Kerala High Court
Chandramouli.V vs The Deputy Director on 26 March, 2025
Author: A.Muhamed Mustaque
Bench: A.Muhamed Mustaque
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
1
2025:KER:24506
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR
WEDNESDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF MARCH 2025 / 5TH CHAITHRA, 1947
WA NO. 2076 OF 2016
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 19.07.2016 IN WPC NO.15378 OF
2016 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
A.K SAMSUDDIN, AGED 71 YEARS
S/O. DR.A.KHALEQUE (LATE),R/O. NO.2/13,
2ND FLOOR, MIZAM OSTAGAR LANE,KOLKATA - 700 017,
(FORMERLY DEPUTY CHIEFCONTROLLER OF EXPLOSIVES,
ERNAKULAM.)
BY ADVS.
SRI.B.RAMAN PILLAI (SR.)
SRI.R.ANIL
SRI.T.ANIL KUMAR
SRI.B.KRISHNA KUMAR
SRI.A.RAJESH
SRI.M.SUNILKUMAR
SRI.SUJESH MENON V.B.
SRI.THOMAS ABRAHAM NILACKAPPILLIL
SRI.M.VIVEK
RESPONDENTS:
1 UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETATY TO GOVERNMENT OF
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2
2025:KER:24506
INDIA,MINISTRY OF FINANCE,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,6TH FLOOR,
'B' WING, JANPATH BHAVAN,JANPATH,
NEW DELHI - 110 001.
2 THE DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE,
6TH FLOOR,LOK NAYAK BHAVAN,
KHAN MARKET,NEW DELHI - 110 003.
3 JOINT DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE,
COCHIN ZONAL OFFICE,KANOOS CASTLE,
MULLASERY CANAL ROAD, (WEST),
COCHIN - 682 011.
4 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE,
COCHIN ZONAL OFFICE,KANOOS CASTLE,
MULLASERY CANAL ROAD (WEST),
COCHIN - 682 011.
BY ADV SRI.JAISHANKAR V.NAIR, RC, FOR ED
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 19.03.2025,
ALONG WITH WP(C)NOS..5562/2017, 5647/2017, 26120/2017 &
8373/2017, THE COURT ON 26.03.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
3
2025:KER:24506
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR
WEDNESDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF MARCH 2025 / 5TH CHAITHRA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 5562 OF 2017
PETITIONER:
MR. HARSHAD B PATEL, AGED 59 YEARS
S/O.BHAVANBHAI G PATEL,
8 B SUVAS 68 F NEPEAN SEA ROAD,
MUMBAI - 400 006.
BY ADVS.
SRI.BABU KARUKAPADATH
SMT.AMRIN FATHIMA
SRI.K.M.FAISAL KALAMASSERY
SRI.MITHUN BABY JOHN
SRI.J.RAMKUMAR
SMT.M.A.VAHEEDA BABU
SRI.P.U.VINOD KUMAR
RESPONDENT:
THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT,
CALICUT SUB ZONAL OFFICE, 3RD FLOOR,
KENDRIYA BHAVAN, M.S. BABU RAJ ROAD,
KALLAI P.O, CALICUT, KERALA 673 003.
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
4
2025:KER:24506
BY ADVS.
SMT.C.G.PREETHA, CGC
SRI.JAISHANKAR V.NAIR, CGC
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
19.03.2025, ALONG WITH WA.2076/2016 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE
COURT ON 26.03.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
5
2025:KER:24506
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR
WEDNESDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF MARCH 2025 / 5TH CHAITHRA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 5647 OF 2017
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED IN CC NO.2 OF 2011 OF ENQUIRY
COMMISSIONER& SPECIAL JUDGE,THRISSUR
PETITIONER:
S.VADIVELU,AGED 59 YEARS
AGED 59 YEARS, S/O.SUBHAYA GOUNDER,
FORMER EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ARK WOOD &METALS PRIVATE
LIMITED, NO.41, ARUCHAMI NAGAR,
MAHALINGAPURAM, POLLACHI, TAMIL NADU-642 001.
BY ADV SRI.K.ANAND
RESPONDENT:
THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT,
CALICUT SUB ZONAL OFFICE,3RD FLOOR,
KENDRIYA BHAVAN, M.S.BABU RAJ ROAD,
KALLAYI PO, CALICUT, KERALA-673 003.
BY ADVS.
SMT.C.G.PREETHA, CGC
SRI.GIRISH KUMAR V
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
6
2025:KER:24506
SRI.JAISHANKAR V.NAIR, SC, ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
19.03.2025, ALONG WITH WA.2076/2016 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE
COURT ON 26.03.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
7
2025:KER:24506
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR
WEDNESDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF MARCH 2025 / 5TH CHAITHRA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 8373 OF 2017
PETITIONER:
CHANDRAMOULI.V
(FORMER PARTNER M/S PIONEER ENTERPRISES)
S/O P. VENKATRAMANI, NOW RESIDING ATHOUSE NO.106,
PONNAYYARAJAPURAM,COIMBATORE-641001.
BY ADVS.
SRI.K.JAJU BABU (SR.)
SRI.RAHUL IPE PRASAD
SMT.M.U.VIJAYALAKSHMI
RESPONDENTS:
1 THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT,GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
3RD FLOOR,KENDRIYA BHAVAN, M.S BABURAJ ROAD,
KALLAI, CALICUT.673003.
2 UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF
INDIA,MINISTRY OF FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE,CENTRAL SECRETARIAT, NEW DELHI.110001.
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
8
2025:KER:24506
BY ADVS.
SMT.C.G.PREETHA, CGC
SRI.JAISHANKAR V.NAIR, SC, ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
19.03.2025, ALONG WITH WA.2076/2016 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE
COURT ON 26.03.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
9
2025:KER:24506
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR
WEDNESDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF MARCH 2025 / 5TH CHAITHRA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 26120 OF 2017
PETITIONER:
MR. NITHIN R, AGED 32 YEARS
S/O RADHAKRISHNAN, NINEETITA, 18/714,
D.P.O., ROAD, BIG BAZAR P.O,
PALAKKAD, KERALA-678014.
BY ADVS.
RANCE R.
N.RAGHURAJ (SR.)(K/114/1986)
SAYUJYA(K/687-E/2014)
VIVEK MENON(K/001227/2022)
RESPONDENTS:
1 THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT,
CALICUT SUB ZONAL OFFICE, 3RD FLOOR,
KENDRIYA BHAVAN, M.S.BABU RAJ ROAD,
KALLAI P.O., CALICUT, KERALA-673003.
2 THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR P.M.L.A
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE,
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, SUB ZONAL OFFICE,
CALICUT-673003.
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
10
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3 THE JOINT DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT,
COCHIN ZONAL OFFICE, KOCHI-682011.
BY ADVS.
SMT.C.G.PREETHA, CGC
SRI.JAISHANKAR V.NAIR
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
19.03.2025, ALONG WITH WA.2076/2016 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE
COURT ON 26.03.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
11
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CR
JUDGMENT
P.Krishna Kumar, J.
The primary issue in these cases is the
constitutional validity of the criminal proceedings
initiated under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money-
Laundering Act, 2002 ('PMLA', for short). According to
the appellant/petitioners, at the time when the act of
money laundering was allegedly committed, either (i)
the PMLA itself was not in force, or (ii) the predicate
offences were not included in the schedule of the said
Act, and thus all the proceedings initiated against
them by the Enforcement Directorate are in the teeth of
Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India.
2. The Writ Appeal is preferred against the
judgment of the Single Bench of this Court, upholding
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2025:KER:24506
such an action initiated by the Enforcement
Directorate. All the above Writ Petitions are placed
before us for disposal together with the Writ Appeal,
as the petitioners also challenge the investigation and
further proceedings under Section 3 of the PMLA on the
above grounds.
3. We heard the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant/petitioners as well as the Retainer Counsel
appearing for the Enforcement Directorate.
4. The question whether the offence of money
laundering under Section 3 of the PMLA can be extended
to a predicate offence which happened prior to the
coming into the force of PMLA or before the inclusion
of such offences in the schedule of the PMLA, is no
longer re integra. In Vijay Mandalal Chaudharay and
Others v. Union of India & Ors. [(2023) 12 SCC 1], the
Apex Court held that it is possible, as the offence
under Section 3 is a continuing offence. However, the
learned counsel appearing for the appellant/petitioners
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2025:KER:24506
forcefully submitted that the question of retrospective
application of Section 3 of the PMLA was not directly
in question in the said case. However, the Honourable
Supreme Court in its judgment dated 17.03.2025 in
SLP(Crl.)6185/2023 (Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v.
Directorate of Enforcement & Another) answered this
question pointedly and in the affirmative. The Court
held that money laundering is not a static event but an
ongoing activity, as long as illicit gains are
possessed, projected as legitimate, or reintroduced
into the economy and thus if the accused commits any of
the acts as defined in Section 3 of the PMLA after its
commencement, the Enforcement Directorate could
maintain a criminal action against him, irrespective of
the fact that the predicate offence allegedly took
place before the commencement of the PMLA. The court
held thus:
"21. A significant ground raised by the appellant
pertains to the nature of the alleged offence
under the PMLA. The appellant has contended that
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2025:KER:24506
the alleged acts do not constitute an offence
under the PMLA as the same was not in force
during the relevant period, or the predicate
offences as alleged were not included in the
schedule to the PMLA at the relevant time and,
therefore, cannot be subject to proceedings under
the PMLA. It has also been argued that these
instances do not constitute continuing offences.
This contention, however, is untenable. It is
well established that offences under the PMLA are
of a continuing nature, and the act of money
laundering does not conclude with a single
instance but extends so long as the proceeds of
crime are concealed, used, or projected as
untainted property. The legislative intent behind
the PMLA is to combat the menace of money
laundering, which by its very nature involves
transactions spanning over time.
22. The concept of a continuing offence under
PMLA has been well-settled by judicial
precedents. An offence is deemed continuing when
the illicit act or its consequences persist over
time, thereby extending the liability of the
offender. Section 3 of the PMLA defines the
offence of money laundering to include direct or
indirect attempts to indulge in, knowingly
assist, or knowingly be a party to, or actually
be involved in any process or activity connected
with the proceeds of crime. Such involvement, if
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2025:KER:24506
prolonged, constitutes a continuing offence.
23. Even though the issue of retrospective
application of the PMLA is pending adjudication
before this Court, the reliance by the respondent
on the observation of this Court in Vijay
Madanlal Chaudhary (Supra) cannot be said to be
misplaced. This Court, in its judgment in this
case made the following observations regarding
the offence of money laundering and its nature as
a continuing offence:
"134. From the bare language of
Section 3 of the 2002 Act, it is amply
clear that the offence of money laundering
is an independent offence regarding the
process or activity connected with the
proceeds of crime which had been derived
or obtained as a result of criminal
activity relating to or in relation to a
scheduled offence. The process or activity
can be in any form -- be it one of
concealment, possession, acquisition, use
of proceeds of crime as much as projecting
it as untainted property or claiming it to
be so. Thus, involvement in any one of
such process or activity connected with
the proceeds of crime would constitute
offence of money laundering. This offence
otherwise has nothing to do with the
criminal activity relating to a scheduled
offence -- except the proceeds of crime
derived or obtained as a result of that
crime.
135. Needless to mention that such
process or activity can be indulged in
only after the property is derived or
obtained as a result of criminal activity
(a scheduled offence). It would be an
offence of money laundering to indulge in
or to assist or being party to the process
or activity connected with the proceeds of
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2025:KER:24506
crime; and such process or activity in a
given fact situation may be a continuing
offence, irrespective of the date and time
of commission of the scheduled offence. In
other words, the criminal activity may
have been committed before the same had
been notified as scheduled offence for the
purpose of the 2002 Act, but if a person
has indulged in or continues to indulge
directly or indirectly in dealing with
proceeds of crime, derived or obtained
from such criminal activity even after it
has been notified as scheduled offence,
may be liable to be prosecuted for offence
of money laundering under the 2002 Act --
for continuing to possess or conceal the
proceeds of crime (fully or in part) or
retaining possession thereof or uses it in
trenches until fully exhausted. The
Offence of money laundering is not
dependent on or linked to the date on
which the scheduled offence, or if we may
say so, the predicate offence has been
committed. The relevant date is the date
on which the person indulges in the
process or activity connected with such
proceeds of crime. These ingredients are
intrinsic in the original provision
(Section 3, as amended until 2013 and were
in force till 31-7-2019); and the same has
been merely explained and clarified by way
of Explanation vide Finance (No.2) Act,
2019. Thus understood, inclusion of clause
(ii) in the Explanation inserted in 2019
is of no consequence as it does not alter
or enlarge the scope of Section 3 at all."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. In the present case, the material on
record establishes that the misuse of power and
position by the appellant, coupled with the
alleged utilization and concealment of proceeds
of crime, has had an enduring impact. The act of
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2025:KER:24506
laundering money is not a one-time occurrence
but rather a process that continues so long as
the benefits derived from criminal activity
remain in circulation within the financial
system or are being actively utilized by the
accused. The respondent has submitted that fresh
instances of the utilization of the proceeds of
crime have surfaced even in recent times,
thereby extending the offence into the present
and negating the appellant's contention that the
act was confined to a particular point in the
past.
25. The law recognizes that money laundering
is not a static event but an ongoing activity,
as long as illicit gains are possessed,
projected as legitimate, or reintroduced into
the economy. Thus, the argument that the offence
is not continuing does not hold good in law or
on facts, and therefore, the judgment of the
High Court cannot be set aside on this ground.
Even if examined in the context of the present
case, the appellant's contention does not hold
water. The material on record indicates the
continued and repeated misuse of power and
position by the appellant, resulting in the
generation and utilization of proceeds of crime
over an extended period. The respondent has
successfully demonstrated prima facie that the
appellant remained involved in financial
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2025:KER:24506
transactions linked to proceeds of crime beyond
the initial point of commission. The utilization
of such proceeds, the alleged layering and
integration, and the efforts to project such
funds as untainted all constitute elements of a
continuing offence under the PMLA. Thus, the
proceedings initiated against the appellant are
well within the legal framework and cannot be
assailed on this ground."
5. The appellant/petitioners assailed the act of
the Enforcement Directorate on the ground that
penalising a person for any act done in the past on the
basis of subsequent legislation is prohibited by
Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India. In fact,
going by the pleadings and records produced before us,
it appears that the appellant/petitioners are not being
proceeded against under the PMLA for any criminal act
done by them before the commencement of the PMLA. In
relation to an act done by a person before the
commencement of the PMLA or the amendment to its
schedule, the penal consequences will follow only if
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
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the accused uses/puts into circulation the tainted
money obtained by the past act, or when he projects
that it is untainted money or when he does any other
acts as defined in Section 3, after the commencement of
the PMLA and the amendment to its schedule in 2009.
6. Article 20(1) of the Constitution declares
that a person shall not be convicted for any offence
except for violation of a law in force at the time of
commission of the act. The expression 'law in force'
refers to a law that is factually in operation at the
time when the offence is committed, in contrast to a
law 'deemed to be in force' due to the retrospective
operation of a subsequently enacted law. This
interdiction cannot be extended to a case of the above
nature where a person is allegedly using the proceeds
of crime or projecting or claiming it as untainted
property, after the commencement of the relevant
statutory provision. In that case, there is no question
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
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of retrospective operation of a penal law. There is
only a reference in the statute to a past action, which
is only for the identification of the subject - the
proceeds of crime. There is no penal consequence for
the past act done by him, under the PMLA.
7. In view of the authoritative pronouncement made
by the Apex Court and in the light of the above
discussion, the main contentions raised in the above
matter do not survive.
8. However, Sri.Reghuraj, the learned Senior
Counsel as instructed by Sri. Vivek Menon, the learned
counsel appearing for the petitioners, raised another
legal issue. It is submitted that unless the person
accused of an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is
convicted of the predicate offence by a court of law,
he cannot be penalized for the offence allegedly
committed by him under Section 3 of the PMLA. If that
is the case, there is no point in proceeding with the
trial of the offence under the PMLA unless and until
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2025:KER:24506
the accused is convicted of the predicate offence, it
is contended. Therefore, it is suggested that the trial
of the offence under the PMLA should be kept in
abeyance until the conclusion of the trial of the
predicate offence.
9. Sri.Jaishankar V.Nair, the learned Retainer
Counsel for the Enforcement Directorate submitted that
such a course, if adopted, would seriously prejudice
the Enforcement Directorate. According to him, if the
trial of the predicate offence is delayed and the trial
under the PMLA is kept suspended till its conclusion,
the important witnesses to prove the offence under the
PMLA might not be available at the time when the trial
ultimately commences. The better course is to proceed
with both matters simultaneously but not to pronounce
the judgment in the PMLA case until the accused is
convicted of the predicate offence, it is submitted.
10. We find merit in the submissions made by both
sides. The issue, on one hand, is that if the trial of
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2025:KER:24506
the offence under PMLA proceeds by examining all the
witnesses by spending invaluable judicial time, it
would become a futile exercise if the accused is
ultimately acquitted in the predicate offence. On the
other hand, if the trial of the offence under the PMLA
is kept in limbo until the conclusion of the trial of
the predicate offence, the Enforcement Directorate may
even lose the most valuable evidence by that time.
11. In this circumstance, we deem it appropriate to
leave the matter for the just decision of the trial
court. Depending upon the nature of each case, it can
take a balanced course. The court may, in its
discretion, permit the Enforcement Directorate to
examine those witnesses who are required to prove the
most important elements of the crime (such as the act
of using the proceeds of crime or projecting or
claiming it as untainted) while the trial of the
predicate offence is pending. In such cases, the court
may keep the examination of the rest of the witnesses
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
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in abeyance until the conclusion of the trial.
12. The procedural and adjective law applicable to
the criminal trial permits the criminal courts to adopt
such a course when it is essential. In this regard, it
is beneficial to consider Section 253 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita ('Sanhita", for short). It
reads:
"If the accused refuses to plead, or does not
plead, or claims to be tried or is not
convicted under section 252, the Judge shall
fix a date for the examination of witnesses,
and may, on the application of the prosecution,
issue any process for compelling the attendance
of any witness or the production of any document
or other thing."
(Emphasis added)
The expression 'may ... issue any process for compelling
the attendance of any witness' confers ample discretion
to the trial court for taking a decision as to which of
the witnesses are to be summoned before the court.
Section 254(1) of the Sanhita states that on the date
fixed for the examination of witnesses, the Judge shall
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2025:KER:24506
proceed to take all such evidence as may be produced in
support of the prosecution. If the court decides not to
issue process to certain witnesses, by exercising its
discretion under Section 253, the court is not bound to
examine them on the date fixed for the prosecution
evidence. Given this scheme of the Sanhita regarding
criminal trials, it is evident that Section 253 of the
Sanhita, which corresponds to Section 230 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973, empowers the Criminal
Courts to decide which witnesses should be summoned
first while fixing a date for the prosecution evidence.
Section 140 of the Bharatiya Sakshiya Adhiniyam also
enables the trial court, at its discretion, to decide
the order in which the witnesses are to be produced and
examined before the court, in the absence of a law
regulating such order. However, if the court finds that
the above course prejudices either side, it should
proceed with the trial in a full-fledged manner and
postpone the pronouncement of judgment until the trial
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
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of the predicate offence is concluded.
13. It is further contended that there are no
materials to attract the offences alleged against the
respective parties and hence the proceedings are liable
to be quashed on that sole ground. We do not agree.
Except in one case, all the cases are at the stage of
investigation. The materials available before us prima
facie indicate that the Directorate initiated actions
against the appellant/petitioners under the PMLA on the
basis of some materials. The sufficiency of the
materials for attracting the penal offences is a matter
to be looked into by the trial court. Based on the
interim directions of this court, the Enforcement
Directorate has not submitted a final report in those
cases. The parties are at liberty to raise such
disputes as and when a situation arises. They can also
challenge the criminal proceedings if there are no
materials to show that they did not commit any act as
above said, subsequent to the passing of the PMLA or
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2025:KER:24506
the amendment made to its schedule.
14. In view of the above discussion, it is to be
concluded that the challenge raised in the above cases
deserves no merit, except to the extent we noticed
above.
In the result, the Writ Appeal and the Writ
Petitions are dismissed, subject to the above
observations.
Sd/-
A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
JUDGE
Sd/-
P.KRISHNA KUMAR
JUDGE
sv
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2025:KER:24506
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 5562/2017
PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PARTS OF THE
SCHEDULE TO PREVENTION OF MONEY-LAUNDERING
ACT, 2002 AS IT ORIGINALLY STOOD TILL IT WAS
AMENDED AS PER THE PREVENTION OF MONEY-
LAUNDERING (AMENDMENT) ACT 2009.
EXHIBIT P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE FIR IN V C NO.8/2011 OF
VACAB, PALAKKAD
EXHIBIT P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE GAZETTE OF INDIA DATED
06.03.2009 PUBLISHING THE PREVENTION OF MONEY
LAUNDERING (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2009
EXHIBIT P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE SUMMONS DATED 07.07.2016
ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT DIRECTING THE
PETITIONER TO APPEAR ON 08.08.2016
EXHIBIT P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 06.08.2016
SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE RESPONDENT
ON 08.08.2016 THROUGH HIS REPRESENTATIVE.
EXHIBIT P6 A TRUE COPY OF THE SUMMONS DATED 08.08.2016
ISSUED BY THE RESPODNENT DIRECTING THE
PETITIONER TO APPEAR IN PERSON ON 31.08.2016
EXHIBIT P7 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 02.09.2016
EXLCUDING THE DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE
PETITIONER TO THE RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P8 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 26.12.2016
EXLCUDING THE DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE
PETITIONER TO THE RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P9 A TRUE COPY OF THE SUMMONS DATED 03.01.2017
ALONG WITH A LETTER DATED 03.01.2017 ISSUED BY
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2025:KER:24506
THE RESPONDENT DIRECTING THE PETITIONER TO
APPEAR ON 06.02.2017
EXHIBIT P10 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 01.02.2017
EXCLUDING THE DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE
PETITIONER TO THE RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P11 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 01.02.2017
EXCLUDING THE DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE
PETITIONER TO THE RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P12 TRUE COPY OF THE ECIR NO.4/2015 OF SUB ZONE,
KOZHIKODE IN KOCHI ZONE INCLUDING ITS
ANNEXURES.
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2025:KER:24506
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 5647/2017
PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1 : TRUE COPY OF THE SUMMONS
EXHIBIT P2 : TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT FROM THE
AUDIT REPORT OF COMPTROLLER AND AUDIT
GENERAL FOR THE YEAR ENDING 31ST MARCH
2010.
EXHIBIT P3 : TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF THE CC
EXHIBIT P4 : TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF THE CC
2/2011.
EXHIBIT P5 : TRUE COPY OF THE GAZETTE OF INDIA
PUBLISHING THE PREVENTION OF MONEY
LAUNDERING (AMENDMENT)ACT, 2009.
EXHIBIT P6 : TRUE COPY OF THE ECIR/KZSZO/04/2015.
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2025:KER:24506
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 8373/2017
PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1 COPY OF THE NOTICE VIDE
F.NO.ECIR/K2520/4/2015/1065 DATED 19.8.2016
ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT TO THE
PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT P2 COPY OF THE NOTICE VIDE
F.NO.ECIR/4/K2520/2015/2017 DATED 9.2.2017
ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT TO THE
PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT P3 COPY OF THE RELEVANT PORTION OF THE FIR
FILED BEFORE THE ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND
SPECIAL JUDGE THRISSUR.
EXHIBIT P4 COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT OF THE
PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT 2002.
EXHIBIT P5 COPY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA GAZETTE
VIDE NO.24 DATED 6.3.2009 NOTIFYING THE
PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING (AMENDMENT)
ACT, 2009.
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2025:KER:24506
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 26120/2017
PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1: A TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PARTS OF THE
SCHEDULE TO PREVENTION OF MONEY-LAUNDERING
ACT, 2002 AS IT ORIGINALLY STOOD TILL IT WAS
AMENDED AS PER THE PREVENTION OF MONEY-
LAUNDERING (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2009.
EXHIBIT P2: A TRUE COPY OF THE FIR IN V.C.NO.8/2011 OF
VACB, PALAKKAD.
EXHIBIT P3: A TRUE COPY OF THE GAZETTE OF INDIA DATED
6.3.2009 PUBLISHING THE PREVENTION OF MONEY
LAUNDERING (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2009.
EXHIBIT P4: A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED
1.3.2017 ISSUED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT IN WPC
NO.5562/2017.
EXHIBIT P5: A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED
12.5.2017 ISSUED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT IN WPC
NO.5562/2017.
EXHIBIT P6: A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED
29.5.2017 ISSUED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT IN WPC
NO.5562/2017 EXTENDING THE ORDER OF STATUS
QUO.
EXHIBIT P7: A TRUE COPY OF THE SUMMONS DATED 7.7.2017
ISSUED BY THE 2ND RSPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT P8: A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 17.7.2017
SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 2ND
RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT.P9 TRUE COPY OF THE ECIR NO.4/2015 OF SUB ZONE,
WA No.2076/2016 & W.P.(C)Nos.5562/2017, 5647/2017,
8373/2017 & 26120/2017
2025:KER:24506
KOZHIKODE IN KOCHI ZONE EXCLUDING ITS
ANNEXURES
EXHIBIT.P10 TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED.10.4.2024
IN SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL[CRIMINAL] NO.
