Koyakkanari Sivadasan vs K.K.Nirmala
2022 Latest Caselaw 3770 Ker

                                                      "C.R."
          IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
                          PRESENT
        THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN
                              &
         THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR
  TUESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF APRIL 2022 / 15TH CHAITHRA, 1944
                   R.C.REV.NO. 56 OF 2021
  AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.01.2021 IN R.C.A.NO.163 OF
  2019 OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (ADDITIONAL
DISTRICT JUDGE-I), KOZHIKODE AND THE ORDER DATED 30.09.2019
IN R.C.P.NO.14 OF 2019 OF THE RENT CONTROL COURT (PRINCIPAL
                   MUNSIFF-I), KOZHIKODE
REVISION PETITIONER:

         KOYAKKANARI SIVADASAN
         AGED 50 YEARS, S/O. KOYAKKANARI BHASKARAN,
         ELATHUR VILLAGE, MOKAVOOR DESOM,
         ERANHIKKAL P.O., KOZHIKODE.
         BY ADVS.
         K.M.FIROZ
         SMT.M.SHAJNA

RESPONDENT:

         K.K.NIRMALA
         AGED 67 YEARS, W/O.KOLANGARAKANDI SREENIVASAN,
         USHAS, 5/1587, JAWAHAR NAGAR COLONY,
         P.O.ASOKAPURAM, KALATHINKUNNU DESOM,
         KOZHIKODE, PIN-673006.
         BY ADVS.
         SRI.B.PREMNATH (E)
         SHRI.SARATH M.S.


     THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL
HEARING ON 25.02.2022, THE COURT ON 05.04.2022 DELIVERED
THE FOLLOWING:
                                2
R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021


                         ORDER                        "C.R."

Ajithkumar, J.

The respondent filed R.C.P.No.14 of 2019 before the

Rent Control Court (Principal Munsiff-I), Kozhikode, seeking

eviction of the petitioner-tenant under Section 11(2)(b),

11(3), 11(4)(ii) and 11(4)(iii) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease

and Rent Control) Act, 1965. On 30.09.2019 that petition was

allowed ex-parte and eviction was ordered. The petitioner filed

an appeal under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act challenging the

said order before the Rent Control Appellate Authority

(Additional District Judge-I), Kozhikode. In that appeal,

R.C.A.No.163 of 2019, the respondent filed I.A.No.1 of 2020

under Section 12 of the Act. Rent since January 2018 has been

said to be in arrears. An order under Section 12(1) of the Act

was passed on 22.12.2020 directing the petitioner to pay within

5 weeks the entire admitted arrears of rent and to continue to

pay the rent for the subsequent months within 3 weeks from

the date on which it becomes due. Arrears of rent was not paid

and eventually an order under Section 12(3) of the Act was

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

passed on 30.01.2021. That order is under challenge in this

revision petition filed under Section 20 of the Act.

2. On 22.03.2021, this revision petition was admitted

and notice was issued to the respondent. Execution of the

order of eviction was stayed for a period of three months.

3. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the

petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the

respondent.

4. I.A.No.1 of 2020 in R.C.A.No.163 of 2019 was filed

contending that the petitioner has defaulted payment of rent

since January 2018 and that fact was admitted by her in the

plaint she filed in O.S.No.156 of 2018 before the Principal

Munisiff-I, Kozhikode. The rate of rent has also been admitted

as Rs. 25,000/- per month. As on March 2020, in which

month I.A.No.1 of 2020 was filed, the amount of arrears of

rent was Rs. 6,25,000/-. Accordingly, the respondent sought

to initiate action under Section 12 of the Act.

5. The petitioner filed a counter-affidavit contending

as follows: The petition was filed by the husband of the

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

respondent-landlady without her consent. The petitioner paid

the rent to the respondent upto November, 2019 in the

presence of her employee, Sri. Santhosh Kumar. Even earlier,

she did not use to issue receipts. Since, entire rent was thus

paid, the petition was not tenable.

6. The Appellate Authority considered the averments

in the plaint in O.S.No.156 of 2018, a copy of which was

produced along with I.A.No.1 of 2020 in the light of the rival

contentions and concluded that rent from January, 2018 had

been in arrears. The appellate authority for the purpose of

deciding what would amount to 'arrears admitted by the

tenant to be due' placed reliance on the decision in Sadique

v. Mohammed Umair and others [2017 (3) KLT 759].

The observation of this Court in the decision was that

expression admitted arrears applies only to the pre-litigation

stage and, not to post-litigation stage. Following that, the

Appellate Authority held that there is admitted arrears of rent.

Also, the claim of the petitioner regarding payment of rent for

the period after filing of the rent control petition has been

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

regarded as a fib, in the absence of any receipt or other

documents as envisaged in Section 9 of the Act.

7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner

would contend that the order directing payment of arrears of

rent to a tune of Rs.6,25,000/- passed in I.A.No.1 of 2020

was without considering the law on the point in its proper

perspective and also without affording a further opportunity of

offering her explanation. In the absence of admission by the

petitioner in her objection, such an order should not have

been passed. The order under Section 12(1) of the Act and

also the order under Section 12(3) pronounced in quick

succession were, therefore in total negation of the provisions

in Section 12 of the Act. The learned counsel would submit

that passing of the order of eviction without giving a

reasonable opportunity has caused serious prejudice to the

petitioner and it is violative of the principle laid down by this

Court in Shaji M. v. SNDP Sakha Yogam No.610,

Alappuzha and another [2010 (2) KLJ 574].

8. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent,

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on the other hand, would contend that the direction of the

Appellate Authority to deposit the admitted arrears of rent

was after taking into account a candid admission made by the

petitioner in O.S.No.156 of 2018 and the same is perfectly in

accordance with the provision of Section 12(1) of the Act. It is

incorrect to say that what is admitted by the tenant in the

objection filed by him before the Rent Control Court alone can

be based on to find as to what is the admitted arrears of rent.

Other materials produced before court, which contain

admission of the tenant regarding rate of rent and amount of

rent due can also be taken into account. It is thus submitted

that an inquiry in a limited sense to find out whether there is

admission by the tenant as to the said facts is very much

postulated by the provisions of Section 12(1) of the Act.

9. Yet another contention raised is that the Rent

Control Court and the Appellate Authority, not being courts

having all the trappings of a civil court, an order under

Section 12(1) of the Act cannot be challenged in an appeal

against an order under section 12(3). By virtue of the

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

provisions of Order LXIII Rule 1-A of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 it is possible to challenge non appealable

interlocutory orders in a regular civil appeal. But that recourse

is not possible in an appeal under Section 18(1)(b) or, as the

case may be in a revision under Section 20 of the Act.

Accordingly, the learned counsel for the respondent would

submit that there is absolutely no reason to interfere with the

order passed by the Appellate Authority under Section 12(3)

of the Act. The learned counsel for the respondent has drawn

our attention to the decisions in Balakrishnan v.

Mariyumma [1997 (1) KLT 205], Krishna Iyer v. Abdul

Rasheed [2015 (1) KLT 511], Sadanandan v. Pradeepan

[2001 (2) KLT 913] and Mukri Gopalan v. Aboobacker

[(1995) 5 SCC 5] to fortify his contention that the Rent

Control Court and the Appellate Authority are not civil courts.

10. In Balakrishnan (supra) this Court considered the

question whether a Rent Control Court under the Rent Control

Act is a 'Court' for the purpose of the provisions of Section

115 of the Code. It was held that even though Rent Control

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

Court under the Rent Control Act is a 'Court' and is not a

persona designata, it is not a Civil Court for the purpose of

the provisions of Section 115 of the Code. In Krishna Iyer

(supra) this Court considered the question whether a Rent

Control Court under the Rent Control Act can order joint trial

of cases invoking its inherent powers or the power available

under Section 151 of the Code. It was held that there is no

provision in the Act saving the inherent power of the Rent

Control Court as is available in Section 151 of the Code. That

does not mean that the Rent Control Court has no power to

pass orders which are not specifically covered by the

provisions in Section 23 of the Act. The Court proceeded to

hold that Section 23 of the Act provides for certain powers

enumerated therein and which are vested in a Court under the

Code of Civil Procedure. Section 23 of the Act would not be a

bar for the Rent Control Court to exercise any other power

which a Civil Court exercises under the Code of Civil

Procedure, provided the facts and circumstances warrant the

exercise of such power and it does not offend the Act and the

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

Rules. The power to do justice between the parties and to

dispose of a Rent Control Petition in accordance with law,

would certainly confer certain inherent powers on the Rent

Control Court.

11. In Sadanandan (supra) this Court considered the

question whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act would apply

to a Rent Control Court and for that purpose, can a Rent

Control Court be said to be a Civil Court. The Court held,

"There is considerable controversy whether a Rent Control Court is a "Court" or merely "persona designata". In any event, the Rent Control Court is not a "civil court" in the strict sense of the term on the scheme of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act."

12. The question here is whether this Court, while

considering a revision filed under Section 20 of the Act against

an order under Section 12(3) of the Act, can also consider

legality of the order under Section 12(1) directing the tenant

to pay or deposit all arrears of rent admitted by him to be

due. In the context of this question the principle laid down in

Gopakumar G. and others v. Ancy Thankachan Philip

and others [2019 (3) KHC 760 : 2019 (3) KLT 346] is

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

more relevant.

13. The issue there was as to the Appellate Court's

power to condone delay in filing an appeal by relying on

Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Division Bench in order to

answer the question took cue from the decisions of the Apex

Court in Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil

Aboobacker [(1995) 5 SCC 5], Consolidated Engineering

Enterprises v. Irrigation Department [(2008) 7 SCC

169] and M. P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of

Central Excise [(2015) 7 SCC 58] and also the decision of

this Court in Ratheesh v. A. M. Chacko and another [2018

(5) KHC 35 : 2018 (4) KLJ 841]. It was held that an

Appellate Authority under the Act, being a District Judge,

undoubtedly possesses all the required powers under the

Code for an effective adjudication of the case. Generally

speaking, the appellate power is an extension of the original

authority's power. In other words, appellate power is co-

extensive to and co-terminus with the original power. The

Court concluded that the Appellate Authority under the Act is

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

a District Judge with full-fledged powers vested in a District

Court to which the entire Code applies. Same analogy applies

to this Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction under

Section 20 of the Act. Viewed so, provisions of Order LXIII

Rule I-A of the Code which enables to challenge non-

appealable orders in an appeal against the decree will also get

application. Legality of an order under Section 12(1) can be

challenged in an appeal or, as the case may be, revision filed

against an order under Section 12(3) of the Act.

14. Section 12 of the Act deals with payment or deposit

of rent during the pendency of proceedings for eviction. As

per Section 12(1), no tenant against whom an application for

eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 11, shall

be entitled to contest the application before the Rent Control

Court under that Section, or to prefer an appeal under Section

18 against any order made by the Rent Control Court on the

application, unless he has paid or pays to the landlord, or

deposits with the Rent Control Court or the Appellate

Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date

of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any

rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the

building, until the termination of the proceedings before the

Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may

be. As per Section 12(2), the deposit under sub-section (1)

shall be made within such time as the court may fix and in

such manner as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied

by the fee prescribed for the service of notice referred to in

sub-section (4). As per the proviso to Section 12(2), the time

fixed by the court for the deposit of the arrears of rent shall

not be less than four weeks from the date of the order and

the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently

accrues due shall not be less than two weeks from the date on

which the rent becomes due. As per Section 12(3) of the Act,

if any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid,

the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case

may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the

contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the

building. As per Section 12(4), when any deposit is made

under sub-section (1), the Rent Control Court or the Appellate

Authority, as the case may be, shall cause notice of the

deposit to be served on the landlord in the prescribed manner,

and the amount deposited may, subject to such conditions as

may be prescribed, be withdrawn by the landlord on

application made by him to the Rent Control Court or the

Appellate Authority in that behalf.

15. The liability of a tenant under Section 12(1) of the

Act, against whom an application for eviction has been made

by a landlord under Section 11, or who preferred an appeal

under Section 18 of the Act, against any order made by the

Rent Control Court on an application made by a landlord

under Section 11, is limited to all arrears of rent admitted by

the tenant to be due in respect of the building, up to the date

of payment or deposit, and to continue to pay or deposit any

rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the

building, until the termination of the proceedings before the

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may

be.

16. The object of the provisions of Section 12(1) of the

Act is to deny the defaulting tenant the right to contest the

application for eviction before the Rent Control Court, or to

prefer an appeal under Section 18 of the Act against any

order made by the Rent Control Court on an application made

by a landlord under Section 11, unless he pays to the

landlord, or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the

Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent

admitted by him to be due in respect of the building, up to the

date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to

deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in

respect of the building, until the termination of the

proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate

Authority, as the case may be.

17. The term 'arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to

be due' has been a subject of judicial discourse many a time.

From the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on

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either side, the question emerges for consideration is, as to

how the court should come to a finding regarding the

admitted arrears of rent; from what is apparent from the

pleadings, namely, objections filed by the tenant, to the

eviction petition and/or objection to the petition under Section

12 of the Act alone, or can the Court undertake an inquiry to

ascertain the admission by the tenant?

18. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner

would contend that the Appellate Authority went wrong in

considering the copy of the plaint in O.S.No.156 of 2018,

produced by the respondent along with I.A.No.1 of 2020 to

render a finding regarding the admitted arrears of rent. This

Court in Sadique v. Mohammed Umair [2017 (3) KLT

759] held that the expression 'admitted arrears of rent' as

envisaged under Section 12 of the Act is operative only to the

pre-litigation stage and it is resting on the admission of the

tenant, for which no enquiry is contemplated. The term

'admitted arrears of rent' has fallen for consideration of this

Court in Sadique (supra), where it was held that,

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

'4. xx xx xx The Court cannot substitute its finding on the arrears of rent in the place of admitted arrears of rent and, if it is allowed, it would fall under the purview of an adjudication under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act, which can be done only on a later stage, at the trial of the Rent Control Petition. In other words, it is totally impermissible for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, to have an adjudication regarding the arrears of rent, as envisaged under the first limb of Section 12, by conducting an enquiry.'

19. As regards the possibility or not of an enquiry in

order to ascertain what is the arrears of rent admitted by the

tenant to be due this Court in Williams Daniel v. Jose

[2019 (4) KLT 464] held as follows,-

'11. xx xx xx Arrears of rent admitted under Section 12 do not postulate adjudicated rent, when there is denial of liability and the only enquiry which could be taken as granted by law in this respect is to find out whether the tenant has made any admission of liability and, if so the extent thereof, so that the arrears of admitted rent could well be ascertained by the court.'

20. Section 13(1) in the Tripura Buildings (Lease and

Rent Control) Act, 1975, is a provision pari materia Section

12(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

1965, where also similar terminology namely, 'all arrears of

rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the

building' is used. In the context of that provision, a Division

Bench of the Apex Court in Manik Lal Majumdar and others

v. Gouranga Chandra Dey and others [(2004) 12 SCC

448] considered as to what is the legislative intention behind

enacting a provision that admitted arrears and recurring rent to be

deposited or paid by the tenant during eviction proceedings or

appeal preferred by him. In view of divergency of opinion on the

question; whether an appeal can be preferred by a tenant under

Section 20 of the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,

1975 without making payment or deposit of admitted arrears of

rent, as stated in Section 13(1) of that Act, the matter was referred

to a larger Bench.

21. Accordingly, that question was come to be decided

by a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Manik Lal

Majumdar and others v. Gouranga Chandra Dey and

others [(2005) 5 SCC 400]. The extent and ambit of

'enquiry' that is allowed to ascertain the 'rent admitted by the

tenant to be due' in the context of Tripura Buildings (Lease

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

and Rent Control) Act, 1975 was considered by the Apex

Court and held as follows:

'6. xx xx xx The expression "all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due", if interpreted literally, would mean that unless the tenant specifically admits any arrears of rent to be due to the landlord, the condition to make the payment of arrears of rent in order to contest the original proceedings before the Rent Control Court or to prefer an appeal as provided under Section 13 of the Act would not arise. The High Court in Binapani Roy's case (1994 (1) Gau.LR 98) has held that giving literal meaning to the words "admitted by the tenant to be due" would frustrate the provisions of Section 13 of the Act and make the same nugatory or otiose. The object of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act is to avoid litigation for realization of arrears of rent which is likely to accumulate during the course of litigation, which may be a long period and also to deter the tenant from resorting to an unfair practice to use and occupy the tenanted premises without payment of any rent so long as the litigation continues. The High Court was of the opinion that the reasonable meaning of the words "admitted by the tenant to be due" is the inference of admission from the material on record. If the material on record prima facie discloses the admission of relationship of landlord and tenant and the

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

rate of monthly rent payable, the tenant would be required to pay or deposit arrears of rent and continue payment of current rent during the pendency of the litigation, as enjoined under Section 13 of the Act.' (Underline supplied)

22. The principle that can be deduced from the

aforesaid decisions is that in order to ascertain the 'arrears

admitted by the tenant to be due' the court can have an

enquiry in a limited sense. The enquiry allowed is scrutiny of

the petitions under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act, the

objections thereto and the other materials brought on record

by either parties for purpose only of ascertaining admission

regarding landlord-tenant relationship, the rate of monthly

rent and the quantum of arrears of rent payable. If the

materials on record disclose or infer such admission, the Court

shall direct the tenant to pay or deposit the arrears of rent

due as on the date of application under Section 12 of the Act

and continue to pay subsequent rent which falls due during

the pendency of the litigation.

23. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner

drew our attention to yet another decision in order to contend

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

that this Court took a different view from what has been held

by the Apex Court as regards the possible enquiry to ascertain

the admitted arrears of rent. In Jose P.O. v. Xavier and

another [2017 3 KLT 222], this Court considered when can

the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority direct the

tenant to deposit or pay the entire arrears of rent admitted to

be due. It was held that the admission regarding the rent can

be found only on two ways, namely, (i) by filing counter

(written objection) to the application submitted under Section

11 of the Act; or (2) by filing counter to an application under

Section 12 of the Act filed by the landlord.

24. In Jose P.O. (supra) this Court did not consider

whether there could be an enquiry by the court to ascertain the

rent admitted to be in arrears. The court only decided, when the

Rent Control Court or, as the case may be, the Appellate

Authority, can take up the question as to the obligation of the

tenant to deposit or pay the arrears of rent for him to contest

the petition for eviction or the appeal. The decision did not

consider the question as to whether an enquiry, to ascertain

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

the rent admitted by the tenant to be due, is possible or not.

25. The observations of this Court in Sadique [2017

(3) KLT 759] is that the Court cannot substitute its finding

after an enquiry and adjudication on the arrears of rent, in the

place of admitted arrears of rent for, an adjudication would fall

under the purview of Section 11(2)(b) of the Act only. It was

thus held that it was totally impermissible for the Rent Control

Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, to have

an adjudication after conducting an enquiry regarding the

arrears of rent contemplated under Section 12 of the Act.

After an anxious consideration we hold that the principles in

Sadique [2017 (3) KLT 759] or Jose P.O. [2017 3 KLT

222] are not in conflict with the law laid down by the Apex

Court in Manik Lal Majumdar [(2005) 5 SCC 400]. The

decisions in Sadique and Jose P.O. are thus explained.

26. The Appellate Authority directed the petitioner to

deposit the admitted arrears of rent after taking into account

an admission made by the petitioner in O.S.No.156 of 2018

which was admittedly filed by him before the Principal

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

Munisiff-I, Kozhikode, besides the averments in the rival

pleadings. In view of the principle of law discussed above,

conduct of such an enquiry cannot be said to be faulty. The

direction was to deposit an amount of Rs.6,25,000/- which

was the arrears of rent admitted to be due as on March 2020,

in which month I.A.No.1 of 2020 was filed. The petitioner did

not make payment of that amount ever.

27. The order under Section 12(1) of the Act was

passed by the Appellate Authority on 22.12.2020 directing the

petitioner to pay within five weeks the entire admitted arrears

of rent and to continue to pay the rent for the subsequent

months within three weeks from the date on which it becomes

due. The Appeal was posted to 27.01.2021 to pay the arrears

of rent. No payment was made as per the direction. The

appeal was therefore postponed to 30.01.2021. Since no

payment was made and no explanation was offered on that

day also, the Authority pronounced the judgment on that day

directing the petitioner to surrender vacant possession of the

tenanted premises under Section 12(3) of the Act.

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28. In Shaji M. v. SNDP Sakhayogam No.610,

Alappuzha and another [2020 (2) KHC 574 : 2020 (2)

KLT 866] a Full Bench of this Court held that, in view of the

principle evolved in Narayanan v. Vinod [2004 (3) KLT

955] from the language of Section 12(3) of the of the Kerala

Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, and from the

legislative intent, it is not for the Rent Control Court or the

Appellate Authority to issue any separate notice to the tenant

to enable him to show sufficient cause for not depositing the

admitted arrears of rent. Instead, when the time fixed for

deposit of the arrears of rent runs out and the tenant has not

deposited the same, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate

Authority, as the case may be, is not expected to pass an

order ordering ejectment of the tenant forthwith. The Rent

Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be,

should normally adjourn the hearing of the case to a date

beyond the date fixed for deposit, thereby allowing reasonable

time to the tenant to show sufficient cause for not depositing

the rent, if he has committed default in payment of the

R.C.Rev.No.56 of 2021

arrears of rent. Only thing is that the opportunity to be

afforded to the tenant to show sufficient cause with respect to

the failure to pay or deposit rent, as directed in Section 12(1)

and (2), within the date stipulated, is not an empty formality.

The principles of natural justice would mandate that the Rent

Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be,

should afford the tenant with such an opportunity.

29. Therefore, there is no necessity to alert the tenant

by issuing any specific notice, calling upon him to show

sufficient cause. On the other hand, providing a further

opportunity after the last date stipulated for effecting the

payment or the deposit, is mandatory. If no sufficient cause is

shown within such an extended date to which the rent control

petition is posted, it is absolutely within the authority and

competence to stop the proceedings and direct the tenant to

put the landlord in possession of the building.

30. Viewed in the light of the aforesaid legal principles,

the impugned orders of the Appellate Authority dated

22.12.2020 and the judgment dated 30.01.2021 do not suffer

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from any illegality, irregularity or impropriety. The revision

petition, therefore, fails. We dismissed it. No order as to

costs.

Sd/-

ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE

Sd/-

P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JUDGE dkr