Kerala High Court
Rajkumar Sasidharan vs The Superintendent Of Police on 21 January, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.VINOD CHANDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA
THURSDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF JANUARY 2021 / 1ST MAGHA, 1942
WP(Crl.).No.18 OF 2020
PETITIONER:
RAJKUMAR SASIDHARAN
S/O. LATE K SASIDHARAN, R/O. PLOT NO.204, 9TH STREET,
KORATTUR, CHENNAI-80, INDIA, PRESENTLY RESIDING AT 2250.
GELLERT BOULEVARD APARTMENT NO.2402, SOUTH SAN FRANCISCO
94090, CALIFORNIA, USA.
THROUGH POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER,
SRI RENJITH RAJAGOPAL, S/O. RAJAGOPAL, AGED ABOUT 46
YEARS, R/O. 27/298, MEDAYILVEEDU, SANNIDHI STREET,
JANARDHANAPURAM, VARKALA, KERALA-695141.
BY ADVS.
SRI.J.JULIAN XAVIER
SRI.FIROZ K.ROBIN
RESPONDENTS:
1 THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
EAST FORT POLICE STATION, TRIVANDRUM, ATTAKULANGARA CHALA
P O, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN-695036.
2 AMIA NAYAR
D/O. GEETA S NAYAR, R/O. TC 42/319, HOUSE NO.9,
SOWPARNIKA, PARAMBIL NAGAR, SREEVARAHAM WARD, VALLAKKADAVU
P O, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DISTRICT, KERALA-695008, INDIA.
3 THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER,
EAST FORT POLICE STATION, TRIVANDRUM, ATTAKULANGARA, CHALA
PO, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
PIN-695036.
4 STATE OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY CHIEF SECRETARY,
SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695001.
R2 BY ADV. SRI.SASTHAMANGALAM S. AJITHKUMAR
OTHER PRESENT:
SENIOR GOVERNMENT PLEADER SRI.K.B.RAMANAND
THIS WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
18-01-2021, THE COURT ON 21-01-2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WP(Crl.).No. 18 of 2020 - 2 -
K. Vinod Chandran & M.R. Anitha, JJ.
-------------------------------------
W.P.(Crl).No. 18 of 2020
------------------------------------
Dated, this the 21st day of January, 2021
JUDGMENT
Vinod Chandran, J.
Marital discords are more challenging to the
offspring, who are not even represented, especially when
questions of custody arise. Hence the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has, oftener than ever emphasized the onerous duty
cast on the Courts, exercising parens patriae
jurisdiction, to keep in mind the profound and dominant
aspect of the welfare of the minor. We would have
normally not entertained the Habeas Corpus petition, but
for the peculiar facts arising herein where the child
born to Indian parents, is an American citizen, by virtue
of his birth in that country. The parents were residing
in that country when the mother along with the child
travelled to her native place and took a conscious
decision not to return. The mother settling down in her
parental house, approached the local Family Court for
divorce and guardianship of the minor child. The father,
much later, approached the Superior Court of California
and obtained an order against the mother commanding her
to produce the child illegally detained by her. The
father after two years approached this Court with this
petition inter alia challenging the jurisdiction of the
Family Court at Thiruvananthapuram, wherein the
applications for divorce and guardianship were filed. The
father on the principle of comity of courts seeks a Writ
of Habeas Corpus for the production of the minor child
from the alleged illegal custody of the mother, to
facilitate repatriation to his own country subject to
further orders from the foreign Court which has issued a
Writ of Habeas Corpus as available at Ext.P14.
2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, father
of the child, contends that the Family Court,
Thiruvananthapuram does not have jurisdiction to
entertain the application filed for determination of
guardianship under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1819 (for
brevity 'G&W Act'). Section 9 of the G&W Act confers
jurisdiction on the District Court, now a Family Court,
in respect of guardianship of a minor, having
jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily
resides. It cannot be said that the minor herein, an
American citizen is a resident of Thiruvananthapuram. The
child had been taken away from his natural habitat and
within a month of his arrival in this country, that too
his first entry, the mother approached the Family Court
at Thiruvananthapuram where her parents are residing. To
advance the above proposition the learned Counsel relies
on 1981 (4) SCC 517 (Jeewanti Pandey vs. Kishan Chandra
Pandey). In similar circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Lahari Sakhamuri vs. Sobhan Kodali AIR 2019 SC
2881 held that the minor children who were taken away
from the foreign country by the mother cannot be said to
be ordinary residents of Hyderabad wherein the mother,
after coming to India, set up her residence.
3. Shilpa Aggarwal vs. Aviral Mittal (2010(1) SCC
591) again was a case in which the couple on their
volition set up their matrimonial home in the foreign
country from where one of the spouses stealthily brought
the child back to India. The High Court as also the
Supreme Court concurrently found in favour of
repatriation and custody of the child being subjected to
the jurisdictional Court in the foreign country. A host
of other decisions were cited at the Bar with special
emphasis on Yashitha Sahu vs. State of Rajasthan (C.A No.
127/2020 dated 20.01.2020) and Neelanjan Bhatacharya vs.
State of Karnataka (2020 SCC Online SC 928). It was
argued that the respondent mother had subjected herself
to the jurisdiction of the foreign Court; nay invoked its
jurisdiction insofar as the claim raised for maintenance
in proportion to the income of the petitioner.
4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner
vehemently urged that the allegation of torture as raised
in the counter affidavit is unsubstantiated. No single
complaint has been lodged against the petitioner by the
respondent in America, where it is asserted, punitive
action of the State is immediate and rigorous as against
an erring husband. There is absolutely no material to
suggest that the child was at any time put to any harm by
the father. The mother and child travelled to India on
tickets purchased by the father which included return
passage. The mother unilaterally stayed back in India
against the earlier conscious mutual decision of the
couple to set up their permanent residence in the US; to
which end the birth of the child was also facilitated in
that country. It is pointed out that the child being an
American Citizen, if allowed to be brought up in India
would suffer disabilities and would not be entitled to
the privileges of a naturally born Indian Citizen. The US
being the land of opportunities would at any time be a
better option for the child's growth and future
prospects. The welfare of the child no doubt would be
served in the company of both parents, which even now the
petitioner is willing to offer. The petitioner undertakes
that he would not file any application for divorce in the
US and seeks repatriation of the child along with the
mother to the US, where he promises to provide them both
with every facility. In the event of the mother not being
agreeable, necessarily the child has to be repatriated,
is the submission.
5. The learned Counsel for the respondent argued
on the basis of the counter affidavit. The torture
inflicted on the mother and also the infant who was not
even one year old were specifically referred to. The
habits of the petitioner coupled with his intemperate,
impulsive behavior are not conducive to a married life
and renders impossible a happy and healthy environment,
absolutely necessary for a child's growth. It is argued
that in deciding on matters of repatriation of a minor
child from the lawful custody of one of the parents, the
reigning consideration is the welfare of the child and
not the conflicting rights of the quarreling spouses. The
child though an American Citizen has the option to
continue in India till 18 and has the choice to decide on
attaining majority, as to whether he should continue as
an American Citizen or fall back upon his Indian roots
which in any event is undisputed. The learned Counsel
points out reports of Consular Officers of the US
Consulate, to assert the safe and healthy environment
provided to the child in India in the company of his
mother and maternal grandparents. The child who was
brought to India within ten months of birth cannot be
said to have imbibed the culture and ethos of America nor
can that be termed his natural habitat. The wife who
remained unemployed in the US, by reason of the
petitioner's insistence, was helpless in the alien land,
where she had no support. The respondent was completely
dependent on the petitioner and his income and she was
naturally afraid to make any complaint in the foreign
country. The learned Counsel would seek for dismissal of
the petition leaving the parties to agitate their cause
before the Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram wherein with
respect to guardianship an elaborate enquiry on proper
adducing of evidence as also interaction with the child
and the parents would be carried out. It is also pointed
out that though there was appearance recorded of the
petitioner in the Family Court, he remained absent after
that.
6. On background facts we note that the
petitioner and respondent married in the year 2013, first
lived as a couple at Bangalore and moved to USA in 2014.
In USA the petitioner was working and the respondent a
house wife; allegedly due to the petitioner being not in
favour of a working wife. While the petitioner asserts
that there was no complaint lodged against him by the
respondent in the USA the respondent has detailed her
travails both at Bangalore, where they resided
immediately after marriage and in the USA. From 2014 the
parties were in America and though they have applied for
permanent residence it has not been obtained. They remain
Indian Citizens but their son by virtue of his birth on
16.02.2017, acquired citizenship of the USA. The mother
and child proceeded to India in January of 2018 and did
not return. The wife initiated proceedings in India for
divorce and guardianship before the Family Court, which
is challenged as lacking jurisdiction, for reason of the
citizenship of the child and Section 9 of the G&W Act.
7. The petitioner's first contention is that
the child is not an ordinary resident of
Thiruvananthapuram and hence the Family Court cannot have
jurisdiction as per Section 9. Jeewanti Pandey was a case
in which the husband and wife, ordinary residents of a
village in Almora had married in Delhi and there after
resided there. The husband filed a petition for divorce
in Almora on the ground that both were originally
residents of Village Bagyan coming within the
jurisdiction of that Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that "The term 'resides' is by no means free from
ambiguity and is capable of a variety of meanings
according to the circumstances in which it is made
applicable and the context in which it is found"(sic). To
confirm jurisdiction on the ground of residence it was
held that there should be something more than a temporary
stay but which is more or less permanent. The Court at
Almora was found to have no jurisdiction merely because
the parties had their origin in a village within the
jurisdiction of that Court and it was held so in para 13:
13. It is plain in the context of clause (ii) of
Section 19 of the Act, that the word "resides" must mean
the actual place of residence and not a legal or
constructive residence; it certainly does not connote
the place of origin. The word "resides" is a flexible
one and has many shades of meaning, but it must take its
colour and content from the context in which it appears
and cannot be read in isolation. It follows that it was
the actual residence of the appellant, at the
commencement of the proceedings, that had to be
considered for determining whether the District Judge,
Almora, had jurisdiction, or not. That being so, the
High Court was clearly in error in upholding the finding
of the learned District Judge that he had jurisdiction
to entertain and try the petition for annulment of
marriage filed by the respondent under Section 12 of the
Act.
{underlining by us for emphasis}
8. Section 9 of the G&W Act, with respect to
application for guardianship of the person of a minor,
confers jurisdiction on the District Court having
jurisdiction over the place where the minor ordinarily
resides. As per the declaration of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court it does not connote the place of origin or the
country in which the minor has citizenship. It does not
depend on the duration of the minor's residence, but more
on the intention of the person who has the child's lawful
custody; which also should be compatible to the status of
the parties and the overall facts and circumstances of
the case. It definitely cannot be a residence chosen by
either of the spouses, to purposefully avoid or confer
jurisdiction to a particular Court. Here the wife and
child came to India on January 2019 to reside with the
parents of the wife, the abode of the wife even before
her marriage; which can by no stretch of reasoning or
imagination be termed a mere legal or constructive
residence. In February the respondent-wife filed
simultaneously, separate applications for divorce and
guardianship in the Court at Thiruvananthpuram where the
minor was residing at the commencement of proceedings.
Obviously the mother planned to take up permanent
residence with her parents considering her unemployed
status and estrangement from husband. The intention of
the wife not to return to the foreign country where she
was wholly dependent on her husband, by reason inter-alia
of being unemployed; is very evident from the petition
filed for divorce. The wife could have in the given
circumstances only resided along with her parents. At the
time of institution of the case, the minor was ordinarily
residing at Thiruvananthpuram, along with his mother and
maternal grand parents and close relatives. We do not
find any reason to deny jurisdiction to the Family Court,
Thiruvananthpuram on the sole reason of the child being a
US citizen, especially when the citizenship does not
preclude the child from ordinarily residing with his
mother, an Indian Citizen, at least till he attains
majority. Further it is an admitted fact that the mother
and child have resided in the same house after coming
back to India till date.
9. In Lahari Sakhamuri the parents who were
involved in the tussle for custody of two minor children
were both green card holders, highly qualified and highly
placed in America. Two children were born to them in the
wedlock and they moved to a house in their joint name, in
Pennsylvania where the first child was attending school.
Proximate to the birth of the second child, the wife
filed for divorce on grounds of irretrievable breakdown
of marriage and there was an Order of Court directing the
husband to appear for conciliation and restraining both
parties from changing the residence of the children.
While such proceedings were continuing in the Court in
the USA, the wife along with her children traveled to
India due to a bereavement and within twenty days of
their arrival, the wife filed an application for custody
in the Court at Hyderabad. On an application filed by the
husband before the Court in USA for custody of children,
the wife responded that she was only temporarily residing
in India; upon which that Court granted temporary custody
of the children to the husband and directed them to be
returned to the US. It was on these facts and
circumstances and specifically noticing the non-
disclosure of the order of the US Court before the Court
in India; that the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the
children, who themselves, and their parents, were US
citizens, cannot be ordinary residents of Hyderabad. The
facts are clearly distinguishable and there can be no
dictum ferreted out that, if the petition filed for
guardianship is immediate to the arrival of the minor in
India, then there can be no jurisdiction conferred on the
Indian Courts.
10. In the instant case both the parents are
Indian Citizens and but for the fact that they were for
the past three years, prior to the minor's journey to
India, residing in USA there is nothing to show that they
had set up permanent residence there or had a dwelling
house in their joint names. And pertinently the wife was
unemployed. We reject the contention of the petitioner
that the Family Court, Thiruvananthpuram has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for guardianship.
However that alone would not result in the claim for
repatriation of the minor being declined, since on the
principle of 'Comity of Courts' it has to be examined
whether the minor, being a US citizen has to be subjected
only to the jurisdiction of the Courts in that country.
For this we turn to the precedents placed before us and
the exposition of law made therein.
11. We have to first refer to a two judge Bench
decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1998) 1 SCC
112 Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde; which elaborately
considered the principle of 'Comity of Courts'. This
decision was affirmed by a three Judge Bench in (2010) 1
SCC 174 Dr. V. Ravi Chandran v. Union of India and re-
affirmed by another three Judge Bench in (2017) 8 SCC 54
Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State(NCT of Delhi). In
Dhanwanti Joshi it was held, financial capacity of the
father or his ability to provide education in the U.S is
not the sole criterion to deny the mother's care and
company to the child. A quote from Walker v. Walker &
Harrison1981 NZ Recent Law 257 (cited by British Law
Commission, Working Paper No. 96, para 6.10) was
extracted with approval, which is as below:
"Welfare is an all-encompassing word. It includes
material welfare, both in the sense of adequacy of
resources to provide a pleasant home and a comfortable
standard of living and in the sense of an adequacy of care
to ensure that good health and due personal pride are
maintained. However, while material considerations have
their place they are secondary matters. More important are
the stability and the security, the loving and
understanding care and guidance, the warm and
compassionate relationships, that are essential for the
full development of the child's own character, personality
and talents."
{underlining by us for emphasis}
12. On the principle of 'Comity of Courts' the
following paragraphs from Dhanwanti Joshi were extracted
by both the three Judge Benches with approval, which we
too extract:
28. The leading case in this behalf is the one rendered by
the Privy Council in 1951, in McKee v. McKee1951 AC 352.
In that case, the parties, who were American citizens,
were married in USA in 1933 and lived there till December
1946. But they had separated in December 1940. On 17-12-
1941, a decree of divorce was passed in USA and custody of
the child was given to the father and later varied in
favour of the mother. At that stage, the father took away
the child to Canada. In habeas corpus proceedings by the
mother, though initially the decisions of lower courts
went against her, the Supreme Court of Canada gave her
custody but the said Court held that the father could not
have the question of custody retried in Canada once the
question was adjudicated in favour of the mother in the
USA earlier. On appeal to the Privy Council, Lord Simonds
held that in proceedings relating to custody before the
Canadian Court, the welfare and happiness of the infant
was of paramount consideration and the order of a foreign
court in USA as to his custody can be given due weight in
the circumstances of the case, but such an order of a
foreign court was only one of the facts which must be
taken into consideration. It was further held that it was
the duty of the Canadian Court to form an independent
judgment on the merits of the matter in regard to the
welfare of the child. The order of the foreign court in US
would yield to the welfare of the child. "Comity of courts
demanded not its enforcement, but its grave
consideration". This case arising from Canada which lays
down the law for Canada and U.K. has been consistently
followed in latter cases. This view was reiterated by the
House of Lords in J v. C1970 AC 668. This is the law also
in USA (see 24 American
Jurisprudence, para 1001) and
Australia. (See Khamis v. Khamis(1978) 4 Fam LR 410 (Full
Court) (Aus).)
29. However, there is an apparent contradiction between
the above view and the one expressed in H. (infants),
Re(1966) All ER 886 and in E. (an infant), Re(1967) 1 All ER 881 to
the effect that the court in the country to which the
child is removed will send back the child to the country
from which the child has been removed. This apparent
conflict was explained and resolved by the Court of Appeal
in 1974 in L. (minors) (wardship : jurisdiction), Re(1974) 1
All ER 913, CA and in R. (minors) (wardship : jurisdiction),
Re(1981) 2 FLR 416 (CA). It was held by the Court of Appeal in
L., Re(1974) 1 All ER 913, CA that the view in McKee v. McKee1951 AC
352 is still the correct view and that the limited question
which arose in the latter decisions was whether the court
in the country to which the child was removed could
conduct (a) a summary inquiry or (b) an elaborate inquiry
on the question of custody. In the case of (a) a summary
inquiry, the court would return custody to the country
from which the child was removed unless such return could
be shown to be harmful to the child. In the case of (b) an
elaborate inquiry, the court could go into the merits as
to where the permanent welfare lay and ignore the order of
the foreign court or treat the fact of removal of the
child from another country as only one of the
circumstances. The crucial question as to whether the
Court (in the country to which the child is removed) would
exercise the summary or elaborate procedure is to be
determined according to the child's welfare. The summary
jurisdiction to return the child is invoked, for example,
if the child had been removed from its native land and
removed to another country where, maybe, his native
language is not spoken, or the child gets divorced from
the social customs and contacts to which he has been
accustomed, or if its education in his native land is
interrupted and the child is being subjected to a foreign
system of education, -- for these are all acts which could
psychologically disturb the child. Again the summary
jurisdiction is exercised only if the court to which the
child has been removed is moved promptly and quickly, for
in that event, the Judge may well be persuaded that it
would be better for the child that those merits should be
investigated in a court in his native country on the
expectation that an early decision in the native country
could be in the interests of the child before the child
could develop roots in the country to which he had been
removed. Alternatively, the said court might think of
conducting an elaborate inquiry on merits and have regard
to the other facts of the case and the time that has
lapsed after the removal of the child and consider if it
would be in the interests of the child not to have it
returned to the country from which it had been removed. In
that event, the unauthorised removal of the child from the
native country would not come in the way of the court in
the country to which the child has been removed, to ignore
the removal and independently consider whether the sending
back of the child to its native country would be in the
paramount interests of the child. (See Rayden & Jackson,
15th Edn., 1988, pp. 1477-79; Bromley, Family law, 7th
Edn., 1987.) In R. (minors) (wardship : jurisdiction),
Re(1981) 2 FLR 416 (CA) it has been firmly held that the concept
of forum conveniens has no place in wardship jurisdiction.
30. We may here state that this Court in Elizabeth
Dinshaw v. Arvand M. Dinshaw(1987) 1 SCC 42 while dealing with
a child removed by the father from USA contrary to the
custody orders of the US Court directed that the child be
sent back to USA to the mother not only because of the
principle of comity but also because, on facts, -- which
were independently considered -- it was in the interests of
the child to be sent back to the native State. There the
removal of the child by the father and the mother's
application in India were within six months. In that
context, this Court referred to H. (infants), Re(1966) 1 All ER
886 which case, as pointed out by us above has been
explained in L. Re(1974) 1 All ER 913, CA as a case where the
Court thought it fit to exercise its summary jurisdiction
in the interests of the child. Be that as it may, the
general principles laid down in McKee v. McKee1951 AC 352 and
J v. C1970 AC 668 and the distinction between summary and
elaborate inquiries as stated in L. (infants), Re (1974) 1 All
ER 913, CA are today well settled in UK, Canada, Australia
and the USA. The same principles apply in our country.
Therefore nothing precludes the Indian courts from
considering the question on merits, having regard to the
delay from 1984 -- even assuming that the earlier orders
passed in India do not operate as constructive res
judicata.
{underlining by us for emhasis and future reference}
13. The broad principles discernible are that the
concept of 'forum convenience' has no place in custody
matters and even the principle of 'comity of courts'
should be subservient to the welfare of the child. Comity
of courts only requires that the order made by the
foreign Court be considered with due weight when ward-
ship jurisdiction is invoked. Applying the declaration of
law (underlined by us in the above extract) regarding
exercise of summary jurisdiction, it has to be found that
the minor here was just 10 months old when he left the US
and there can arise no problem of language or
interruption of education and least of all, a change in
the social customs and contacts since the child's contact
in the US was confined to his parents. He is too young to
have imbibed the customs of his land of citizenship,
which also is only by virtue of his birth in that country
and not by reason of nativity. The minor was not removed
forcibly or stealthily, as the petitioner himself admits
to have booked the tickets for their travel to India. But
of course petitioner expected them to return and had
booked return passage too. The petitioner allowed
considerable time to expire as we will presently show, to
approach the US Court and when he did, he made false
declarations which may result in action against him for
perjury.
14. The mother and child were to return in March and
after the date of return passage the petitioner was aware
of the decision of his wife to stay back. He approached
the District Attorney's office in the US in September,
six months later, as a retaliatory measure to the
proceedings initiated in India by the mother. We say this
specifically because we called for a copy of the
proceedings before the Family Court and we see that there
was representation of the petitioner recorded on
07.07.2018 and 01.10.2018. On the first day counselling
was directed and on the next date the matter was referred
for mediation. It is after the first appearance on
07.07.2018 that the petitioner approached the D.A's
office with Ext. P6. The application for Child Custody
and Visitation dated 21.02.2019 enclosed with Ext.P8 was
after the second day on which the petitioner appeared
through Counsel before the Family Court. The learned
Counsel for the petitioner admits that a lawyer appeared
on his behalf before the Family Court, but did not file a
Vakkalath since the petitioner intended to challenge the
jurisdiction of the Family Court. Despite his coming to
India earlier; as evident from the FIR registered (Ext
R2(h) dtd: 11.11.2019) against him for trespass into the
residence of his in-laws, he approached this Court only
in January 2020 with this petition through a duly
appointed Attorney. Now three years have elapsed from the
entry of the child into India; who is moving into his
fourth year. In fact when the petitioner was in India in
November 2019, the order of the Superior Court of
California, produced as Ext.P14, with a direction to
produce the child before 15.08.2019 was available with
him. The petitioner then allegedly trespassed into the
house of his in-laws in search of his son, without taking
legal recourse. The child as of now is found to have
developed roots in India [welfare reports of the US
Consular Officers, which we will refer to later] and
imbibed its culture and ethos in a safe house in the
company of his mother and maternal grand parents. There
cannot be a summary order of repatriation and in
considering the welfare of the minor child the impact of
deprivation of his fathers company also has to be
reckoned with due weight given to the order passed by the
foreign Court.
15. The petitioner and the respondent were
living in the US as man and wife happily, as claimed by
the petitioner; agonizingly, as asserted by the
respondent. From the pleadings we cannot but notice that
there are allegations of drug abuse by the petitioner and
the use of cannabis (marijuana) is proved as per the
Physicians statement and the certificate issued as per
Ext.R2(a). The reason stated is for the treatment of
chronic headaches. The respondent specifically avers that
the petitioner is addicted to marijuana and also forced
it on her. He is alleged to have smoked it in the
presence of his pregnant wife and later the infant child.
None of these allegations are controverted by the
petitioner by way of filing a reply in denial. The
response to the said allegation, at the time of hearing,
is that use of marijuana was as a medicine for
alleviating pain.
16. As to the nature of the relationship
between the husband and wife we specifically raised a
query with reference to the WhatsApp messages between the
parties printed out and produced as Ext.R2(c). The
exchange is disturbing to any reasonable man and there is
no rebuttal placed on record by the petitioner. The
learned Counsel for the petitioner would in fact rely on
the messages to establish the concern of the father for
the son; where he queries about the bite marks on the
child. We cannot accept the said argument especially
noticing that the respondent clarified the marks to be
caused by mosquitoes. In the wake of admission of such
messages we have to find that the allegation of torture
by forcing the child and mother to perform full splits,
by stretching of legs stand confirmed. The messages
indicate that the respondent refused to allow the
petitioner to stretch the minor's legs while the
petitioner advocated it for the minor to have the best
body. We would not refer copiously to the messages but
only refer to one such message which states "I am going
to start thrashing you everyday if you come back" (sic).
It is obvious by that threat that the petitioner did not
want the respondent to come back and in the event she
did, the promise was physical violence.
17. The mother and child traveled to India on
09.01.2018 when the child was ten months' old. A return
ticket was also available as is evident from Ext.P3, the
journey to commence on 01.03.2018. The respondent
approached the Family Court with an application for
divorce (Ext.R2(d)) and an application for appointment
of guardian (Ext.R2(e)) both dated 09.02.2018. There is
also an order issued restraining the petitioner from
forcibly taking the minor child from the custody of the
respondent as is evident from Ext.P5.
18. The petitioner approached the Santa Clara
District Attorney's Office of California by Ext.P6 dated
06.09.2018, six months after the expected arrival back of
the child and mother. The claim was also that the child
was abducted from his custody; which is perse false.
Ext.P6 is a Child Abduction Police Report based on which
presumably the Superior Court of California took
cognizance of the incident alleged. The respondent filed
her response, rather uploaded it; which is available at
Ext.P7 and is dated 17.12.2018. Ext.P11 as we make out is
a notice of hearing scheduled on 13.03.2019 issued to the
respondent. The notice had, as its attachment the
application filed by the petitioner for Child Custody and
Visitation dated 21.02.2019, after one year from the date
on which the child and mother left for India; on which
the present order has been issued by the Superior Court
of California. The order of the Court at Ext.P11 directs
the mother to return the minor child to the fathers
custody in San Mateo County, California and the surrender
of all of the minor child's passports to the father.
Ext.P13 indicates a hearing conducted on 05.06.2019 in
the presence of the Attorney of the petitioner alone. The
writ of Habeas Corpus is produced at Ext.P14 dated
10.07.2019 directing production of the minor child before
that Court on 15.08.2019 and also to show cause why the
child shall not be returned to the petitioner, the
father. The petitioner, before the Superior Court of
California, did not disclose the proceedings initiated by
the respondent in India.
19. We cannot but observe that the respondent but
for filing a response as seen from Ext.P6, to the
proceedings initiated by the petitioner on grounds of
abduction of the minor, has not invoked the jurisdiction
of that Court. In filing the response the prayer included
for maintenance in proportion to the income of the
petitioner cannot be said to be an invocation of the
jurisdiction. The respondent resisted the claim of
custody raised by the petitioner and sought for
maintenance from the US Court specifically disclosing
her residential address in Thiruvananthapuram and
conceding to supervised visitation for the petitioner at
Thiruvananthapuram. The respondent also in the mandatory
declaration under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act, filed along with the response, indicated
the proceedings for divorce and guardianship pending in
the Family Court at Thiruvananthapuram. It also discloses
a criminal case pending before the Court in India which
is evident from Ext.P4 an order of restrain issued
against the petitioner by the Judicial First Class
Magistrate-II Thiruvananthapuram on allegation of
domestic violence raised by the respondent.
20. We presume that it is based on Ext.P6 Child
Abduction Police Report that the Superior Court of
California took cognizance. Further we also specifically
refer to Declaration of Reporty Party as available in
Ext.P6. The 1st paragraph indicates that the declaration
is made 'under penalty of perjury' regarding the
information provided to the D.A's Personnel. The 2nd
paragraph also prohibits the petitioner from taking self-
help measures to effect the return of his child(ren) and
that if he so does, the Child Abduction Unit (CAU) will
immediately close the case and cease all investigations.
21. In this context we notice the abduction
information as available in Ext.P6 which reports the wife
having taken the child to India promising to return and
having refused to return. The dates on which the
petitioner last saw the child and communicated with the
child is stated to be on 09.01.2018 [which in that
application appears as 01/09/2018; an American practice
as seen from the seal affixed in Ext.P14 and the date
subscribed in the petitioner's application at Ext. P6].
This is prima facie false looking at the WhatsApp
messages exchanged between the parties which as produced
herein were on 25.01.2018, 28.01.2018 and on 02.08.2018.
The date on which the petitioner stated to have last seen
the child and communicated with the child as available in
Ext.P6 is the date on which the wife and child boarded
for India as is evident from Ext.P3 Air ticket. Further
in Ext P6 after "Abduction Information" under the head
"Information about Custody" the petitioner has declared
that there are no custody orders. At that point there was
an order passed by the Family Court in which proceeding
a Counsel represented the petitioner on 07.07.2018. It is
also relevant that the petitioner attempted to trespass
into the residence of his in-laws in search of his son
which is against the declaration, he made before the DA's
office, that he would not take self-help measures to
effect the return of the child. Ideally he should have
approached the Indian Courts to get vacated the restrain
order against him passed by the Family Court and sought
enforcement of the order passed by the Superior Court of
California. The present attempt to get repatriation is
delayed by two years, at its inception itself. The mother
as we noticed filed the divorce application after
reaching India, later to the abusive messages the
petitioner send, through the WhatsApp and the threat
leveled on 25.01.2018 which we extracted herein before.
22. Lahari Sakhamuri as we noticed is on
distinguishable facts. However, the dictum is applicable
on the facts herein too. It was held "The doctrines of
comity of courts, intimate connect, orders by foreign
courts having jurisdiction in the matter regarding
custody of the minor child, citizenship of the parents
and the child etc., cannot override the consideration of
the best interest and the welfare of the child and that
the direction to return the child must not result in any
physical, mental, psychological or other harm to the
child." (sic.para 51) Shilpa Agarwal dealt with a 3 ½
year old girl child, a British citizen born in England,
of Indian parents. Both parents had the status of
permanent residents of UK, even prior to birth of the
child. The mother came to India with the child on a
return ticket and canceled the return ticket thus
refusing to go back to England with the child. It is the
vehement submission of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that the facts are similar and even a 3 ½ year
old was directed to be send back to the jurisdiction of
the Court in UK which had declared the child to be a ward
of that Court. But for the fact that the mother in this
case also came to India on a return ticket and did not go
back to the country of birth of the child; we do not find
any further identity on facts. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
apart from noticing that both the husband and wife had
set up their matrimonial home in the foreign country,
stressed on the fact of both the parents working for gain
and also having acquired permanent resident status in the
UK. One other compelling circumstance to rule in favour
of repatriation was that immediately on the wife refusing
to return by return ticket dated 09.11.2008; the father
approached the High Court in UK wherein by order dated
25.11.2008, the child was made a ward of that Court with
further direction issued to the mother to return the
child to UK for further proceedings. Extracting the order
in its entirety, it was observed that but for insisting
the return of the child to its jurisdiction, the UK Court
had not intended to separate the child from the mother
until a final decision was taken. It was also held the
ultimate decision with regard to the custody of the child
"has to be left to the English Courts having regard to
the nationality of the child and the fact that both the
parents had worked for gain in the UK and had also
acquired permanent resident status in the UK' (sic-
para33). We find that apart from the child having
citizenship of the foreign country there are no
compelling circumstances which would persuade us in the
instant case to adopt the measure of repatriation. The
respondent-wife, here was not employed in the USA and the
petitioner-father had delayed the application before that
Court by six months.
23. The decision in Yashitha Sahu also turns on
distinguishable facts, according to us. There the
marriage was solemnized in India in 2016 and the wife
accompanied the husband to USA where he was working and a
daughter was born to them in 2017 who, by birth, acquired
citizenship of USA. The similarity with the instant case
ends there. When the marital relationship got strained
the wife applied to the Domestic Relations District Court
seeking protection, which was granted ex parte. Later
the wife instituted a petition before the same court for
custody of the minor girl. In terms of the agreement
between parties, the Court passed an order on 26.09.2018
providing for residence of the mother and child in the
matrimonial home itself, maintenance for both, as also
joint and shared physical custody with individual
parenting time at specified times and days. Within four
days of the order issued on the basis of the agreement of
parties, violating the said order, the child was brought
back to India by the mother, before the next posting
date. The child again was an infant of one year when she
was brought to India, which factor alone was stated to be
in favour of the mother. It was the mother who approached
the jurisdictional Court in USA and obtained a consent
order from that Court. The mothers act of taking the
child to India, in that context was held to be a clear
act of violation with impunity. It was in that
circumstances the Hon'ble Supreme Court, directed
repatriation of the child to UK, with the mother or
without her. The operative portion took care of both
situations with provision for protection of the mother
and child individually and together in either of the
circumstances; as per the specific undertaking made by
the father on affidavit.
24. Neelanjan Bhatacharya again is on distinct
facts. Therein the couple were residing and working
(both) in USA when a child was born to them in 2016. In
2019, the wife returned to India and informed her
intention to stay back with the child. Immediately there
after the husband came to India to explore the
possibility of an amicable solution. Having failed, he
went back to the US and applied for custody of the child
as also for divorce. Based on the temporary custody
granted by the Superior Court of New Jersey the husband
moved a Habeas Corpus petition on 10.07.2019 before the
Supreme Court under Article 32 and later withdrew the
same to approach the High Court of Karnataka. The High
Court allowed the petition on certain conditions, two of
which, regarding certification; from the country from
which the repatriation is to be made, ie: India and the
locality in the US where the husband ordinarily resides,
of being pandemic free, was challenged before the Supreme
Court. The wife did not appear before the Supreme Court
upon which an Amicus Curiae was appointed. The Amicus
informed the Court of the disinclination of the wife to
contest the proceedings. But still the Hon'ble Supreme
Court considering the welfare of the child to be the
paramount consideration in such matters examined the
facts threadbare. It was held so in paragraph 15:
"The respondent arrived in India with the child in March
2019. The appellant filed for custody and for return of
the minor child before the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Hudson County, Chancery Division-Family Part on 16 April
2019, which awarded him temporary custody on 21 May 2019.
On 10 July 2019, the appellant filed a petition under
Article 32 of the Constitution seeking a writ of a habeas
corpus before this Court. This Court granted the
appellant liberty to move the appropriate forum.
Thereafter, the appellant filed a habeas corpus petition
before the High Court of Karnataka on 13 August 2019. The
above sequence of events makes it evident that the
appellant has acted promptly to secure the custody of the
child. In such an event, this Court is only required to
conduct a summary inquiry to ascertain whether there is
any harm if the child returns to the US, where he was
born and has been brought up. The Court is required to
engage in an elaborate inquiry on the merits of the case
only if a considerable time has passed since the child
has been removed and if the child has developed roots in
India. In either event, the primary consideration of
this Court is to ascertain the welfare of the child."
In addition to the above, the husband convinced the Court
of having ardently carried out his parenting
responsibilities. On the unilateral decision of the wife
to stay back in India with the child, the husband had
immediately approached the Court in the foreign country
as also in India for obtaining custody of the child. The
child had been in India only for a short period and it
was observed that the mother did not contest the
proceedings. The Court, on these facts held, a summary
enquiry would suffice in that case; which we find to be
impossible in the instant case for reason of gross delay
on the part of the petitioner which we already noticed.
The facts in the instant case warrant a more elaborate
enquiry by us, though not in the nature of a trial;
keeping in mind the predominant aspect of welfare of the
child.
25. Now we come to the decision of a three Judge
Bench in Nithya Anand Raghavan. The child therein was six
years old who had spend equal time of her life in the US
and in India. She was born in Delhi and had retained her
Indian citizenship. The child was living in India with
her maternal grandparents and relatives as distinguished
from her residence in UK, in a nuclear family; in the
company of only her father and mother. It was emphasized
that the respondent-father did not initiate any action
for the initial six months after having knowledge that
his wife and child were not returning to UK. The husband
and wife were both Indian citizens at the time of
marriage and had shifted to UK after an year from
marriage. There were allegations of physical and mental
abuse raised by the wife which were disputed by the
husband. For child birth the wife came to India and
returned to UK. Due to marital discords the mother and
child had frequently returned to India but again rejoined
the father in UK. The child was admitted to a nursery
school and then a primary school in UK. On consent of
both parties an application was filed in UK for
citizenship of the daughter which was granted in
December, 2012. The child developed some cardiac
problems, upon which the mother along with the child came
back to India, for reason also of the neglect of the
father and his alleged violent behaviour. The mother
filed a complaint before the Women's Cell in New Delhi
and as a counter-blast the father filed custody/wardship
petition in UK; in which an ex parte order for return of
the child was issued. On 23.01.2016 the husband
approached the jurisdictional High Court with a Habeas
Corpus petition and obtained a direction to the mother to
return the child to UK at the expense of the father, who
had undertaken before the UK Court to bear such expenses
for transport and for stay of the mother and child in UK.
The High Court allowed the petition on the ground of the
UK Court being better suited to appreciate the social and
cultural milieu in which the child was brought up, due to
its intimate contact with that environment, the principle
of 'Comity of Courts' the 'first strike principle' and so
on and so forth. The learned Judges of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court extracted from Dhanwanti Joshi, to find
that India is not a signatory to the Hague Convention of
1980 on "Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction".
In non-convention Countries it was held, '...the
principle of Comity of Courts cannot be given primacy or
more weightage for deciding matters of custody or for
return of the child to the native state.'(sic-para 42) We
extract herewith paragraph 69:
69. We once again reiterate that the exposition in
Dhanwanti Joshi is a good law and has been quoted with
approval by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in V. Ravi
Chandran (2). We approve the view taken in Dhanwanti
Joshi, inter alia, in para 33 that so far as non-
Convention countries are concerned, the law is that the
court in the country to which the child is removed while
considering the question must bear in mind the welfare of
the child as of paramount importance and consider the
order of the foreign court as only a factor to be taken
into consideration. The summary jurisdiction to return the
child be exercised in cases where the child had been
removed from its native land and removed to another
country where, may be, his native language is not spoken,
or the child gets divorced from the social customs and
contacts to which he has been accustomed, or if its
education in his native land is interrupted and the child
is being subjected to a foreign system of education, for
these are all acts which could psychologically disturb the
child. Again the summary jurisdiction be exercised only if
the court to which the child has been removed is moved
promptly and quickly. The overriding consideration must be
the interests and welfare of the child.
Finding that the minor child on attaining majority, would
be free to exercise her choice as to citizenship, it was
held that the child till then, should remain in the
custody of the mother, unless the Court of competent
jurisdiction trying the issue of custody of the child
orders to the contrary. The Court was also pleased to
grant visitation right to the father. It was also
directed that the wife should participate in the
proceedings before the foreign Court by engaging
solicitors of her choice and also travel to that country
if required with the respondent husband bearing all the
expenses of litigation, travel and stay in the foreign
country.
26. What we discern from the above precedents
is that, the principle of 'Comity of Courts' should be
subservient to the welfare of the child. In a given
situation, even if the child is illegally removed from
his/her natural habitat, the Courts in that Country, to
which the child has been removed; especially if it is a
non-Convention (Hague Convention of 1980) country, are
obliged to first and foremost keep in mind the welfare of
the child. Due consideration and weightage should be
given to the orders passed by the foreign Court. There is
no imprimatur that on production of an order of the
foreign Court, the child should immediately be
repatriated by the Courts in the country to which he/she
is removed and is presently residing. Though the 'first
strike' principle [ie: who among the spouses first filed
for custody] has been disapproved in Nithya Anand
Raghavan; the alacrity with which the spouse, denied of
custody of the minor,approached a Court of competent
jurisdiction, was held to be a very significant aspect in
ordering repatriation. The removal of the child from the
environment to which it is acclimatized, resultant
exposure to alien language, culture and system of
education as juxtaposed with the possibility of the child
having developed roots in the country to which she/he has
been removed also assumes importance in deciding the
aspect of custody. With these principles in mind we once
again, at the risk of repetition, look at the instant
case and the facts arising herein.
27. The petitioner and respondent were married in
2013 and while continuing in Bangalore; in the year 2014
they moved to the US. The respondent is a Post Graduate
in Medical Psychology who was working in a Dental College
at Bangalore, as Lecturer, prior to her marriage
[Ext.R2(e)], which employment she quit, allegedly at the
insistence of the petitioner. The respondent in her
counter affidavit had stated that even from the initial
years the marriage ran into rough whether and there was
contemplation of divorce. There are allegations made
about the behavioural patterns of the respondent. The
respondent also claims that twice she had suffered
miscarriages, one an MTP and a child was born in her
third pregnancy. Her pregnancy is said to have been
assisted by her mother who traveled to US, who also is
alleged to have been subjected to violence by the
petitioner. The respondent admits that she along with her
child traveled to India in January 2018 on a round
ticket, the fare for which was paid from the debit card
of the petitioner. Obviously the petitioner too was aware
of the travel itinerary since the round ticket is
produced as Ext.P3. The return flight was on 01.03.2018,
departing from Dubai at 8.45 am and arriving in San
Francisco at 12.45 pm. Hence by the 2nd of March the
petitioner was aware of the fact that the respondent
along with the child is intending to stay back in India.
The petitioner approached the District Attorney's Office
of the County in the US only after six months, in
September, claiming that the child was abducted, after
receiving notice of the petitions filed before the Family
Court; presumably as a counter-blast to the order passed
by the Family Court.
28. As to what transpired in India, after
arrival of the respondent and child, we had referred to
the continued contact over WhatsApp, evidenced by the
messages produced by the respondent as Ext.R2(C). The
messages reveal that all was not well with the marriage,
thus seriously putting to peril the contention of the
petitioner that they had a happy life in the US, as a
couple. The messages also reveal that the petitioner was
a stickler insofar as the baby turning out with the best
body and was enforcing his will even on the infant. There
was also a threat leveled at the respondent that if she
comes back to the US, she is going to be exposed to
physical violence. That specific threat was leveled on
25.01.2018, after which, on 09.02.2018, the respondent
filed for divorce and custody of the minor child. The
petitioner is also restrained by an ex parte order issued
by the Magistrates Court, wherein proceedings were
initiated alleging domestic violence. In violation of
that order the petitioner is alleged to have committed an
act of trespass on 15.11.2019; in search of his son,
based on which incident Ext.R2(b) FIR was registered.
29. On what transpired in the U.S., the
petitioner, being aware of the respondent having decided
to stay back in India with the child, did nothing to get
back the child or attempt to resolve the apparent marital
discords. The petitioner was also aware of the order
passed against him under the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, a copy of which is produced
as Ext.P4. The respondent also has produced Ext.P5 order
passed by the Family Court restraining the petitioner
from taking away the child from the custody of the
mother. It was much later, on 06.09.2018 that a claim of
abduction of the child was raised before the District
Attorney's Office as evidenced from Ext.P6, six months
after the petitioner had knowledge of the child being
retained in India. By this time, the Family Court had
passed an order affirming the temporary custody on the
mother and restraining the father from taking away the
child. The 'first-strike' principle definitely is not
applicable as found in Nithya Anand Raghavan, but the
delay of six months in approaching the foreign Court and
two years to move this Court, stands against the
petitioner.
30. The order produced at Ext.P14 of the Superior
Court of California was dated 10.07.2019. The petitioner
came to India after that, as is evidenced in Ext.R2(h)
FIR. He did not approach the Indian Courts seeking
repatriation or even vacation of the orders passed
against him, but resorted to self-help measures to get
back the child, which is prohibited by the declaration
made in the proceedings initiated before the foreign
Court; which invites abrupt action of closure of
proceedings in that jurisdiction. The child was an infant
of ten months, when he left U.S. for India. It cannot be
said that the child had imbibed the culture and ethos of
his land of birth. The welfare of the child is not
inextricably connected to the social milieu in the US to
find the Superior Court of California to have intimate
contact with the circumstances in which the child was
brought up. The child was in a nuclear family in the
company of his father and mother. As of now, three years
have elapsed after his coming to India and the infant has
developed into a child with close intimacy and awareness
of his surroundings, his peers and elders. The child is
now with his mother, maternal grant parents and also has
close links with the children of his mother's sister. The
child's welfare require that he be continued in the
existing surroundings and environment, which was found to
be perfectly conducive to his growth, in the Welfare
Report prepared by the Personnel of the US Consulate in
Chennai, as evidenced from Ext.R2(i).
31. The visits of the Consular staff with the
consent of the mother were on 19.12.2018 and 12.06.2019,
to ensure the welfare of the minor child, an American
citizen. The young boy, as per the reports, speaks
Malayalam and recognizes each of his family members. The
child calls his mother 'Chitta', which in the vernacular
Malayalam is a reference to 'mother's sister'. This is
taken as a direct consequence of his close association
with his cousins, his maternal aunt's children, who
address his mother as 'Chitta'. We are convinced that the
facts eminently require the child to be retained in
India, with the company of his mother and does not
require a repatriation as of now. If the proceedings in
the foreign Court are pending, necessarily the respondent
shall, through Solicitors of her choice, appraise the
foreign Court, of the fact situation and also produce our
judgment before that Court. The expenses of such
participation would be met by the petitioner. As has been
directed in Nithya Anand Raghavan the expenses of the
travel and stay of the mother and child in the foreign
country will be met by the petitioner; only if the
foreign Court requires their presence after being
apprised of the entire facts. As for visitation rights to
the father, we leave it to be agitated before the Family
Court, Thiruvananthapuram. The petitioner will do well to
enter appearance before the Family Court, wherein an
enquiry has to be held to look at the rival contentions
and arrive at a finding on custody of the minor child;
keeping in mind that in deciding custody of minors the
aspect of the welfare of the child is predominant,
paramount and foremost.
We dismiss the writ petition leaving the parties
to suffer their respective costs. We make it clear that
the proceedings for divorce and custody before the Family
Court at Thiruvanthapuram would not be governed by the
observations made by us here; which adjudication has to
proceed on the independent evidence adduced in that
Court.
Sd/-
K.VINOD CHANDRAN
JUDGE
Sd/-
M.R.ANITHA
JUDGE
Jma/-
APPENDIX
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF THE
CHILD REYAN NAYAR DATED 23.05.2017.
EXHIBIT P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE PASSPORT OF THE CHILD
REYAN NAYAR ISSUED BY THE US GOVERNMENT
BEARING NO. 575800906 ISSUED ON 20.07.2017.
EXHIBIT P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE TICKETS OF THE RESPONDENT
NO.2 AND THE MINOR CHILD FOR THEIR TRAVEL TO
INDIA INCLUDING RETURN TICKETS.
EXHIBIT P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 27.07.2018
PASSED BY THE HON'BLE FAMILY COURT
TRIVANDRUM, KERALA, INDIA, IN IA NO.441 OF
2018 FILED BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 2 AT FAMILY
COURT AT TRIVANDRUM, KERALA INDIA.
EXHIBIT P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 25.07.2018
PASSED BY THE HON'BLE MAGISTRATE COURT
TRIVANDRUM, KERALA, INDIA.
EXHIBIT P6 A TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE
PETITIONER COMPLAINT WITH THE SANTA CLARA
DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OFFICE AGAINST THE
RESPONDENT NO.2 FOR CHILD ABDUCTION ON
06.09.2018.
EXHIBIT P7 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 07.01.2019
FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 2 TO
THE RFO MOTION FILED BY THE PETITIONER
BEFORE THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA IN
DECKET NO. 18FL002305.
EXHIBIT P8 A TRUE COPY OF THE DECLARATION UNDER UNIFORM
CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT
ACT (UCCJEA) DATED 07.01.2019 SIGNED ON
17.10.2018 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.2
BEFORE THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA IN
DOCKET NO.18FL002305.
EXHIBIT P9 A TRUE COPY OF THE RESPONDENT FILED BY THE
RESPONDENT NO.2 BEFORE THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
CALIFORNIA SEEKING CUSTODY OF THE MINOR
CHILD AND MINOR CHILD SUPPORT (MAINTENANCE)
DATED 07.01.2019 SIGNED ON 17.12.2019.
EXHIBIT P10 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 08.01.2019
PASSED BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
WAIVING THE COURT FEE N FAVOUR OF THE
RESPONDENT NO.2.
EXHIBIT P11 A TRUE COPY OF THE REQUEST FILED BY THE
PETITIONER FOR TEMPORARY EX PARTE ORDER
BEFORE THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
SEEKING URGENT ORDERS FOR RETURN OF THE
MINOR CHILD.
EXHIBIT P12 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 22.02.2019
PASSED BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE PETITION FOR CUSTODY AND VISITATION
WITH DOCKET NO. 18FL002305.
EXHIBIT P13 A TRUE COPY OF THE CHILD ABDUCTION
PREVENTION ORDER ATTACHMENT DATED 06.06.2019
PASSED BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA.
EXHIBIT P14 A TRUE COPY OF THE CHILD ABDUCTION
PREVENTION ORDER ATTACHMENT DATED 10.07.2019
PASSED BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA.
EXHIBIT P15 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 20/11/2020
PASSED BY THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN THE
CASE OF NAVEEN SHARMA vs STATE OF RAJASTHAN,
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1341-1343-2019
