Kerala High Court
Ashkar vs State Of Kerala on 27 October, 2025
Author: A.K.Jayasankaran Nambiar
Bench: A.K.Jayasankaran Nambiar
2025:KER:80334
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JOBIN SEBASTIAN
MONDAY, THE 27TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2025 / 5TH KARTHIKA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 37737 OF 2025
PETITIONER:
ASHKAR
AGED 35 YEARS
S/O ABDUL HAKEEM, VAZHAKALAYIL VEEDU, NEETHIVILASAM
COLONY DESOM, ERIYAD, KODUNGALLOOR, THRISSUR.,
PIN - 670112
BY ADVS.
SHRI.M.H.HANIS
SMT.T.N.LEKSHMI SHANKAR
SMT.NANCY MOL P.
SHRI.ANANDHU P.C.
SMT.NEETHU.G.NADH
SMT.RIA ELIZABETH T.J.
SHRI.SAHAD M. HANIS
RESPONDENTS:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, HOME AND
VIGILANCE DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2 DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE,
RANGE OFFICE, THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN - 670002
3 THE CHAIRMAN
ADVISORY BOARD, KAAPA, SREENIVAS, PADAM ROAD,
VIVEKANANDA NAGAR, ELAMAKKARA,ERNAKULAM DIST, PIN -
682026
BY ADVS.
SRI.K.A.ANAS, G.P.
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
27.10.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
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JUDGMENT
Jobin Sebastian, J.
This is a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, challenging Ext.P1 order of externment passed against the
petitioner under Section 15(1)(a) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities
(Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA(P) Act for the sake of brevity]. By the said
order, the petitioner was interdicted from entering the limits of the
Revenue District Thirssur for a period of six months from the date of
the receipt of the order.
2. The records available before us reveal that, it was after
considering the recurrent involvement of the petitioner in criminal
activities on 13.07.2025, the District Police Chief, Thrissur Rural
submitted a proposal for the initiation of proceedings against the
petitioner under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007 before the
jurisdictional authority, the Deputy Inspector General of Police,
Thrissur Range. For initiation of proceedings, the petitioner has been
classified as a "known rowdy" as defined under Section 2(p)(iii) of the
KAA(P) Act, 2007.
3. The authority considered five cases in which the petitioner
got involved while passing the order of externment. The case
registered against the petitioner with respect to the last prejudicial
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activity is crime No.1191/2025 of Kodungallur Police Station, alleging
commission of the offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2),
118(1), 110, 296(b) r/w 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short
"BNS").
4. Heard Sri.M.H.Hanis, the learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner, and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that
the Ext.P1 order was passed on improper consideration of facts and
without proper application of mind. According to the counsel, there is
an inordinate delay in passing the impugned order, and hence, the live
link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of
externment is snapped. The learned counsel further urged that the
jurisdictional authority ought to have taken note of the fact that
already proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner under
Section 126 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (for short
"BNSS"), 2023, and the same would have been sufficient to prevent the
petitioner from being involved in criminal activities. On these
premises, it was urged that the impugned order of externment is liable
to be set aside.
6. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader submitted
that the impugned order was passed by the jurisdictional authority
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after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite
objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the learned
Government Pleader, there is no unreasonable delay in passing the
impugned order, and hence, the petitioner could not be heard to say
that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose
of externment was snapped. Similarly, the learned Government Pleader
submitted that the impugned order was passed by the jurisdictional
authority after being satisfied that proceedings under Section 126 of
the BNSS would not suffice to prevent the petitioner from engaging in
criminal activities. According to the learned Government Pleader, the
detaining authority passed the Ext.P1 order after arriving at the
requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction, and no
interference is warranted in the said order.
7. On perusal of the records, it is evident that the last prejudicial
activity considered by the jurisdictional authority while passing Ext.P1
order of externment is crime No.1191/2025 of Kodungallur Police
Station registered, alleging commission of the offences punishable
under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 110, 296(b) r/w 3(5) of BNS.
The incident which led to the registration of the case with respect to
the last prejudicial activity occurred on 30.06.2025, and in the said
case, the petitioner was arrested on 01.07.2025 and subsequently
released on bail on 09.07.2025. It was on 13.07.2025, while the
externee was on bail, the District Police Chief, Thrissur Rural,
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forwarded the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the
KAA(P)Act against the petitioner. Later it was on 29.08.2025, Ext.P1
externment order was passed.
8. The sequence of events narrated above reveals that there is
no unreasonable delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the
externment order. The proposal for initiation of proceedings under the
KAA(P) Act was mooted by the sponsoring authority within thirteen
days and the externment order was passed within two months from the
date of the last prejudicial activity. Moreover, an externment order
under the KAA(P) Act has a significant bearing on the personal as well
as fundamental rights of an individual. Therefore, some minimum time
is required to collect the details of the cases in which the petitioner is
involved and to comply with the procedural formalities. Therefore, we
are of the view that the minimum delay occurred in this case is only
justifiable, and it could not be said that the live link between the last
prejudicial activity and the purpose of the impugned order is snapped.
Moreover, unlike in the case of an order of detention passed under
Section 3 of the KAA(P) Act, even if some delay has occurred in passing
an order of externment, the same has no serious bearing as the
consequences of both the orders are different. Because an order of
detention is a grave deprivation of the personal liberty of the person
detained. We are cognizant that Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act also
visits the person concerned with an intrusion on his personal liberty
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within the limit of Article 21, especially when the said order restrains a
citizen from his right to travel in any part of India. However, when a
detention order under Section 3 of the KAA(P) Act is compared with an
order of externment passed under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act,
the latter visits a person with lesser deprivation of liberty. Therefore,
the nature of proceedings under Sections 3(1) and 15(1)(a) are
inherently different. In this regard, we are fortified by the decision in
Stalin C.V. v. State of Kerala and others [2011 (1) KHC 852].
Moreover, an order under Section 15(1)(a) can be treated only as
equivalent to a condition imposed in a bail order, especially when the
same only curtails the movement of the petitioner. Consequently, we
have no hesitation in holding that the minimal delay in mooting the
proposal and in passing the externment order after the date of the last
prejudicial activity has no serious impact at all, and the same is only
liable to be discarded.
9. Another contention taken by the learned counsel is that, as
already proceedings under 126 of BNSS were initiated against the
petitioner and the same would have been sufficient to prevent the
petitioner from being involved in criminal activities. While considering
the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that
proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS would have been sufficient
to restrain the petitioner from repeating the criminal activities, first of
all, it is to be noted that proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS,
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and action under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act operates in
different spheres. Under Section 126 of the BNSS, a person is only
called to furnish security for his good behaviour. On the other hand,
under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act, a person who has criminal
antecedents is interdicted from entering a particular area where he
has repeatedly been involved in criminal activities. Therefore, action
under the KAA(P) Act is more effective and operates in a totally
different sphere. It is for the jurisdictional authority to decide whether
action under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act is necessary against a
person against whom already proceedings under Section 126 of the
BNSS have been initiated. Proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS
will in no way preclude the jurisdictional authority from initiating
proceedings under the KAA(P) Act. Moreover, in the impugned order,
the fact that the petitioner has already executed a bond in terms of
Section 126 of BNSS is specifically adverted to. Likewise, in the order,
it is recorded that all the actions already taken under are insufficient,
and an order under the KAA(P) Act is highly necessary to restrain him
from repeating criminal activities. The said explanation in the
impugned order justifies the present externment order.
10. From a perusal of the records, we are satisfied that all the
necessary requirements before passing an order under Section 15(1)
(a) of the KAA(P) Act have been scrupulously complied with in this
case. We are further satisfied that the competent authority passed the
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externment order after thoroughly verifying all the materials placed by
the sponsoring authority and after arriving at the requisite objective,
as well as subjective satisfaction. Therefore, it cannot be said that the
order passed under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act is vitiated in any
manner.
In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has
not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails
and is accordingly dismissed.
Sd/-
DR. A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
JUDGE
Sd/-
JOBIN SEBASTIAN
JUDGE
ANS
WP(C) No.37737 of 2025 :: 9 ::
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APPENDIX OF WP(C) 37737/2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. B3-
17368/2025/TSR DATED 29.08.2025 OF THE
2ND RESPONDENT
Exhibit P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED
08.10.2025 IN O.P.NO. 201/2025 OF THE
3RD RESPONDENT
