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Subash @ Achu vs State Of Kerala
2025 Latest Caselaw 7139 Ker

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 7139 Ker
Judgement Date : 25 June, 2025

Kerala High Court

Subash @ Achu vs State Of Kerala on 25 June, 2025

         IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                              PRESENT

         THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN

 WEDNESDAY, THE 25TH DAY OF JUNE 2025 / 4TH ASHADHA,

                                1947

                      CRL.A NO. 97 OF 2014

     AGAINST      THE      JUDGMENT    DATED   27.01.2014   IN   SC

NO.378    OF   2012   OF    ADDITIONAL    SESSIONS   JUDGE,    PALA

ARISING OUT OF CP NO.45 OF 2012 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE

OF FIRST CLASS ,ERATTUPETTA

APPELLANT/ACCUSED:

           SUBASH @ ACHU,
           AGED 36 YEARS,
           S/O.RAGHAVAN, CHOKKATTU HOUSE, PALLIPPADI
           BHAGOM, THEEKOY KARA, THEEKOY VILLAGE,
           KOTTAYAM DISTRICT.


           BY ADVS.
           SMT.DIVYA C BALAN
           SHRI.P.D.SUBRAMANIAN NAMPOOTHIRI
           SHRI.K.N.SUGATHAN
           SHRI.SIDHARTH BIMAL


RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:

           STATE OF KERALA
           REP. BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
           KERALA, ERNAKULAM.

           SENIOR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI RENJIT GEORGE
     THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
17.06.2025,     THE   COURT    ON     25.06.2025   DELIVERED     THE
FOLLOWING:
                                                                 2025:KER:45998
Crl.Appeal No.97/2014                    2




                                                                          "CR"


                       A. BADHARUDEEN, J.
               ================================
                       Crl.Appeal No.97 of 2014
             ================================
                  Dated this the 25th day of June, 2025


                               JUDGMENT

The sole accused in S.C.No.378/2012 on the files of Additional

Sessions Judge, Pala, assails conviction and sentence imposed against him

as per judgment dated 27.01.2014 in this appeal. Respondent is the State

of Kerala.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the accused/appellant and

the learned Public Prosecutor representing the prosecution side.

3. I shall refer the parties in this appeal as 'prosecution' and

'accused' hereafter for easy reference.

4. Perused the trial court records and the judgment under

challenge.

5. In this matter the accused was tried after framing charge 2025:KER:45998

for the offences punishable under Sections 452, 294(b), 354 and 307 of the

Indian Penal Code (`IPC' for short). The prosecution case is that at 5.30 p.m on

20.05.2012 the accused entered in the middle room of house No.55 in Ward

No.5 of Teekoy Grama Panchayat while PW3 alone was there and uttered

obscene words on her. Then the accused pulled the tuft of PW3's hair and

pushed her down. When PW3 got up, the accused attempted to murder PW3 by

cutting on her neck and on her right palm by using a folding knife, a dangerous

weapon.

6. Trial court examined PW1 to PW12 and Exts.P1 to P22

and M.O No.1 to M.O No.5 were marked on the side of the prosecution.

But no defence evidence was adduced by the accused.

7. Finally, the trial court found that the accused committed

the offences punishable under Sections 452 and 307 of IPC and he was

sentenced as under:

"The accused is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two years for offence U/s 452 IPC and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-. He is further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years for offence U/s 307 IPC and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- in default simple imprisonment for three months. The sentences shall run concurrently. MOs.1 to 5 being valueless, shall be destroyed after the appeal period is over. The period in which he was in custody shall be set off from the sentence."

2025:KER:45998

8. The learned counsel for the accused argued highlighting

4 points to upset the trial court verdict. According to him there is delay of

18 hours in registering the FIR. Further in this matter, crime was

registered recording the statement given by PW3. But in the FIS there is

no whisper regarding any attempt on the part of the accused to commit

murder of PW3. It is also pointed out that no independent witnesses either

cited in the final report or examined to prove the guilt of the accused

beyond reasonable doubt that apart in M.O1, no blood stains were found as

per the FSL report and the shadows doubt as to the use of M.O1 in

committing crime. On these grounds enlarging benefit of doubt, the

accused is liable to be acquitted.

9. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor vehemently

opposed these contentions. According to the learned Public Prosecutor,

the occurrence was at 5.30 p.m on 20.05.2012 and crime was registered on

the next day recording the statement of PW3 marked as Ext.P1. Therefore,

there is no delay in registering the FIR. It is also pointed out by the

learned Public Prosecutor that FIS was given by PW3, the injured, while

she was at the hospital. Therefore, PW3, who was under a trauma, might 2025:KER:45998

not be able to state about the attempt of murder. But in the additional

statement recorded after her initial information, she spoke about the

attempt to commit murder. Therefore, the argument at the instance of the

petitioner in that regard is not sustainable. Regarding absence of

independent witnesses, the learned Public Prosecutor would argue that

since the occurrence was inside the house where PW3, the victim, who is

the one and only witness to the occurrence, was alone, the contention that

there is no independent witnesses to the occurrence is not sustainable.

Since the same is an improbability, this contention also must fail.

Regarding absence of blood stains on M.O1 knife also, the learned Public

Prosecutor would submit that M.O1 was recovered when the same was

produced by the accused after preparing Ext.P5 mahazar, i.e on

21.06.2012, after 41 days of the occurrence. Therefore, absence of blood

stains as argued by the learned counsel for the accused is natural.

10. Having addressed the rival arguments, the questions pose

for consideration are:

(i) Whether the trial court went wrong in finding that the

accused had committed offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC?

2025:KER:45998

(ii) Whether the trial court went wrong in finding that the

accused had committed offence punishable under Section 452 of IPC?

(iii) Whether the judgment would require interference in any

manner?

          (iv)      The order to be passed?

Point Nos.(i) to (iii)

11. In this case Ext.P1, FIS was given by PW3, the victim of

this occurrence, who was at the rental house of PW1, her sister, at the time

of occurrence. During her examination she supported the prosecution case

with regard to recording of her statement and also her admission at the

MCH, Kottayam after the occurrence with injuries on neck and palm.

According to PW3, she sustained injuries at the rental house of PW1 at

about 5.30 pm on 20.05.2012 when she reached the said house in

connection with the marriage of her sister by name Renjini. PW3 testified

further that, the accused came to the house in search of Anish (PW2), the

husband of her married sister (PW1). When he was informed that Anish

was not there, the accused abused her and threatened that she would not

allow Anish to reside in Mangalagiri or Teekoyi. At this time, she was in 2025:KER:45998

the middle room of the house and she came out. When the accused used

abusive words against her, she got inside the house. Then the accused

followed her, trespassed on the house and caught hold of the tuft of her

hair and pulled her down. When she woke up, the accused took a knife and

brandished the same towards her neck and she evaded. Again he

attempted to cause injury on her neck and the same caused injury on the left

side of her neck. Again, though the accused brandished the knife to cause

injury on her neck, she caught hold of the knife and thereby her right palm

was injured. Nobody other than PW3 was present at the time of

occurrence. According to PW3, if she would not have caught on the knife,

the accused would have killed her. She also deposed that there were no

houses near the rental house where the incident occurred. On hearing the

noise, the wife of the accused reached and PW3 asked her to take back the

accused and the wife along with the accused went back. PW3 identified

the accused at the dock after stating that the accused was familiar to her for

3-4 years. She also deposed about her treatment at MCH, Kottayam by

putting stitches and bandages. She identified the signature in Ext.P1 and

also identified M.O1 knife used by the accused to cause injuries on her.

2025:KER:45998

She also identified the churidhar and top worn by her at the time of

occurrence as M.Os 2 and 3 and ' kavi dhothi ' and ' thorthu ' worn by the

accused as M.Os 4 and 5. During cross examination one question was

asked regarding how many times the accused brandished the knife against

her with reference to her previous statement and she answered that she did

not remember what was stated in the FIS. She also denied the suggestion

that the accused was seen by PW3 for the first time and affirmed that she

had prior familiarity with him. Even though she was subjected to cross

examination, nothing extracted to disbelieve her version in the matter of

occurrence. PW2 examined in this case is the husband of PW1 and he

supported the events after the occurrence with reference to PW3 in the

hospital. Ext.P2 mahazar was marked through PW2, who is the husband

of PW1 as he supported the same. Production of M.O2 and M.O3 before

the police, was deposed by PW5, the father of PW3. As per Ext.P5

mahazar, M.O1 knife was recovered when the same was produced by the

accused before the court as on 21.06.2012. PW9, who was examined to

prove Ext.P5, also supported Ext.P5. Though PW6, who admittedly is

another friend of the accused also admitted his signature in the mahazar, 2025:KER:45998

and testified that Ext.P5 mahazar was pertaining to recovery of a knife.

PW7 examined is Mr.Joseph, who is the owner of the rental house and he

supported entrustment of house to PW1 on rent. Ext.P6 is the site plan

marked through PW8, the Village Officer. PW10, the grade Sub Inspector

of Police, Erattupetta Police Station as on 21.05.2012 registered FIS in this

crime regarding the statement of PW3 marked as Ext.P1 and registration of

Ext.P7, FIR. He also prepared Ext.P2 scene mahazar and incorporated

offence under Section 307 of IPC as per Ext.P8 report. Investigation in

this crime was conducted by PW11, the then Circle Inspector of Police,

Erattupetta Police Station. He deposed about the investigation at his

option and it was through him, in which Exts.P9 to P21 were marked.

12. PW12 examined in this case is Dr.Sreekanth and he was

examined to prove Ext.P21, wound certificate pertaining to PW3 when she

was taken to MCH Kottayam. He deposed about the examination of the

victim and also deposed about the injuries sustained by her, viz. (i)

lacerated wound 10 X 1 X 1 cm on the right palm, (ii) another lacerated

wound 3 X 1 cm on the left side of the neck. He also opined that the

injuries could be caused by using weapon like M.O1, a folding knife. He 2025:KER:45998

also deposed that neck is a vital part of the body. During cross

examination he stated that both the injuries are grievous in nature. Injury

No.(ii) is also grievous, because the same is on the neck.

13. In the instant case the question to be addressed is

whether the prosecution succeeded in establishing the offences under

Section 452 and 307 of the IPC with the ingredients thereof?

14. Tracing the ingredients to attract offence under section

452 of IPC, reference to Section 442, 441 and 452 of IPC is necessary.

Section 442 of IPC defines `house trespass' and the same reads as under:

"442. House-trespass.- Whoever commits criminal trespass by entering into or remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or any building used as a place for worship, or as a place for the custody of property, is said to commit "house-trespass".

15. Section 441 of IPC defines criminal trespass and the

same reads as follows:

"441. Criminal trespass. - Whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit "criminal trespass".

16. So, doing an act by entering into or upon property in the 2025:KER:45998

possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate,

insult or annoy any person in possession of such property or remaining in

any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or any building used

as a place of worship, after criminally trespassing upon the same is said to

commit the offence of house trespass, punishable under section 452 of

IPC.

17. Similarly, in order to find out the ingredients to attract

offence under Section 307 of IPC, it is necessary to extract the said

provision as under:

"307. Attempt to murder.--Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is herein before mentioned."

Thus the ingredients are;

(i) That the accused did an act;

(ii) That the act was done with intention or knowledge and under

such circumstances to cause a bodily injury as the accused knew to be

likely to cause death or that such bodily injury was in the ordinary course 2025:KER:45998

of nature to cause death, or that the accused attempted to cause such death

by doing an act known to him to be so imminently dangerous that it must

in all probability cause death or such bodily injury a is likely to cause

death; and

(iii) That the accused had no excuse for incurring the risk of

causing such death or injury.

In other words, the ingredients are;

(i) that the death of a human being was attempted;

(ii) that such death was attempted to be caused by, or in

consequence of the act of the accused; and

(iii) that such act was done with the intention of causing death; or

that it was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as:

(a) the accused knew to be likely to cause death; or

(b) was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death,

or that the accused attempted to cause death by doing an act known to him

to be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause (a)

death, or (b) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the accused

having no excuse for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury (see 2025:KER:45998

decision in Chimanbhai Jagabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, reported in

AIR 2009 SC 3223 : (2009) 11 SCC 273).

18. The first part makes any act committed with the intention

or knowledge that it would amount to murder if the act caused death

punishable with imprisonment up to ten years. The second part makes such

an act punishable with imprisonment for life if hurt is caused thereby.

Thus even if the act does not cause any injury it is punishable with

imprisonment up to 10 years. If it does cause an injury and therefore hurt,

it is punishable with imprisonment for life (see decision in Pasupuleti Siva

Ramakrishna Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in 2014 (2) Scale

417 : (2014) 5 SCC 369).

19. In the decision in State of Madhya Pradesh V. Saleem,

reported in (2005) 5 SCC 554, the Apex Court held that to sustain a

conviction under Section 307 IPC, it was not necessary that a bodily injury

capable of resulting in death should have been inflicted. As such, non-

conviction under Section 307 IPC on the premise only that simple injury

was inflicted does not follow as a matter of course. In the said judgment, it

was pointed out that the court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its 2025:KER:45998

result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances

mentioned in the section. The position that because a fatal injury was not

sustained alone does not dislodge Section 307, IPC conviction has been

reiterated in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 and State

of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanha, (2019)3 SCC 605. Yet, in Jage Ram

(supra) and Kanha (supra), it was observed that while grievous or life

threatening injury was not necessary to maintain a conviction under

Section 307, IPC, the intention of the accused can be ascertained from the

actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among

other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows

inflicted can be considered to infer intent.

20. On evaluating the evidence discussed herein above,

along with the way in which the accused assaulted PW3, who was alone at

the house of PW1 after trespassing on the house of PW1, the irresistible

conclusion is that the accused herein committed the offence punishable

under Section 452 of IPC. That apart, the accused committed offence

punishable under Section 307 of IPC by using M.O1 knife with intention

to do away PW3, though she survived. Therefore, conviction imposed by 2025:KER:45998

the trial court for the said offences is only to be confirmed.

21. Coming to the sentence, the trial court imposed 2 years

of simple imprisonment for the offence under Section 452 of the Indian

Penal Code and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/-. Similarly, for the offence under

Section 307 of IPC, the accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for a period of 4 years and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/-. In

default of payment of fine, the accused shall undergo simple imprisonment

for a period of three months. In consideration of the request made by the

learned counsel for the accused, I am inclined to modify the sentence.

22. In the result, the appeal stands allowed in part by

confirming the conviction and modifying the sentence as under:

The accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a

period of 3 years for the offence under Section 307 of IPC and to pay fine

of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) and in default of payment of

fine, the accused shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one

month. The accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a

period of one year for the offence under Section 452 of IPC and to pay fine

of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five thousand only) and in default of payment of 2025:KER:45998

fine, he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 15

days.

The substantive sentence shall run concurrently and the default

sentence shall run separately.

Sd/-

A. BADHARUDEEN, JUDGE

rtr/ 2025:KER:45998

APPENDIX

APPELLANT'S EXHIBITS

ANNEXURE-A1: A TRUE COPY OF THE DISCHARGE CARD OF THE APPELLANT'S

SISTER DT.01.09.1995.

 
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