Kerala High Court

E.V. Ramanarayanan vs General Manager (Hrm) on 31 October, 2025

WA NO.200/2016                 1



                                             2025:KER:81983

         IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                          PRESENT

  THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
                             &
        THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.

 FRIDAY, THE 31ST DAY OF OCTOBER 2025 / 9TH KARTHIKA, 1947

                    WA NO. 200 OF 2016
   ARISING OUT OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 23.12.2015 IN WP(C)
           NO.35029/2005 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA

APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
          E.V.RAMANARAYANAN,
          SENIOR MANAGER (STANDS REMOVED),
          UNION BANK OF INDIA, SERVICE BRANCH,
          ERNAKULAM, RESIDING AT SAKETHAM,
          CHEVARAMBALAM, CALICUT-673017.

         BY ADV SRI.U.BALAGANGADHARAN

RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
    1     GENERAL MANAGER (HRM),
          HRM DEPARTMENT, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS DIVISION,
          UNION BANK OF INDIA, CENTRAL OFFICE, 239,
          VIDHAN BHAVAN MARG, NARIMAN POINT, MUMBAI-400021.

    2    THE CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR,
         APPELLATE AUTHORITY, UNION BANK OF INDIA,
         CENTRAL OFFICE, 239, VIDHAN BHAVAN MARGH,
         NARIMAN POINT, MUMBAI-400021.

    3    PAUL MATHEW,
         REGIONAL MANAGER (RETD), UNION BANK OF INDIA,
         RESIDING AT 34/2564, MUKTHIL BETHANYA HOUSE,
         JAWAHAR NAGAR, KADAVANTHARA, COCHIN
         (SINCE DEAD IN THE YEAR 2006)

         BY ADV.SRI.SADCHITH P.KURUP, R1 TO R3

THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 04.08.2025,
THE COURT ON 31.10.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
 WA NO.200/2016                          2



                                                             2025:KER:81983



                              JUDGMENT

Dated this the 31st day of October, 2025

Syam Kumar V.M., J.

This Writ Appeal is filed challenging the judgment dated

23.12.2015 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.35029 of

2005. Appellant was the petitioner in the said W.P.(C).

2. Appellant, a Senior Manager in the respondent Bank had

filed the above W.P.(C) challenging the penalty of dismissal from

service imposed on him as illegal and unsustainable. Disciplinary

proceedings had been initiated against the appellant alleging that

he had facilitated certain entities who were borrowers of the

respondent Bank to commit fraud by sanctioning loans in his

capacity as a Branch Manager of Kozhikode main Branch. It was

alleged that he had flouted the lending norms/procedures/rules and

sanctioned/recommended advances/enhancement without proper

assessment and despite knowing unsatisfactory dealing/records of

the party. He had thus abused his delegated authority and did not

monitor/supervise the advance and accommodated the party by

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jeopardising the interest of the Bank. Aggrieved by the penalty of

dismissal from service imposed on him, the appellant had filed the

W.P.(C) seeking the following reliefs:

"(i) issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or order or direction, quashing Exts.P7 charge memo, P11 penalty order and P12 appellate order ;

(ii) issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate order or direction, commanding the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service with immediate effect and grant all consequential benefits viz, back wages etc.

(iii) declare that the enquiry conducted is highly illegal, arbitrary and in violation of all principles of natural justice ;

(iv) declare that the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service and further declare that he is deem to have continued in service untrammelled by the impugned proceedings, which stand dismissed ;

(v) issue such other further writ or order or direction as deemed fit and proper by this Honourable Court on the facts and circumstances of the case."

3. The learned Single Judge dismissed the W.P.(C) inter alia

holding that the allegations levelled against the appellant were of

serious nature, that he was at the eye of the storm and that the

irregularities alleged had originated from him. It was also held that

the gravity of the offences alleged against the appellant was more

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onerous than those alleged against others and hence no parity of

punishment could be found in the circumstances of the case.

Aggrieved by the said judgment dismissing his W.P.(C), this Writ

Appeal is filed.

4. Heard Sri.U.Balagangadharan, Advocate for the appellant

and Sri.Sadchith P.Kurup, Advocate for respondents 1 to 3.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the

judgment of the learned Single Judge is erroneous and contrary to

the settled position of law. The learned counsel put forth two

principal contentions, so as to substantiate his case. Firstly, the

learned Single Judge had overlooked the specific contention put

forth by the appellant that during the disciplinary proceedings, copies

of relevant documents which were considered and relied upon, so as

to arrive at the penalty of dismissal had not been provided to him.

Thus, there had been a clear violation of the principles of natural

justice, rendering the impugned orders unsustainable in law.

Secondly, the penalty of dismissal from service imposed on the

appellant vide orders impugned in the W.P.(C) was shockingly

disproportionate to the offence allegedly proved. As per the articles

of charges issued to the appellant, he was charged with "Failure to

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take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interest of the

Bank.", "Failure to discharge his duties with utmost devotion and

diligence", "Failure to discharge his duties with utmost honesty and

integrity" and for "Acting otherwise than in his best judgment in the

performance of his official duties." The learned counsel submits that,

assuming without admitting that the said charges had been proved,

dismissal from service is a highly disproportionate penalty to be

imposed as against the charges levelled. Admittedly, no loss was

occasioned to the respondent Bank, and the Bank had won the

connected cases before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Moreover, the

Bank had subsequently returned all the mortgaged documents to the

concerned party, finding that nothing was due from them. The orders

impugned are thus unsustainable on the ground of proportionality.

Ancillary contentions are also raised by the learned counsel to

substantiate the above principal contentions put forth. It is contented

that the appellant is actually a whistleblower who had been made a

scapegoat for the forewarning that he had made regarding the

insufficient security and ill health of the relevant group account of the

exporter who had multi-crore transactions with the Bank. The

valuation done by the appellant had actually been ignored by the

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Regional Manager, who had admonished the appellant for having

made a report against a key account and had got it valued privately.

The sum and substance of the submissions of the learned counsel

for the appellant is that the learned Single Judge ought to have

allowed the W.P.(C) both on the grounds that there had not been a

compliance of audi alteram partem principle as also for the alleged

stark violation of the proportionality doctrine. He places reliance on

the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the State of

UP and others v. Ramesh Chandra Mangalik [2002 KHC 1198] to

substantiate his contention regarding the effect of non-furnishing of

relevant documents to the delinquent employee.

6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Bank contended that

the appellant had been served with all the relevant documents which

were relied on in the disciplinary proceedings and that he had in

writing, informed that he was satisfied with the list of documents. It

is further contended that no prejudice has been caused to him due

to the alleged non-supply of documents. Only those documents that

were relied on need to be given, and all the said documents were

provided. Further, it is contended that when voluminous documents

are requested, it is incumbent on the part of the Inquiry Authority to

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weigh in balance the relevancy of the document as per 'Note' in

Regulation 6(10) of Union Bank of India Officer Employees

(Disciplinary & Appeal) Regulation, 1976 and the Inquiry Authority

had acted well within the powers vested in him. It is further

contended that the fact that no loss had occasioned to the Bank is

irrelevant and the delinquent employee cannot bank on the same.

Insofar as a procedural matter is concerned, a question of loss is not

a ground at all. If misconduct has been proved, as in the case of the

appellant, the disciplinary proceedings had to be taken to their

logical conclusion. Whether any loss had been occasioned or not is

not a matter of consequence at all. It is further contended that

indiscriminate grant of loan violating the procedural norms is a

serious misconduct, and reliance is placed on precedents in the said

respect. It is thus prayed that there is no cause or reason to

interfere with the findings of the learned Single Judge. Reliance is

placed on Ramesh Chandra Mangalik (supra) to contend that the

delinquent must show the prejudice caused to him by non-supply of

a copy of document, where the order of punishment is challenged on

that ground. No such prejudice has been revealed. Reliance is

placed by the learned counsel on the dictum laid down in State

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Bank of India and another v. K.S. Vishwanath [2022 KHC 6588]

to contend that the High Court cannot act as an Appellate Authority

in the disciplinary proceedings. Reliance is also placed on the

dictum laid down to the said respect in Regional Manager, UCO

Bank and another v. Krishna Kumar Bhardwaj [(2022) 5 SCC

695]. Pointing to U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Ram Kishan Arora [(2007)4 SCC

627], it is contended that High Court even if it finds that the

punishment is disproportionate, cannot direct reinstatement and has

to remit the matter to the employer for reconsideration of the

quantum of punishment. Relying on the judgment in Syndicate

Bank and others v. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati [(2006) 3 SCC

150], it is contended that non-supply of documents which are neither

forming part of the charge nor relied on by the prosecution is not

prejudicial, so as to violate the principles of natural justice. The

judgment in State Bank of India and another v. Bela Bagchi and

others [AIR 2005 SC 3272] is relied on to contend that a Bank

officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and

integrity as he deals with money of depositors and customers. In

Canara Bank v. V.K. Aswathy [AIR 2005 SC 2090], it was held that

if detailed charge sheet has been served on the respondent

2025:KER:81983

employee and had submitted reply and participated in proceedings

and unless failure of justice has occasioned and if no prejudice has

been caused, the court need not go into the 'useless formality

theory' in detail and even a post decisional hearing would suffice.

Reliance is also placed on the dictum laid down in Damoh Panna

Sagar Rural Regional Bank and another v. Munna Lal Jain [AIR

2005 SC 584] to point to the emergence of the Wednesbury

Principle and to contend that the scope of judicial review is limited.

Placing reliance on the dictum in Tara Chand Vyas v. Chairman &

Disciplinary Authority and others [(1997) 4 SCC 565], it is

submitted that Banks are means of achieving socio-economic goals

laid down in the Constitution, and any conduct of the Bank

employees which adversely affects the achievement of those goals

should be meted out with disciplinary action. The dictum in

Disciplinary Authority cum Regional Manager and others v.

Nikunja Bihari Patnaik [(1996) 9 SCC 69] is relied on to contend

that procedural lapses constitute misconduct as defined in the

Regulations of the Bank, and proof of loss is not necessary to

impose a penalty. The learned counsel for the respondent Bank

thus prayed that Writ Appeal may be dismissed.

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7. We have heard both sides and have considered the

contentions put forth. It is the specific case of the appellant that he

had been prejudiced by the non-sharing of documents that had been

relied on against him in the disciplinary proceedings. He relies on

Ext.P8, which is a letter dated 16.06.2003 issued by him to the

Inquiry Authority, whereby he had forwarded a list along with the

details of the documents, which, as had been stated therein, are

necessary for him to defend his case. The list of documents so

requested had been produced as Ext.P13, along with the reply

affidavit dated 12.05.2007 filed in the W.P.(C). A perusal of the

document produced as Ext.P13 reveals that the same is a list

enumerating documents about two entities viz., M/s. Kaveri Trading

Company and M/s.Kalpa Oils, whose loan transactions with the

respondent Bank had been the subject matter of the disciplinary

proceedings against the appellant. The said list contains the details

of the documents sought as well as the justification and purpose of

seeking the same. It is further seen from Ext.P13 that while

explaining the reason for seeking copies, the appellant had, as

against each document sought, elaborated that in the light of the

specific allegation made against him, the relevant document is

2025:KER:81983

required to prove his case as well as to counter the allegations

against him in the disciplinary proceedings for instance the

allegation that there was no proper follow-up by the appellant with

the parties for getting the overdues adjusted.

8. As submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant, the

W.P.(C) did contain a specific pleading with respect to the denial of

documents. The appellant had preferred the detailed list comprising

three columns, viz., the number of documents, description of

documents, contents/justification for the same, etc., on the very date

on which the enquiry had started and that the list contained 216

documents with full justification. The same had been marked as

DEX 3 in the enquiry proceedings. He contends that the Inquiry

Authority commenced the inquiry on the same day without providing

any of the relevant documents as sought in Exts.P8 and P13. This

was contended to be a deprivation of a reasonable opportunity of

being heard, as defined by the principles of natural justice, and the

appellant was thus effectively disabled from defending his case

properly. It is admitted that thereafter, 35 documents were provided

to the appellant by the order of the Inquiry Authority, and the regular

inquiry commenced on the very date of issuing such order. A

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detailed breakup of the documents demanded by the appellant and

allowed to him had also been incorporated in the Writ Petition.

Thus, as contended by the learned counsel, the W.P.(C) contained a

specific pleading to the said effect supported by Exts.P8 and P13. It

is the case of the appellant that the learned Single Judge had

overlooked the same, and had erroneously concluded that no list

had been attached along with Ext.P8 and that the appellant had not

pointed out specifically the documents which he was not supplied

with. The learned Single Judge had also concluded that when the

Assisting officer of the appellant was asked as to whether he was

satisfied regarding the documents provided, he had affirmed such

satisfaction. Thus, it was held by the learned Single Judge that there

was no reason to sustain the allegation that documents requested

by the delinquent employee were not given to him and that no

sustainable reason had been made out to find a prejudice on that

count. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the satisfaction

which was recorded was with respect to the 'list of documents'

presented and could not have been taken to mean that all the

documents sought for had been received, especially since the Bank

themselves have no case that copies of all the documents sought for

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in Ext.P13 had been provided to the appellant. Reliance is placed on

the dictum laid down in Ramesh Chandra Mangalik (supra). We

find merit in the contention put forth by the learned counsel for the

appellant. The learned Single Judge had not referred to Ext.P13 and

had not considered the impact of the denial of the documents that

had been sought for by the appellant. It is clearly revealed that the

Inquiry Authority had in Ext.R1 D Inquiry Report relied on documents

numbered as DEX- 11, 12, 27, 48, 55 and 56 in the enquiry, which

were not supplied to the appellant at any point of time. Respondent

Bank has no case that copies of the said documents were supplied

to the appellant and would rather justify such refusal to supply by

relying on the 'Note' in Regulation 6(10) of the Union Bank of India

Officer Employees (Disciplinary & Appeal) Regulation, 1976,

contending that the Inquiry Authority had the power and authority to

weigh-in the relevancy of the document before supplying it to the

delinquent employee. The said contention is not sustainable in view

of the clear stipulation in the very same Regulation of 1976 viz.,

Regulation 6(3) which mandates that the delinquent shall be

supplied with copies of the documents as well as the proviso to

Regulation 6 (3) which stipulates that wherever it is not possible to

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furnish the copies of documents, the disciplinary authority shall allow

the officer employee, inspection of such documents within a time

specified in this behalf. Further as per Regulations 6(11) and (12) of

the Regulation of 1976, it was the duty of the Inquiring Authority on

receipt of the notice for the discovery of production of the

documents, to forward the same or copies thereof to the authority in

whose custody or possession the documents are kept, with a

requisition for the production of the documents on such date as may

be specified. Nothing has been produced by the respondent Bank to

show that upon receipt of Exts.P8 and P13 list of documents from

the delinquent employee, the above-mentioned provisions were

complied with. Non-compliance with the same, squarely vitiates the

inquiry and the contention of the appellant that there had been a

violation of principles of natural justice is valid and substantiated.

The findings to the contrary by the learned Single Judge in the

impugned judgment are thus unsustainable.

9. That takes us to the next contention of the learned counsel

for the appellant based on proportionality. The norms to be followed

while applying the principle of proportionality are no longer re

integra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan and

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others v. Heem Singh ((2021) 12 SCC 569) observed that service

jurisprudence recognises proportionality as a legal principle in

allowing the authority of the court to interfere when the finding or the

penalty is disproportionate to the weight of evidence or misconduct.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Modern Dental College and

Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2016 (3) KLT SN

38 (C.No.32) SC] has held that the principle of proportionality is

inherently embedded in the Indian Constitution under the realm of

reasonable restrictions and that the same can be traced to Article

19. In Coal India Ltd. and another v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri

and others [AIR 2010 (SC) 75], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while

considering the legal correctness of removal of an employee from

service, though in a different context of unauthorised absence from

duty, had discussed in detail the precedents on the doctrine of

proportionality and held as follows:

"The doctrine of proportionality is thus a well-recognised concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision maker to quantify punishment once charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of punishment which is grossly in excess of the allegations cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope of judicial review. One of the tests to

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be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be, would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration the measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. In a case like the present one, where the misconduct of the delinquent was unauthorized absence from duty for 6 months, but upon being charged of such misconduct, he fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he did not have any intention nor desire to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any of the company's Rules and Regulations, but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control and as a matter of fact, he sent his resignation, which was not accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to be justified, since in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. The punishment is not only unduly harsh, but grossly in excess of the allegations. Ordinarily, we would have sent the matter back to the appropriate authority to for reconsideration on the question of punishment, but in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this exercise may not be proper. In our view, the demand of justice would be met if the respondent no. 1 is denied back wages for the entire period by way of punishment for the proved misconduct of unauthorized absence for six months." Emphasis supplied)

The Hon'ble Supreme Court had thus, after laying down the

contours of the doctrine and the manner in which it is to be

employed in a given fact situation, had also held that the doctrine of

proportionality would be met by imposing a lesser punishment rather

than removal from service.

10. As regards the appellant, he is a person now aged 70

years who has rendered long service of 25 years in the respondent

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Bank. The charges levelled against him, as enumerated in the

articles of charges of Ext.R1D Inquiry Report states that he had

flouted the lending norms/procedures/rules and sanctioned/

recommended advances/enhancements without proper assessment

and despite knowing unsatisfactory dealings/records of the party. He

had thus abused his delegated authority and did not

monitor/supervise the advance and accommodated the party by

jeopardising the interest of the Bank. It is relevant to note that of the

five persons who were co-accused in the same episode, only the

appellant had been imposed with the highest penalty. While all

others were imposed with increment cuts, the appellant alone was

visited with the major penalty of dismissal from service. Admittedly,

all Bank documentation was in order, and there was total

compliance with legal formalities. The fact that the Debt Recovery

Tribunal had decreed the matter in favour of the Bank fortifies the

conclusion that legal mandates had been met. No loss whatsoever

had been occasioned to the Bank in the imbroglio. All export bills

purchased involved had been duly insured with the Export Credit

Guarantee Corporation (ECGC), and money advanced, bills

purchased were received back by the Bank. Had there been any

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lapse on the part of the Bank in the said respect, the ECGC would

not have indemnified the Bank at all. It is also relevant to note that,

after the event, the respondent Bank had returned all the documents

to the concerned party, finding that nothing else was due from them.

The matter involving the appellant is not one pertaining to

misappropriation of customers money or any other financial

malfeasance or misfeasance. The penalty of dismissal imposed on

the appellant is, thus, highly disproportionate and shocks the

conscience of any man of ordinary prudence. The Hon'ble Supreme

Court has in Dr.Sunil Kumar Singh v. Bihar Legislative Council

(Through Secretary) and others [2025 SC OnLine SC 439]

reiterating the importance of proportionality when dealing with the

question of punishment or disciplinary action for misconduct at the

workplace, whether it be in public service or private organisations,

held that the nature of the misconduct, the circumstances of the

occurrence, the history and effect of the incident are all factors which

ought to be taken into consideration. It has been held therein that

service laws in India are riddled with such precedents, mandating

employers, including the Government, to take all circumstances into

account and undertake proportionate action against offences

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committed by the employees. We deem that the facts and

circumstances of the case at hand merit consideration in similar

lines. The major penalty of dismissal from the services of the

respondent Bank imposed on the appellant vide Ext.P11 order of the

Disciplinary Authority is, in the facts and circumstances of the case

as discussed herein above, patently disproportionate which shocks

the conscience of this Court and is legally unsustainable. As regards

Ext.P12 appellate order dated 16.06.2005 is concerned, the same is

totally devoid of any reasoning. The same, issued without discussing

any of the challenges raised in the appeal preferred by the appellant,

cryptically concludes that "The various grounds raised by Sri.

Ramanarayanan in his appeal do not merit any consideration." The

appellate Order (Ext.P12) had thus been rendered mechanically and

without proper application of mind, rendering it unsustainable in law.

The learned Single Judge, while rendering the impugned judgment

dismissing the W.P.(C), had overlooked the above aspects. The

impugned judgment is thus fit to be interfered with.

Accordingly, we set aside the judgment of the learned Single

Judge and quash the enquiry report dated 25.10.2003 and all further

proceedings pursuant thereto, including Ext.P11 order of the

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Disciplinary Authority and Ext.P12 order of the Appellate Authority.

Consequently, the appellant shall be entitled to all emoluments and

benefits of service to which he would have been legally entitled to,

had he been honourably retired from service. The Writ Appeal is

allowed as above.