator, the principles would definitely apply in
case of rejection of an arbitration request also.
21. The concept of limited judicial engagement with
arbitration is adequately addressed in IN RE
Interplay (Supra) judgment of the seven-judge
bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Arbitration
and Conciliation Act is a self-contained code,
according to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The
highest court in the land has made it plain that
anything beyond what is explicitly stated in the
Arbitration Act is not permissible. The principles of
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
modern arbitration were highlighted by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in IN RE Interplay (Supra). The
legislature has made it a policy to limit the role of
courts in arbitration. This policy is reflected in
Section 5 of the Act. In addition, the legislature
reaffirmed the same policy by adding sub-section
(6A) to Section 11. The legislative goal of limiting
judicial involvement would be plainly undermined if
the proposition that every order issued under
Section 11 of the Act is subject to substantive review
is accepted. Nevertheless, power for limited
procedural review on the basis of well settled
principles would be inherently available to the High
Court with respect to every order passed. Hence it
can be firmly concluded that this Court, even though
has inherent plenary powers, would not be justified
in entertaining petitions for substantive review
against orders issued under Section 11 of the Act for
want of any enabling provision for review under the
Act. Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Hindustan Construction Company Ltd (supra)
makes the proposition abundantly clear.
To sum up, this review petition is not maintainable
and it is accordingly dismissed."
10. In Koshy Phillip (Supra) this Court held that though
power for limited procedure in review would be inherently
available to the High Court, it could not be justified in
entertaining petition for substantive review against orders
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
issued under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996.
11. Arguments advanced by the learned counsel for
the petitioners are to be analyzed keeping in mind the law
laid down in the judgments referred above.
12. The learned counsel for the petitioners placed
reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
M/s.Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala [1994
Supp (3) SCC 477] and ASF Buildtech Private Limited v.
Shapoorji Pallonji and Company Private Limited [(2025) 9 SCC
76] and of the Delhi High Court in Brilltech Engineers Private
Limited v. Shapoorji Pallonji and Company Private Limited
[2022 SCC OnLine Del 4422] and contended that the purpose
of a notice under Section 21 of the Act is very limited and
in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
in the judgments cited, Annexure A3 produced with the
memorandum of Arbitration Request satisfies the
requirement of issuing a notice/raising a demand for
arbitration.
13. This Court analyzed the contents of Annexure A3 in
the order sought to be reviewed and held as under:
"28. Contents of Annexure -A3 communication in the
case at hand needs to be analysed, bearing in mind the
above position of law. It contains a request to the
respondents 1 and 2 to give their suggestion about the
arbitrator. Further, a person was suggested as an
arbitrator, in case the respondents 1 and 2 had no
other suggestion. There is no mention, as noted at the
outset, about any particular dispute. As pointed out by
the learned counsel appearing for the respondents,
there are two different partnership deeds executed by
the applicants and respondents 1 and 2, Annexures -
A1 and A2. Both contain arbitration clauses. Disputes
have arisen with respect to both deeds. However, the
first applicant did not make any mention in Annexure
A3 about the arbitration clause invoked. In the facts
and circumstances of this case, wherein serious
contentions with regard to limitation are raised by the
respondents, in my view, Annexure-A3 does not satisfy
the prime object of the request/notice under Section
21 for want of clarity regarding the dispute sought to
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
be resolved. With no specific arbitration clause being
pointed out and no particular dispute being mentioned
in it, the date of receipt of Annexure-A3 cannot be
considered as the point of time of commencement of
arbitration with respect to any particular dispute
between the parties. It failed in marking the point of
commencement of arbitral proceedings. In the facts
and circumstances of the instant case, lack of vital
details in Annexure-A3 is fatal. Hence, I find that
Annexure-A3, being too vague, cannot be considered
as a proper and valid request under Section 21 of the
Act."
[Emphasis added ]
14. Findings of this Court in the above extracted
paragraph of the order are to be read in conjunction with
the findings of law in the previous paragraphs of the order.
Therefore, if the contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioners noticed above are accepted and a different view
is taken, it will amount to revisiting findings of law as well
as re-appreciation of issues already decided.
15. It is pertinent to note that the Hon'ble Supreme
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
Court in Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. (Supra) held
unmistakably that the inherent power of review available to
the High Court cannot be used to revisit findings of law or
reappreciate issues already decided.
16. Nevertheless, to be fair to the learned counsel for
the petitioners, I shall mention the contentions raised and
address them notwithstanding the conclusion in previous
paragraphs. The learned counsel for the petitioners
emphasized that most of the disputes narrated in the
memorandum of arbitration request were not specifically
denied by the respondents in their counter affidavits. He
hence submitted that those contentions should be deemed
to have been admitted by the respondents and under said
circumstances this Court ought to have concluded that
there was no lack of clarity regarding the disputes between
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
the parties. That being so, according to the learned
counsel, the conclusion of this Court in the order sought to
be reviewed that Annexure A3 failed to indicate even the
bare minimum details of the dispute is an error apparent on
the face of the record. I am afraid that the said contention
has been raised without a proper scrutiny of the order
sought to be reviewed. In the order, this Court examined
whether Annexure A3 communication would satisfy the
requirements of a request contemplated under Section 21
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The analysis was
essential in the peculiar circumstances of this case wherein
two partnership deeds each containing arbitration clauses
are involved and transactions mentioned in the
memorandum of arbitration request spread over a long
period. Clarity regarding limitation being a main objective
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
of the request under S.21, it became necessary to analyse
Annexure A3 as the respondents vehemently contended
that there was no proper request for arbitration. The said
analysis was obligatory to arrive at a conclusion as to
whether the conditions to approach this Court under
Section 11 of the Act are satisfied. This court would
misdirect itself if it proceeds to examine as to whether
there is clarity among the respondents regarding the nature
of the disputes. Such an enquiry would be definitely out of
the purview of a proceeding under S.11. It needs to be
emphasised that the finding rendered by this Court was
regarding the lack of clarity in Annexure A3, projected by
the petitioners as a valid request under Section 21 of the
Act. Therefore, the contention built upon the alleged non-
denial in the counter affidavits is not at all relevant in this
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
review.
17. Another contention raised during the course of
argument was that in a proceeding under Section 11, the
scope of analysis by this Court is too narrow and therefore
this Court ought to have referred the parties to the
arbitrator and left all issues to be decided by the arbitrator.
The learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in IN RE Interplay
Between Arbitration Agreements Under Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 And The Indian Stamp Act 1899 [(2024)
6 SCC 1] and Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh v. ASAP Fluids
Pvt. Ltd. [2024 KHC 6613] in support of his contention that
the ambit of the jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Act is
constricted. There cannot be any quarrel with regard to the
proposition canvassed. However, a Court considering an
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
application under Section 11 of the Act seeking reference is
bound to satisfy itself regarding validity of the arbitration
agreement between the parties. It is settled beyond any
iota of doubt that an order passed under S.11 is a judicial
order. Hence the court considering an application under
S.11 should apply mind judiciously and satisfy about
existence of the essential jurisdictional facts. It is therefore
elementary to satisfy whether there is a valid arbitration
agreement and whether the party seeking reference had
made a proper request to initiate arbitral proceedings as
contemplated under Section 21 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. Unless such a request was made,
the conditions to invoke the jurisdiction under Section 11 of
the Act would not be satisfied. Therefore, it was
indispensable in the instant case also to verify whether
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
there was a valid request under Section 21 of the Act. In
the order sought to be reviewed, this Court analyzed the
said aspect and concluded that there was no proper
request. It cannot be the law that whenever a request is
made under Section 11 of the Act, the Court should
obligatorily refer the parties to the arbitrator. Though the
scope of the enquiry under Section 11 of the Act is narrow,
the Court can exercise the power under Section 11 of the
Act, which indisputably is a judicial power, only on being
satisfied about the rudimentary requirements pointed out
above. Hence, I find no merit in the contention that this
Court committed an error by examining whether there is a
valid request for arbitration.
18. As already stated, if this Court accepts the
grounds raised in the review petition and the arguments
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners,
undoubtedly the same would amount to substantive review.
The same is impermissible as found in Koshy Phillip (Supra).
The learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 pointed
out that the order in Koshy Phillip (Supra) was challenged
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP(C)No.36921 of
2025 and by order dated 05.01.2026 the SLP was rejected.
Hence the said order has become final.
Following the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. (Supra) and
by this Court in Koshy Phillip (Supra), I find that this review
petition is not maintainable. It is accordingly dismissed.
Sd/-
S.MANU
JUDGE
MC
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
APPENDIX OF RP NO. 48 OF 2026
PETITIONER ANNEXURES
Annexure A A TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL DATED
16/10/2019 SENT BY THE APPLICANTS TO
THE RESPONDENTS 1 & 2
Annexure B A TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES OF THE
MEETING DATED 04/05/2020 HELD BY AND
BETWEEN THE APPLICANTS AND THE
RESPONDENTS 1 & 2 AT KAKKANAT HOUSE
Annexure C A TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL DATED
11/07/2023 SENT BY THE APPLICANTS TO
THE RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2 ACCEDING TO THE
STAND OF THE RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2 TO
CONTINUE IN MANAGEMENT OF THE FIRM
Annexure D A TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL DATED
11/08/2023 SENT BY THE APPLICANTS TO
THE RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2 DETAILING THE
PROBABLE RECONCILIATED FINANCIAL
STATEMENT OF THE FIRM, INDICATING THE
MINIMUM PROBABLE SHARE OF PROFIT TO BE
PAID TO EACH OF APPLICANT AT RS.
5,71,43,370/- UP TO THE FINANCIAL YEAR
2022-2023
Annexure E A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY E-MAIL DATED
17/08/2023 SENT BY THE RESPONDENTS 1
AND 2 TO THE APPLICANTS IN RESPONSE TO
THE EMAIL DATED 11.08.2025 OF THE
APPLICANTS, INDICATING THAT, THE
CALCULATION OF PROFIT MADE BY THE
APPLICANTS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THEM
Annexure F A TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL DATED
18.08.2023 SENT BY THE APPLICANTS TO
THE RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2 REQUESTING THEM
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
TO PROVIDE RECONCILIATED FINANCIAL
STATEMENT OF THE FIRM ACCEPTABLE TO
THEM
Annexure G A TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL DATED
22.08.2023 SENT BY THE APPLICANTS TO
RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2 REQUESTING THEM TO
SEND THE DETAILS OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVED
FROM THE CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT AND BANK
STATEMENTS OF ROOFS AND SHADES TO THE
APPLICANTS BY 25/08/2023
Annexure H A TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL DATED
02.09.2023 SENT BY THE APPLICANTS TO
RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2 REQUESTING THEM TO
SEND THE DETAILS OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVED
FROM THE CHARTED ACCOUNTANT AND BANK
STATEMENTS TO THE APPLICANTS
Annexure I A TRUE COPY OF THE CMA NO. 01/2024 ON
THE FILE OF THE HON'BLE COMMERCIAL
COURT, KOZHIKODE FILED BY THE
APPLICANTS
