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Arthar vs Lala Mohanraj & Anr
2025 Latest Caselaw 1522 Ker

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 1522 Ker
Judgement Date : 23 July, 2025

Kerala High Court

Arthar vs Lala Mohanraj & Anr on 23 July, 2025

                                              2025:KER:54650

        IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                         PRESENT

        THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JOBIN SEBASTIAN

WEDNESDAY, THE 23RD DAY OF JULY 2025 / 1ST SRAVANA, 1947

                 CRL.A NO. 2281 OF 2007

         ORDER/JUDGMENT DATED 22.10.2007 IN Crl.L.P.
NO.1090 OF 2007 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ARISING OUT OF
  THE ORDER/JUDGMENT DATED 13.12.2002 IN CC NO.709 OF
      1997 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS
                   -III,NEYYATTINKARA


APPELLANT/COMPLAINANT:

           ARTHAR, KATTAKUZHYYVILA ROADARIKATHU VEEDU,
           KUNNATHUKAL DESOM,KUNNATHUKAL VILLAGE,
           THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.

           BY ADV SRI.SUMAN CHAKRAVARTHY


RESPONDENT/ACCUSED AND STATE:

    1      LALA MOHANRAJ, S/O. PONNUSWAMY, HOUSE NO.28,
           VEDATHA ST.VADASSERRI, NAGARCOIL, KK DISTRICT
           NOW RESIDING AT THAYAGAM LANE, NEW HOUSE NO.777
           (OLD 171/1) OPPOSITE SUB JAIL, NAGARCOIL-1

    2      STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY
           THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
           HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.

           BY ADVS. ​
           SHRI.M.GOPIKRISHNAN NAMBIAR-R1​
           SHRI.K.JOHN MATHAI-R1​
           SRI.JOSON MANAVALAN-R1​
           SHRI.PAULOSE C. ABRAHAM-R1​
           SHRI.CHETHAN KRISHNA R.-R1
 CRL.A NO. 2281/2007            :2:​​        2025:KER:54650

                              ​ ​     ​    ​    ​
               SHRI.ALEX M THOMBRA SERNIOR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR​

       THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION
  ON 18.07.2025, THE COURT ON 23.07.2025 DELIVERED THE
  FOLLOWING:
 CRL.A NO. 2281/2007                 :3:​​       2025:KER:54650

                                ​     ​     ​   ​   ​
                           JUDGMENT

This appeal has been preferred by the complainant in

C.C.No.709 of 1997 on the file of the Judicial First Class

Magistrate Court-III, Neyyattinkara, challenging the judgment

of acquittal rendered in the said case, dated 13.12.2002,

alleging commission of an offence punishable under Section 138

of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short "N.I. Act"). For the

sake of convenience and clarity, the parties in this appeal are

hereinafter referred to as the complainant and the accused.

2.​ The case of the complainant in brief is as follows;

The accused, in discharge of a liability of Rs.3,00,000/-,

issued a cheque dated 03.04.1997 drawn on Federal Bank Ltd.

Nagarcoil branch, in favour of the complainant. However, when

the complainant sent the said cheque for collection through his

account maintained at Federal Bank Ltd., Nagarcoil branch, the

same was returned unpaid, stating the reason 'funds insufficient'.

Thereafter, the complainant issued a notice to the accused

intimating the dishonour of the cheque and demanding the

payment of the cheque amount. However, the accused refused

to receive the said notice and did not pay any amount. Thus, the CRL.A NO. 2281/2007 :4:​​ 2025:KER:54650

​ ​ ​ ​ ​ accused is alleged to have committed an offence punishable

under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. (for

short "N.I. Act").

3. Before the trial court, the complainant got himself

examined as PW1 AND marked Exts. P1 to P6. Another witness

was examined from the side of the complainant as PW2. On the

side of the defence three witnesses were examined as DW1 to

DW3 and two documents were marked as exhibits D1 and D2.

Among the defence witnesses, DW3 is none other than the

accused himself. After considering the oral and documentary

evidence on record, and hearing both sides, the trial court found

the accused not guilty of the offence punishable under Section

138 of N.I. Act, and accordingly acquitted him. Assailing the said

finding and the order of acquittal, the complainant has preferred

this appeal.

​ 4. I heard the learned counsel appearing for both

sides.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit

that the trial court acquitted the accused in a hasty and

unjustified manner without properly appreciating the facts and CRL.A NO. 2281/2007 :5:​​ 2025:KER:54650

​ ​ ​ ​ ​ evidence brought on record. According to the counsel, as the

execution of Ext.P1 cheque was duly proved, the trial court ought

to have found that the complainant had succeeded in establishing

the basic facts to draw a presumption under Section 139 of the

N.I. Act. The learned counsel urged that since the accused

miserably failed to rebut the said statutory presumption, he is

liable to be found guilty and convicted. In response, the learned

counsel for the respondent/accused submitted that the

complainant miserably failed to prove his case. According to the

counsel, the complainant failed to discharge his initial burden to

prove the transaction and execution of the cheque, and hence

the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act

cannot be invoked in his favour. According to the learned

counsel, the trial court correctly appreciated the facts and

evidence brought on record and rightly acquitted the accused.

6. Before delving into a discussion regarding the scope of

interference in the present appeal, it is pertinent to note that the

legal yardsticks applicable to an appeal against acquittal are

different from those applicable to an appeal against conviction.

Ordinarily, an appellate court would not interfere with a judgment CRL.A NO. 2281/2007 :6:​​ 2025:KER:54650

​ ​ ​ ​ ​ of acquittal unless it is demonstrated that the trial court's view is

perverse, manifestly illegal, or grossly unjust, and that the only

possible conclusion on the basis of the evidence on record was

that the accused was guilty of the offence alleged. If two views

are possible on the basis of the evidence, and the trial court has

taken one such view leading to acquittal, the appellate court

would generally refrain from substituting its own view merely

because it might have arrived at a different conclusion. However,

that does not mean that the appellate court cannot reverse an

erroneous acquittal. More specifically, when the appreciation of

evidence by the trial court is patently erroneous or perverse or

runs contrary to the settled principles of law, and when the

evidence on record clearly establishes the guilt of the accused,

leaving no room for any other plausible conclusion, the appellate

court is well within its power to reverse the finding of acquittal

and convict the accused.

7. As already stated, the definite case of the complainant

is that the accused owed him an amount of Rs.3,00,000/-, and

towards the discharge of the said liability, the accused issued a

cheque in favour of him for the said amount. However, when the CRL.A NO. 2281/2007 :7:​​ 2025:KER:54650

​ ​ ​ ​ ​ said cheque was sent for collection, it was dishonoured due to

insufficiency of funds in the account of the accused. In order to

prove his case, the complainant got himself examined as PW1.

During the chief examination, PW1 reiterated the allegations set

forth in the complaint. Notably, as in the complaint during chief

examination also, PW1, did not state any specific details of the

transaction, such as the date on which the amount was

borrowed, the date of issuance of the cheque, place of

transaction, etc. I am not oblivious that there is no legal

requirement mandating the complainant to disclose the entire

details of the transaction either in the complaint or during chief

examination. The non-disclosure of such details is not by itself, a

ground for acquittal.

8.​ In the case at hand, during chief examination, what PW1

stated is that the accused issued a cheque towards the discharge

of a liability of Rs.3,00,000/- and that it was the accused who

had signed the cheque. Significantly, PW1 does not claim that

the accused signed the cheque in his presence. Anyhow, from

the version put forward by the defence it is discernible that the

accused has admitted the signature in Ext.P1 to be his.

 CRL.A NO. 2281/2007                   :8:​​          2025:KER:54650

                                  ​     ​     ​     ​     ​

Therefore, the admission of signature in Ext.P1 substantiates and

supports the complainant's case regarding the execution of the

cheque. Once the execution of the cheque is proved, the

presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act will come into

operation in favour of the complainant. Likewise, when the

complainant succeeds in establishing the basis for drawing a

presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act in his favour, the

burden shifts to the accused to rebut the said presumption.

9.​ While considering whether the accused had succeeded in

rebutting a presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act, it is to be

borne in mind that there is no legal requirement for the accused

to adduce independent evidence to rebut the said presumption.

On the other hand, the accused can even rely upon the

improbabilities in the case of the complainant to displace the

presumption. In the present case, the accused has raised a

definite defence that he neither had any acquaintance with the

complainant nor had any monetary transaction with the

complainant. Instead, his case is that in the year 1996, he

borrowed some amount from one Anil Kumar, who was running a

private bank in the name and style "Narikkallil Bankers" at CRL.A NO. 2281/2007 :9:​​ 2025:KER:54650

​ ​ ​ ​ ​ Karakonam. The said Anil Kumar was introduced to the accused

by one Sreekumar. However, the accused failed to repay the said

amount to Anil Kumar. Consequently, he issued five cheques to

the said Anil Kumar, each for Rs.3,00,000/-. Even thereafter, he

failed to raise the amount covered by the cheque, and he was

constrained to dispose of his 20 acres of rubber estate. As per

the direction of Anil Kumar, the sale deeds were executed in

favour of Anil Kumar and three others named Krishnan Nair,

Shibu, and Pushpa Kumari. Even after the execution of the sale

deeds in favour of the above-said persons, Anil Kumar did not

return the cheque.

10.​ In order to substantiate his version, the accused

examined Sreekumar as DW2. On examination before court,

DW2 stated that he and the accused were working in different

branches of the same bank. He knew the complainant in this

case as the latter maintained an account in his branch. The

complainant was introduced to the bank by one Anil Kumar, who

was running a private bank named "Narikkalil Bankers". DW2

further deposed that he had personal acquaintance with Anil

Kumar and the accused had borrowed an amount of CRL.A NO. 2281/2007 :10:​ ​ 2025:KER:54650

​ ​ ​ ​ ​ Rs.6,00,000/- from Anil kumar and the accused issued five

cheque leaves as security. DW2 stood as a middleman in the

said transaction. The said cheque leaves were issued in the

names of five persons as directed by Anil Kumar. The agreed

rate of interest was 60%. As the accused failed to repay the

loan, the accused was constrained to execute sale deeds with

respect to 20 acres of property in the name of Anil Kumar, his

wife Sheeba, his father Krishnan Nair, and his mother-in-law

Pushpa Kumari. However, even after the execution of the sale

deeds, Anil Kumar did not return the cheque leaves.

Consequently, the accused issued legal notice and proceeded to

cancel the sale deeds.

11.​ While analysing the defence version of the incident, it is

significant to note that during cross-examination, PW1, the

complainant, admitted that he had no acquaintance with the

accused prior to this transaction. He further admitted that the

accused was introduced to him by one Sreekumar(DW2). PW1

also stated that he did not remember the date on which the

money was lent or when the cheque was issued. However, he

stated that the cheque was issued on the same day the money CRL.A NO. 2281/2007 :11:​ ​ 2025:KER:54650

​ ​ ​ ​ ​ was lent. More pertinently, during the cross-examination, PW1

stated that he had given the amount to Sreekumar, who in turn

had given it to the accused. He further admitted that the cheque

was also handed over to him by Sreekumar.

12.​ At this juncture, it is important to note that during

cross-examination, PW1 admitted that the accused was a

stranger to him. Furthermore, when questions were put to PW1

regarding the source of the amount which he allegedly lent to the

accused, PW1 stated that he had obtained Rs.2,00,000/- from his

brother, who is serving in the Military. He further claimed that

Rs.15,000/- was borrowed from one Sasidharan Nair.

Rs.30,000/- was from his personal savings, and the remaining

amount was raised by pledging his gold ornaments with two

private financiers. Ofcourse, the above version of PW1 regarding

the manner in which he raised the funds to lend to the accused,

who is a complete stranger, raises serious doubts in the mind of

this court. It is difficult to accept, in the ordinary course of

human conduct, that a person would go to such lengths,

borrowing from multiple persons and pledging gold, to lend

money to someone with whom he had no prior acquaintance.

 CRL.A NO. 2281/2007                 :12:​     ​         2025:KER:54650

                                ​     ​      ​    ​    ​

Therefore, I am of the view that the defence put forward by the

accused cannot be brushed aside. Moreover, the evidence of

DW2 shows that no amount was even given by the complainant

to the accused. According to him, the transaction was between

one Anil Kumar and the accused, and DW2 acted as a middleman

in the said transaction. DW2 further stated that it was at the

direction of the said Anil Kumar, the accused, issued five cheques

in favour of five different persons, including the complainant in

this case. The version of events as narrated by DW2 cannot be

disbelieved, especially in the light of the admissions made by the

complainant during cross-examination, which I have already

discussed.

13.​ As already noted, this appeal has been filed against an

order of acquittal. An interference in such an order cannot be

done in a casual manner. As there is already an order of

acquittal, a prima facie presumption of innocence is available in

favour of the accused. Interference with an order of acquittal

was warranted only when it is shown that the view taken by the

trial court is perverse, illegal, or grossly unjust. In the present

case, the view taken by the trial court cannot be said to be CRL.A NO. 2281/2007 :13:​ ​ 2025:KER:54650

​ ​ ​ ​ ​ perverse or unreasonable. In that context, I am of the view that

no interference is warranted in the impugned order of acquittal.

In the result, the appeal stands dismissed.

Sd/-

                                    ​​       JOBIN SEBASTIAN
                                                  JUDGE
  ncd
 

 
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