Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 1701 Ker
Judgement Date : 1 February, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN
WEDNESDAY, THE 1ST DAY OF FEBRUARY 2023 / 12TH MAGHA, 1944
CRL.REV.PET NO. 1770 OF 2009
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN CRA 583/2007 OF ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE KOZHIKODE
JUDGMENT IN ST 881/2005 OF SPECIAL JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF
FIRST CLASS FOR TRIAL OF MARADU CASES, KOZHIKODE
REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/ACCUSED:
PILAKKATT SANTHA,
D/O.M.C.KRISHNAN NAIR,
4/528 A, KARIMBIL HOUSE,
KACHERI AMSOM,
KURUMBRAKKATTUSSERRI DESOM,
JOSEPH ROAD, KOZHIKODE - 32.
BY ADV SRI.S.RAJEEV
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/STATE & COMPLAINANT:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REP. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA,
ERNAKULAM.
2 M. GOPINATHAN,
AGED 48 YEARS, S/O KRISHNAN, GAYATHRI NIVAS,
NADUVATTOM AMSOM, DESOM, KOZHIKODE TALUK.
BY ADVS.
SMT.M.MANJU
SRI.R.SUDHISH
SR.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI.RENJIT GEORGE
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN FINALLY
HEARD ON 18.01.2023, THE COURT ON 01.02.2023 PASSED THE
FOLLOWING:
Crl.R.P No.1770/2009 2
A. BADHARUDEEN, J.
================================
Crl.R.P No.1770 of 2009
================================
Dated this the 1st day of February, 2023
ORDER
This revision petition, filed under Sections 397 and 401 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as `Cr.P.C'
for convenience), is at the instance of the sole accused in
S.T.No.881/2005 on the files of the Special Judicial Magistrate
(Marad Cases), Kozhikode.
2. Challenge in this revision petition is the veracity of the
judgment of the in the above case dated 05.07.2007, modified by
the Additional Sessions Judge, Kozhikode as per judgment in
Crl.Appeal No.583/2007 dated 01.04.2009.
3. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner
and the learned Public Prosecutor as well as the learned counsel
for the 2nd respondent.
4. I shall refer the parties in this Revision Petition as
`complainant' and `accused' for convenience.
5. The complainant initiated prosecution alleging
commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act (`N.I Act' for short) by the accused,
when cheque for Rs.5,00,000/- dated 18.02.2005, alleged to be
issued by the accused to the complainant in repayment of
Rs.5,00,000/- alleged to be borrowed by the accused from the
complainant for the purpose of business, was dishonoured, when
it was presented for collection.
6. The trial court secured the presence of the accused for
trial. During trial, PW1 examined and Exts.P1 to P4 were marked
on the side of the complainant. The accused was questioned
under Section 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C and the accused adduced
defence evidence. Accordingly, DW1 also was examined.
7. The trial court given emphasis to the evidence of PW1
and Exts.P1 to P4 to hold that the complainant discharged his
initial burden in the matter of executing Ext.P1 cheque.
8. Trial court appraised the evidence in detail and finally
convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section
138 of the N.I Act and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment
for a period of 2 months and to pay Rs.5 lakh to the complainant
as compensation under Section 357(3) of Cr.P.C and in default, to
undergo simple imprisonment for one month also was imposed.
9. The said verdict was challenged before the Sessions
Court, Kozhikode and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, on
re-appraisal of the evidence confirmed the conviction and finally
modified the sentence to imprisonment till the rising of the court
and to pay compensation of Rs.5 lakh and in default of payment
of compensation, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of
2 months.
10. While impeaching the concurrent verdicts of
conviction and the modified sentence imposed by the appellate
court, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner reiterated the
contentions raised before the trial court as well as the appellate
court on the assertion that the complaint is barred by limitation. It
is submitted that the notice of demand issued by the accused was
received by the husband of the complainant on 1.3.2000. But, in
the acknowledgment card marked as Ext.P4(b), there is material
alteration as to the date of acceptance of notice. It is argued that,
in fact, DW1 accepted the notice on 1.3.2005; but in the
acknowledgment card the date was materially altered as 7.3.2005,
to save the period of limitation. The learned counsel submitted
further that since there was material alteration, the accused filed
petition to get expert opinion to prove the same. But the said
initiative failed since it was reported that the back records
pertaining to the postal article were missing. The appellate court
found that there is some overwriting on the date in Ext.P4(b). But
the appellate court was not inclined to accept the contention
holding that if at all the complaint was filed beyond the period of
limitation, the same could be entertained after condoning the
delay. The trial court also negatived this contention.
11. The learned counsel for the accused/revision petitioner
given heavy reliance on the evidence of DW1 to prove that he had
received the notice on 1.3.2005. In the case on hand, it is clear
that immediately on dishonour of Ext.P1 cheque as per Ext.P2
dishonour memo and Ext.P3 cheque return memo, the
complainant caused legal notice demanding the amount covered
by the cheque. The specific case put up by the complainant
before the trial court was that the accused accepted the demand
notice on 7.3.2005. Whereas the accused would contend that the
notice was received by her husband on 1.3.2005. The plank of
this contention is based on an overwriting in Ext.P4(b)
acknowledgment card regarding the date of acceptance of notice
as "7.3.2005". It is true that the appellate court also observed
that there was overwriting.
12. The crucial question is, on which date accused
accepted notice? I have perused the deposition of PW1. During
cross examination of PW1, no challenge was raised to the effect
that the complainant or any persons related to the complainant
had overwritten or altered the date in the acknowledgment card as
`7.3.2005' instead of `1.3.2005'. However, leaving PW1 even
without asking a remote suggestion as to the effect that the
complainant or his men materially altered the date in Ext.P4(a),
DW1 was examined and DW1 given evidence in support of the
same contention.
13. It is pertinent to note that when the dispute is with
regard to the date of acceptance of the notice and the complainant
asserts the same as 7.3.2005, while the accused would allege the
same as 1.3.2005, the best evidence should have been adduced by
the accused, who raised the contention, must be by examining the
postman or to bring the relevant records, available with the postal
authority to prove the date of acceptance of notice by DW1. It is
true that when an attempt was made by the learned counsel for
the accused to get expert opinion regarding the date in Ext.P4(a),
the same could not be materialised for want of records. But the
same is not a reason for the accused not to summon and examine
the postman, who served the notice since he had direct knowledge
with regard to service of notice on one part, supported by
the official records on the other part. Therefore, examination of
the postman should be the procedure to adduce best evidence
to prove that the notice was served upon DW1 on 1.3.2005 and
not on 07.03.2005 and therefore the complaint filed on
18.04.2005 is barred by limitation, since the same was beyond the
period of 45 days. But the accused had not even attempted to
summon the postman in this regard. That shows that the accused
was not interested to bring the best evidence to prove the said
contention.
14. As I have already pointed out, merely because there
was an overwriting in Ext.P4(b), the same was not a reason to
hold that there is material alteration. Such overwriting was
possible at the time when the person who accepted it if put the
date by overwriting. It is true that somebody handling the same
also may overwrite the same. Usually acknowledgment card will
be addressed to the counsel, who issued notice and therefore
overwriting in the acknowledgment card by the complainant
cannot be believed normally, unless the same is established by the
cogent and convincing evidence. In this matter during cross
examination of PW1, no question was asked regarding
overwriting in Ext.P4(b) by PW1, as I have already pointed out.
It is true that DW1 stated that he had accepted the notice on
1.3.2005, but the said evidence cannot be relied on, when the
accused spared the examination of the postman, who is competent
to give best evidence on this point. In view of the matter, I agree
with the finding of the lower courts to hold that the material
alteration alleged by the accused in Ext.P4(b) is not at all
established and the complaint had been filed within time and the
same was not barred by limitation.
15. The second point argued by the learned counsel for the
revision petitioner is that when the transaction stated in the
complaint and the one deposed by the complainant are different,
the same is a reason to disbelieve the case of the complainant. In
this regard, he had placed decision of this Court reported in [2021
(2) KHC 432], Basheer K. v. C.K.Usman Koya & anr. and relied
on para.30 of the above judgment. Para.30 of the above judgment
is as under:
"Complainant stated that the money was advanced to facilitate a visa business carried on by the accused. He thus resiled from the specific contention that there existed business transactions between them. It had been initially deposed that all records in connection with the business is kept by the accused and he has no document at all in connection with that business. That would lead to an inference as suggested during cross - examination of the complainant that actually PW1 was not having any business transaction with DW1 and that is why he was not having any records in connection with the same. The nature of business of the accused is said to be purchase of visa from Arab Nationals, who alone can sponsor foreign nationals, which, for a minor profit would be given to seekers of jobs in Gulf countries. But he could not state any of such visa transaction of the accused or himself with a third party. The prevarication of the complainant would probabilise the defence that there was no joint business conducted by them."
16. There is no quarrel that when the complainant given
contrary evidence regarding the transaction and execution of the
cheque, the ratio held in Basheer's case (supra) would apply. In
this matter, in the complaint the complainant specifically alleged
that the accused borrowed the amount for his business purpose.
During cross examination, the complainant reiterated that money
was borrowed for the purpose of business, while admitting that
there was a sale agreement prior to that.
17. In the instant case, the case put up by the accused
throughout the proceedings is that the husband of the accused
borrowed Rs.90,000/- from the complainant during 2002 and
towards security for the payment of the same amount, 4 blank
cheques belonged to the husband as well as 3 blank cheques
belonged to the accused were given to the complainant apart from
handing over 3 signed blank stamp papers worth Rs.50/- by the
husband of the accused. The accused not stated whether the said
admitted liability has been discharged.
18. In the above context, the courts below given emphasis
to the evidence of PW1 to hold that the complainant successfully
discharged the transaction led to execution of the cheque.
19. In this matter, as I have already pointed out, issuance
of cheque is admitted while admitting liability to the tune of
Rs.90,000/- and the said liability also was not discharged. When
notice of demand was issued, no reply also was sent. In such a
case, the courts below perfectly justified in giving the benefit of
presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I Act in favour
of the complainant.
20. It is the settled law that power of revision available to
this Court under Section 401 of Cr.P.C r/w Section 397 is not
wide and exhaustive to re-appreciate the evidence to have a
contra finding. Decisions reported in [(1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999
SCC (Cri) 275], State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan
Namboodiri; [(2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19],
Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke;
[(2018) 8 SCC 165], Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, are on this
point.
21. No doubt, law regarding presumptions under Sections
118 and 139 of the N.I Act also well settled on the point that
when the complainant discharged the initial burden to prove the
transaction led to execution of the cheque, the presumptions
under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I Act would come into play.
No doubt, these presumptions are rebuttable and it is the duty of
the accused to rebut the presumptions and the standard of proof of
rebuttal is nothing but preponderance of probabilities. It has been
settled in law that the accused can either adduce independent
evidence or rely on the evidence tendered by the complainant to
rebut the presumptions. See decisions reported in [2010 (2) KLT
682 (SC)], Rangappa v. Mohan; [2019 (1) KLT 598 (SC) : 2019
(1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (2)
KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 CriLJ 3227], Bir Singh v.
Mukesh Kumar, [2021 (2) KHC 517 : 2021 KHC OnLine 6063 :
2021 (1) KLD 527 : 2021 (2) SCALE 434 : ILR 2021 (1) Ker.
855 : 2021 (5) SCC 283 : 2021 (1) KLT OnLine 1132], Kalamani
Tex (M/s.) & anr. v. P.Balasubramanian.
22. It is relevant to refer a latest decision of the Apex
Court reported in [2022 (5) KHC 560 (SC)], Oriental Bank of
Commerce v. Prabodh Kumar Tewari, wherein it has been held
that, the fact that the details in the cheque have been filled up not
by the drawer, but by some other person would be immaterial.
The presumption which arises on the signing of the cheque canot
be rebutted merely by the report of a handwriting expert. Even if
the details in the cheque have not been filled up by drawer but by
another person, this is not relevant to the defence whether cheque
was issued towards payment of a debt or in discharge of a
liability.
23. No other contentions raised in this matter. Therefore,
there is no reason to disbelieve the transaction as well as the
execution of the cheque. As such, the concurrent verdicts of
conviction do not require any interference. The sentence also
does not require any interference since the appellate court rightly
modified the substantive sentence to the least minimum possible,
viz., imprisonment till rising of the court.
24. In fact, in the instant case, the learned counsel for the
accused failed to establish that the complaint was barred by
limitation and also the complainant not discharged his initial
burden in the matter of prosecution led to execution of Ext.P1
cheque. That apart, the accused also failed to establish cogent
evidence to rebut the presumptions also. Therefore, the revision
petition fails and the same is liable to be dismissed.
25. Accordingly, the Revision Petition stands dismissed
confirming the concurrent conviction and modified sentence
imposed by the appellate court. The accused/revision petitioner is
directed to surrender before the trial court within a period of
seven days from today and on failure to do so, the trial court is
directed to execute the sentence in accordance with law without
fail.
Registry shall forward a copy of this order to the courts
below concerned for information and compliance.
Sd/-
(A. BADHARUDEEN, JUDGE) rtr/
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