Kerala High Court
Shyni vs State Of Kerala on 8 July, 2025
Author: V Raja Vijayaraghavan
Bench: V Raja Vijayaraghavan
WP(Crl.) No. 395 of 2025 1 2025:KER:49799
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K. V. JAYAKUMAR
TUESDAY, THE 8TH DAY OF JULY 2025 / 17TH ASHADHA, 1947
WP(CRL.) NO. 395 OF 2025
PETITIONER:
SHYNI
AGED 41 YEARS
W/O MANI @ ANIL, AGED 41 YEARS, MANNIL VEETIIL,
GANDHIKUNNU KANNATTIPADI,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 676304
BY ADVS.
SHRI.SREEJITH S.NAIR
SHRI.REMIL REGI GEORGE
SHRI.RAJESH BHASKARA KURUP
RESPONDENTS:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF HOME AFFAIRS, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2 ADVISORY BOARD
KERALA ANTI SOCIAL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT, PADAM
ROAD, ELAMAKKARA.P.O, ERNAKULAM, KOCHI, REPRESENTED BY
ITS SECRETARY, PIN - 682026
3 THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR & DISTRICT MAGISTRATE
CIVIL STATION, MALAPPURAM, PIN - 676505
WP(Crl.) No. 395 of 2025 2 2025:KER:49799
4 THE SUPERINTENDENT
CENTRAL PRISON, VIYYUR, THRISSUR, PIN - 680010
5 DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF
DISTRICT POLICE OFFICE, UP HILL POST, MALAPPURAM,
PIN - 676505
THIS WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
08.07.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WP(Crl.) No. 395 of 2025 3 2025:KER:49799
JUDGMENT
Raja Vijayaraghavan V, J.
The husband of the petitioner herein, Sri. Mani @ Anil ('the detenu' for the
sake of brevity), has been detained under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social
Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 ('KAA(P) Act' for the sake of brevity) on the
strength of Ext. P3 order.
2. The said order was passed based on a proposal dated 09.01.2025,
submitted by the 5th respondent before the 3rd respondent. This was followed by two
additional reports dated 09.01.2025 and 20.02.2025. The detention order has been
issued by classifying the detenu as a 'known-goonda' as defined under Section
2(o)(ii) of the KAA(P) Act. To classify the detenu as a 'known goonda', the
respondents have relied on seven crimes. The details of the crimes in which the
detenu is allegedly involved are the following:
Sl. Crime No. Police Station Sections involved Status of case
No.
1 548/2023 Vengara 20(b)(ii)(A) of the Narcotic Drug Convicted by JFCM
Court, Malappuram
and Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1985
2 217/2019 Vengara 341, 323 and 506(1) of the IPC Pending Trial
3 18/2020 Vengara 447, 294(b), 506 of the IPC Pending Trial
4 287/2022 Vengara 20(b)(ii)(B), 29(1) of the Narcotic Pending Trial
Drug and Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1985
WP(Crl.) No. 395 of 2025 4 2025:KER:49799
5 219/2024 Thirurangadi 15(4) of the KAAP Act and Section Pending Trial
20(B)(ii) A of the Narcotic Drug &
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
6 90/2024 Parappanangaadi E22(B), 29 and 25 of the Narcotic Pending Investigatio
Range Drug and Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1985
7 29/2023 Vengara 117e of the Kerala Police Act. Convicted by JFCM
Court, Malappuram
3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the
detention of the detenu is legally unsustainable, as the offences in which the detenu
is allegedly involved are minor in nature. These offences, it is contended, may at
best be considered prejudicial to law and order, but do not rise to the level of acts
that disturb public order, which is a prerequisite for invoking preventive detention. It
is further submitted that owing to the long time lag between the last prejudicial act
and the order of detention, the live link will get snapped. It is further submitted that
an earlier externment order had been issued against the detenu, and he was
complying strictly with the directions contained therein. However, based on an
allegation of violation of the said order, Crime No. 219 of 2024 was registered
against the detenu by the Thirurangadi Police Station. It is pointed out that the
detenu has been granted bail in all the pending cases imposing stringent conditions.
Such conditions would have been sufficient to prevent the detenu from committing
further prejudicial activities.
WP(Crl.) No. 395 of 2025 5 2025:KER:49799
4. The learned Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed the submissions
made on behalf of the petitioner. He submitted that in one of the cases involving
possession of a small quantity of narcotic drugs, the detenu had voluntarily pleaded
guilty. He emphasized that, for the purpose of classifying a person as a 'known
goonda' under the relevant statutory provisions, a conviction in even a single case is
sufficient. The contention that the offences committed by the detenu are minor and
therefore cannot justify preventive detention is untenable. On the contrary, the
detenu is involved in at least three cases relating to the trafficking of narcotic
substances. This pattern of repeated involvement in drug-related offences, clearly
demonstrates a tendency that threatens public order, and warrants preventive action
to forestall further harm to society. Despite the imposition of stringent bail
conditions and the passing of the earlier order of externment, the detenu has
persisted with his activities, leaving the respondents with no other option to initiate
proceedings under the KAA(P) Act.
5. We have considered the submissions advanced and have perused the
records.
6. The first question is whether the classification of the detenu as a
"known goonda" is in order. Based on a proposal dated 09.01.2024, submitted by
the Superintendent of Police, Malappuram, the detention order was passed on
26.02.2025. A perusal of the order would reveal that the detenu got himself involved
in seven criminal cases, within a period of 7 years, immediately preceding the
WP(Crl.) No. 395 of 2025 6 2025:KER:49799
detention order. In Crime No. 548 of 2023, and in Crime No. 29 of 2023 the detenu
suffered a conviction. Crime No. 217 of 2019, Crime No. 18 of 2020, Crime No. 287
of 2022, Crime No. 219 of 2024 were pending trial, and Crime No. 90 of 2024 was
pending investigation.
7. The last prejudicial act was committed on 09.11.2024. Though the said
crime was under investigation, all the records in connection with the crime were
forwarded to the detaining authority by the sponsoring authority, showing the
prominent role of the detenu in the aforesaid crime. In view of the law laid down in
Stenny Aleyamma Saju v. State of Kerala and Ors1, the filing of a final report
under Section 173 (2) of the Cr.P.C is not a prerequisite to invoke the power under
Section 3 of the KAA(P) Act. The crimes in which the detenu is involved are
sufficient and enough to classify the detenu as a "known goonda". It cannot be said,
therefore, that the objective satisfaction has not been correctly arrived at.
8. The next contention advanced by the learned counsel is that there is
no proximate or live link with any recent criminal activity. We find that the last
prejudicial activity was committed on 09.11.2024, and the detenu was arrested on
the same day. He was released on bail on 12.12.2025. The report of sponsorship
was submitted before the detaining authority on 09.01.2025, and additional reports
were submitted on 20.02.2025, consequent to which the detention order was passed
on 26.02.2025. It has been held time and again by the Apex Court that the question
[2017 (3) KHC 517]
WP(Crl.) No. 395 of 2025 7 2025:KER:49799
whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of
detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live link between
the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely
formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances, and no exhaustive
guidelines can be laid down on that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not
a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting the number of months between the
offending acts and the order of detention. Only when there is an undue and long
delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of the detention order, the
court has to scrutinize whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined
such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a
delay has occasioned when called upon to answer and further the court has to
investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of
each case. Having considered the sequence of events and the facts and
circumstances, the delay in passing the order cannot be said to be inordinate so as
to snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the detention order.
9. The next contention is that the detaining authority failed to consider
whether alternative measures like the initiation of proceedings under Section 107 of
the Cr.P.C. were sufficient to curb the activities of the detenu. We find that in the
case of the detenu, proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr. P.C. were initiated
before the SDM Court, Tirur as M.C. No. 399 of 2022. The detenu appeared before
WP(Crl.) No. 395 of 2025 8 2025:KER:49799
the SDM Court and executed a bond on 03.08.2023. It is thereafter that he got
involved in Crime No. 219 of 2024 and Crime No. 90 of 2024, the latter being one
under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, and involving
commercial quantity of drugs. Thus, it is plainly clear that such proceedings did not
deter the detenu from involving himself in serious drug-related crimes. In Sameena
Beevi v. State of Kerala2, it was held that insofar as Section 110 of the Cr.P.C is
concerned, the provisions therein are essentially intended to protect the social order
and tranquility and to prevent instances at the hands of habitual offenders. But if
the habitual offender proceeded against under that provision is not amenable to the
process which is initiated, obviously such proceedings fail and cannot be utilised as a
shield against an order under KAA(P) Act.
10. The next contention advanced by the learned counsel is that the
crimes alleged to have been committed by the detenu cannot be termed as those
affecting "public order", and that they were only related to "law and order". We are
unable to accept the said contention as it is evident from the predilection of the
detenu to indulge in crimes one after the other, causing a threat to the peaceful
living of the public at large.
11. In Pesala Nookaraju v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and
Others3, the Apex Court, after referring to the earlier precedents including
[2014 (4) KLT 874]
[(2023) SCC OnLine SC 1003]
WP(Crl.) No. 395 of 2025 9 2025:KER:49799
Dr.Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar4 and Arun Ghosh v. State of West
Bengal5, held as follows:
"65. Thus, from the various decisions referred to above, it
is evident that there is a very thin line between the question of
law and order situation and a public order situation, and some
times, the acts of a person relating to law and order situation can
turn into a question of public order situation. What is decisive for
determining the connection of ground of detention with the
maintenance of public order, the object of detention, is not an
intrinsic quality of the act but rather its latent potentiality.
Therefore, for determining whether the ground of detention is
relevant for the purposes of public order or not, merely an
objective test based on the intrinsic quality of an act would not
be a safe guide. The potentiality of the act has to be examined in
the light of the surrounding circumstances, posterior and anterior
for the offences under the Prohibition Act.
66. Just because four cases have been registered against
the appellant detenu under the Prohibition Act, by itself, may not
have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. The detenu
may be punished for the offences which have been registered
against him. To put it in other words, if the detention is on the
ground that the detenu is indulging in manufacture or transport
or sale of liquor then that by itself would not become an activity
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order because the same
can be effectively dealt with under the provisions of the
Prohibition Act but if the liquor sold by the detenu is dangerous
to public health then under the Act, 1986, it becomes an activity
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, therefore, it
becomes necessary for the detaining authority to be satisfied on
material available to it that the liquor dealt with by the detenu is
liquor which is dangerous to public health to attract the
provisions of the 1986 Act and if the detaining authority is
satisfied that such material exists either in the form of report of
the Chemical Examiner or otherwise, copy of such material
[(1966) 1 SCR 709]
[(1970) 1 SCC 98]
WP(Crl.) No. 395 of 2025 10 2025:KER:49799
should also be given to the detenu to afford him an opportunity
to make an effective representation.
xxxx xxxxx xxxxx
73. In the case on hand, the detaining authority has
specifically stated in the grounds of detention that selling liquor
by the appellant detenu and the consumption by the people of
that locality was harmful to their health. Such statement is an
expression of his subjective satisfaction that the activities of the
detenu appellant is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
Not only that, the detaining authority has also recorded his
satisfaction that it is necessary to prevent the detenu appellant
from indulging further in such activities and this satisfaction has
been drawn on the basis of the credible material on record. It is
also well settled that whether the material was sufficient or not is
not for the Courts to decide by applying the objective basis as it
is matter of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority."
12. Thus, the true distinction between the areas of "public order" and
"law and order" lies not in the nature of quality of the act, but in the degree and
extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the concepts of "law and
order" and "public order" is a fine one, but this does not mean that there can be no
overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and
circumstances might cause different reactions. As far as the present case is
concerned, the prejudicial activities of the detenu leading to public disorder as
revealed in the grounds of detention, consist of a consistent course of criminal
conduct. The involvement of the detenu in drug-related offences even after
executing a bond and while on bail in similar offences establishes the acts of the
detenu as one affecting public order, and not a mere law and order issue. When
WP(Crl.) No. 395 of 2025 11 2025:KER:49799
viewed from the above perspective, it is not possible to say that the prejudicial
activities attributed to the detenu were mere law and order issues. For the above
reason, we are not inclined to accept the argument advanced by the learned counsel
for the petitioner upon the above lines.
13. It is well settled that subjective satisfaction entertained by the
detaining authority is not justiciable. This Court does not sit in appeal in proceedings
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India over the decisions taken by the
detaining authority on the basis of the materials placed before the detaining
authority as to whether preventive detention is necessary or warranted. The short
area of jurisdiction is to ascertain whether subjective satisfaction is entertained
properly on the basis of materials placed before the detaining authority. If the
entertainment of the latter subjective satisfaction is vitiated by mala fides or by total
absence of materials or by reference to and reliance on materials which cannot
legally be taken note of, certainly the powers of judicial review vested in this Court
can be invoked and the order of detention on the basis of such alleged subjective
satisfaction can be set aside. But, certainly, if there are materials, it is not open to
this Court to sit in appeal over the subjective satisfaction entertained by the
detaining authority. (See: Ibrahim Bachu Bafan and Another v. State of
Gujarat and Another6).
[AIR 1985 SC 697]
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14. From a perusal of the records, we are satisfied that all the necessary
requirements before passing an order under Section 3(1) of KAA(P) Act have been
scrupulously complied with in this case. The competent authority passed the
detention order after thoroughly verifying all the materials placed by the sponsoring
authority and after arriving at the requisite objective, as well as subjective
satisfaction. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order passed under Section 3(1) of
the KAA(P) Act is vitiated in any manner.
In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out
any case for interference.
Resultantly, this Writ Petition stands dismissed.
Sd/-
RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V,
JUDGE
Sd/-
K.V. JAYAKUMAR,
msp JUDGE
WP(Crl.) No. 395 of 2025 13 2025:KER:49799
APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 395/2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 A COPY OF THE SAID REPORT BEARING NO.
01/SB-KAAPA/2025 DATED 09.01.2025
Exhibit P2 A COPY OF THE SAID CONTINUATION REPORT
BEARING NO. G1(A)/01/KAAPA/2025/MM DATED
20.02.2025
Exhibit P3 A COPY OF THE SAID ORDER BEARING NO.
DCMPM/10541/2023-S1 DATED 26.02.2025
Exhibit P4 A COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 28.02.2025 ISSUED
TO THE PETITIONER
