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Sri Doddagiriyappachari vs The Deputy Commissioner
2025 Latest Caselaw 8849 Kant

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 8849 Kant
Judgement Date : 26 September, 2025

Karnataka High Court

Sri Doddagiriyappachari vs The Deputy Commissioner on 26 September, 2025

Author: R Devdas
Bench: R Devdas
                          -1-


     IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

      DATED THIS THE 26TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025

                        BEFORE

          THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R. DEVDAS

        WRIT PETITION NO.14207 OF 2025 (SC-ST)


BETWEEN

SRI. DODDAGIRIYAPPACHARI
S/O. LATE GIRIYAPPACHARI,
AGED ABOUT 82 YEARS
R/OF KHAJI SONNENAHALLI VILLAGE,
KANNAMANGALA POST,
BIDARAHALLI HOBLI,
BENGALURU EAST TALUK,
BENGALURU-560067
REP. BY HIS POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER
SRI V. S. MANOJ,
S/O. SRI V. V. SADANANDA,
AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS
                                         ...PETITIONER

(BY SRI. MOHAMMED AKHIL, ADVOCATE)

AND

1.     THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
       BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT,
       KANDAYA BHAVAN, K.G.ROAD,
       BENGALURU-560009.

2.     THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
       BENGALURU NORTH SUB-DIVISION.
                          -2-


     KANDAYA BHAVAN, K.G.ROAD,
     BENGALURU-560009.

3.   SRI B.M.RAMESH
     S/O. LATE MUNISHAMAPPA
     AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
     R/OF BOMMANABANDI VILLAGE,
     KATTIGENAHALLI POST,
     JADIGENAHALLI HOBLI,
     HOSKOTE TALUK
     BENGALURU RURAL - 562114

4.   SRI M. HARISHA
     S/O. LATE MUNINARAYANAPPA
     AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS
     R/OF KHAJI SONNENAHALLI VILLAGE,
     BIDARAHALLI HOBLI,
     KANNAMANGALA POST,
     BENGALURU EAST TALUK,
     BENGALURU-560067.
                                        ...RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI. ARUNA G.S., HCGP, FOR R1 & R2;

SRI. GURDAS S KANNUR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. SHIVAKUMAR C., FOR RESPONDENT NO.3; SRI. Y. ESHWARAPPA, ADVOCATE FOR R4)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 22.04.2025 PASSED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1 IN APPEAL NO.PTCL/79/2024 PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-W AND THE ORDER DATED 27.09.2024 PASSED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2 IN CASE NO.PTCL (BET) 16/2024 PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-T, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND ETC.

THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON 02.09.2025 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, THIS DAY, THIS COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE R DEVDAS

CAV ORDER

(PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE R DEVDAS)

The petitioner is aggrieved of the impugned order at

Annexure-W dated 22.04.2025 passed by the respondent

No.1-Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District and

the order dated 27.09.2024 passed by respondent No.2-

Assistant Commissioner at Annexure-T.

2. The undisputed facts leading to the writ petition

are that Smt.Kenchamma and her son Sri Muninarayanappa

had earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the Assistant

Commissioner, under the provisions of the Karnataka

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of

Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, (hereinafter referred

to as 'the PTCL Act' for short) calling in question the sale

deed dated 25.10.1956, under which 3 acres 26 guntas of

land in Sy.No.143 of Khaji Sonnenahalli Village, Bidarahalli

Hobli, Bengaluru East Taluk, were sold by Smt.Kenchamma

and her son Sri Muninarayanappa, in favour of one Smt.

Basamma. The Assistant Commissioner allowed the

petition annulling the sale deed while directing resumption

and restoration of the lands in favour of the original grantee

or his legal heirs. The appeal filed by Smt.Basamma and

her daughters were dismissed by the Deputy Commissioner.

This Court in W.P.No.31871/2000, upheld the orders passed

by the authorities and accordingly, the lands were restored

in favour of the legal heirs of the original grantee.

3. It is contended by the petitioner that Sri

Muninarayanappa applied for and sought permission to sell

the lands, in terms of Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act, on

15.11.2005. It is contended by the petitioner that in terms

of the requirement of the Rules, viz., the Karnataka

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (PTCL) Rules, 1979

(hereinafter referred to as 'the PTCL Rules' for short) and

the conditions imposed by the Government while granting

permission, Sri Muninarayanappa purchased 2 acres 27

guntas of land as an alternative. Thereafter, permission

was granted to Sri Muninarayanappa vide Official

Memorandum dated 07.12.2005 permitting Sri

Muninarayanappa to sell the property in favour of

respondent No.3-Sri B.M.Ramesh. However, Sri

Muninarayanappa and his family members executed

registered General Power of Attorney dated 19.04.2006 in

favour of respondent No.3, permitting him to alienate 1

acre 36 guntas in Sy.No.143, and accordingly, respondent

No.3, representing Sri Muninarayanappa and his family

members, sold the property in favour of the petitioner,

under registered sale deed dated 21.04.2006.

Nevertheless, after the death of Sri Muninarayanappa, his

legal heirs and family members executed a Deed of

Confirmation, confirming the sale made in favour of the

petitioner herein. The Deed of Confirmation was registered

on 20.08.2015, in the office of the Sub-registrar,

Shivajinagar (Bidarahalli), Bengaluru.

4. The petitioner being the absolute owner of the

lands in question executed a registered agreement of sale

and also General Power Attorney in favour of one Sri

V.S.Manoj. The 4th respondent Sri M.Harisha, S/o Late

Muninarayanappa filed a petition before the Assistant

Commissioner, invoking Section 5 of the PTCL Act, to annul

the Sale Deed dated 21.04.2006. The Assistant

Commissioner allowed the petition, while declaring the Sale

Deed dated 21.04.2006 null and void and directed

resumption and restoration of the lands in favour of the

original grantee or his legal heirs. The Special Deputy

Commissioner, before whom the appeal was filed by the

petitioner, dismissed the appeal upholding the order passed

by the Assistant Commissioner.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that

the sale could not have been annulled when admittedly

prior sanction was granted by the State Government, in

terms of Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act. Secondly, delay of

more than 18 years was not explained and having regard to

the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case

of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi Vs. State of Karnataka And

Another (2020) 14 SCC 232 and Sri Vivek M Hinduja

And Others Vs. M.Ashwatha And Others (2020) 14

SCC 228, although no period of limitation is prescribed in

the Act for filing a petition, nevertheless, the petition has to

be filed within reasonable period.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would also

place reliance on a recent decision of a Co-ordinate bench

of this Court in the case of Smt. Rudramma and others

Vs. State of Karnataka and others, in

W.P.No.29559/2018 dated 09.04.2025, where it is

held that the provision contained in Section 4 of the Act are

attracted only when the granted lands have been

transferred for the first time in contravention of the terms

of the grant and it does not contemplate to govern the

transfer made after the lands have been resumed and

restored to the grantee under the Act. It is held that the

intent of law is thus manifestly clear, that it is designed to

undo a wrong by declaring the alienation void and restore

the land to the grantee so that he can utilize the land for

the purpose that it is granted. While framing the question,

"Whether these provisions could be invoked for a second

time after the lands have been resumed and restored to the

grantee?", the Co-ordinate bench held that the provisions of

the PTCL Act were not meant to grant a licence to grantees

to sell the lands that were resumed in their favour and once

again seek restoration. It was held that a grantee cannot

abuse a remedial statute to perpetuate an illegality and, at

the same time, secure a process which legitimizes his illegal

act repeatedly. The Co-ordinate bench also noticed a

decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of

Bhadre Gowda Vs. Deputy Commissioner - (2012) 2

KCCR 1529, where it was held, "we are satisfied that

repeated sales at the hands of the original grantee

constitutes the offence of cheating under Section 420 of the

Penal Code, 1860. A person who cheats is definitely not

entitled to seek restoration of the granted land and retain

the consideration received by him by sale thereof.............. It

also needs to be recorded here, that when a grantee

repeatedly sells the granted land, it is open to the vendee

to initiate criminal prosecution against him. Such repeated

sale is nothing but a process of cheating." Thus, the Co-

ordinate Bench has proceeded to hold that on a plain

reading of Section 4, it cannot be in doubt that an

alienation made in contravention of the terms of the grant

or under a transfer in violation of Section 4(2) would be null

and void. However, it was also held that Section 4 only

contemplated that a transfer made for the first time alone

was required to be annulled and it did not contemplate

subsequent alienations made by a grantee after the lands

were restored in his favour.

7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further

submitted that after the impugned orders are passed by the

Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner,

respondent No.4 has entered into an agreement with

respondent No.3, agreeing to sell the lands in question.

This shows that respondents No.3 and 4, in collusion with

each other are trying to defraud the petitioner and are

defrauding the Government, while misusing the provisions

of the beneficial legislation. Respondent No.4 has further

entered into an agreement with another Multinational

Company, trying to make a windfall at the cost of the

petitioner. It is submitted that the conduct of respondents

No.3 and 4 should be taken into consideration, as held in

the case of Bhadre Gowda (supra).

8. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel Sri.Gurudas

S.Kannur, appearing for respondent No.4 submitted that

the petitioner, knowing fully well that sanction has been

accorded by the State Government on 15.11.2005, at

Annexure-H permitting Sri Muninarayanappa S/o

T.Poojappa to sell the property in question in favour of

respondent No.3-Sri.B.M.Ramesh on certain conditions that

the purchaser should be eligible to purchase the land under

the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act; that the

applicant should sell the lands as per the prevailing market

value; that the applicant shall purchase agricultural lands

from the sale proceeds received from the transaction,

nevertheless, the petitioner proceeded to purchase the

property from respondent No.3. It is submitted that the

petitioner cannot make allegations against respondent

No.4, since the petitioner willfully purchased the lands from

respondent No.3 who was not the owner of the property

and he was not the person who was permitted to sell the

property. Moreover, the permission granted by the State

Government enabled sale by respondent No.4 in favour

respondent No.3 only. The conduct of the petitioner should

fall under a scanner and not the conduct of respondent

No.4.

9. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that since

respondent No.4 did not sell the property in favour of the

petitioner herein, the cause of action to invoke the

provisions of the PTCL Act did not commence from the date

of the sale deed or the registration of the same. The cause

of action, at the most, may begin to run from the date of

execution of the Deed of Confirmation dated 20.08.2015

and the second Deed of Confirmation dated 24.08.2015.

The application under Section 5 was filed before the

Assistant Commissioner on 08.02.2024, after delay of about

8 years and 05 months. It is submitted that in the case of

Satyan Vs. Deputy Commissioner and others (2020)

14 SCC 210 the Apex Court has held that a period of 8

years cannot be said to be such, as to amount to such delay

and laches as would make the action void, considering that

it is in respect of beneficial legislation for the Scheduled

Castes and Scheduled Tribes community.

10. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that this Court

in the case of A K Chikkaveerappa and Others Vs. The

Assistant Commissioner and Others reported in 2022

(3) KCCR 2022 has held as follows:

"8. As noticed in the beginning, this case presents another bleak picture of the manner in which the officials of the Revenue Department have been ignoring the guidelines issued by the State Government while considering an application seeking prior permission of the State Government in terms of Section 4(2) of the Act. This Court has been repeatedly bringing it to the notice of the State Government that while considering an application under Section 4(2) of the Act, persons claiming to be holders of Powers of Attorney should not be entertained by the State Government. The very purpose for which provisions are made under the Act, the Rules and the Circulars issued by the State Government in the matter of considering of an application under Section 4(2) of the Act is to ensure that the persons belonging to the depressed classes are not taken for a ride. This avowed objective of the

statute is keeping in mind the poverty, illiteracy and innocence of such persons who have been granted with lands so that they cultivate the lands and eke out a living and stand shoulder to shoulder with other persons in the Society. This Court has come across numerous such instances where applications are made by third parties claiming to be the holders of Powers of Attorney, while the gullible grantees are kept in dark not only about the restrictions placed in the statute in the matter of transacting with such granted lands, but also provision being made to ensure that proper market value is paid by the purchasers to such grantees. It is in this regard that certain conditions are imposed while granting prior permission. One such conditions is that the grantee who is disposing of the agricultural lands, shall purchase an alternative agricultural land in order to maintain himself and his family. Conditions are also imposed that the prevailing market value shall be paid to the grantee. It is in order to ensure that these conditions are fulfilled, the authorities are required to find out from the original grantee as to whether he intends to sell the property; to whom he is selling the property and what is the sale consideration. After ascertaining all these aspects, the authorities are required to accord permission.

9. It is found that in many such instances, persons claiming to be Powers of Attorney of the original grantee approach the State Government and the persons manning the Department are not adhering to the guidelines issued by the State Government. As seen in the present case, a General Power of attorney is got registered at the hands of the original grantee. In the considered opinion of this Court, execution of a general Power of Attorney granting powers to deal with the property and sell the property is equally hit by the provisions of the Act..."

(emphasis supplied)

And further, in paragraphs No.11 and 12 it was held

as follows:

"11. Going by the letter and spirit of the provision, this Court does not hesitate to hold that if such Powers of Attorney are permitted to be executed by the grantees empowering the Attorney to deal with the granted land, it will pave way to defraud gullible grantees. The present case is one such example. A look at the sale deed dated 13.04.2006 evidences the fact that no sale consideration is passed on to the original grantee and obviously the registered General Power of Attorney dated 07.04.2005 is not coupled

with interest. The words 'or enter into any other transaction' used in the provision would encompass Power of Attorney also. The law prohibits the grantee from transferring and any person from acquiring granted land, without the previous permission of the Government. This Court has come across several such instances where gullible grantees are tricked into executing Powers of Attorney on the premise that the Attorney will secure the permission from the State Government.

12. In that view of the matter, it is trite to hold that the Power of attorney registered by the original grantee in favour of the 5th respondent is hit by the provisions of the Act. Section 4(2) would definitely apply even in a case of Power of attorney, since the instrument seeks to grant power in favour of the attorney to sell the property in favour of any other person. In the considered opinion of this Court, such execution of powers of attorney granting powers to dispose of the property or to approach the State Government seeking prior permission under Section 4(2) of the Act, is also not permissible."

(emphasis supplied)

11. Consequently, it was held that when permission

was accorded by the State Government to Sri.A K

Chikkaveerappa to sell the lands in favour of

Sri.Munianjanappa, a sale deed could not have been

executed at the hands of the Power of Attorney holder in

favour of respondent No.4, contrary to permission accorded

by the State Government. Learned Senior Counsel submits

that the situation is exactly the same in the present case.

This Court held that under such circumstances, where a

sale deed was executed by a Power of Attorney holder

being without authority of law and in contravention of

permission accorded by the State Government, the same is

required to be held as null and void. It is submitted that

the said judgment of this Court in the case of A K

Chikkaveerpappa has been confirmed at the hands of the

Hon'ble Division Bench in W.A.No.1402/2021 dated

21.01.2025. The Hon'ble Division Bench has held that the

contentions raised by the appellants therein that appellant

No.1 had purchased the property for due consideration and

that he had acted on the permission granted by the State

Government cannot make a difference to the factual

situation as available in the instant case. It was held that

the permission clearly has to be specific with regard to the

person selling the property as also buying the same. The

transferee as well as the transferor have to be specific in

the order of permission. It was held that if such permission

is not granted, same would not be valid.

12. Learned Senior Counsel would also submit that

the sale deed dated 21.11.2005 under which Sri

Muninarayanappa purchased 2 Acres 27 Guntas of land in

Sy.No.29/3 of Sonnawadi village, Kasaba Hobli, Mulabagilu

Taluk, Kolar District, has nothing to do with the petitioner

or respondent No.3. The sale consideration in the said sale

deed is Rs.1,90,000/- and whereas the sale consideration in

the sale deed dated 21.04.2006 executed by respondent

No.3 in favour of the petitioner herein is Rs.19,00,000/-

and no part of the sale consideration is given to respondent

No.4 or his family members. This clearly shows that the

petitioner herein, knowing fully well that permission is

accorded by the State Government to respondent No.4 to

sell the property in favour of respondent No.3, the

petitioner has ignored the same and transacted with

respondent No.3 and has paid no part of the sale

consideration to respondent No.4 or his family members.

Learned Senior Counsel therefore submits that the

petitioner cannot make allegations against respondent No.4

or cast aspersions on respondent No.4.

13. Insofar as the judgment relied upon by the

learned Counsel petitioner in the case of Smt.Rudramma

(supra), learned Senior Counsel Sri.Gurudas S. Kannur,

submitted that a plain reading of the provisions contained in

Section 5 of the PTCL Act, does not give any impression

that the provisions are attracted only in respect of one

transaction or that the provisions are not attracted in

respect of a second transaction or subsequent transactions.

It is submitted that Section 4 of the Act, does not prescribe

that once granted lands are resumed and restored in favour

of the original grantee or his/her legal heirs, there is no

need to obtain permission at the hands of the State

Government. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the said

judgment is contrary to the express provisions of the Act

and the Rules.

14. Even otherwise, it is submitted that the petitioner

has proceeded to purchase the property on the strength of

the sanction accorded by the State Government. In that

view of the matter, learned Senior Counsel submits that the

petitioner is blowing hot and cold, if on the one hand, he is

contending that in terms of the judgment in the case of

Smt.Rudramma, there is no need for a grantee or his legal

heirs to obtain prior sanction of the Government for a

subsequent sale since the property has been resumed and

restored under the provisions of the PTCL Act in terms of

the previous proceedings and on the other hand, the

petitioner is contending that he has purchased the lands

after obtaining permission from the Government.

15. Heard learned Counsel Sri.Mohammed Akil, for

the petitioner, learned Counsel Sri.C.Shivashankar for

respondent No.3, learned Senior Counsel Sri.Gurudas S.

Kannur for respondent No.4 and learned High Court

Government Pleader for respondents No.1 and 2 and

perused the petition papers.

16. It remains undisputed that an application was

filed in the name of Sri.Muninarayanappa, on 15.11.2005

seeking permission from the Government in terms of

Section 4(2) of the Act. Official Memorandum was issued on

07.12.2005 permitting Sri Muninarayanappa to sell the

property in favour of Sri B.M.Ramesh, respondent No.3

herein. However, a General Power of Attorney dated

19.04.2006 is executed by Sri Muninarayanappa, his wife

Smt.Gowramma and their children, minors represented by

their father Sri Muninarayanappa empowering the third

respondent Sri B.M.Ramesh to sell the property and receive

sale consideration on behalf of the executants therein. It is

noticeable that there is a mention of the Official

Memorandum dated 07.12.2005 stating that prior

permission has been obtained from the Government. No

sale consideration is shown to have been passed to the

executants. The General Power of Attorney is registered in

the office of the Sub-Registrar, K.R.Puram on 19.04.2006.

On 21.04.2006 the third respondent executes a sale deed in

favour of the petitioner herein on the strength of the

registered Power of Attorney. It is stated in the sale deed

that the entire sale consideration of Rs.19,00,000/- is paid

by the petitioner to the third respondent, by cash.

17. It is under similar such circumstances that this

Court held in the case of A.K.Chikkaveerappa (supra) that

this Court has come across numerous such instances where

applications are filed by third parties claiming to be holders

of Power of Attorney, seeking permission at the hands of

the Government, while the gullible grantees are kept in

dark not only about the restrictions placed in the statute in

the matter of transacting with such granted lands, but also

provision being made to ensure that proper market value is

paid by the purchasers to such grantees. In this case,

although it is not clear as to whether the third respondent

got the permission from the Government in the name of Sri

Muninarayanappa, however, it is clear that in violation of

the terms of sanction granted by the Government, the third

respondent got a General Power of Attorney executed in the

place of a sale deed. No sale consideration is passed on to

Sri Muninarayanappa or his legal heirs.

18. However, learned Counsel for the petitioner

sought to place reliance on Sri A.K.Chikkaveerappa

(supra) where this Court having regard to the definition of

the word 'transfer' in Section 3(1)(e) of the Act held that

execution of a General Power of Attorney granting powers

to deal with the property and sell the property would

amount to transfer. Even if that argument is accepted,

nevertheless there is utter violation of the conditions

imposed in the sanction accorded by the Government. One

of the conditions imposed on the purchaser viz., Sri

B.M.Ramesh, respondent No.3 is that he shall pay the

market value to Sri Muninarayanappa. The other condition

is that out of the sale proceeds, Sri Muninarayanappa is

required to purchase another piece of agricultural land, as

an alternative for his livelihood.

19. Regarding the contention of the petitioner that

there is compliance of the conditions imposed in the

permission granted by the Government inasmuch as Sri

Muninarayanappa purchased alternative lands under sale

deed dated 21.11.2005, and having regard to the

chronology of events, where permission was granted by the

Government on 07.12.2005, it cannot be contended by the

petitioner or respondent No.3 that Sri Muninarayanappa

purchased the lands from out of the sale proceeds flowing

from the sale deed dated 21.04.2006 or that Sri

Muninarayanappa, purchased the lands from any advance

amount paid by the petitioner or respondent No.3. Neither

the registered Power of Attorney dated 19.04.2006 nor the

registered sale deed dated 21.04.2006 mention any such

transaction or payment made to Sri Muninarayanappa.

Therefore, such a contention raised by the learned Counsel

for the petitioner that Sri Muninarayanappa purchased the

lands under sale deed dated 21.11.2005 from out of the

sale proceeds of the lands in question, cannot be accepted.

20. The third respondent and the petitioner herein

have violated the conditions imposed in the sanction

accorded by the Government inasmuch as the third

respondent not purchasing the property from Sri

Muninarayanappa. The petitioner too is guilty of violating

the express conditions imposed by the Government. The

learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.4 is right, while

pointing out to the decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench

in W.A.No.1402/2021, where it was held as follows:

"9. In the above factual situation, we are of the opinion that the contentions raised by the appellants that appellant No.1 had purchased the property for due consideration and that he had acted on the permission granted by the State government cannot make a difference to the factual situation as available in the instant case.

10. There is a clear bar as to transfer and acquisition of granted land without prior permission of the State government. The prior permission clearly has to be specific with regard to the person selling the property as also buying the same. The transferee as well as the transferor have to be specific in the order of permission. If such permission is not granted, same would not be valid."

(emphasis supplied)

21. In the above analysis, this Court does not find any

infirmity in the impugned orders passed by the Assistant

Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy

Commissioner has placed reliance on the decision of this

Court in the case of A.K.Chikkaveerappa (supra) where it

was held that when permission was accorded by the State

Government to Sri A.K.Chikkaveerappa to sell the

properties in favour of Sri Munianjanappa, a sale deed could

not have been executed at the hands of the Power of

Attorney holder to a third party.

22. The learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.4

is also right in his submission that since admittedly Sri

Muninarayanappa or his legal heirs did not execute the sale

deed in favour of respondent No.3 or the petitioner herein,

the cause of action for filing an application under Section 5

of the PTCL Act, did not arise from the date of the sale

deed. At best, it can be said that the cause of action arose

for respondent No.4 to move the Assistant Commissioner

when he along with his family members executed the Deeds

of Confirmation i.e., on 20.08.2015 and/or 24.08.2015. It

is necessary to notice that Article 59 of the Limitation Act,

1963, prescribes three years for cancellation or setting

aside an instrument and the time from which period begins

to run is when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the

instrument cancelled or set aside 'first became known to

him'.

23. The delay from the date of the Deeds of

Confirmation may be around 8 years 5 months or less than

8 years. The learned Senior Counsel is right while

submitting that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of

Satyan (supra) has held that delay of 8 years is not so

enormous, having regard to the objective of the beneficial

legislation. In fact, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that

the law of limitation does not apply to the Act.

24. Nevertheless, since the learned Counsel for the

petitioner sought to place reliance on a decision rendered

by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of

Smt.Rudramma (supra) to contend that if a grantee or his

legal heirs, on getting the lands resumed and restored in

their favour, once again choose to sell the lands that are

restored to them, then, they would not be entitled to invoke

the provisions of the PTCL Act, for the second time and

seek resumption and restoration, this Court is required to

deal with such contention. For that purpose, it would be

relevant to notice the provisions contained in Sections 4

and 5 of the PTCL Act, which read as follows:

4. Prohibition of transfer of granted lands.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement, contract or instrument, any transfer of granted land made either before or after the commencement of this Act, in contravention of the terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant, or sub-

section (2) shall be null and void and no right, title or interest in such land shall be conveyed or be deemed ever to have conveyed by such transfer.

(2) No person shall, after the commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land without the previous permission of the Government. (3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to the sale of any land in execution of a decree or order of a civil court or of any award or order of any other authority.

(emphasis supplied)

5. Resumption and restitution of granted lands.- (1) Where, on application by any interested person or

on information given in writing by any person or suo- motu, and after such enquiry as he deems necessary, the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that the transfer of any granted land is null and void under sub-section (1) of section 4, he may,-

(a) by order take possession of such land after evicting all persons in possession thereof in such manner as may be prescribed:

Provided that no such order shall be made except after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard;

(b) restore such land to the original grantee or his legal heir. Where it is not reasonably practicable to restore the land to such grantee or legal heir; such land shall be deemed to have vested in the Government free form all encumbrances. The Government may grant such land to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the rules relating to grant of land.

[(1A) After an enquiry referred to in sub-section (1) the Assistant Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that transfer of any granted land is not null and void pass an order accordingly.]

(2) [Subject to the orders of the Deputy Commissioner under section 5A, any order passed] under [sub-section (1) and (1-A)] shall be final and shall not be questioned in any court of law and no injunction shall be granted by any court in respect of any proceeding taken or about to be taken by the Assistant Commissioner in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.

(3) For the purposes of this section, where any granted land is in the possession of a person, other then the original grantee or his legal heir, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such person has acquired the land by a transfer which is null and void under the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 4.

25. On a plain reading of the said provisions, this

Court finds no such restriction, that an application invoking

the provisions of the PTCL Act is prohibited if granted lands

are transferred after they are resumed and restored in

favour of the grantee or his legal heirs in an earlier round of

litigation under the provisions of the Act. A larger Bench of

the Apex Court, in the case of D.R.Venkatachalam and

Others Vs. Dy. Transport Commissioner and Others

(1977) 2 SCC 273 held as follows:

"If we start from a theory as to what the real purpose or need is or could be, the danger is that we may be injecting a subjective notion or purpose of our own into what is, after all, a legal question of construction or interpretation, according to well recognised principles, although it may be necessary, in exceptional eases, to explain or fortify the interpretation adopted in the light of so well understood and well known a purpose or theory that we could take judicial notice of it and refer to it. The exposition of the well known purpose or theoretical foundation must, however, generally, flow from and explain an interpretation adopted, on the strength of legally acceptable and accepted canons of construction, if we are to avoid the danger of an a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on our own pre-conceived notions of an ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somehow fitted. The path of judicial certainty and predictability has to be paved with well settled principles of construction and interpretation."

(emphasis supplied)

26. In Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit And Others

Vs. State of Maharashtra And Others (2001) 4 SCC

534 the Apex Court has held that an Ordinance, if does not

infringe the constitutional safeguards, it cannot be

examined nor can the motive for such a promulgation be in

question. Courts cannot interfere with the legislative malice

in passing a statute. Interference is restrictive in nature

and that too on the constitutionality aspect and not beyond

the same. Legislative malice is beyond the pale of

jurisdiction of the law courts and since there is no

constitutional invalidity nor the same been contended

before the Court, question of interference does not arise. It

was reiterated that,

"It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is

that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the law giver. The Courts have adhered to the principle that efforts should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute."

(emphasis supplied)

27. In Sangeeta Singh Vs. Union of India and

Others (2005) 7 SCC 484 it was held as follows:

"Two principles of construction one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a

casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in some cases of strong necessity."

(emphasis supplied)

28. In that view of the matter, this Court is unable to

agree with the opinion of the co-ordinate Bench. A plain

reading of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act, do not in any way

suggest that a grantee or his legal heirs are barred from

invoking the provisions of the Act alleging violation of the

conditions of grant or violation of Section 4(2) of the Act

which mandates prior permission of the Government for

sale of granted lands in favour of Scheduled Caste and

Scheduled Tribe persons, after the commencement of the

Act i.e., 01.01.1979. Such an opinion will also have a

bearing on the express provisions contained in Section 4(2)

of the PTCL Act, which mandates prior permission for sale.

29. For the reasons stated above, this Court is of the

considered opinion that the writ petition lacks merit. The

writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

30. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand

disposed of.

Sd/-

(R.DEVDAS) JUDGE

KLY/DL/JT CT:JL

 
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