[Cites 17, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
Mr Irfan Nasir @ Irfi vs The National Investigation Agency on 29 January, 2026
Author: H.P.Sandesh
Bench: H.P.Sandesh
-1-
NC: 2026:KHC:4947-DB
CRL.A No. 1015 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 29TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1015 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
1. MR. IRFAN NASIR @ IRFI,
S/O LATE NASIR SATTAR,
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS,
R/AT H.NO.24, 'F' STREET,
TASKEEN APARTMENTS,
FLAT NO.TF-301, 4TH FLOOR,
CLEVELAND TOWN, FRAZER TOWN,
BENGALURU-560005.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. RAVI L. VAIDYA, ADVOCATE)
Digitally signed by
MOUNESHWARAPPA
NAGARATHNA
Location: High Court AND:
of Karnataka
1. THE NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY,
BENGALURU,
REPRESENTED BY LEARNED SPECIAL
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. SACHIN C., ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. PRASANNA KUMAR P., SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR)
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 21(4)
OF NIA ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED
-2-
NC: 2026:KHC:4947-DB
CRL.A No. 1015 of 2025
HC-KAR
15.04.2025 PASSED BY THE LEARNED COURT OF THE 49TH
ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE (SPECIAL
COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF NIA CASES) (CCH-50) AT
BENGALURU IN SPL.C.C.NO.595/2021 AND THEREBY ENLARGE
THE APPELLANT ON BAIL IN THE SAID SPL.C.C.NO.595/2021,
[RC NO.33/2020/NIA/DLI].
THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ADMISSION THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T)
Heard the learned counsel for the appellant/accused No.3
and the learned Special Public Prosecutor for the
respondent/NIA.
2. The appellant/accused No.3 has filed this appeal
under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act,
2008, to set aside the order dated 15.04.2025 passed by the
learned 49th Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge (Special
Court for the Trial of NIA Cases), (CCH-50) at Bengaluru in
Spl.C.C.No.595/2021 and R.C.No.33/2020/NIA/DLI and prayed
to enlarge him on bail in the said Spl.C.C.No.595/2021.
NC: 2026:KHC:4947-DB
HC-KAR
3. The brief facts of the case is that, in connection
with the said case, two accused persons were arrested on
08.03.2020 for their alleged affiliation with the banned terrorist
organization, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). During
the investigation, another accused, Abdur Rehman @ Dr.Brave
was arrested on 17.03.2020. During his interrogation, he
disclosed that he had traveled to Syria in the year 2013-14
along with Afroz Ahmed, allegedly funded by members of a
group called "Quran Circle." He further revealed that pro-ISIS
activists were actively operating in Bengaluru, involved in
identifying and radicalizing gullible Muslim youths, recruiting
them, raising funds and facilitating their illegal travel to Syria
via Turkey to join and fight for ISIS. Pursuant to these
developments, the Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, by its
order No.11011/61/2020/NIA dated 18.09.2020, directed the
NIA to register and investigate a new case under Sections 120B
and 125 of IPC and Sections 17, 18 and 18B of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act ('UAP Act' for short). Accordingly,
the NIA registered R.C.No.33/2020/NIA/DLI on 19.09.2020
against four accused persons and took up the investigation.
NC: 2026:KHC:4947-DB
HC-KAR
4. On 07.10.2020, after securing intimation from the
Special Court, search were conducted at the residential
premises of accused No.3 Irfan Nasir and accused No.5
Ahamed Abdul Cader, during which, incriminating digital and
physical articles, including a diary, were seized. Based on the
materials recovered and subsequent examination of the
accused, accused Nos.3 and 5 were arrested on the same day
and they were remanded to judicial custody. Later, the
Investigating Officer completed the investigation and filed the
charge-sheet against the appellant and others.
5. The Special Court by the impugned order, rejected
the bail application holding that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the appellant has committed the offences
alleged against him. The Special Court further held that having
regard to the material available on record with regard to
commission of offences under the provisions of UAP Act, the
Court is barred from granting bail in view of Section 43D of the
UAP Act. Challenging the said order, the above appeal is filed.
6. Sri Ravi L. Vaidya, the learned counsel for the
appellant/accused No.3 submits that there is a delay in
NC: 2026:KHC:4947-DB
HC-KAR
conducting trial by the Special Court. The Special Court ought
to have appreciated that though the recording of evidence in
the above case commenced on 21.05.2024, however, as on the
date of filing of the application for bail, only 13 witnesses have
been examined as against 60 witnesses cited by the
prosecution. The right of the appellant to speedy trial is
violated resulting in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. Secondly, there is non-furnishing of grounds of arrest by
the Investigating Officer and since the respondent/NIA has
failed to furnish the grounds of arrest in writing to the appellant
at the time of arrest, the remand and further custody of the
appellant becomes void-ab-initio being violative of Article 22(1)
of the Constitution of India. The Special Court has committed
an error in holding that the requirement of furnishing the
grounds of arrest in writing is applicable to only those cases
where the arrest is subsequent to the date of decision of
Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India and Others reported in
(2024) 7 SCC 576. In this regard, the Special Court has failed
to appreciate the settled law enunciated in the matter of
Madhu Limaye and others reported in (1969) 1 SCC 292,
Prabir Purkayastha V/s. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in
NC: 2026:KHC:4947-DB
HC-KAR
(2024) 8 SCC 254, Vihaan Kumar V/s. State of Haryana
and Another reported in (2025) SCC Online SC 269 and
Hari Kishan V/s. State of Maharashtra And Others
reported in (1962) SCC Online SC 117. Further, the
appellant/accused No.3 is relying on third ground i.e., his
health condition. The learned counsel vehemently contended
that all these aspects have not been considered by the Special
Court, hence prayed to allow the appeal.
In support of his contention, he relied upon following
citations:
1. (1969) 1 SCC 292
2. (2003) 7 SCC 517
3. 2022 (3) MLJ 333
4. (2004) 8 SCC 254
5. 2025 SCC Online SC 269
6. (2021) 5 SCC 435
7. (2021) 3 SCC 713
8. (2024) 8 SCC 293
9. 2025 SCC Online SC 322
10. GAHC010208062025 (Gauhati High Court)
7. Per contra, Sri Sachin.C representing Sri Prasanna
Kumar P, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the
respondent/NIA vehemently contended that the
appellant/accused No.3 previously had approached the Special
NC: 2026:KHC:4947-DB
HC-KAR
Court seeking bail on three occasions and the same were
rejected by the Special Court. The appellant has not indicated
any change in law or circumstances to justify the filing of
successive bail applications before the Special Court and
without any such change, the successive application was not
maintainable before the Special Court. He further contended
that during the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer
collected the material evidence indicating that the appellant
was an active worker of an unlawful organization and the
appellant had organized several meetings and had participated
in the crime. It is further contended that the investigation
report clearly reveals that the appellant was a member of a
terrorist gang, was a part of criminal conspiracy to wage war
against the Government of Syria; he was a member of an
unlawful assembly with a common object to commit a terrorist
act. The role of the appellant has been established through
prosecution witnesses, statement of protected witnesses and
documentary/electronic evidence and prima facie case was
made out against him. Hence, the final report was filed under
Section 173 of Cr.P.C. before the Special Court and the Special
NC: 2026:KHC:4947-DB
HC-KAR
Court took cognizance of the offences committed by the
appellant and therefore, the appeal requires to be rejected.
8. The learned Special Public Prosecutor further
contended that earlier the appellant had approached this Court
in Crl.A.No.1535/2021 seeking bail and the same was rejected
by order of this Court dated 01.07.2022 and being aggrieved
by the order passed by this Court, the appellant approached
the Hon'ble Apex Court in SLP (Crl.) No.7125/2022 and the
same was dismissed on 29.08.2023 with a direction to the
Special Court to complete the hearing and pass orders as
expeditiously as possible, preferably within four months from
the date of the order. Previously, the bail application of the
appellant was rejected by the Special Court on 09.09.2024 and
the same was not challenged before this Court or before the
Hon'ble Apex Court.
9. Considering the submissions made by both sides
and examining the material available on record, the point that
arises for consideration of this Court is:
(i) Whether the impugned order of rejection of
bail application suffers from any arbitrariness
NC: 2026:KHC:4947-DB
HC-KAR
or illegality warranting interference at the
hands of this Court?
10. Admittedly, the appellant/accused No.3 had filed
successive bail petition before the Special Court. It is trite law
that personal liberty cannot be taken away, except in
accordance with the procedure established by law. Personal
liberty is a constitutional guarantee. It is also trite law that the
person's bail application once rejected is not precluded from
filing a subsequent application for grant of bail, if there is a
change in the fact situation. At the same time, the issues
which have been canvassed earlier could not be permitted to be
re-agitated, as the same leads to speculation and uncertainty in
the administration of justice and they lead to forum hunting.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in various judgments has held that
successive bail applications are not barred per se, but they can
be entertained only if there is a demonstrable change in
circumstances since the rejection of the previous application.
11. In the instance case, the appellant has taken
several grounds amongst others and some grounds were urged
in the earlier application. Now, the learned counsel for the
- 10 -
NC: 2026:KHC:4947-DB
HC-KAR
appellant relied upon three grounds i.e., 1. delay in trial;
2. non-furnishing of grounds of arrest to the appellant and; 3.
health condition of the appellant.
12. Insofar as the delay in conducting the trial is
concerned, the Special Court has examined 13 witnesses at the
time of filing of this appeal and subsequently, the Special Court
recorded the evidence of two witnesses, as rightly submitted by
the learned counsel for the appellant. According to the learned
Special Public Prosecutor, the Special Court examined in all 19
witnesses as on date. It appears that the prosecution has
shown much progress in the matter and it was only on the
request of the accused persons, the framing of charge was
deferred from time to time. Though the Hon'ble Apex Court
directed to expedite the trial, but this was not brought to the
notice of the Special Court by the accused No.3/appellant.
Hence, the delay cannot be attributed to the prosecution and
the accused person shall not be permitted to take the benefit
from his own wrong doing as the prosecution has got examined
19 witnesses out of 60 witnesses and has shown substantial
progress in recording the evidence. The learned Special Public
- 11 -
NC: 2026:KHC:4947-DB
HC-KAR
Prosecutor vehemently contended that the prosecution has
always been ready and willing to conduct the trial on day-to-
day basis to ensure speedy disposal of the said case.
13. Secondly, the appellant has taken the contention
that the grounds of arrest was not furnished to the appellant,
thereby invalidating his arrest. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Pankaj Bansal (supra), has laid down the mandate of
furnishing of grounds of arrest and clarified that the
Investigating Officer shall be duty bound to furnish the grounds
of arrest "henceforth" i.e., from the date of said judgment i.e.,
03.10.2023". This aspect was also considered by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Ram Kishor Arora v. Directorate
of Enforcement reported in (2023) SCC Online SC 1682,
wherein, it was clarified that the requirement to furnish
grounds of arrest would only apply prospectively. Admittedly,
the appellant/accused No.3 in the present case was arrested on
07.10.2020 i.e., prior to the aforementioned decisions of the
Hon'ble Apex Court. The learned counsel for accused No. 3
further relies on the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Prabir Purkavastha vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in
- 12 -
NC: 2026:KHC:4947-DB
HC-KAR
(2024) 8 SCC 254, and Vihaan Kumar vs. State of
Haryana and another, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC
269.
14. In these decisions, the Hon'ble Apex Court has
unequivocally held that an arrested person has both a
fundamental and statutory right to be informed of the grounds
of arrest in writing, and that a copy of such written grounds
must be furnished to the arrestee as a matter of course and
without exception, at the earliest opportunity. Any violation of
this constitutional safeguard vitiates the process of arrest and
remand. The legal position enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the aforementioned cases is well-settled and not in
dispute. In the present case, as noted above, the Investigating
Officer orally informed accused No. 3 of the grounds of arrest
at the time of his apprehension. However, he failed to provide
the grounds of arrest in writing, thereby raising the issue of
non-compliance with the constitutional and statutory mandate.
15. The central issue for determination is "whether
accused No.3 is entitled to bail on the sole ground that the
grounds were not communicated in writing at the time of his
arrest, thereby constituting a violation of Article 22(1). In
- 13 -
NC: 2026:KHC:4947-DB
HC-KAR
response, the learned Special Public Prosecutor has relied on
Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, reported in (2024) 7 SCC
576, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in cases under
The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (for short,
'PMLA'), the grounds of arrest must be furnished in writing on
the date of the arrest. This principle was later extended to
cases under the U.A. (P) Act in Prabir Purkayastha as well.
16. Reference is also made to Ram Kishore Arora Vs.
Directorate of Enforcement (Criminal Appeal No.
3865/2023), where the Hon'ble Apex Court, at para 23,
clarified that the requirement to furnish written grounds of
arrest, as laid down in Pankaj Bansal, applies prospectively
from the date of the judgment, i.e., 03.10.2023. Since Accused
No. 3 was arrested on 07.10.2020, prior to this date, the non-
furnishing of written grounds of arrest does not render his
arrest illegal.
17. Paragraph 23 in Ram Kishore Arora (Supra) is
significant and reads as follows:
"23. As discernible from the judgment in Pankaj
Bansal Case also noticing the inconsistent practice being
followed by the officers arresting the persons under
Section 19 of PMLA, directed to furnish the grounds of
- 14 -
NC: 2026:KHC:4947-DB
HC-KAR
arrest in writing as a matter of course, "henceforth",
meaning thereby from the date of the pronouncement
of the judgment. The very use of the word "henceforth"
implied that the said requirement of furnishing grounds
of arrest in writing to the arrested person as soon as
after his arrest was not the mandatory or obligatory till
the date of the said judgment. The submission of the
learned Senior Counsel Mr. Singhavi for the Appellant
that the said judgment was required to be given effect
retrospectively cannot be accepted when the judgment
itself states that it would be necessary "henceforth" that
a copy of such written grounds of arrest is furnished to
the arrested person as a matter of course and without
exception. Hence non furnishing of grounds of arrest in
writing till the date of pronouncement of judgment in
Pankaj Bansal case could neither be held to be illegal
nor the action of the concerned officer in not furnishing
the same in writing could be faulted with. As such, the
action sufficient compliance of Section 19 of PMLA as
also Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, as held in
Vijay Madanlal (Supra)"
(emphasis supplied)
18. In this decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court clearly held
that in Pankaj Bansal's (Supra), the use of the word
"henceforth" signifies that the direction to furnish the grounds
of arrest in writing applies prospectively, from the date of the
judgment. Consequently, the failure to provide written grounds
of arrest prior to the pronouncement of the Pankaj Bansal
(Supra) judgment, cannot be deemed illegal, nor can the action
of the concerned officer be faulted on that ground. The Hon'ble
Apex Court further held that oral communication of the grounds
of arrest to the arrestee constitutes sufficient compliance with
- 15 -
NC: 2026:KHC:4947-DB
HC-KAR
Section 19 of the PMLA as well as Article 22(1) of the
Constitution of India. In the present case, accused No. 3 was
arrested prior to the pronouncement of the Pankaj Bansal
(Supra) judgment, and the grounds of arrest were duly
communicated to him at the time of his arrest. In light of the
above authoritative pronouncement, such oral communication
satisfies the constitutional requirement under Article 22(1) of
the Constitution of India. Therefore, the ratio laid down by the
Hon'ble Apex Court is squarely applicable to the facts of the
present case, and accused No.3 is not entitled to bail on this
ground. Such being the case, the aforementioned contention
of the learned counsel for the appellant/accused No.3 is
contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
Hence, in view of the same, the appellant cannot avail such
ground.
19. Insofar as third ground with regard to health
condition of the appellant is concerned, the appellant has not
furnished any documents with regard to the same. Hence, he is
not entitled for any relief under this ground also. However, this
Court can direct the Special Court to expedite the trial.
- 16 -
NC: 2026:KHC:4947-DB
HC-KAR
Considering the material available on record and the fact that
the Special Court has dealt with all the aspects of the material
in its order and has rightly rejected the bail application of the
appellant and the same does not require interference at the
hands of this Court.
20. Accordingly, we pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The Criminal Appeal is dismissed.
(ii) The Special Court is directed to expedite the
trial.
Pending applications, if any, stands dismissed.
Sd/-
(H.P.SANDESH)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VENKATESH NAIK T)
JUDGE
MD
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 16
