[Cites 13, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

Jyothi W/O. Fakirappa Chavan vs State Of Karnataka on 25 March, 2026

Author: M.Nagaprasanna

Bench: M.Nagaprasanna

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH

DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

WRIT PETITION No.105222 OF 2025 (LA - KIADB)

C/W

WRIT PETITION No.105242 OF 2025 (LA - KIADB)

IN WRIT PETITION No.105222 OF 2025

BETWEEN:

1. JYOTHI
W/O FAKIRAPPA CHAVAN
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
OCC.:BUSINESS / HOUSEWIFE
R/O. H.NO. 32, 2ND CROSS,
DEENABHANDU COLONY
KARAWAR ROAD, HUBBALLI,
DISTRICT DHARWAD.

2. ADITYA A/F. OF SHIVAJIRAO PAWAR
AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS,
OCC: BUSINESS / STUDENT
R/O. H.NO. 32, 2ND CROSS,
DEENABHANDU COLONY
KARAWAR ROAD, HUBBALLI,
DISTRICT DHARWAD.

3. MANJUNATH @ AMOG
S/O. FAKIRAPPA CHAVAN
2

AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS, OCC. BUSINESS
R/O. H.NO. 32, 2ND CROSS,
DEENABHANDU COLONY
KARAWAR ROAD, HUBBALLI,
DISTRICT DHARWAD.

4. DR. POOJA CHAVAN A/F. OF SHIVAJIRAO PAWAR
AFTER MARRIAGE W/O. KAPIL KUMAR SHISHODIA
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS, OCC. DOCTOR / BUSINESS
NOW R/O. KULABA, NAVY NAGAR, MUMBAI.

5. PAVITRA A/F. OF SHIVAJIRAO PAWAR
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
OCC. DOCTOR / HOUSEWIFE
R/O. H.NO. 32, 2ND CROSS,
DEENABHANDU COLONY
KARWAWAR ROAD, HUBBALLI,
DISTRICT DHARWAD.

... PETITIONERS

(BY SMT.ARCHANA A.MAGADUM, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS
UNDER SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES
VIDHAN SOUDHA
BENGALURU.

2. THE EXECUTIVE MEMBER
KIADB BANGALORE RASHTRASTOMA BUILDING
NRUPATUNGA ROAD,
BENGALURU.
3

3. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER/
MANAGING DIRECTOR
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD
DHARWAD.
... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI RAMESH CHIGARI, AGA FOR R-1;
SRI BASAVARAJ SABARAD, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SRI PAVAN B.DOAATTI, ADVOCATE FOR R-2 AND R-3)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO I) ISSUE A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI QUASHING THE PRELIMINARY
NOTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 28(1) OF THE KIADB ACT
BEARING NO.CI 290 SPQ 2010, BANGALORE, DATED 28/05/2010
ISSUED BY RESPONDENT NO. 1 VIDE ANNEXURE-E IN SO FAR AS
IT RELATES TO THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS; II) ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI QUASHING THE FINAL NOTIFICATION UNDER
SECTION 28(4) OF THE KIADB ACT BEARING NO. CI 23 S.P.Q.2023
DATED. 29/02/2024 ISSUED BY RESPONDENT NO.3 VIDE
ANNEXURE - F IN SO FAR AS IT RELATES TO THE LANDS OF
PETITIONERS.

IN WRIT PETITION No.105242 OF 2025
BETWEEN:

JYOTHI W/O. FAKIRAPPA CHAVAN
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS
OCC.: BUSINESS/HOUSEWIFE
R/O. H.NO.32, 2ND CROSS, DEENABHANDU COLONY
KARAWAR ROAD, HUBBALLI
DISTRICT DHARWAD.
... PETITIONER

(BY SMT.ARCHANA A.MAGADUM, ADVOCATE)
4

AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS UNDER SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND IDUSTRICES
VIDHAN SOUDHA
BENGALURU - 560 001.

2. THE EXECUTIVE MEMBER
KIADB BENGALORE RASHTRASTOMA BUILDING
NRUPATUNGA ROAD, BENGALURU.

3. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER /
MANAGING DIRECTOR
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD
DHARWAD - 580 004.

... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI RAMESH CHIGARI, AGA FOR R-1;
SRI BASAVARAJ SABARAD, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SRI PAVAN B.DOAATTI, ADVOCATE FOR R-2 AND R-3)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO I) ISSUE A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI QUASHING THE PRELIMINARY
NOTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 28(1) OF THE KIADB ACT
BEARING NO.CI 420 SPQ 2009, BANGALORE, DATED 07/11/2009
ISSUED BY RESPONDENT NO. 1 VIDE ANNEXURE-C IN SO FAR AS
IT RELATES TO THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS; II) ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI QUASHING THE FINAL NOTIFICATION UNDER
SECTION 28(4) OF THE KIADB ACT BEARING NO. CI 22 S.P.Q.2023
DATED. 17/02/2024 ISSUED BY RESPONDENT NO.3 VIDE
ANNEXURE - D IN SO FAR AS IT RELATES TO THE LANDS OF
PETITIONERS.
5

THESE WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CAV ORDER

Both these petitions call in question preliminary and final

notifications issued by the 1st respondent/State of Karnataka, under

the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Act, 1966

(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short). The lands in both

these cases are different, but concerning the same village acquired

for setting up industries. Therefore, the matters are taken up

together, heard and considered by this common order.

2. Facts in brief, in Writ Petition No.105242 of 2025:-

The petitioner claims to be the owner of agricultural land in

R.S.No.81/4 measuring 02 acres situated at Shinganahalli Village,

Dharwad Taluk and District. On an application filed by the

petitioner, the Government permits conversion of land of the

petitioner for non-agricultural purposes. On 07-07-2008, it appears
6

the petitioner gives a letter of consent for acquisition of the subject

land along with several other lands. Preliminary notification then

comes to be issued on 07-11-2009 under Section 28(1) of the Act

seeking to acquire several packets of lands including the subject

land of the petitioner for the purpose of establishment of industrial

area. In furtherance of the said notification, Section 28(2) notice

comes to be issued on 16-12-2009 concerning the land of the

petitioner. The notice issued to the petitioner on 31-12-2021 is

said to have reached the doors of the petitioner only on

11-01-2022. The petitioner replied to the notice issued under

Section 28(2) contending that she was under the impression that

the land was not required for the purpose of setting of an industrial

area. On 17-02-2024, a final notification comes to be issued under

Section 28(4) of the Act. The final notification took into its sweep

the land of the petitioner as well. Aggrieved by the preliminary and

final notification, the subject petition is preferred seeking their

quashment.
7

3. Facts in brief, in Writ Petition No.105222 of 2025:-

The petitioners, who are five in number, call in question the

preliminary notification issued by the 1st respondent/State under

the Act on 28-05-2010 and the final notification issued on

29-02-2024 seeking to acquire lands of the petitioners in

R.S.Nos.58/1, 58/2, 59/1 and 59/2 totally measuring 23 acres 13

guntas situated at Shinganahalli Village, Dharwad Taluk and District

for the purpose of setting up industries. The petitioners claim to be

owners of the said lands contending that they are all joint family

properties and they are in possession of the said lands for close to

decades. On 28-05-2010, a preliminary notification comes to be

issued declaring certain lands including the subject lands for

acquisition for the purpose of setting up industrial area. Pursuant to

the preliminary notification, not even a notice under Section 28(2)

of the Act was issued. Therefore, the petitioners applied for

conversion of the subject lands from agriculture to non-

agricultural/commercial purposes. Accordingly, they got the lands

converted between 21-10-2021 and 14-11-2022 and entered into a

lease agreement with Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited to
8

run a petroleum outlet. When things stood thus, on 10-01-2024 an

enquiry hearing notice under Section 28(3) of the Act is issued to

the petitioner. In the proceedings of enquiry, it was made known

to the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board ('the Board'

for short) that there was no notice issued under Section 28(2) of

the Act and without issuing Section 28(2) notice, the proceedings

under Section 28(3) could not have been initiated. Notwithstanding

the same, final notification dated 29-02-2024 emerges. It is,

therefore, the petitioners are before this Court seeking quashment

of both preliminary and final notifications.

4. Heard in both the petitions Smt. Archana A. Magadum,

learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri Ramesh Chigari,

learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the 1st

respondent and Sri Basavaraj Sabarad, learned senior counsel

appearing for respondents 2 and 3.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would

vehemently contend that without issuing a notice under Section
9

28(2) of the Act, there could not have been an enquiry notice under

Section 28(3) or a final notification under Section 28(4) of the Act.

Therefore, the entire final notification seeking to acquire the subject

lands is contrary to law. The final notification is issued after 14

years of issuance of preliminary notification which cannot be done

in law is her submission. The learned counsel would further submit

that Government has issued a circular on 03-03-2007 clearly

indicating that where the lands are converted from agriculture to

non-agricultural/commercial purposes, they must not become the

subject matter of acquisition for the purpose of setting up of an

industry. Admittedly, the petitioners have leased out land long ago

for setting up of petroleum out-let and a Daba also exists in the

said land. She would in all seek quashment of the entire acquisition

proceedings.

6. The learned senior counsel Sri Basavaraj Sabarad

representing the Board would vehemently contend that there is a

delay in issuing final notification as the acquisition was for 2686.76

acres which took place under four different preliminary and final

notifications which had to be integrated into one large industrial
10

park and resistance from the farmers delayed issuance of final

notification within a reasonable time. The delay is bona fide,

unintentional and beyond the control of the Special Land Acquisition

Officer. The claim of non-service of Section 28(2) notice is not

correct, as Section 28(3) hearing notice clearly indicates that

notices are served on all the concerned. The notices were issued

for fixation of ₹45/- lakhs for dry lands and ₹90/- lakhs for lands

adjacent to national highways as compensation. Conversion,

development or establishment of petroleum outlet and Daba after

the preliminary notification is void and illegal. Therefore, the

circular dated 03-03-2007 is not applicable to the facts obtaining in

the case at hand. He would further contend that the delay in issuing

final notification cannot be a ground to quash the preliminary

notification or the final notification. The challenge to the acquisition

is by minuscule number of land owners out of the vast extent of

land. Therefore, it is not prudent to quash the entire acquisition

process of vast extent of land. He would seek dismissal of the

petitions.
11

7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions

made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the

material on record.

8. The afore-narrated facts, dates, link in the chain of events

are not in dispute. Four dates and facts that assume significance

would require reiteration. Government of Karnataka issues a

circular on 03-03-2007. The circular is indicative of the fact that

lands converted for non-agricultural purposes and lands with

petroleum outlet may not be acquired, except on certain conditions

that they should not affect the contiguity. The preliminary

notification is issued under Section 28(1) of the Act on 07-11-2009

in W.P.No.105242 of 2025. Immediately thereon, it appears, notice

under Section 28(2) is issued; there is no document produced by

the Board to demonstrate that notice was ever served upon the

petitioner or any other, but the issue is concerning the petitioner.

Therefore, it can safely be concluded that there is no document

produced to demonstrate that the petitioner was issued with any

notice, as neither the petitioner has a copy of the notice nor the

Board has produced any document to show that notice under
12

Section 28(2) dated 16-12-2009 or any other day thereafter was

issued and served upon the petitioner. Then comes the final

notification. The final notification takes within its sweep the land of

the petitioner as well. Admittedly, there is no notice issued to the

petitioner under Section 28(2) of the Act. No enquiry was

conducted under Section 28(3) of the Act, but a final notification

has emerged. The issuance of final notification qua the land of the

petitioner is on the face of it contrary to law.

9. Insofar as the petition in Writ Petition No.105222 of 2025

is concerned, the preliminary notification is issued on 28-01-2010.

The next document that is produced either by the petitioners or by

the Board is an enquiry notice on 10-01-2024, 14 years after

issuance of preliminary notification. The notice dated 10-01-2024

issued under Section 28(3) to these petitioners reads as follows:

"ಕ : ೆಐಎ /ಭೂ ಾ / ಾ/ ಎಂಐ /1239/2023-24 ಾಂಕ2: 10-01-2024

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13

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14

ಕ ಾ9ಟಕ ೈ3ಾ< ಾ ಪ ]ೇuಾvವೃ x ಮಂಡ*,
ಾರ ಾಡ"

The notice no where indicates that Section 28(2) notice was issued

and served upon the petitioners.

10. Few admitted facts in the cases at hand are that in Writ

Petition No.105242 of 2025 a notice under Section 28(3) was never

served upon the petitioner. In Writ Petition No.105222 of 2025 a

notice under Section 28(2) was never served upon the petitioners.

This is the specific contention taken by the petitioners while causing

the legal notice upon the Board when for the first time Section

28(3) proceeding was sought to be conducted. The final notification

is issued after a lapse of 14 years, without any plausible

explanation for delay from the date of issuance of preliminary

notification under Section 28(1) of the Act. In the light of the final

notification being issued without compliance with sub-sections (2)

and (3) of Section 28 in both these cases, it is on the face of it

illegal. The law in this regard is laid down by the Division Bench of

this Court. The Division Bench in THE KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL
15

AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD v. SRI CHETAN TAYAL1, has held

as follows:

".... .... ....

6. Having considered the contentions advanced, we notice
that the preliminary Notification issued on 18.03.2006 in respect
of the property of the respondents herein, had not culminated in
the issuance of a final Notification, even in the year 2016 or on
21.12.2020 when the learned Single Judge had taken up the
writ petition for consideration.

7. Though, no time frame is specifically provided
under Section 28 of the KIADB Act, we are of the opinion
that the contention that the final Notification can be
issued at any time after the preliminary Notification has
been issued in 2006 cannot be accepted. In the above view
of the matter, we are of the opinion that there is no scope for
interference with the findings of the learned Single Judge in the
judgment under appeal. The writ appeal therefore fails, the
same is accordingly dismissed."
(Emphasis supplied)

The Division Bench in the aforesaid judgments holds that the final

notification under Section 28(4) of the Act must be issued within a

reasonable time.

11. Prior to the said judgment, a coordinate Bench of this

Court quashed similar proceedings on these very grounds in

1
W.A.No.509 of 2021 decided on 19-12-2024
16

SRI NARAYAN v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA2. The coordinate

Bench has held as follows:

".... .... ....

24. After carefully considering the arguments of the
learned counsel for the parties, the key points that arise for
deliberation in these petitions are as follows:

1. Whether there was compliance with the mandatory
provision contained in Section 28(3) before issuing
the final notification under Section 28(4)?

2. In the absence of a prescribed limitation, can the
KIADB issue a final notification after the expiry of a
period of 27 years from the date of the preliminary
notification?

3. Whether the respondents can acquire land for the sole
purpose of establishing an educational institution as an
amenity or for a different purpose than the one notified
under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act?

4. Whether the instant writ petitions are plagued with delay
and laches, and if so, whether it can be condoned?

5. Whether the acquisition proceedings are vitiated on the
grounds that it is a case of colorable exercise of power by
the concerned authorities?

25. Before addressing the points raised for deliberation, it
is necessary to divulge the facts of the case that led to the filing
of these petitions.

26. Point No.1. In this instance, the preliminary
notification was issued on 10th February 1981, and the final
notification was published on 12th February 1982. However, this
final notification was quashed by this Court in WP No.
6448/1982 and a connected petition via an order dated 26th

2
W.P. No.71377 of 2012 & connected matter decided on 26-07-2024
17

April 1984 due to non-compliance with the mandatory provision
contained in Section 28(3) of the Act, 1966. Following the order
of remand passed by this Court, a notice dated 21st November
1984/27th November 1984 was issued, to which the petitioner
in WP No. 71377/2012 filed objections, requesting the
acquisition proceedings to be dropped. Despite these objections,
the Special Land Acquisition Officer recommended acquisition
via an order dated 26th January 1986. The KIADB subsequently
sent a proposal to the State Government to issue and publish
the final notification, followed by subsequent reminders.

27. The State Government did not approve the proposal
sent by the KIADB. Consequently, the Board, in its 143rd
General Body Meeting dated 11.7.1989, resolved to withdraw
from the acquisition of land in Sy.No.127, among other lands.
Respondent No. 5(c) submitted a representation dated 30th May
2006 to the KIADB to delete the name of the KIADB from the
record of rights and to enter his and his brother's names
instead.

28. Given these circumstances, respondent No.4
requested the KIADB, stating that the legal heirs of the
deceased S.B. Kademani were agreeable to hand over
possession of the land through the concerned acquisition. The
legal representatives of the deceased S.B. Kademani,
suppressing the pendency of the suit in OS No. 61/2005 and the
temporary injunction granted on 22nd December 2005, which
restrained the parties from alienating the subject land,
submitted a consent letter on 16th January 2007, asserting
ownership and consenting to acquisition. The Special Land
Acquisition Officer submitted a report to the Special District
Commissioner, KIADB, on 2nd March 2007 regarding the
consent and pendency of the suit but did not mention the
interim order that was in effect or the resolution passed by the
Board in its 143rd General Body Meeting to withdraw from the
acquisition of the subject land. The KIADB then decided to
continue from the stage of Section 28(3), following the
preliminary notification dated 10th February 1981.

29. The SLAO, KIADB, claims to have issued a notice
dated 21st September 2007 to the petitioners to show cause as
to why the land should not be acquired. On this notice, the
Village Accountant, Attikola, made an endorsement dated 3rd
18

October 2007, stating that when he attempted to serve the
notice to Narayana Bhim Rao Kademani, the petitioner in WP
No. 71377/2012 at Malmaddi, Dharwad, he was informed that
the address provided was insufficient. Thus, the service of notice
could only be effected if a sufficient address was furnished. The
Tahsildar, Dharwad, endorsed the notice on 15th October 2007,
informing the Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB, that the
concerned person was not residing at the address provided. The
notice was received by the office of SLAO on 24th October 2007.

30. The order sheet dated 4th October 2007, which
pertains to the enquiry under Section 28(3), indicated that
Ranganath Srinivasrao Kademani, respondent No. 5(c),
appeared before the SLAO, stating he was ready to give the
land on acquisition to the KIADB. Therefore, the petitioner in WP
No. 71377/2012, Narayan s/o Bhimappa Kademani, who was
the petitioner in WP No. 6489/1982, and the father of the
petitioner in WP No. 60868/2011, Thimmappa Bhimrao
Kademani, who was plaintiff No. 2 in OS No. 61/2005, were not
issued notices to file objections and were not provided with an
opportunity for a personal hearing as mandated under Section
28(3), despite the direction issued by this Court in WP Nos.
6448 & 6449 of 1982. Based on the consent given by Ranganath
Srinivasrao Kademani, the SLAO passed an order dated 6th
October 2007, stating that there was no objection to the
acquisition of land for the benefit of respondent No. 4. This
order preceded the endorsement made by the Tahsildar on 15th
October 2007 on the notice issued by the SLAO, stating that the
concerned individual was not residing at the provided address.

31. Upon receiving and accepting the proposal sent
by the KIADB, the State Government published the final
notification under Section 28(4) on 6th February 2008. It
is pertinent to note that the final notification was issued
after a lapse of 28 years from the date of the issuance of
the preliminary notification.

32. The KIADB has produced vouchers for the payment of
compensation made under Section 29(2) of the KIAD Act to
respondents No. 5(a) to 5(c) and cheques for sums of
Rs.28,61,086/- and Rs.14,30,542/-, respectively, as shown in
Annexures-R7 and R8. An agreement was entered into between
the State Government and respondents No. 5(a) to 5(c), but not
19

with the petitioner in WP No. 71377/2012, who was issued a
notice to participate in the enquiry under Section 28(3) but was
not served with the notice. Therefore, in the absence of an
agreement with all the owners, the compensation paid and
received by respondents No. 5(a) to 5(c) is not binding on the
petitioners, and the acquisition cannot be said to be by consent.

33. In light of the above facts, the key points raised for
deliberation must be considered with reference to the relevant
provisions of the KIAD Act and the legal principles established
by the Apex Court and this Court regarding those provisions.

34. The objective of the Act, 1966, is to make
necessary provisions for the orderly establishment and
development of industries in suitable areas within the
State. Chapter VII of the Act deals with the acquisition
and disposal of land. Section 28 of the Act addresses land
acquisition, and its provisions are as follows:

Sub-Section (1) states that if, at any time, the State
Government deems land necessary for development by
the Board or for any other purpose in furtherance of the
Act's objectives, it may issue a notification announcing its
intention to acquire such land.

Sub-Section (2) requires the service of a notice to
the landowner to show cause within 30 days why the land
should not be acquired.

Sub-Section (3) mandates that an opportunity be
given to the landowners to be heard. The State
Government must consider any objections raised by the
landowners and may then pass such orders as it deems
appropriate.

Sub-Section (4) stipulates that after passing an
order under Sub-Section (3) and if the State Government
is satisfied that the land is required for the purpose
specified in the notification issued under Section 1, a
declaration shall be made by notification in the official
gazette.
20

35. After issuing the preliminary notification, the
only requirements are to serve a notice on the landowner
to show cause why the land should not be acquired,
conduct an enquiry to consider any objections submitted
by the landowners, provide an opportunity for a personal
hearing, and, after considering the objections, publish the
final notification.

36. In the case of Poojari Peddanna v. State and
Others 2009(5) Kar L J 556, the coordinate Bench of this
Court examined whether service of notice under Section
28(2) of the Act on all interested parties is mandatory or
directory. Referring to the decisions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Ahuja Industries Limited v. State of
Karnataka (AIR 2003 SC 3519) and Devinder Singh v.
State of Punjab (AIR 2008 SC 261), it was ruled that non-
service of notice on the legal representatives of the
original grantee, despite the respondent's awareness of
the pending proceedings, constitutes absolute non-
compliance with the mandatory provisions contained in
Section 28(2) of the Act.

37. In the present case, the father of the petitioner
in WP No.60868/2011 was plaintiff No. 2 in OS
No.61/2005. The pendency of the partition suit
concerning the subject land was well within the
knowledge of the respondent KIADB. Despite this
knowledge, the KIADB did not issue a notice under
Section 28(2) or provide a personal hearing as required
by Section 28(3). Similarly, the petitioner in WP
No.71377/2012 was not issued a notice under Section
28(2) nor provided a personal hearing as required by
Section 28(3), as evidenced by the endorsements made
by the Tahsildar and the Village Accountant on the notice
issued by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. Therefore,
the non compliance with the mandatory provisions of
Section 28(2) and (3) of the KIAD Act, 1966, vitiates the
acquisition proceedings. Accordingly, Point No. 1 is
answered in the negative and in favor of the petitioner.

38. Point No. 2. The preliminary notification was issued
on October 30, 1981. The final notification dated February 12,
1982, was subsequently quashed by this Court on July 26,
21

1984. Upon remand, the KIADB, during its 143rd General Body
Meeting dated 11.7.1989, resolved to withdraw from the
acquisition of the subject land. However, on November 6, 2006,
respondent No. 4 requested the KIADB to proceed with the
acquisition of the subject land. In response, the Special Deputy
Commissioner of KIADB directed the Special Land Acquisition
Officer to verify the status of the acquisition and check for any
pending cases.

39. Following this, based on a consent letter from the
legal representatives of the deceased S.B. Kademani, an enquiry
was conducted under Sections 28(2) and (3) of the Act. Notably,
notices were not issued during this enquiry, which ultimately led
to the publication of the final notification on February 6, 2008.
This final notification was issued after an inordinate delay of 27
years.

40. A review of the provisions contained in Section
28 of the Act indicates that while there is no specific time
limit prescribed for issuing the final notification from the
date of the preliminary notification issued under Sub-
Section (1), it is implicit that the final notification should
be published within a "reasonable time" if no specific
time frame is established by law.

41. The concept of what constitutes reasonable
time can be subjective and is determined on the facts and
circumstances of the case including the purpose of the
acquisition, the procedures involved and impact on the
land owners. The market value of the lands is often
pegged to the date of preliminary notification. Meaning,
the compensation to the landowner is calculated based
on the value of land as it was on the date of the
preliminary notification rather than its value at the time
of the final notification.

42. The Division Bench of this Court in Shimoga
Urban Development Authority by its Commissioner and
Another v. State of Karnataka by its Secretary (ILR 2002
KAR 2078), referencing the Apex Court's decision in
Ramchand and Others v. Union of India and Others
(1994) 1 SCC 44, ruled that when a statute does not
prescribe a time limit for exercising a power, it must be
22

exercised within a time frame that can be deemed
reasonable. The Division Bench further observed that,
according to the Supreme Court, when compensation is
pegged to the date of the preliminary notification and
there is an inordinate delay, the market value as of the
preliminary notification becomes a fraction of the market
rate prevailing at the time of passing the award and
taking possession, which is unjust to the landowners.

43. In H.N. Shivanna and Ors v State of Karnataka
and Ors, WA 3189/2010 : AIR 2013 KAR 163 , the
Division Bench, referring to the Shimoga Urban
Development Authority by its Commissioner and Another
v. State of Karnataka by its Secretary (ILR 2002 KAR
2078) case and a series of Apex Court decisions, held that
even if no period is prescribed under the Act for issuing
the final declaration or passing the award, it does not
imply that limitation is not a bar. A period of two years
was considered reasonable for issuing a final declaration,
provided there are no legal or procedural obstacles. If the
final declaration is not issued within this period, the land
acquisition proceedings lapse, regardless of the absence
of a specific provision in the Act. Although the decision in
Shivanna's case was challenged before the Apex Court,
which dismissed the special leave petition while keeping
the position of law open, the decision of the Division
Bench in Shimoga Urban Development Authority remains
final.

44. Regarding the abandonment of acquisition
proceedings due to delay and inaction by the KIADB, the
Division Bench in Special Land Acquisition Officer and
Others v. Sri Venugopal V. and Others (WA No.
6820/2017, dated September 28, 2020) dismissed the
writ appeal and affirmed the co-ordinate bench's order,
stating that a delay of nearly seven years in passing the
award for land acquisition under the Act, 1966 leads to
the lapse of the acquisition proceedings. The co-ordinate
bench in WP No. 34313-317/2016 (dated August 17,
2017), referring to Tukaram Kana Joshi & Others v.
M.I.D.C. (AIR 2013 SC 565), Ram Chand and Others v.
Union of India (1994 1 SCC 44), and H.N. Shivanna and
Ors v. State of Karnataka and Ors WA 3189/2010 AIR
23

2013 KAR 163, noted that there is a legal obligation on
the competent authority to conclude acquisition
proceedings within a reasonable time.

45. Similarly, this Court in Special Land Acquisition
Officer v. Sri K.B. Lingaraju (WA No. 6819/2017, dated
September 28, 2020) upheld the decision of the co-
ordinate bench in WP No. 34318/2016 (dated August 17,
2017), ruling that a delay of nearly seven years in
passing the award for land acquisition under the Act,
1966 results in the lapse of the acquisition proceedings.

46. In this case, no order of restraint was in place
against the KIADB acquiring the land. The final
notification pertained only to the subject land, and there
were no impediments to commencing the acquisition
proceedings. Unlike cases involving large extents of land,
where the State Government delayed action from the
date of the proposal sent by the KIADB, the proceedings
here were inordinately delayed due to extraneous
considerations and a lack of reasonable explanation.
Consequently, the entire acquisition proceedings have
lapsed due to the failure to issue the final notification
within a reasonable time. Therefore, Point No. 2 is
answered in the negative and in favor of the petitioners."

........ ........ ........

59. Point No. 4. In State of A.P. v. Surya Chandra
Rao (2005 (6) SCC 149), the Apex Court elaborated on the
concept of fraud, stating that in public or administrative law,
fraud arises from a deception that involves the disclosure of
incorrect facts, knowingly and deliberately, to exercise
jurisdiction that would otherwise not have been exercised. The
misrepresentation must relate to conditions outlined in a
section, concerning the existence or non-existence of which
power can be exercised. Hence, if the exercise of power involves
exceeding the jurisdiction conferred by the legislature or
defeating statutory provisions through subterfuge or for
irrelevant considerations, it constitutes a fraud in law and
amounts to a colorable exercise of power.
24

60. Citing earlier decisions in Narayana Reddy v. State
of Karnataka (ILR 1991 KAR 2248, decided on January 1,
1991) and HMT House Building Cooperative Society v.
Syed Khader & Ors (AIR 1995 SC 2244), where the Court
had annulled mala fide acquisition proceedings as a colorable
exercise of power--because members who were neither
employees of HMT nor residing within the society's jurisdiction
were admitted, and land was acquired under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 for extraneous considerations--the
Supreme Court in Vyalikaval House Building Co-operative
Society v. Chandrappa (2007 (9) SCC 304) upheld the
decision to allow a writ petition in a Letters Patent Appeal filed
after a delay of fourteen years. The challenge was based on the
finding that the acquisition was mala fide and fraudulent. The
Court also concluded that money paid for settlement in such
cases was at the risk of the petitioner society.

61. In State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980 2 SCC
471), the Supreme Court had observed that where land was
notified for industrial development under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, and was later allocated to private builders for
residential apartments--contrary to the intended use--the
acquisition was deemed a colorable exercise of power. The Court
affirmed that fraud on power voids the order if it is not
exercised bona fide for the intended purpose.

62. In Greater Noida Industrial Development
Authority v. Devendra Kumar (2011 12 SCC 375), the
Court noted that when land acquired for industrial development
was instead allotted for residential purposes within weeks of the
notification, it constituted a colorable exercise of power. The
State Government's evasive responses about land usage further
supported the finding of fraud.

63. In Tukaram Kana Joshi &Ors. v. M.I.D.C. &Ors.
(AIR 2013 SC 565), where State functionaries had taken
possession of land in 1964 without compensating the owners,
the Court referenced that deprivation without legal sanction
does not equate to valid acquisition. It observed that delay in
challenging unlawful dispossession should not bar the claim if
substantial justice was violated, even if acquisition proceedings
had lapsed due to inaction by authorities.
25

64. Additionally, in Union of India v. N. Murugesan
(2022 2 SCC 25), the Supreme Court emphasized that delay
and laches are matters of fact and prejudice, and may not apply
if fraud is proven. The Court noted that condonation of delay
involves examining the length of delay and the nature of actions
taken during that period, and it may be unreasonable to
challenge settled schemes based on technical delay.

65. In B. Mahadevappa v. The Deputy Commissioner
(W.P. 43155/2011 : DD 11.06.2024), this Court ruled that
the State Government cannot dispossess individuals of their
constitutionally protected property rights without following due
process, even if the writ petition is delayed. The Court stated
that unjust enrichment by the State Government and unlawful
possession do not confer any right to the State Government.

66. Given that the final notification was published
after 28 years from the date of issuance of preliminary
notification, and the writ petitions were filed on February
1, 2011, and October 18, 2012, respectively, it is
improper and unacceptable for the KIADB to argue that
the petitions should be dismissed on the grounds of delay
and laches. The principle of equity prevents a party from
benefiting from wrongful conduct and protects the
enjoyment of rights that have become permanent due to
the passage of time. The KIADB's conduct signifies a
waiver of the right to the land proposed for acquisition.
Moreover, fraud on power renders limitations on
remedies ineffective. Therefore, the KIADB's claim that
the writ petitions are barred by delay and laches is
without merit and is hereby rejected. Accordingly, Point
No. 4 is answered in favor of the Petitioners."

(Emphasis supplied)

The coordinate Bench in the aforesaid judgment holds that non-

compliance with the mandatory provisions under Sections 28(2)

and 28(3) of the Act vitiates the acquisition proceedings. Further,
26

the acquisition proceedings would lapse if the final notification

under Section 28(4) is not issued within a reasonable time.

12. A Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.100558 of 2024 and

connected cases decided on 27-02-2025 rejects the appeal filed by

the Board against the aforesaid order of the learned single Judge

who had allowed the petitions and quashed the acquisition

proceedings. The order of the Division Bench reads as follows:

".... .... ....

ORDER

[a] The writ Appeals in No. 100558/2024 and 100566/2024 are rejected.

[b] The contempt proceedings in CCC 100349/2024 are closed directing the respondents in such proceedings to implement the writ Court's direction within 8 [eight] weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order reserving liberty to the petitioners to file a certified copy of this order within [4] four weeks from the date of receipt thereof.

[c] It is needless to observe that the petitioners will be at liberty to seek revival of this complaint CCC No. 100349/2024 if there is any failure to comply with the direction."

(Emphasis supplied)

The submissions that are now projected before this Court that mere

delay will not vitiate the notifications are all considered by the

Division Bench and the learned single Judge. Delay therein was 17

years. Delay herein is 14 years. The delay that is sought to be

justified therein was on the score that several thousands of acres of

land were made subject matter of acquisition. The same swan song

is sung by the Board in the case at hand as well.

13. The learned senior counsel appearing for the Board has

placed reliance upon several judgments to buttress his submission

that when public interest is involved, delay should not come in the

way of setting up industries and quashment of notification should

not arise. All those judgments are considered by the judgments

rendered by the learned single Judge or by the Division Bench

noted hereinabove. In that light the submissions of the learned

senior counsel for the Board would tumble down, as they have all

been rejected by the Division Bench and the coordinate Bench. The

illegality that shrouds the acquisition in the case at hand is that

there is no notice under Section 28(2) in one of the proceedings

and there is no proceeding under Section 28(3) in another petition.

These are admitted facts, as not a speck of paper is produced by

the Board to demonstrate in one of the cases that Section 28(2)

notice was issued and in the other case Section 28(3) proceedings

was ever undertaken. These are illegalities that would cut at the

root of the acquisition, albeit qua the petitioners.

14. It is not that the entire notifications - preliminary and

final - would stand obliterated, but the lands of the petitioners

which are subject matter of acquisition stand obliterated. The

possession admittedly is with the petitioners even today and after

the final notification there is an interim order operating in favour of

the petitioners in these cases. In that light the petitions deserve to

succeed.

15. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

ORDER

(i) Writ Petitions are allowed.

(ii) Preliminary Notification No.CI 290 SPQ 2010 dated

28-05-2010 issued by the 1st respondent and final

notification No.CI 23 SPQ 2023 dated 29-02-2024

issued by the 3rd respondent stand quashed qua the

lands of the petitioners in Writ Petition No.105222 of

2025.

(iii) Preliminary Notification No.CI 420 SPQ 2009 dated

07-11-2009 issued by the 1st respondent and final

notification No.CI 22 SPQ 2023 dated 17-02-2024

issued by the 3rd respondent stand quashed qua the

land of the petitioner in Writ Petition No.105242 of

2025.

SD/-

(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE

bkp CT:MJ