Karnataka High Court
Karnataka Lokayuktha vs The State Of Karnataka on 24 September, 2025
Author: S.G.Pandit
Bench: S.G.Pandit
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WP No.38939 of 2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND
WRIT PETITION No.38939/2018 (S-KSAT)
BETWEEN:
1. KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR,
M.S.BUILDINGS, DR. B.R.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BANGALORE-560001.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
Digitally signed REVENUE DEPARTMENT,
by VALLI
MARIMUTHU M.S.BUILDING,
Location: HIGH BANGALORE-1.
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
2. SRI.K.M. MANJUNATH,
S/O SRI SHADAKSHARI,
AGED ABOUT 12 YEARS,
VILLAGE ACCOUNTANT,
YEMMIGANURU VILLAGE,
BELLARY DISTRICT.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. B. SUKANYA BALIGA, AGA FOR R1;
SRI M. MADHUSUDHAN, ADVOCATE FO R2)
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WP No.38939 of 2018
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER
DATED 10.5.2018 PASSED BY THE KARNATAKA STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL AT BANGALORE IN APPLICATION
No.2851/2017 AT ANNEXURE-A;
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 03.09.2025, THIS DAY
K. V. ARAVIND J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND
C.A.V. ORDER
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND)
The Registrar, Karnataka Lokayukta, has approached this
Court assailing the order dated 10.05.2018 passed by the
Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal, Bengaluru, in
Application No.2851/2017, whereby the Tribunal set aside the
order dated 11.05.2017 (Annexure-A17) imposing the penalty
of compulsory retirement and directed reinstatement of the
respondent with consequential benefits of seniority, but without
arrears of salary.
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2. Brief facts are that, a complaint was lodged against
respondent No.2, while serving as Village Accountant,
Kallukamba Circle, Bellary Taluk, alleging that on 05.05.2009
he demanded and accepted a bribe of Rs.4,600/- for effecting
change of katha, conducting a mahazar, and thereafter
forwarding the same to the Revenue Inspector in respect of
land measuring 2 acres 2 guntas in Survey No.64/C1 of
Kallukambha village, Bellary Taluk and District.
2.1 On receipt of the complaint, a case was registered
in Special Case No.66/2010 for the offences punishable under
Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Charges were framed
against respondent No.2 for the said offences. Upon conclusion
of the trial, the Special Court held that the prosecution had
failed to prove the charges levelled against respondent No.2
and consequently acquitted him of the said offences.
2.2 In the meantime, a departmental enquiry was
initiated against respondent No.2 by appointing an Enquiry
Officer. The Enquiry Officer, after recording the evidence of
witnesses and considering the documents on record, submitted
a report holding the charge as proved. Based on the said
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report, the petitioner-Institution recommended the penalty of
compulsory retirement. A show-cause notice was issued to
respondent No.2, and upon consideration of his reply,
respondent No.1 passed an order imposing the penalty of
compulsory retirement from service. The said order was the
subject matter of challenge before the Tribunal.
2.3 The Tribunal, having observed that the complainant
had not supported the charge in the departmental enquiry and
that the allegation of illegal gratification was therefore not
established, proceeded to modify the penalty of compulsory
retirement to one of reduction of salary to the minimum of the
pay scale of Village Accountant for a period of three years, with
a direction to reinstate the applicant with continuity of service
and seniority, but without arrears of salary.
3. Sri Venkatesh S. Arbatti, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner, submits that, the degree of proof required in
departmental proceedings and criminal prosecution is different.
While departmental proceedings require proof on the
preponderance of probabilities, criminal prosecution demands
proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that
acquittal in a criminal case does not constitute a ground for
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exoneration in departmental proceedings. Both proceedings are
distinct and are to be assessed independently on the evidence
available. In this context, it is contended that once the charge
is held to be proved, the Tribunal cannot substitute the
punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. At most, the
Tribunal can examine the decision-making process, but not the
decision itself.
4. Learned counsel further submits that respondent
No.2, having accepted the order of the Tribunal holding that the
charge is proved and the penalty imposed, cannot now contest
the matter on merits. It is submitted that where a charge of
corruption is established against a delinquent, the prescribed
punishment is dismissal and not a lesser penalty. It is
contended that the Tribunal erroneously relied solely on the
evidence of PW.1 to conclude that the complainant had not
supported the disciplinary authority, while failing to consider
the evidence of PWs.2 and 3, the shadow witness and the
Investigation Officer. Learned counsel further submits that
even if the complainant is hostile, such hostility, when
corroborated by other evidence, is immaterial to the case of the
disciplinary authority.
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5. Sri M. Madhusudhan, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.2, submits that the Government has not
challenged the order of the Tribunal modifying the punishment.
It is submitted that the Tribunal's order has been given effect
to and respondent No.2 has been reinstated. Learned counsel
further contends that at this stage, it is not permissible to
reverse the findings of the Tribunal. It is also submitted that
the petitioner, being merely the Enquiry Authority, cannot
assail the Tribunal's order modifying the penalty imposed,
particularly when the Disciplinary Authority itself has not
challenged the same. Learned counsel additionally made
submissions on the merits, seeking to contend that the
Tribunal's finding on guilt is not justifiable. At this stage, this
Court notes that such a challenge to the Tribunal's finding has
not been raised by respondent No.2.
6. Smt B. Sukanya Baliga, learned Additional
Government Advocate appearing for respondent No.1, submits
that the reinstatement of respondent No.2 was subject to the
outcome of the present writ petition. Accordingly, it is
contended that the reinstatement has no bearing on the
determination of the present petition.
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7. We have given due and thoughtful consideration to
the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the
parties, as well as to the material on record.
8. It is pertinent to note that there are two distinct
proceedings with separate evidence. One set of findings
emanates from the Enquiry Officer, who examined witnesses
and considered the relevant documents in the departmental
enquiry. The other set of findings arises from the criminal
Court, which adjudicated the matter based on the charge-sheet
filed by the Lokayukta Police, taking into account the testimony
of witnesses and documentary evidence. Learned counsel for
respondent No.2 contends that the acquittal in the criminal
proceedings constitutes an honourable acquittal, rendered after
consideration of the merits, and therefore, the findings of the
trial Court are relevant for the purposes of the departmental
enquiry.
9. The order of the trial Court in Special Case
No.66/2010 forms part of the record. It is observed that the
trial Court recorded the evidence of 11 witnesses and marked
36 documents. Noting the hostility of the complainant, and the
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probability that neither a bribe was demanded nor accepted,
the trial Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish
the charges leveled against the accused. Consequently, the
Court acquitted the accused of the charged offences.
10. The enquiry report of the Lokayukta is based on the
statements of 4 oral witnesses, 3 supporting the prosecution
and 1 in favour of the defence and the marking of 13
documents by the prosecution and 5 documents by the
defence. The Enquiry Officer, after noting that PW.1, the
complainant, had not supported the case of the Disciplinary
Authority, and upon considering the evidence of PW.2, held
that the Disciplinary Authority had established that respondent
No.2 demanded Rs.4,600/- from PW.1 and received the said
amount as a bribe, thereby committing misconduct under Rules
3(1)(i) to (iii) of the Karnataka Civil Service (Conduct) Rules,
1966.
11. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 made
submissions challenging the correctness of the finding recorded
by the Enquiry Officer and the Tribunal insofar as the charge
against him was held to be proved. It is noted that respondent
No.2 has not assailed the Tribunal's finding confirming the
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Enquiry Officer's conclusion, and the Tribunal interfered only
with the quantum of punishment. In that view, this Court is not
inclined to entertain submissions relating to the merits of the
finding regarding the proved charge.
12. The Tribunal appears to have been influenced by its
observation that PW.1, the complainant, did not support the
prosecution's case. However, PW.2, the shadow witness, gave a
detailed account of the incident and was extensively cross-
examined by counsel for respondent No.2. Despite the
suggestions and cross-examination, the testimony of PW.2
remained unshaken and establishes the demand and
acceptance of a bribe by respondent No.2. The other evidence
on record corroborates PW.2's testimony. The cash seized from
respondent No.2 remained unexplained, and its denominations
correspond with the evidence on record. PW.3, the
Investigation Officer, also provided a comprehensive account
from the receipt of the complaint, conducting the trap, to filing
the charge-sheet, and his evidence was not contradicted on
cross-examination. The defence evidence offers no support to
respondent No.2. Considering the above, the Enquiry Officer
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rightly concluded that the charge against respondent No.2 is
proved.
13. It is now for this Court to examine how the Tribunal
has considered the evidence while passing the impugned order.
The Tribunal, after setting out the factual aspects, noted that
the Principal Sessions Judge, Bellary, after examining 11
witnesses and 36 documents, acquitted respondent No.2. The
Tribunal further recorded that, in the departmental enquiry, the
complainant had not supported the charge. The Tribunal
referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.
Bhaskar Reddy v. Superintendent of Police ([2015] 2 SCC
365) and also to its own decision in T. R. Ramesh v. State
and Others (Application No.7773/2015 dated
26.09.2016), wherein it set aside an order of dismissal and
imposed the penalty of reduction of salary to the minimum of
the pay scale of the post for a period of three years. Referring
further to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari ([2017] 2 SCC
308), the Tribunal held that a writ Court must be slow to
interfere with findings of fact recorded by a departmental
authority based on evidence. Interference is justified only if the
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findings are unsupported by evidence, or if no reasonable
person could have arrived at the same conclusion. The Tribunal
further observed that interference is permissible where the
enquiry is vitiated in violation of principles of natural justice, or
where the authority has not applied its mind or failed to assign
reasons for its conclusion, in which case the writ Court can
examine the order of punishment.
14. The Tribunal, thereafter, without discussing the
effect of the acquittal in the criminal case, without applying the
principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
judgments referred to above, and without examining the
applicability of its earlier decision in T. R. Ramesh (supra),
proceeded to set aside the penalty of compulsory retirement
and imposed the penalty of reduction of salary to the minimum
of the pay scale of Village Accountant for a period of three
years.
15. We note that the Tribunal, while correctly recording
the binding principles of law, failed to apply the same to the
facts of the case. We agree with the Tribunal's observation that
a writ Court must be slow to interfere with findings of fact
recorded by a departmental authority based on evidence,
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except where the enquiry is vitiated due to non-application of
mind or is short of reasons. In the present case, none of these
exceptions are discernible to justify modification of the penalty.
The Tribunal itself has failed to identify any such exception
before proceeding to modify the penalty.
16. This Court, in W.P. No.1647/2020 dated
01.10.2024, in State of Karnataka and Others v. Smt. H.S.
Kanthi, held as follows:
"10. The vital question in the present writ petition is
whether the Tribunal is justified in substituting punishment
of dismissal by compulsory retirement for a proved
misconduct of accepting illegal gratification or bribe. The
Hon'ble Apex Court in MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE,
BAHADURGARH v/s KRISHNAN BEHARI reported in (1996)
2 SCC 714 has held that in cases involving corruption, there
cannot be any other punishment than dismissal. Further, it
observed that any sympathy shown in such cases is totally
uncalled for and opposed to public interest. It also
observed that the amount misappropriated may be small or
large, it is the act of misappropriation that is relevant.
Relevant paragraph 4 of the said judgment reads as follows:
"4. It is obvious that the respondent has
been convicted of a serious crime and it is a clear
case attracting under proviso (a) to Article 311(2)
of the Constitution. In a case of such nature -
indeed, in cases involving corruption - there cannot
be any other punishment than dismissal. Any
sympathy shown in such cases is totally uncalled
for and opposed to public interest. The amount
misappropriated may be small or large; it is the act
of misappropriate that is relevant. The Director
had interfered with the punishment under a total
misapprehension of the relevant factors to be borne
in mind in such a case."
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11. As observed above, imposing punishment on
proved charge vests with the Disciplinary Authority taking
note of the nature and seriousness of the charge. It is for
the Disciplinary Authority to impose appropriate
punishment. In the instant case, since the charge of
receiving illegal gratification/bribe is proved, the
Disciplinary Authority was justified in imposing
punishment of dismissal.
12. The Tribunal is not justified in substituting
punishment of dismissal to that of compulsory retirement
by observing that lenient view is to be taken, following
the judgment in GYAN CHAND CHATTAR (supra) and
also observing that the applicant being a Lady having put
in only 11 years and 8 months of service, she would put
to great hardship and inconvenience. In GYAN CHAND
CHATTAR case, the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph 21
held that a serious charge of corruption requires to be
proved beyond any shadow of doubt and to the hilt and it
cannot be proved on mere probabilities. But
subsequently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in STATE OF
KARNATKA AND ANOTHER v/s UMESH reported in
(2022) 6 SCC 563 has clarified that observations in
paragraph 21 of GYAN CHAND CHATTAR case are not
the ratio decidendi of the case and those observations
were made while discussing the judgment of the High
Court. Paragraphs 16, 18 and 19 in UMESH case reads
as follows:
"16. The principles which govern a
disciplinary enquiry are distinct from those which
apply to a criminal trial. In a prosecution for an
offence punishable under the criminal law, the
burden lies on the prosecution to establish the
ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable
doubt. The accused is entitled to a presumption of
innocence. The purpose of a disciplinary proceeding
by an employer is to enquire into an allegation of
misconduct by an employee which results in a
violation of the service rules governing the
relationship of employment. Unlike a criminal
prosecution where the charge has to be established
beyond reasonable doubt, in a disciplinary
proceeding, a charge of misconduct has to be
established on a preponderance of probabilities.
The rules of evidence which apply to a criminal trial
are distinct from those which govern a disciplinary
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enquiry. The acquittal of the accused in a criminal
case does not debar the employer from proceeding
in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction.
17. xxxxxxxxxx
18. In the course of the submissions, the
respondents placed reliance on the decision
in Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar [Union of
India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78 :
(2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 129] . In that case, six
charges were framed against the respondent. One
of the charges was that he demanded a
commission of 1% for paying the railway staff. The
enquiry officer found all the six charges proved.
The disciplinary authority agreed with those
findings and imposed the punishment of reversion
to a lower rank. Allowing the petition under Article
226 of the Constitution, the High Court observed
that there was no evidence to hold that he was
guilty of the charge of bribery since the witnesses
only said that the motive/reason for not making the
payment could be the expectation of a commission
amount. The respondent placed reliance on the
following passages from the decision : (SCC pp. 85
& 87, paras 21 & 31)
"21. Such a serious charge of corruption
requires to be proved to the hilt as it brings
both civil and criminal consequences upon the
employee concerned. He would be liable to be
prosecuted and would also be liable to suffer
severest penalty awardable in such cases.
Therefore, such a grave charge of quasi-
criminal nature was required to be proved
beyond the shadow of doubt and to the hilt. It
cannot be proved on mere probabilities.
***
31. ... wherein it has been held that the
punishment should always be proportionate to
the gravity of the misconduct. However, in a
case of corruption, the only punishment is
dismissal from service. Therefore, the charge of
corruption must always be dealt with keeping in
mind that it has both civil and criminal
consequences."
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19. The observations in para 21 of Gyan Chand
Chattar case [Union of India v. Gyan Chand
Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S)
129] are not the ratio decidendi of the case. These
observations were made while discussing the
judgment [Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar,
2002 SCC OnLine Guj 548] of the High Court. The
ratio of the judgment emerges in the subsequent
passages of the judgment, where the test of
relevant material and compliance with natural
justice as laid down in Rattan Singh [State of
Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491: 1977
SCC (L&S) 298:(1977)1 SLR 750] was reiterated :
(Gyan Chand Chattar case [Union of India v. Gyan
Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78:(2010) 1 SCC
(L&S) 129], SCC p. 88, paras 35-36)
"35. ... an enquiry is to be conducted against
any person giving strict adherence to the
statutory provisions and principles of natural
justice. The charges should be specific, definite
and giving details of the incident which formed
the basis of charges. No enquiry can be
sustained on vague charges. Enquiry has to be
conducted fairly, objectively and not
subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or
unreasonable, nor the same should be based on
conjectures and surmises. There is a distinction
in proof and suspicion. Every act or omission on
the part of the delinquent cannot be a
misconduct. The authority must record reasons
for arriving at the finding of fact in the context
of the statute defining the misconduct.
36. In fact, initiation of the enquiry against
the respondent appears to be the outcome of
anguish of superior officers as there had been
an agitation by the railway staff demanding the
payment of pay and allowances and they
detained the train illegally and there has been
too much hue and cry for several hours on the
railway station. The enquiry officer has taken
into consideration the non-existing material and
failed to consider the relevant material and
finding of all facts recorded by him cannot be
sustained in the eye of the law."
(emphasis supplied)
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On the charge of corruption, the Court observed in
the above decision that there was no relevant
material to sustain the conviction of the respondent
since there was only hearsay evidence where the
witnesses assumed that the motive for not paying
the railway staff "could be" corruption. Therefore,
the standard that was applied by the Court for
determining the validity of the departmental
proceedings was whether (i) there was relevant
material for arriving at the finding; and (ii) the
principles of natural justice were complied with."
13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in (2008) 5 SCC 569 in the
case of CHAIRMAN & MANAGING DIRECTOR, V.S.P. AND
OTHERS v/s GOPURAJU SRI PRABHAKARA HARI BABU,
the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the High Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India also cannot, on the basis of
sympathy or sentiment over-turn a legal order. Relevant
paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 of the above judgment reads
as follows:
20. The jurisdiction of the High court in this regard
is rather limited. Its power to interfere with
disciplinary matters is circumscribed by well-known
factors. It cannot set aside a well-reasoned order
only on sympathy or sentiments. (See Maruti
Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal, State of Bihar v. Amrendra
Kumar Mishra; SBI v. Mahatma Mishra; State of
Karnataka v. Amreerbi; State of M.P. v. Sanjay
Kumar Pathak and Urrar Haryana Bijli Vitram
Nigam Ltd., v. Surji Devi.).
21. Once it is found that all the procedural
requirements have been complied with, the courts
would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of
punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee.
The superior courts only in some cases may invoke
the doctrine of proportionality. If the decision of an
employer is found to be within the legal
parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be
invoked when the misconduct stands proved. (See
sangfroid Remedies Ltd., v. U ion of India).
22. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India also
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cannot, on the basis of sympathy or sentiment,
overturn a legal order.
14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of
proportionaility of punishment in CHENNAI METROPOLITAN
WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE BOARD AND OTHERS v/s
T.T.MURALI BABU reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 has
observed that proportionality or substitution of punishment
would come into play, if the Court on the analysis of
material brought on record comes to the conclusion that
the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or
Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court.
15. In the instant case, the Tribunal has not found and
come to the conclusion that the charges are not proved
against the respondent in the departmental enquiry. The
Tribunal having observed that demanding and receiving
bribe is a serious social morality and it needs to dealt with
firmly, could not have substituted the punishment of
dismissal with that of compulsory retirement. Further, as
held by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the Tribunal without
recording as to whether the punishment of dismissal for
proved charge of accepting bribe is disproportionate or
whether it shocks the conscience of the Court, could not
have substituted the punishment. In other words, unless
the Court records that the punishment imposed is
disproportionate to the gravity of charge, which shocks
the conscience of the Court, the Court would not get
jurisdiction to substitute the punishment."
17. The facts in the present case are identical to those
in the aforementioned case. In view of the legal position, once
the Tribunal accepts the finding of the Enquiry Officer that the
charge is proved, it cannot modify the punishment without
assigning any reasons. We find no discussion by the Tribunal
justifying the modification of the penalty.
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18. Learned counsel relied on the judgments of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Bandreddy Raja Gopal Reddy
v. High Court of Judicature Registrar Vigilance and
Others (2025 SCC OnLine AP 1134) and Ram Lal v. State
of Rajasthan and Others ([2024] 1 SCC 175) in support of
his submissions. We find that both judgments are of no
assistance to respondent No.2. Further, as contended by the
learned Additional Government Advocate, the reinstatement of
respondent No.2 is always subject to the outcome of the
present writ petition.
19. In the present factual scenario, the acceptance of
the Tribunal's order by the Disciplinary Authority/State is of
little assistance, and it cannot be held that the petitioner has no
right to challenge the Tribunal's order modifying the
punishment, particularly when the punishment was imposed on
the recommendation of the petitioner pursuant to its enquiry.
20. Upon detailed analysis of the impugned order, we
are of the considered view that the same is not sustainable in
law. Accordingly, the following:
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ORDER
(i) Writ petition is allowed.
(ii) The order in Application No.2851/2017 dated
10.05.2018 passed by the Karnataka State
Administrative Tribunal at Bengaluru is set
aside.
(iii) The order dated 11.05.2017 at Annexure-A17
bearing No.PÀAE 35 ©r¦ 2012 imposing
penalty of compulsory retirement is restored.
(iv) No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(S.G.PANDIT)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(K. V. ARAVIND)
JUDGE
VBS
