Kerala High Court
Selvin Abraham vs Punjab & Sind Bank on 22 May, 2025
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O.P. No.25142 of 1998
1 "C.R."
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.M.MANOJ
THURSDAY, THE 22ND DAY OF MAY 2025 / 1ST JYAISHTA, 1947
OP NO. 25142 OF 1998
PETITIONER:
SELVIN ABRAHAM,
KANDATHIL HOUSE, MOONNILAVU PO,
PALA, KOTTAYAM DISTRICT.
RESPONDENTS:
1 PUNJAB & SIND BANK
CENTRAL OFFICE, BANK HOUSE, 21, RAJENDRA PLACE, NEW DELHI,
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN & MANAGING DIRECTOR.
2 GENERAL MANAGER,
REVIEWING AUTHORITY PUNJAB & SIND BANK, CENTRAL OFFICE,
BANK HOUSE,21, RAJENDRA PLACE, NEW DELHI.
3 DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER(P),
APPELLATE AUTHORITY, PUNJAB & SIND BANK, CENTRAL OFFICE,
BANK HOUSE, 21, RAJENDRA PLACE, NEW DELHI.
4 DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER (ZONAL HEAD) AND DISCIPLINARY
AUTHORITY,PUNJAB & SIND BANK, ZONAL OFFICE, SPENCER
TOWERS, MOUNT ROAD, MADRAS.
5 A.K.OHRI,MANAGER, PUNJAB & SIND BANK,
OPPANAKKARA STREET, COIMBATORE
BY ADVS. K.JAJU BABU (SR.)
C.S.SHEEJA
ABRAHAM P.GEORGE
M.SANTHY(K/001410/1999)
THIS ORIGINAL PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 08.04.2025,
THE COURT ON 22.05.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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O.P. No.25142 of 1998
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P.M. MANOJ, J
------------------
O.P. No. 25142 of 1998
----------------------
Dated this the 22nd day of May, 2025
JUDGMENT
The Original Petition is preferred challenging Exts.P1, P13, P16 &
P20. Ext.P1 is the order of suspension, and Ext.P13 is the original
order imposing punishment of dismissal without notice. Ext.P16 is the
appellate order confirming Ext.P13. Ext.P20 is the confirmation of
Exts.P13 & P16 in the light of Ext.P19 judgment in review.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that he was appointed as Junior
Management Grade-I Scale Officer in the 1st respondent Bank. Later,
he was promoted as Assistant Manager. While continuing at the
Coimbatore Branch as Assistant Manager, the petitioner was placed
under suspension as per Ext.P1 dated 27.07.1993. A punishment of
dismissal was imposed on the petitioner by the 4th respondent as per
Ext.P13 dated 13.06.1995. The punishment imposed is dismissal
without notice. The said order was confirmed by the appellate
authority as per Ext.P16 dated 15.07.1996. Thereafter, the review
preferred was also considered in the light of Ext.P19 judgment of this
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Court in O.P. No.13396 of 1998. Being aggrieved by the
aforementioned orders, the petitioner preferred this Original Petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
3. This case has a chequered history. It went up to the Hon'ble
Apex Court and later came up before this Court once again for
consideration of the same on merits. In fact, all other litigations pertain
to the jurisdiction of this Court in the matter as the entire incident
occurred at Coimbatore which comes within the territorial jurisdiction
of High Court, Tamil Nadu. Finally, it was answered by an order dated
02.04.2024 in reference.
4. The contentions raised by the petitioner are as follows:
▪ Firstly, Ext.P13 order is not in accordance with Regulation 4 of
the Punjab and Sind Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and
Appeal) Regulations, 1981(hereinafter referred to as
'Regulations, 1981').
▪ Secondly, while deviating from the report of the enquiry officer,
the disciplinary authority did not assign a specific reason for such
deviation.
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▪ Thirdly, no notice proposing tentative punishment prior to Ext.P13
order of dismissal was issued to the petitioner.
▪ Fourthly, the enquiry officer was appointed without properly
considering the written statement of defence in violation of the
statutory provisions under Clause 6(4).
▪ Fifthly, the disciplinary action was concluded in violation of
Regulation 6(17).
▪ Sixthly, the appeal was considered by an authority having the
same rank as the disciplinary/appointing authority.
▪ Seventhly, the petitioner challenges the charge that there is
violation of Clause 3(1) and (2) of the Punjab and Sind Bank
Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1981 (hereinafter
referred to as 'Conduct Regulations, 1981').
▪ Eighthly, the review petition was not considered and disposed of
in time.
▪ Ninthly, the punishment imposed is disproportionate.
▪ Finally, the files pertaining to the disciplinary proceedings are
lost. Thereby, the only remedy is to set aside the entire
proceedings.
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5. For the consideration of the aforesaid contentions, the facts
that led to this incident need to be described. The petitioner joined the
service of the respondent Bank as a Probationary Officer in Junior
Management Grade Scale I on 02.04.1983. After serving various
Branches, on 13.05.1993, the petitioner joined the Coimbatore Branch
as Assistant Manager. It is stated that while working as Assistant
Manager at Coimbatore Branch, he came across very serious
irregularities committed by the Branch Manager. This was reported to
the higher authorities, which resulted in an antagonistic attitude
towards the petitioner from the Branch Manager, thereby he tried to
transfer the petitioner from that Branch. While so, on 27.07.1993, the
Branch Manager incriminated him in a false criminal case that the
petitioner had manhandled him. The Branch Manager also intimated
the same to the higher authorities through emergency calls prevailing
during that period. Therefore, the suspension order dated 28.07.1993
was issued; however, in the meanwhile, the complaint preferred to the
police was referred by them after due enquiry, and the Bank did not
attempt a follow-up action.
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6. Thereafter, the petitioner was served with two memos of
charges. One is for obstinacy shown towards the directions of the
Branch Manager as per the memo of charges dated 24.08.1993, and
the other is for misbehaviour and manhandling of the Branch Manager
as per the memo of charges dated 21.08.1993. Both the memo of
charges were replied to by the petitioner by negating the same and he
tried to explain the prejudicial attitude towards him by the Branch
Manager. Thereafter, an enquiry was conducted, and a report was filed
as per Ext.P11. Though the findings are in favour of the petitioner,
ultimately, without assigning any reason, the enquiry was concluded
where the charge of manhandling is proved, but the earlier part of the
findings specifically found that ".......It is proved that CSO entered the
Branch Manager's cabin in furious mood as he was having lot of
pressure of the salary deductions and due to Branch Manager's
prejudice attitude, there might be some heated exchange between
Branch Manager & CSO and CSO might have taken the salary register
forcibly from the Branch Manager which may have resulted in push and
fall of Branch Manager's spectacles." In the light of such an enquiry
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report, Ext.P13 order was issued whereby the petitioner was dismissed
from the service of the Bank without notice.
7. Ex.P14 appeal was preferred before the appellate authority.
Since there was no result on Ext.P14 appeal and as the appellate
authority constituted was on the same rank and status, the petitioner
preferred Ext.P15. Ultimately, by Ext.P16 order, the Deputy General
Manager, the authority in the same rank as that of the authority which
issued Ext.P13, has disposed of the appeal confirming Ext.P13.
Thereafter, the petitioner preferred a review petition before the
reviewing authority as per Ext.P17 and O.P. No.13396/1998 has been
preferred for an expeditious disposal of the review petition. By
judgment dated 17.07.1998, the Original Petition was disposed
directing the General Manager, reviewing authority, to render an
opportunity of being heard to the petitioner and pass appropriate
orders within the stipulated time. In the light of the said judgment,
the Review Petition was disposed of by Ext.P20, confirming Ext.P13 and
Ext.P16.
8. The petitioner, who appeared in person, primarily tries to
establish that the punishment imposed is not the one stipulated under
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the provision of Regulations, 1981. According to the petitioner, as per
Regulation 4, under penalties, altogether 11 punishments were
prescribed, which are as follows;
"(a) Censure;
(b) withholding of increments of pay with or without
cumulative effect;
(c) withholding of promotion,
(d) recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due
to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the
bank by negligence or breach of orders.
(e) Reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a
period not exceeding 3 years without cumulative effect and not
adversely affecting officer's pension.
Major penalties
(f) Save as provided for in (e) above reduction to a lower
stage in the time scale of pay for a specified period, with further
directions as to whether or not the officer will earn increments of
pay during the period of such reduction and whether on expiry of
such period the reduction will or will not have the effect of
postponing the future increments of his pay.
(g) reduction to a lower grade or post,
(h) compulsory retirement;
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(i) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification
for future employment.
(j) dismissal which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for
future employment."
Under the head, Major penalties, (h), (i) and (j) provide the
termination of employment in different ways, but none of them
contemplates a punishment that is prescribed in Ext.P13, which is
"dismissal without notice." According to the petitioner, in a civilised
society governed by the rule of law, punishment not prescribed under
the statutory rule cannot be imposed. As stated earlier, the
punishment imposed was not prescribed under Regulation 4(h) of the
Regulations 1981. In fact, Regulation 4(h) prescribes "compulsory
retirement." Such contentions raised by the petitioner on the strength
of the reported decision by the Apex Court in Vijay Singh v. State of
Uttar Pradesh and another [(2012) 5 SCC 242], in which an integral
certificate of the officer was withheld on the ground that he had not
recorded criminal history of accused who was charged under Section
60 of UP Excise Act. The question involved in that case was, whether
the disciplinary authority can impose punishment not prescribed under
the Statutory Rules after holding disciplinary proceedings. On a finding
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that, Rule 4, which is similar to that of Regulations 1981, does not
contemplate any punishment which denies integrity certificate, the
Apex Court entered into a finding that it is a settled proposition of law
that the punishment not prescribed under the rules as a result of
disciplinary proceedings cannot be awarded. Here, in the case on hand,
Regulation 4 of Regulation 1981 under the head 'major penalties', the
dismissal without notice is not prescribed. Only three modes of
removal from the service are prescribed under (h), (i) and (j) of
Regulation 4, which do not contemplate any punishment of dismissal
without notice.
9. Ext.P13 order of dismissal from service is based on Ext.P11
enquiry report. Though Ext.P11 enquiry report did not enter into a
finding that the charge that is raised against the petitioner "....while on
duty on 27.07.1993, misbehaved with the Branch Manager,
Sri.A.K.Ohri, he manhandled the Branch Manager, Sri. A.K. Ohri used
abusive language. He failed to maintain proper discipline in the office
and his behaviour was unbecoming an officer of the Bank." This act of
the petitioner is an act of misconduct and attracts sections under
Clause 3(1) and (2) of the Conduct Regulations, 1981 to be read along
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with Clause 24 of the said Regulations. Clause 24 of the Conduct
Regulations 1981 says the breach of any provisions of these regulations
shall be deemed to constitute a misconduct punishable under
Regulation 1981.
10. In the light of this provision, a memo of charges was issued
as per Ext.P8 and a written statement was submitted. Even without
properly considering the same, an enquiry was ordered by appointing
Sri.Sweety Iqbal Singh Bindra as the enquiry officer. However, it is not
specified that the enquiry was ordered to be conducted after not being
satisfied with the written statement. According to the petitioner, that
itself is an irregularity, since he had submitted his written statement
on 14.09.1993, and the disciplinary authority informed the petitioner
vide Ext.P6 communication dated 18.09.1993 that they decided to hold
an enquiry. Thereafter, an enquiry was conducted on both the charge
sheets; after conducting the enquiry, Ext.P11 report and Ext.P8 charge
memo were submitted. It appears that further proceedings on Ext.P7
memo of charges were dropped. Going by Ext.P11 enquiry report, it
appears that the enquiry officer had entered into the findings as
follows:
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"It has been observed from the proceedings as well as Exhibits
submitted by P.O. and CSO that there was a dispute/conflict between Selvin
Abraham and Branch Manager ever since he joined the B/O Coimbatore in
May, 1993. It is also observed from the exhibit that CSO was pointing out
day-to-day irregularities to higher authorities, which prejudiced Branch
Manager's attitude towards him".
11. This finding proved that the petitioner was a victim of the
wrath of the Branch Manager for having reported the irregularities and
that the allegations are motivated. The Enquiry Officer concluded his
report thus;
"There might be some heated exchange between Branch Manager &
CSO & CSO might have taken the salary register forcibly from the Branch
Manager which may have resulted in push and fall of Branch Manager
spectacles. Thus, Management charge of manhandling is proved."
Going by Ext.P11 enquiry report, it appears that the conclusion is
a paradoxical one at first blush. The enquiry officer found in favour of
the petitioner in his reasoning but only in conclusion it is stated that,
"Thus, the management charge of manhandling is proved". Going by
those words, it appears that it may be a missing of a word, "not", prior
to prove.
12. In the light of the said report, by Ext.P12, the petitioner
submitted his objection against the enquiry report. Even thereafter, on
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disagreeing with the finding of the enquiry officer as per Ext.P13, it was
held by the disciplinary authorities that "the findings drawn by the
Enquiry Authority are lopsided. He has not analysed the evidence on
record in the right perspective, and as such, I am left with no
alternative except to discuss in this order the issues involved." In the
light of this finding, the disciplinary authority decided to award the
penalty of dismissal without notice in terms of Regulation 4(h) of the
Regulations, 1981. According to the petitioner, such imposition of
punishment is against the well-settled principles of natural justice,
since the disciplinary authority, disagreeing with the findings of the
enquiry officer, shall afford an opportunity of submitting a
representation to the charged employee before entering into those
findings.
13. The petitioner is trying to establish the aforesaid contentions
on the strength of reported decisions such as :
Punjab National Bank & Ors v. Kunj Behari Misra [(1998) 7
SCC 84]
Shajimon v. State of Kerala [2002 (1) KLT SN 78],
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State Bank of India & Ors. v. K.P. Narayanan Kutty [(2003)
2 SCC 449],
Ranjit Singh v. Union of India & Ors. [(2006) 4 SCC 153]
Going by the aforementioned decisions it can be seen that the
Hon'ble Apex Court from 1998 onwards consistently followed the
position that, while disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry
authority on any article of charge, the disciplinary authority must
record the reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings
on such charge if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose
and shall afford a full opportunity to prove his innocence. The first
decision that is Punjab National Bank (Supra) was based on the
Regulation 1981 itself, especially, Regulation 7(2) which provides "the
disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the
Enquiring authority on any article of charge, record its own findings on
such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose."
This position was consistently followed in the other decisions cited
above. In the light of the said decisions, according to the petitioner,
Ext.P13 is issued in violation of the above principles, and punishment
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is imposed. Therefore, the said punishment imposed is against the
principles of natural justice.
14. The other contention also pertains to the violation of
principles of natural justice. Prior to the issuance of Ext. P13 final order
of punishment, no notice proposing the tentative punishment was
issued to the petitioner, and he was not afforded an opportunity to
show cause why that punishment should not be imposed. This position
is argued on the basis of the reported decisions in :
Malhotra v. Punjab National Bank [2013 (3) KLT SN 40 Case
No.43 SC]
Lav Nigam v. Chairman and Managing Director, ITI Limited
and another [(2006) 9 SCC 440]
SBI and others v. Arvind K. Shukla [(2004) 13 SCC 797]
Yoginath D Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and another
[AIR 1999 SC 3734]
15. In the aforementioned cases, the Hon'ble Apex Court
consistently followed the decisions rendered in Punjab National Bank
case supra and held that the disciplinary authority disagreeing with the
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findings of the enquiry officer in favour of officer and coming to a
conclusion that charges against the officer were proved and a show
cause notice to the officer shall be issued as to why he should not be
dismissed, lest violates the principles of natural justice. It is also found
that while intimating the same, the reasons by the disciplinary
authority for its disagreement were also to be communicated to the
officer.
16. On the strength of the aforementioned decisions, it is
contended that prior to issuing Ext.P13 and on disagreeing with the
findings of the enquiry officer, no 'show cause notice' was issued to the
petitioner, and no opportunity was given to him to explain his side prior
to imposing such punishment which is in violation of the principles
of natural justice.
17. The other contention is with respect to the violation of
statutory provisions, that though the written statement was preferred
by the petitioner on 14.09.1993, without considering the same, an
enquiry was ordered, and an enquiry officer was appointed. Prior to the
imposition of major penalty as per Regulation 6, since Regulation 6(4)
provides that "on receipt of the written statement of the officer
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employee, or if no such statement is received within the time specified,
an enquiry may be held by the disciplinary authority itself, or if it
considers it necessary to do so appoint under Sub-regulation (2) an
enquiry authority for the purpose.
Provided that it may not be necessary to hold an enquiry in
respect of the articles of charge admitted by the officer employee in his
written statement but shall be necessary to record the findings on each
such charge."
18. In the case on hand, according to the petitioner, without
considering the contentions in the written statement of defence,
enquiry officer was appointed. Such contention is raised on the basis
of reported decisions as follows :
E.S. Nambiar v. Union Bank of India [1991 (2) KLT 354]
Vijay Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (supra)
Ram Bahadur Pande and another v. State of Utharakhand and
other [(2015) 2 SCC 142]
C.L. Subramaniam v. The collector of Customs, Cochin [AIR
1972 SC 2178].
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19. On the strength of the aforementioned decisions, if the
regulations provide for show cause notice to an employee and filing of a
written statement of defence, an enquiry officer cannot be appointed prior
to the perusal of the delinquent's defence. Similarly, if the procedure
prescribed under the provisions of the regulation is not followed, the
disciplinary proceedings conducted are vitiated, since the regulations have
statutory force. An authority exercising such statutory power was
required to act within the four corners thereof. Here, in the case on hand,
the written statement was preferred on 14.09.1993, but the disciplinary
authority intimated the petitioner as per Ext.P6 communication dated
18.09.1993 that it was decided to conduct an enquiry and an enquiry
officer was appointed. According to the petitioner, it is in violation of
Regulation 6(4) of Regulations 1981, and it is also in violation of
Regulation 6(17), which reads as follows:
"The inquiring authority may, after the officer employee closes his
evidence, and shall, if the officer employee has not got himself examined,
generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the
evidence for the purpose of enabling the officer employee to explain any
circumstances appearing in the evidence against him."
In the case on hand, after closing the evidence, since he has not
examined himself, he is required to question on the circumstances
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appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the
officer employee to explain any circumstances appearing in the
evidence against him. This procedure is not followed. Hence, the
disciplinary proceedings conducted are vitiated.
20. With respect to the contention that the disciplinary authority
is the appointing authority, that authority cannot hear the appeal. In
the case on hand, Ext.P13 order is passed by the Deputy General
Manager, (Zonal Head) & Disciplinary Authority, whereas Ext.P16
appeal order is passed by the Deputy General Manager (Personnel),
the appellate authority. As per the procedure normally followed, an
appeal should be heard by a higher authority than the authority that
passed the order. Here in the case on hand, the appellate order is
passed by Deputy General Manager (Personnel), who is in the same
rank as Deputy General Manager, (Zonal Head) & Disciplinary Authority,
who passed Ext.P13 order of imposing punishment. As per the
principles of administrative jurisprudence, the appellate authority shall
be higher than the authority that passed the original order. That
principle and procedure are violated by passing Ext.P16 appellate
order.
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21. It is further contended that the charge framed itself is not
sustainable, going by Ext.P8 memo of charges which states as follows :
"Mr.Selvin Abraham, Officer u/s. B.O. Coimbatore while on duty on
27.07.93 misbehaved with the Branch Manager, Sri.A.K.Ohri. He
manhandled the Branch Manager Sri.A.K. Ohri and used abusive language.
He failed to maintain proper discipline in the office and his behaviour was
unbecoming of an officer of the bank.
This act of Mr.Selvin Abraham is an act of misconduct and attracts
disciplinary action under Section 3(1) & 3(2) of Punjab & Sind Bank Officer
Conduct Regulation 1981 to be read along with Clause 24 of the said
regulations."
22. On considering the afore-charge and reading out the words
under Regulation 3(1) and 3(2) of Conduct Regulation 1981, the words
that compose the said provision display that the same are intended
with respect to the business of the bank. There is no case against the
petitioner that he has caused any loss to the Bank, and he acted in a
deceitful manner. Sub-regulation (2) speaks about good conduct,
discipline, courtesy and attention to all persons in all transactions and
negotiations. Going by these words, the meaning conveyed is that
these provisions are meant with respect to the business of the bank
and not with respect to inter-personal contact between two employees
of the bank. Thereby, the charge itself is not sustainable.
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23. Then it is contended by the petitioner that the appeal or
revision preferred by the aggrieved person against the order of
imposing penalty should be considered in a time-bound manner. In the
case on hand, though the petitioner's appeal preferred before the
appellate authority was considered in a reasonable time, the review
preferred by the petitioner as per Ext.P17 was not considered in time,
thereby the petitioner was constrained to approach this Court by
preferring OP No.13396 of 1998. Only in the light of the directions in
the judgment, the review petition was disposed of by a non-speaking
order. In support of his contention, the petitioner brought the attention
of this court to a reported judgment of the Apex Court in S.S. Rathore
v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1989) 4 SCC 582] wherein it is held
that ordinarily, a period of 3 to 6 months should be the outer limit in
disposing appeals and revisions under the Service Rules. That would
discipline the system and keep the public servant away from a
protracted period of litigation.
24. Finally, it is contended by the petitioner that, going by the
affidavit dated 25.11.2013 preferred by the respondent Bank, it is
admitted by the authorities that the file pertaining to this case is
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completely lost. Under such circumstances, no further enquiry is
possible. Even a fresh enquiry is not practical. All these contentions
are taken in the light of reported decisions in Krishnan Nair v. State
of Kerala [1998 (2) KLT Case No. 46 SN] and Anant R Kulkarni vs
Y.P. Education Society & Ors [(2013) 6 SCC 515], whereby
contended that even a fresh enquiry is not possible. Under such
circumstances, the Original Petition is to be allowed, the punishment
imposed on the petitioner is unfounded, irregular, disproportionate and
violative of principles of natural justice since the order itself is
perversive and not sustainable, and the petitioner is also entitled to
back-wages. In support of this contention, the petitioner has produced
Gurpreet Singh v. State of Punjab [2002 (1) KLT SN 98 (C.No.125)
SC] and State Bank of India and others v. Palak Modi and
another [(2013) 3 SCC 607].
25. Per contra, the counsel for the respondent Bank contended
that the act committed by the petitioner was in violation of Rule 3 of
the Conduct Rules 1981 of the Bank. Rule 3 provides for the general
conduct of an officer employee that is not exclusively meant for the
business of the Bank, whereas it is the general behaviour expected
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from the officer employee within the Bank during its business hours.
The alleged incident occurred during the business hours of the bank
and within the premises of the Bank. Therefore, the petitioner cannot
contend that the charges are not sustainable, and the disciplinary
proceedings initiated against the petitioner under Rule 3 are not
sustainable.
26. It is further contended that there is no violation of Regulation
6(17), as the petitioner himself abstained from giving evidence.
Thereafter, he cannot contend that there has been a violation of
statutory provision and needs to be questioned on the basis of the
evidence, for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances
appearing in the evidence against him. This position has been clarified
on the strength of the reported decision in Union of India v.
Mohammed Ramzam Khan [1991 KHC 236] wherein the Hon'ble
Apex Court observed that :
"The reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provision under
consideration includes -
(a) an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he
can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the
allegations on which such charges are based;
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(b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses
produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in
support of his defence; and finally
(c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed
punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the
competent authority, after the enquiry is over and after applying his mind
to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the government
servant tentatively proposed to inflict one of the three punishments and
communicates the same to the government servant".
Therefore, the violation of principles of natural justice is not
applicable in this case as the petitioner had sufficient opportunity to
defend his side, even by cross-examining the management witnesses.
27. The primary question raised against the petitioner was on
the ground of territorial jurisdiction as the entire incident happened at
Coimbatore, and that place is situated in the territorial jurisdiction of
Tamil Nadu; this Court cannot entertain the Original Petition. However,
this question is answered by an order dated 02.04.2024. Hence, the
contention with respect to territorial jurisdiction is not pressed.
28. The counter affidavit filed by the 4th respondent denies all the
factual aspects referred to in the Original Petition. The contention with
respect to deviating from the enquiry is also defended, stating that it
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was not necessary for the disciplinary authority to reject the report of
the enquiry officer. The disciplinary authority has not rejected the
report in which the petitioner was found guilty by the enquiry officer.
The disciplinary authority has found that the findings are lopsided and
has not rejected the report or findings at any time. The disciplinary
authority has found there are stronger reasons and evidence to
establish the acts of misconduct and guilt of the petitioner than those
found by the enquiry officer. Therefore, the question of deviating from
the findings of the enquiry officer does not arise at all.
29. The counter affidavit further contended that the allegations
that the disciplinary authority was punishing the petitioner after
improper enquiry was not correct. The enquiry was properly conducted,
and the petitioner cannot make any complaint against it. Only the
reasoning given by the enquiry officer to his findings was not
appropriate.
30. The contention against non-compliance of Clause (7) of the
Regulation is also denied. The disciplinary authority is not required
to remit the case to the enquiry officer for fresh or further enquiry, as
stated by the petitioner. Disciplinary authorities were not acting as
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judges or prosecutors. The appellate authority considered the appeal
and found that there was no valid ground or substance in the appeal,
and it upheld the findings of the disciplinary authority. Thereby, Ext.P16
is valid.
31. The contention with respect to the status of disciplinary
authority and appellate authority is also denied. The appellate
authority was holding a different post. They held different posts that
were designed in accordance with the regulation by the Managing
Director as the disciplinary authority and appellate authority,
respectively. These objections were not raised by the petitioner at the
relevant time. It is further contended that the right to review is not an
absolute right. But it is a discretionary power to be exercised suo motu
by the reviewing authority. Even then, it has considered the review and
decided against the petitioner.
32. The contention that the punishment of dismissal is not in
conformity with the penalties in the regulation is without any
substance. The punishment of dismissal is the effective punishment
given to the petitioner, and the expression dismissal without notice is
of no consequence and is a dismissal simpliciter.
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27 "C.R."
33. Finally, the counsel for the respondents argued on the basis
of the reported decisions in Apparel Export Promotion Council v.
A.K. Chopra [(1999) 1 SCC 759], Management of State Bank of
India v. Smitha Sharad Deshmukh and another [(2017) 4 SCC 75]
and State of Rajasthan and others v. Bhupendra Singh [AIR 2024
SC 4034] that the scope of judicial review for interfering with
disciplinary proceedings is quite limited. In that regard, the learned
counsel for the respondents brought the attention of this Court to para
16 & 17 of the Apparel Promotion Council supra which are as follows :
"16. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that
in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge
of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the
appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to reappreciate
the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole
fact-finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of
evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not
normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the
recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings
were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or
inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the
High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority
over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while
exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normally
speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the
delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as
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28 "C.R."
imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment
or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate
authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of
the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and
impose some other punishment or penalty. Both the learned Single Judge
and the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, ignored the well-
settled principle that even though judicial review of administrative action
must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the court, in
exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with the
correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are
made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and
have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with
for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by
which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, it must be
remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the
examination of the decision-making process. Lord Hailsham in Chief
Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans observed:
"The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the
individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the
authority, after according fair treatment, reaches, on a
matter which it is authorized or enjoined by law to decide for
itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court."
17. Judicial review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of
the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the court, while exercising
the power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the fact that if the
decision has been arrived at by the administrative authority after following
the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the
individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the
court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative authority
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29 "C.R."
on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that
authority. "
Whereby it is contended that the High Court normally should not
interfere unless such findings are based on no evidence or were wholly
perverse and/or legally untenable, and the High Court cannot function
as an appellate authority.
34. Similarly, paragraph 6 of Management of State Bank supra
reads:
"6. In Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana³, after referring to H.C.
Goel case, this Court held at para 11: (Degala case³, SCC pp. 768-69)
"11. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry
proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against
the delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting
upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity
may arrive at a finding upholding the gravamen of the charge against
the delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the
finding of guilt even in departmental enquiry proceedings. The court
exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with the
findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings
excepting in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no
evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man
acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that
finding. The court cannot embark upon reappreciating the evidence or
weighing the same like an appellate authority. So long as there is some
evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental
authority, the same has to be sustained."
35. The High Court will not re-appreciate the evidence, and its
jurisdiction is limited only to examining whether there is evidence in
support of the conclusion. It is further pointed out that in State of
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30 "C.R."
Rajasthan supra as per paragraphs 20 to 24 & 27 it is contended by
the counsel for the respondents that the scope of judicial review under
Article 226 of the Constitution does not extend to reassessing evidence
on the ground that another view was possible on the material on record
and interference is needed only when the findings are perverse based
on no evidence and if there is a violation of natural justice.
36. The counsel for the respondent bank has also filed an
additional counter affidavit whereby it was contended that after the
termination of the service from the 1st respondent Bank petitioner
enrolled as an advocate before the Bar Council of Kerala in the year
2003 and he is a practicing lawyer before the Hon'ble High Court of
Kerala ever since his enrollment. His registration number and
enrollment number with the Bar Council is K/38/2003.
37. The said contention was also replied to by the petitioner,
the party in person, stating that the original petition was filed on
15.12.1998 through a lawyer. Thereafter, he joined the LLB Course in
the year 1999 and passed the course with 3rd rank and enrolled as an
advocate in the year 2003. Thereafter, he joined for LLM course in the
academic year 2003-05 and with first rank, he passed LLM in May, 2005
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from the MG University. Thereafter, he was practising as a junior to
Dr.George Abraham, Advocate, and it is contended that during the
juniorship, he had no independent vakalath. Even the details of
vakalath were provided for the years 2006-2010. Thereafter, due to
the financial crisis, he returned to agricultural activities for his
livelihood, and he is not a member of any of the Bar Associations. All
these contentions are raised only to show that he has no gainful
employment during this period.
38. I have heard Sri.Selvin Abraham, party in person and Adv.
Abraham P. George for the respondent.
39. As stated earlier, this case has a chequered history. Going by
the contentions in the writ petition and from the arguments advanced,
it appears that the petitioner herein is an academically brilliant person
whose life ended up in misery due to the disciplinary proceedings
initiated during his employment under the Punjab and Sind Bank.
40. The alleged incident occurred on 27.07.1993 while he was
working as Assistant Manager at the Coimbatore Branch. The charge
was that he manhandled the Branch Manager, Sri.A.K.Ohri and used
abusive language. He failed to maintain proper discipline in the office
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32 "C.R."
and his behaviour was unbecoming of an officer of a bank. The said act
of the petitioner attracts Clause 3(1) and 3(2) of the Punjab and Sind
Bank Officers Conduct Regulation, 1981, to be read along with Clause
24 of the said regulation.
41. Though a written statement was given to the memo of charge,
an enquiry was ordered, and by Ext.P11, the enquiry report was
preferred by the enquiry officer. Going by the entire enquiry report it
appears that, the enquiry officer came to a conclusion that the charge
of manhandling is proved. However, the finding just prior to that shows
that the enquiry officer did not find that the petitioner had committed
such indiscipline. In order to substantiate this observation, I deem it
appropriate to reproduce the finding in the report which reads as
follows:
"It has been observed from the proceedings as well as exhibit
submitted by P.O. and C.S.O. that there was a dispute/conflict
between Selvin Abraham and Branch Manager ever since he joined
the B/O Coimbatore in May 93. It is also observed from exhibit
that CSO was pointing out day to day irregularities to higher
authorities which prejudice Branch Manager's attitude towards
him.
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33 "C.R."
Branch Manager should have ascertained his exact leave record
from B/O Cochin ................... for salary deduction. Further, PO and
could not give proper justification for dropping MW Mr.
Vasudevan, ................ declaring Mr. Karuppasamy a hostile, as he
has given written statement in the fart finding stating that MW4
shouted and pushed Abraham, CSO also could not prove the
presence of DW Sh.Sitaraman and Mr.Seshadri in Branch
Manager's cabin. During their cross examination by CSO, both the
witnesses have stated that Branch Manager has shouted and
manhandled the CSO. If the was so, why they have not mentioned
in the written memorandum (Management exhibit) signed by all
workman staff including them submitted to Zonal Office. The
memorandum submitted to Branch Manager on 28/7/93 also did
not mention their presence in Manager's Cabin and manhandling
incident by Branch Manager. As such it can be presumed that these
two witnesses did not enter the Branch Manager Cabin and are not
stating the truth. It is further proved that Branch Manager cabin
was fully curtained and nobody could see from outside. CSO also
not rebutted this claim of management. It is also proved that MW1
Ravinder Singh was in Branch Manager's cabin throughout the
incident, the same has not been rebutted by CSO. It is also
observed that MW1 Ravinder Singh has stated that Selvin entered
Branch Manager's cabin in angry mood and used abusive language
while giving written statement to fact finding officer. But during
examination Chief/cross examination he has stated that Selvin
entered in furious mood and used these words" मादर चौदहुआ को मार
दी ". These Hindi words are normally used in North and it is
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34 "C.R."
expected to be used by person of South origin. So it can be
presumed that CSO has used abusive language but not the words
as mentioned in Charge Sheet.
Similarly MW4 during examination has stated that Selvin set for a
moment and without provocation he pounced on the Branch
Manager whereas a letter addressed to Zonal Manager, Branch
Manager stated hat he pounced upon salary register and office
note without using the word that he sat for a moment in his cabin.
Keeping in view of the proceedings/exhibits it is proved
that CSO entered the Branch Manager's cabin in furious
mood as he was having a lot of pressure of his salary
deductions & due to Branch Manager's prejudice attitude.
There might be some heated exchange between Branch
Manager & CSO & CSO might have taken the salary register
forcibly from the Branch Manager which may have resulted
in push and fall of Branch Manager spectacles. Thus
Management charge of manhandling is proved." (emphasis
supplied)
42. The findings and reasonings of the enquiry officer are contrary
to his conclusion and it also leads that there is no specific evidence to
the alleged incident and it is only on the words of one Ravinder Singh,
an officer of the bank, the only witness who is also a beneficial witness.
Being an employee of the bank cannot be treated as a neutral witness.
But that witness deposed that the petitioner entered the manager's
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35 "C.R."
cabin in an angry mood and used abusive language in Hindi vernacular,
and there is no specific deposition with respect to manhandling from
the sole person other than the aggrieved person.
43. The rest of the conclusions appear to be in favour of the
petitioner stating that "there might be some heated exchange between
Branch Manager and CSO (charge sheeted officer) and CSO might have
taken the salary register forcibly from the Branch Manager which may
have resulted in push and fall of Branch Manager's spectacles." From
these words, it cannot be presumed that there is a manhandling. Even
then it is stated by the enquiry officer that Management charge of
manhandling is proved, which in common parlance appears to be a
missing of the word 'not' prior to the word 'proved'. Such a finding
entered by me from the words of the disciplinary authority in Ext.P13
wherein it is specifically stated, "the findings drawn by the enquiry
officer are lopsided. He has not analysed evidence on record in the
right perspective and as such I am left with no alternative except to
discuss in this order the issue involved." Thereafter, he discussed the
entire incident at length. It is already considered by the enquiry officer.
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36 "C.R."
That itself shows that the report of the enquiry officer is in favour of
the petitioner.
44. Going by the impugned order itself it can be seen that except
the management witness, i.e. only an officer Ravinder Singh, has
supported the charge. All other staff denied such an incident. Rather,
a memorandum was submitted by the other staff against the Branch
Manager, which was interpreted by the disciplinary authority as a
solidarity towards the petitioner. That itself shows that the disciplinary
authority was determined to conclude the punishment in a pre-planned
manner, which ended up in the termination of the petitioner. Thereby,
he modified the findings of the enquiry officer and found, the petitioner
guilty of the misconduct imposed against him and awarded a penalty
of dismissal without notice in terms of Regulation 4(h). In fact, the
petitioner, as well as the counsel for the Bank handed over Punjab and
Sindh Bank Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981.
Going by the regulation produced by the petitioner, Clause 4(h)
prescribes "dismissal which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for
future employment", whereas from the copy of the Regulation 1981
handed over by the counsel for the respondent Bank, it appears that
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37 "C.R."
" 4(h) is a compulsory retirement." Whereas 4(j) prescribes dismissal,
which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment. From
the perusal of these two documents, which are Regulation 1981, it
appears that there is no punishment or dismissal without notice
prescribed in any of the regulations, especially under Clause 4(h).
From the above finding, it appears that there is some force in the
contentions raised by the petitioner.
45. This position is already considered by the Apex Court in Vijay
Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (supra), in which an
integral certificate of the officer was withheld on the ground that they
had not recorded the criminal history of the accused who was charged
under Section 60 of the UP Excise Act. The question involved in that
case was as to whether the disciplinary authority can impose
punishment not prescribed under the Statutory Rules after holding
disciplinary proceedings on a finding that, under the provisions of Rule
4, which is similar to that of Regulation 1981, does not contemplate
any punishment which denies an integrity certificate. In that
background, entering a finding that it is a settled proposition of law
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38 "C.R."
that the punishment, not prescribed under the rules as a result of
disciplinary proceeding, cannot be awarded.
46. Here, in the case on hand, Regulation 4 of Regulation 1981,
under the head-major penalties, dismissal without notice is not
prescribed. Only three modes of removal from the service are
prescribed under Regulation 4(f) (g) &(h) in the regulation provided by
the petitioner. Whereas, 4(h), (j), (i) of Regulation 4 from the
Regulation provided by the counsel for the respondent, nowhere the
punishment of dismissal without notice is contemplated. Hence, the
version of the Bank in the counter affidavit cannot be accepted. It
appears that the punishment which is imposed is one not prescribed
under the Statute.
47. Answer to the second contention of the petitioner is that the
disciplinary authority, while deviating from the findings of the enquiry
officer, has not assigned any specific reason. In fact, the said
contention is taken on a mistaken impression that the enquiry officer
found against the petitioner, but going by the words on evaluating the
entire report as stated above, may be an error occurred from the part
of the enquiry officer in adding a 'not' prior to the word 'proved'. This
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39 "C.R."
finding of mine is justified in the light of the discussions made in the
impugned order. It is a fact that the disciplinary authority was under
the impression that the enquiry officer entered into a conclusion in
favour of the delinquent employee. The disciplinary authority discussed
the entire facts and entered into a conclusion that the delinquent
employee is found guilty of the charges. However, that does not
discuss the gravity of the alleged indiscipline and does not explain why
such a capital punishment is warranted. But, simply entered into a
finding that the charge-sheeted officer is liable to be dismissed without
notice. From the aforementioned discussion, I am of the considered
view that the contention of the petitioner that the disciplinary authority
deviated from the findings without assigning a reason, should not be
accepted. However, the disciplinary authority entered into the finding
and imposed punishment without assessing the gravity of the
punishment. Therefore, the punishment itself was found to be
disproportionate.
48. Whereas the other contention with respect to no notice
proposing before tentative punishment is a matter to be assessed.
Going by the pleadings or nowhere in the contention of the counsel for
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40 "C.R."
the respondent that they have taken an opportunity to show that
sufficient notice to meet the principles of natural justice was issued to
the petitioner prior to the issuance of Ext.P13 to explain his reason why
a capital punishment of termination of service should not be imposed
on the alleged/proved charges. In fact, this position is confined by the
Apex Court in umpteen number of judgments; Ram Narain Singh v.
State of Punjab [(2015) 13 SCC 438], Delhi Transport Corporation
v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Others [1991 Supp.(1) SCC 600]
49. Going by the aforementioned decisions, which have already
been discussed along with the contentions of the petitioner in this
regard, it appears to me that the contention of the petitioner is
sustained. Accordingly, I find that there is a violation of the principles
of natural justice.
50. The other contention with regard to the violation of the
statutory provision i.e. Regulation 6(17), it appears that this position
is already held by this Court in Rajendra Pai v. Canara Bank [1988
SCC OnLine Ker 240] wherein it is held that in a case where the officer
employee has not got himself examined, it is mandatory on the part of
the enquiry officer to question the delinquent himself regarding the
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41 "C.R."
circumstances appearing against him in evidence for the purpose of
enabling the officer employee to explain any circumstances appearing
against him. Here, the petitioner himself abstains from giving evidence.
It appears that as per the statutory provision under Regulation 6(17),
generally questioned him on the circumstances appearing against him
in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the officer employee to
explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. That
cannot be diluted by pointing out that the word 'may' employed in the
first part of sub-regulation (17), wherein it is stated that the enquiry
authority, after the officer employee closes his evidence, shall, if the
officer employee has not got himself examined. In the light of the
findings in Rajendra Pai supra, I am of the considered opinion that
the issue is squarely covered. Thereby, the contention raised by the
petitioner that there is violation of statutory provision, sustains.
51. The other contention with respect to the status of the
disciplinary authority and the appellate authority, the justification
offered by the respondent bank in the counter affidavit, as well as
during the argument, cannot be accepted. In the administrative
jurisprudence, it prescribes the consideration of an order passed by the
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42 "C.R."
original authority by the higher authority in appeal. Otherwise, a
natural prejudice will occur by the appellate authority. The explanation
offered by the respondent bank was that two authorities assigned
different functions may not be a reason to deviate from the settled
positions. Hence, that point is also found in favour of the petitioner.
That also amounts to procedural irregularity.
52. The question raised with respect to the dispute on charge is
a matter that would have been considered at the original stage.
However, that issue is not at all considered by the bank due to the
natural bias. Going by the words employed under Clause 3 of the
Punjab and Sind Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Rules, it appears
that the said provision is meant for the general conduct of the officer
within the bank, whether it is for banking purposes or for a general
purpose which is a matter to be decided by the competent authority at
the original stage. Unless and until that is not decided by the original
authority, I am not venturing to answer that.
53. The delay in disposing of the appeal and review petition
appears to be correct since the appeal against Ext.P13 order was filed
by the petitioner on 21.07.1995 against the order of awarding
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43 "C.R."
punishment dated 30.06.1995 and the appellate order is dated
15.07.1996. There is a considerable delay in considering the appeal.
Similarly, the review was preferred against the appellate order dated
15.07.1996 before the reviewing authority on 31.07.1996. Thereafter,
he preferred further representation for the consideration of the review
petition on 26.06.1998. Even then, the review was not considered.
Hence, he had preferred OP No.13396/98, which was allowed with
directions to the respondent bank to consider the review within a period
of three months. Finally, the order on the review petition was passed
on 12.09.1998. Thereby, it is evident that there was a considerable
delay in disposing of the appeal as well as the review petition.
54. This position is already considered in SS Rathore supra
wherein it is held that service appeal or revision should ordinarily be
disposed within a period of three to six months. Such findings entered
by the Hon'ble Apex Court are only with an intention to discipline the
system and keep the public servant away from a protracted period of
litigation. This is in order to prevent further prejudice to the incumbent
who has undergone a disciplinary proceeding.
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44 "C.R."
55. Under such circumstances normally it requires to set aside
the original order of punishment for a fresh consideration to meet the
all requirement, however, the impugned order is dated 13.06.1995 and
going by the affidavit dated 25.11.2013 filed by the respondent bank,
the entire file pertains to this disciplinary proceedings is not traceable,
despite their persistent earnest efforts. Therefore, there is no point in
remanding the matter to the original authority after a lapse of this
much of time and also considering the age factor of the petitioner at
the time of filing this writ petition that he was at the age of 41 and he
even crossed the age of retirement much early. In the absence of a
file pertaining to disciplinary proceedings, there is no point in
remanding the matter back to the original authority.
56. However, on the basis of aforementioned discussions, I am of
the considered opinion that the findings in Ext.P13 are pervasive,
erroneous and in violation of principles of natural justice and the
punishment imposed is disproportionate. Hence, it is quashed. As
there is a delay against the settled principles in considering the appeal
and review, those orders are liable to be set aside. Moreover, the order
under review, which is a compliance with Ext.P19 order, is a non-
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45 "C.R."
speaking order and hence Exts.P16 and P20 are also quashed on the
above grounds.
In the result, the petitioner is liable to be reinstated from the
original date of suspension and he is entitled to back wages as held in
Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak
Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Others [(2013) 10 SCC 324] in which
the Supreme Court observed that the courts must always keep in view
that in the cases of wrongful/illegal termination of service, the wrong
doer is the employer and the sufferer is the employee/workman and
there is no justification to give a premium to the employer of his wrong
doings by relieving him of the burden to pay to the employee/workman
his dues in the form of full back wages.
Sd/-
P.M.MANOJ
JUDGE
ttb
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APPENDIX OF O.P.NO.25142 OF 1998
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 TRUE COPY OF THE SUSPENSION ORDER OF THE 4TH
RESPONDENT DATED 27.07.1993 ISSUED TO THE
PETITIONER.
Exhibit P2 TRUE COPY OF THE PHONOGRAM DATED 28.07.1993
SENT BY THE 5TH RESPONDENT TO THE 4TH
RESPONDENT.
Exhibit P3 TRUE COPY OF THE POLICE COMPLAINT DATED
27.07.1993 FILED BY THE 5TH RESPONDENT.
Exhibit P4 TRUE COPY OF JOINT MEMORANDUM DATED 29.07.1993
SENT BY THE STAFF TO THE 4TH RESPONDENT.
Exhibit P5 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 21.12.1993
ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER
REJECTING THE APPEAL MADE AGAINST SUSPENSION.
Exhibit P6 TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 18.09.1993
ISSUED BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER
CONSTITUTING THE ENQUIRY.
Exhibit P7 TRUE COPY OF THE CHARGE SHEET DATED 24.08.1993
ISSUED BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT TO THE PEITITONER.
Exhibit P8 TRUE COPY OF THE CHARGE SHEET DATED 21.08.1993
ISSUED BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER.
Exhibit P9 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 21.12.1994 ISSUED
BY THE ENQUIRY OFFICER TO THE PETITIONER
COMMUNICATING THE 4TH RESPONDENT'S INSTRUCTION
THAT ENQUIRY HAS TO BE CONDUCTED SIMULTANEOUSLY
INTO BOTH CHARGE SHEET DATED 24.08.1993 &
21.08.1993'.
Exhibit P10 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 15.10.1994 SENT
BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT ENCLOSING ENQUIRY REPORT
AND CALLING FOR SUMMATION.
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47 "C.R."
Exhibit P11 TRUE COPY OF THE ENQUIRY REPORT DATED NIL
FORWARDED BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT ALONG WITH
EXT.P10.
Exhibit P12 TRUE COPY OF THE SUMMATION DATED 05.11.1994
SENT BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 4TH RESPONDENT.
Exhibit P13 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 13.06.1995 ISSUED
BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT PUNISHING THE PETITIONER
WITH 'DISMISSAL 'WITHOUT NOTICE'.
Exhibit P14 TRUE COPY OF APPEAL DATED 21.07.1995 SUBMITTED
BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE APPELLATE
AUTHORITY THROUGH 4TH RESPONDENT.
Exhibit P15 TRUE COPY OF THE WRITTEN NOTE DATED 27.06.1996
SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE APPELLATE
AUTHORITY.
Exhibit P16 TRUE COPY OF THE APPELLATE ORDER DATED
15.07.1996 ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT TO THE
PETITIONER.
Exhibit P17 TRUE COPY OF THE REVIEW PETITION DATED
31.07.1996 FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE
2ND RESPONDENT.
Exhibit P18 TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED
26.06.1998 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE
THE CHAIRMAN & MANAGING DIRECTOR OF 1ST
RESPONDENT BANK.
Exhibit P19 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THIS HON'BLE COURT
IN O.P.NO.13396 OF 1998 DATED 17.07.1998 AND
ORDER DATED 04.08.1998.
Exhibit P20 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 12.11.1998 ISSUED
BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER.
Exhibit P21 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 28.07.1993 SENT
BY THE 5TH RESPONDENT TO THE 4TH RESPONDENT.
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48 "C.R."
Exhibit P22 TRUE COPY OF THE CERTIFICATE DATED 03.11.1999
ISSUED BY THE RUBBER BOARD.
Exhibit P23 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER
NO.PER.S.I/A.10(3)91/DR/928 DATED 16.05.1992
RESPONDENT EXHIBITS
Exhibit R1(a) COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT DATED
07.09.2015 IN SLP NO.35691/2013.
Exhibit R1(b) TRUE COPY OF APPLICATION FILED BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT IN SLP NO.35691/2013.
Exhibit R1(c) TRUE COPY OF LETTER DATED 11.05.2016.
