Kerala High Court
K.V.Prasadan vs K.Thahira on 7 September, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA
TUESDAY, THE 7TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2021 / 16TH BHADRA, 1943
RCREV. NO. 200 OF 2020
RCP 61/2012 OF MUNSIF COURT, KUTHUPARAMBA, KANNUR
REVISION PETITIONER/RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT
K.V.PRASADAN
AGED 52 YEARS
S/O. KURUVATH ACHUTHAN, BUSINESS , RESIDING AT
KARUVATH HOUSE, KUNHUPARAMBA AMSOM, AMBILAD DESOM,
KUTHUPARAMBA, THALASSERY TALUK, PIN-670 643
BY ADV K.V.PAVITHRAN
RESPONDENT/APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS
1 K.THAHIRA
AGED 63 YEARS
W/O. DR. SALIH, AGED 63 YEARS, NO OCCUPATION, RESIDING
AT THAIS, KANDAMKUNNU AMSOM, KYTHERI DESOM,
KUTHUPARAMBA, THALASSERY TALUK, PIN-670 643.
2 K. RAMEES,
S/O. DR. SALIH, AGED 43 YEARS, SALESMAN IN GENTS
FASHION, RESIDING AT THALS, KANDAMKUNNU AMSOM, KYTHERI
DESOM, KUTHUPARAMBA, THALASSERY TALUK, PIN-670 643.
3 K. RAJEES,
S/O. DR. SALIH, AGED 43 YEARS, NO OCCUPATION, RESIDING
AT THALS, KANDAMKUNNU AMSOM, KYTHERI DESOM,
KUTHUPARAMBA, THALASSERY TALUK.
4 K. RAZVIN
S/O. DR. SALIH, AGED 35 YEARS, NO OCCUPATION, RESIDING
AT THALS, KANDAMKUNNU AMSOM, KYTHERI DESOM,
KUTHUPARAMBA, THALASSERY TALUK.
5 K. RAMZINA,
S/O. DR. SALIH, AGED 32 YEARS, NO OCCUPATION, RESIDING
AT THALS, KANDAMKUNNU AMSOM, KYTHERI DESOM,
KUTHUPARAMBA, THALASSERY TALUK.
R.PARTHASARATHY
RAJESH V.NAIR
THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON22.7.2021, THE COURT ON 7.9.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
2
ORDER
M.R.Anitha, J.
This Rent Control Revision Petition has been filed against the
judgment in R.C.A.No.164 of 2013 dated 05.03.2020 of the Rent
Control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge-IV), Thalassery,
by which, the order in R.C.P.No.61 of 2012 dated 27.08.2013 of the
Rent Control Court (Munsiff), Kuthuparamba was varied and allowed.
The petitioner herein is the respondent-tenant in the said R.C.P.
2. R.C.P.No.61 of 2012 has been filed by the respondents
herein-landlords seeking eviction of the petition schedule building
under Section 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and
Rent Control) Act, 1965, (for short, the Act). According to the
landlords, the tenant took the petition schedule building on lease from
the original landlord Dr.Sali, (husband of the first petitioner and father
of petitioners 2 to 5 herein) for a period of six months, on 25.08.1998,
on a monthly rent of Rs.300/-, excluding the Municipal tax and other
charges, on executing a joint kychit between the tenant and the
original landlord. The tenant attorned to the petitioners herein on the
death of Dr. Sali and cleared the rent upto and inclusive of April 2012,
at the rate of Rs.1,000/- and thereafter the rent is kept in arrears. The
landlords seek vacant possession of the petition schedule building for
the bonafide need, i.e, own occupation of the 4 th respondent herein, to
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
start a business in travel bags and allied accessories, who has no job or
other source of income. The landlords are not in possession of any
vacant rooms to start the proposed business. The tenant is not
depending upon the income derived from the petition schedule building
for his livelihood and there are other vacant buildings available in the
locality for occupation of the tenant.
3. The tenant filed objection admitting the rental arrangement
with Dr.Sali on execution of Kychit, agreeing to pay monthly rent of
Rs.300/-. Tenant denied the claim of the landlords as to enhancement
of rent at Rs.1,000/-. According to him there was a demand for
enhancement of rent at the rate of Rs.500/- when he paid the rent of
the month April, 2012, for which he was not amenable, and
subsequently 2nd respondent refused to accept the rent from May, 2012
onwards. The bonafide need alleged is stoutly denied and according to
the tenant respondents 2 to 4 herein are conducting business in the
name and style 'Gents Fashion' at Kuthuparamba Town and it is a joint
venture. Further the tenant contended that the income derived from
the petition schedule building is his only source of income and no other
suitable rooms are available in the locality for shifting his business.
Hence he prayed for dismissal of the petition.
4. Fourth respondent herein was examined as PW1 and Ext.A1
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
marked on the side of landlords. The tenant got himself examined as
RW1 and Ext.B1 to B5 series marked on his side. On hearing both
sides, the Rent Control Court dismissed the petition under Section
11(2)(b) of the Act, on the ground of non-compliance of the proviso to
Section 11(2)(b). Though bonafide need for own occupation of the 4 th
respondent herein was found in favour of the landlords, the 2 nd limb of
the 2nd proviso to Section 11(3) was found in favour of the tenant and
the Rent Control Court declined the eviction sought under Section
11(3).
5. Aggrieved by the dismissal of R.C.P.No.61 of 2012 under
Section 11(2)(b) and 11(3), the landlords filed R.C.A.No.164 of 2013
before the Rent Control Appellate Authority. The tenant filed cross
objection against the finding under Section 11(3). At the appellate
stage, from the side of the petitioners, Ext.A2 series were marked. The
Appellate Authority, by the impugned judgment, partly allowed the
appeal ordering eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, which is
challenged in this revision by the tenant. The cross objection filed by
the tenant was dismissed.
6. When this Revision Petition came up for admission on
01.12.2020 interim stay of the judgment impugned was granted and
the said order is still in force.
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
7. According to the tenant the 4th respondent herein along with
respondents 2 and 3 are already conducting a business at
Kuthuparamba town in the name and style' Gents Fashion'. Hence the
need urged by the landlords is without any bonafides. The main attack
of the learned counsel for the tenant is on the finding of the Rent
Control Appellate Authority on the 2nd limb of 2nd proviso to Section
11(3), which was found in favour of the tenant by the Rent Control
Court. According to the tenant, Ext.B4 letter issued by the
Accommodation Controller was marked without any objection and
therefore, the Appellate Authority went wrong in discarding that
evidence.
8. The learned counsel for the landlords, on the other hand,
fully supported the judgment of the Appellate Authority. According to
him there is no irregularity or impropriety in that judgment, warranting
any interference of this Court in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction
under Section 20 of the Act.
9. The powers of the Revisional Court Under Section 20 of the
Act is is no longer res integra. Way-back in Dattonpant Gopalvarao
Devakate v. Vithalrao Marutirao Janagavai [AIR 1975 SC 1111 :
(1975) 2 SCC 246 : 1975 KHC 184], it has been laid down that the
revisional powers under the Rent Act is not as narrow as the revisional
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and at
the same time it is not wide enough to the second court of first appeal.
10. In Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana
and Ors. [(1993) 1 SCC 499 : AIR 1993 SC 1616 : 1993 KHC
874] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court dealt with the revisional
powers of the High Court and its scope and it has been held that even
the wider language of Section 20 of the Act will not enable the High
Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. It is also held that
even by the presence of the word 'propriety' it cannot mean that there
could be a re-appreciation of evidence. Though it was laid down that
revisional court can come to a different conclusion, it was emphasised
that it is not on a re-appreciation of evidence. In that case, the
procedure of High Court in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral
and documentary in the light of the commissioners report was
deprecated and it was held that the High Court had traveled far beyond
the revisional jurisdiction and it was also held that the presence of the
word 'propriety' cannot be said to mean that there could be a re-
appreciation of evidence and accordingly the order passed by the High
Court in revision was set aside.
11. In Ubaiba v. Damodaran [(1999) 5 SCC 645 : 2000 (1)
KLT 24 SC : 2000 KHC 6], a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
again had occasion to consider the powers of revision of the High Court
under Section 20 of the Act and it has been reaffirmed that no power
has been vested with the court in revision to re-appreciate evidence
and come to its own conclusion and ultimately it was held that the
revisional order of the High Court is wholly unsustainable and
accordingly it was set aside and the order of the Appellate Authority
was affirmed.
12. Again, in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v.
Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78 : 2014 (4) KLT 182 (SC) :
2014 (3) KHC SN 15] a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court had
occasion to examine the scope of revisional jurisdiction under various
Rent Control Legislations prevailing in various States and held that the
word 'propriety' coming under Section 20 of the Kerala Act does not
confer power on High Court to re-appreciate evidence and come to a
different conclusion but the consideration of evidence is confined to find
out that the finding of fact recorded by the court below does not suffer
from any error of law. If finding of the courts by the court below is
perverse or arrived at without consideration of material evidence or
such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or is
grossly erroneous, and if allowed to stand it would result in gross
miscarriage of justice, then it is open to correction in exercise of
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
revisional jurisdiction.
13. In Thankamony Amma & Ors. v. Omana Amma N. &
Ors. [AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KLT 361 (SC) : 2019 (4)
KHC 412] it has been affirmed that when the findings rendered by the
courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not
even be said to be perverse, the High Court could not have re-
appreciated the evidence and concurrent findings rendered by the
courts below ought not to have been interfered with, by exercising the
revisional jurisdiction.
14. Bearing in mind the above settled position of law we have to
analyze the scope of interference which can be made by this Court in
the order passed by the Rent Control Court and also the judgment of
the Appellate Authority. In the case in hand there is concurrent findings
under Section 11(2)(b) and on the bonafide need projected in the
R.C.P. for own occupation of the building by the 4 th respondent herein.
Only with regard to the 2 nd limb of the 2nd proviso there is divergence of
views.
15. It has been found by the Rent Control Court as well as the
Appellate Authority that there is no proof to substantiate the claim of
the landlords, that the rent has been enhanced to Rs.1,000/- per
month. It has also been found that there was no proper notice
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
issued prior to the filing of the R.C.P. As per the proviso to Section
11(2)(b) of the Act, an application under this sub-section shall be made
only if the landlord has sent a registered notice to the tenant intimating
the default and the tenant has failed to pay or tender the rent together
with interest at 6% per annum and postal charges incurred in sending
the notice, within 15 days of receipt of notice or of the refusal thereof.
The landlords did not adduce any evidence to prove the factum of issue
of notice to the tenant prior to the institution of the proceedings. So the
concurrent findings by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate
Authority refusing to grant an order of eviction under Section 11(2)(b)
is well founded and does not call for any interference.
16. The bonafide need urged by the landlords is for the own
occupation of the 4th respondent herein for starting a business in travel-
bags and allied accessories. The specific contention of the tenant in this
regard was that the respondents 2 to 4 herein are conducting a joint
venture in the name and style 'Gents Fashion' in Kuthuparamba town
and the bonafide need urged is only a ruse for eviction. But it has come
out in evidence that the licence of the business at Kuthuparamba is in
the name of the 1st respondent herein-mother and the specific case of
the landlords is that respondents 2 and 3 are conducting the business
and the 4th respondent has no role in running that business. The 4 th
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
respondent, as PW1 gave evidence regarding the bonafide need and
that he has no other source of income. During cross examination,
nothing could be brought out to show that he has role in conducting
business at Kuthuparamba and is deriving any income out of that
business. So we do not find any illegality or impropriety in the
concurrent findings of the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate
Authority regarding the bonafide need projected by the landlords for
own occupation of the 4th respondent, the said finding does not call for
any interference.
17. Once the bonafide need is proved, the next aspect to be
considered is the 1st and 2nd proviso to Section 11(3). The 1 st proviso
hinders the landlord in getting vacant possession if it is shown that
landlord has in his possession another building in the same city, town
or village of his own, except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied
for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to
do so.
18. The Apex Court in M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal
[(2001) 2 SCC 355 : 2001 KHC 1023] held that non disclosure of
alternate building by the landlord in the eviction petition belonging to
him or his wife by itself is not fatal when the material about them had
been placed before the Rent Control Court as well as the High Court
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
and it is also held that the suitability of the alternate building has to be
seen from the point of view of the landlord and family members and on
the basis of the totality circumstances including their profession,
vocation, style of living, etc. In that case two adequate rooms pointed
out by the tenant were proved to have been used by the servants of
the landlords. In the said circumstances it was found that it can hardly
be expected that the landlord or his family to shift into the rooms
meant for servants.
19. A Division Bench of this Court in Vasantha Mallan v.
Aboobacker Siddique & Ors. [2020 (3) KLT 224 : 2020 (1) KLJ
348 : 2020 (1) KHC 21] has held that law does not require the
landlord to plead that he is in possession of any vacant building and
has special reasons for its non occupation and it is upto the tenant to
take up the contention and prove that landlord is in vacant possession
of premises.
20. The initial burden to show that the landlord has another
building of his own is on the tenant and if such evidence is adduced, it
is the burden of the landlord to establish the special reasons for not
occupying that room. In the instant case, the tenant did not have any
case that the landlords have in their possession any vacant building as
such. On the other hand their specific contention is that the
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
respondents 2 to 4 herein are conducting a joint venture, in the name
and style "Gents Fashion", at Kuthuparamba. It has already been found
that the said business is being run by the petitioners 2 and 3 herein
and hence the bonafides of the 4 th respondent herein for vacant
possession of the petition schedule building cannot be doubted for that
reason. So the concurrent findings of the Rent Control Court and the
Appellate Authority denying benefit of 1 st proviso to Section 11(3) of
the Act to the tenant is perfectly in order, which warrants no
interference.
21. As far as the 2nd proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is
concerned, the first limb, i.e., the tenant is depending for his livelihood
mainly on the income derived from the business carried on in the
petition schedule building has been concurrently found against the
tenant by both the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority.
Ext.B5 series tax returns have been evaluated, apart from the oral
testimony of tenant to arrive at such a conclusion regarding the income
of the tenant derived from that business. We do not find any illegality
or impropriety in the factual findings, warranting interference under
Section 20 of the Act.
22. Only with respect to the 2nd limb of the 2nd proviso to Section
11(3) of the Act divergent view has been taken by the Appellate
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
Authority. That was the main ground of attack by the tenant in this
proceedings.
23. The learned counsel for the tenant placed reliance on the
decision in Varghese Eapen v. Varghese [2001 (2) KLT 263 :
2001 (1) KLJ 957] to substantiate the contention that it is the tenant
who has to adduce evidence to disprove the existence of vacant
building as provided under the 2nd proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act.
It has also been held that, merely showing that there is no vacant
building in the register of the Accommodation Controller does not mean
that the case of the tenant as to nonavailability of vacant buildings has
to be accepted and it is the duty of the tenant to establish by adducing
evidence that those buildings are not actually vacant or that those
buildings are not suitable for the purpose.
24. At the appellate stage Ext.A2 series Building Tax Assessment
Register extracts have been additionally marked from the side of the
landlords to prove availability of vacant buildings in the locality, as per
the Building Tax Assessment Register. The Appellate Authority rightly
refused to rely upon the copy of the Building Tax Assessment Register
extracts as proof of availability of other vacant buildings, in view of the
dictum laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Panoli Alikutty &
Anr. v. Suresh Babu [2018 (5) KHC 621] wherein it has been held,
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
by examining the scope of Section 26 of the Act, that an entry in a
property tax or house tax assessment book maintained by a local
authority relating to occupancy or vacancy of a building cannot be
received as evidence of the said fact in the light of Section 26, in a
proceeding under eviction under the Act. It has also been held that
Section 26 of the Act is only a provision which enables the parties to a
proceeding under sub-section(1) of Section 5 of the Act to let in
evidence as to the rental value of the buildings as fixed by the local
authority for the relevant period, for the purpose of levying property
tax or house tax, as the case may be, by producing certified copies of
the extracts from the property tax or house tax assessment books of
the local authority. The scheme of the Act does not indicate that the
legislature intended the parties to a proceeding for eviction under the
Act to prove the vacancy or the occupancy of a building by producing
certified extracts of the property tax or the building tax assessment
books of the local authority and further, such extracts can at best be a
piece of evidence and the occupancy of the building needs to be
established by the parties by other corroborative evidence.
25. In the instant case, the Rent Control Court found the 2 nd limb
of the 2nd proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act in favour of the tenant
mainly relying on Exts.B1 to B4. Ext.B1 is a letter issued by the tenant
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
to the Accommodation Controller enquiring about the availability of the
rooms in the locality and Exts.B2 and B3 are the postal receipt and
acknowledgment card, respectively, in order to prove the sending of
Ext.B1 letter. Ext.B4 is the reply of the Accommodation Controller
stating that no room is reported to be vacant and available for rent in
the locality.
26. The Appellate Authority on the other hand found that Ext.B4,
which is a letter issued by the Accommodation Controller stating that
he has not received any information to the effect that vacant buildings
are available in the locality where the petition schedule building is
situated does not leads to an inference that no other building is
available in the vicinity of the petition schedule building. It was also
found that the Accommodation Controller will get information regarding
the availability of vacant building only if such data is furnished by the
landlords. In the said circumstances it has been concluded by the
Appellate Authority that Ext.B4 can never be taken as evidence to hold
that no vacant building is available in the locality. It has also been
found by the Appellate Authority that the Accommodation Controller
was not examined to prove Ext.B4.
27. The findings entered as above by the Appellate Authority is
not fully correct. Ext.B4 is a letter issued by the Accommodation
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
Controller, a Public Servant in discharge of his official duties. The
objection of the landlords with respect to Ext.B4 is that it ought to have
been proved by examining the Accommodation Controller, who issued
the same. So in effect the landlords are challenging the mode of proof
of Ext.B4 and not that the document is wholly inadmissible in evidence.
28. Paragraph No.20 of Two-Judge Bench decision of the Apex
Court in R.V.E.Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu
Viswesaraswami and V.P.Temple and Anr. [(2003) 8 SCC 752 :
AIR 2003 SC 4548 : 2003 KHC 1696] is relevant in this context,
which is extracted hereunder;
"20. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondent has
relied on Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras in
support of his submission that a document not admissible
in evidence, though brought on record, has to be excluded
from consideration. We do not have any dispute with the
proposition of law so laid down in the above said case.
However, the present one is a case which calls for the
correct position of law being made precise. Ordinarily, an
objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken
when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections
as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be
classified into two classes:- (i) an objection that the
document which is sought to be proved is itself
inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does
not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence
but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case,
merely because a document has been marked as 'an
exhibit', an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded
and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even
in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection
should be taken before the evidence is tendered and once
the document has been admitted in evidence and marked
as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been
admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving
the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at
any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as
an exhibit. The later proposition is a rule of fair play. The
crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the
appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party
tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to
such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to
object becomes fatal because by his failure the party
entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence
to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not
serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a
prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering
the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the Court
to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the
question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in
the event of finding of the Court on the mode of proof
sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the
evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the
Court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and
thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite
party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such
practice and procedure is fair to both the parties. Out of
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
the two types of objections, referred to hereinabove, in the
later case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection
amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal
proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to
be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case,
acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in
superior Court."
29. A Two-Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court in
Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. Sri.K.M.Shaffi [(2004) 7 SCC 107 : AIR
2004 SC 4082 : 2004 KHC 1478] followed the principles laid down in
R.V.E.Venkatachala Gounder supra and held that objection as to
mode of proof falls within procedural law and such objection could be
waived and such objection have to be taken before the document is
marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record.
30. In the case on hand, the objection with respect to Ext.B4 the
letter issued by the Accommodation Controller is not with respect to
the admissibility of that document, but with regard to the mode of
proof of the same through RW1, without examining the Accommodation
Controller. So that objection ought to have been raised by the landlords
at the time of marking the document itself and the objection as to the
mode of proof of the same is no longer available to them at a
subsequent stage.
31. But the point is that Ext.B4 document as such will not in
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
anyway help the tenant to establish that no rooms are available in the
locality for alternate accommodation. What Ext.B4 states is that no
vacancy has been reported to the Accommodation Controller. It is not
necessary that every landlord should report the vacancy to the
Accommodation Controller as and when the buildings become
unoccupied. So even if Ext.B4 document is accepted in toto it will not
prove that no vacant buildings are available in the locality for alternate
accommodation of the respondent. Burden of proving all facts in 2 nd
proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is on the tenant. [See: Kochappan
Pillai v. Chellappan 1976 KLT 1]. The fact that 1st limb of the 2nd
proviso could be proved in favour of the tenant will not suffice to claim
protection under the 2nd proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. A Division
Bench of this Court has held in Pookandi Kumaran v Kulangara
Veettil Madhu [2009(1)KLT607 : ILR 2009(1) Kerala 651 :
2009(1)KHC 515] that two ingredients of the 2nd proviso to Section
11(3) of the Act are conjunctive and in order to get the benefit of that
proviso, tenant has to satisfy both the ingredients.
32. In Francis v. Sreedevi Varassiar [2003 (2) KLT 230
(F.B.)] while dealing with Section 11(3) of the Act it has been held
that the tenant has to prove that he is dependent upon the income
derived from the trade or business being carried on by him in the
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
premises in question for his livelihood and also that a suitable alternate
accommodation is not available in the locality and the burden of proof
is upon the tenant. That position has been affirmed in Thanuja
Sunderdas v. Sisirkumar Raj [2008 (4) KLT 248] also in Lucy
Varghese v. Karunakaran Achary [2010 (2) KHC 643]. So proof of
the 1st limb of the 2nd proviso in favour of the tenant will not enable him
to get the protection under the 2nd proviso to section 11(3) of the Act.
33. So on a close scrutiny of the order passed by the Rent
Control Court and also the judgment of the Appellate Authority, this
Court finds that the Appellate Authority rightly found in the impugned
judgment that the tenant is not entitled to get the protection under the
2nd proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. The finding of the Appellate
Authority in this regard is legal and proper, which do not warrant any
interference in this revision.
34. The learned counsel for the tenant, at the time of closure of
the arguments, requests for nine months time for vacating the petition
schedule building, in view of the Covid 19 pandemic crisis. The learned
counsel for the landlords agrees for granting a shorter period, i.e., four
months.
35. In such circumstances, this Rent Control Revision Petition is
dismissed declining interference on the impugned judgment of the
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
Rent Control Appellate Authority; however by granting six months time
to the tenant, to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule
room to the landlords, considering the situation prevailing in the
Country on account of COVID-19 pandemic, subject to the following
conditions:
(i) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall
file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court or the
Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks
from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order,
expressing an unconditional undertaking that he will
surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule
room to the petitioners-landlords within six months
from the date of this order and that, he shall not induct
third parties into possession of the petition schedule
room;
(ii) The tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall deposit the
entire arrears of rent as on date, if any, before the Rent
Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may
be, within four weeks from the date of receipt of a
certified copy of this order, and shall continue to pay
rent for every succeeding month, without any default;
(iii) Needless to say that, in the event of the tenant in the
Rent Control Petition failing to comply with any one of
R.C.R.No.200 of 2020
the conditions stated above, the time limit granted by
this order to surrender vacant possession of the
petition schedule room will stand cancelled
automatically and the landlords will be at liberty to
proceed with the execution of the order of eviction.
Sd/-
ANIL K. NARENDRAN
JUDGE
Sd/-
M.R. ANITHA
JUDGE
shg/Mrcs x
