THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH PORTION OF
THE IMPUGNED ORDER ANNEXURE-A DATED 4-3-2015 PASSED IN
AIR NO.116 OF 2014 BY THE HON'BLE DRAT - CHENNAI DIRECTING
THE PETITIONER TO DEPOSIT RS.1,00,00,000/- [RUPEES ONE
CRORE ONLY] BEFORE DRAT WITH IN FOUR WEEKS FROM THE DATE
RECEIPT OF COPY OF THE ORDER I.E., ON OR BEFORE 1-4-2015 ON
FILING AN APPLICATION THE TIME IS EXTENDED TILL 10-4-2015
CONSEQUENTLY DIRECT THE HON'BLE TRIBUNAL DRAT TO RESTORE
THE SA REGISTERED IN IR NO.825 OF 2013 AND PERMIT THE
PETITIONER TO PROCEED IN THE SAID MATTER AND CONSIDER THE
APPEAL ON MERITS.
THIS WRIT PETITION, HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
ON 19.08.2025 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT,
THIS DAY, VENKATESH NAIK T. J., PRONOUNCED THE
FOLLOWING:
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T)
2. The brief facts of the petitioner's case is that:
Late. S. Venkataswamy, father of the petitioner was a
famous Musician and physically handicapped. Considering his
service, the Government of Karnataka had granted 5 acres of
land bearing Sy.No.262(old Survey No.154), vide order dated
23.07.1981 by the Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru District, at
S. Bingipura village, Jigani Hobli, Anekal Taluk, Bangalore
District.
3. On 09.08.1998, Sri. Venkataswamy stood as
guarantor(for short 'Guarantor') for the loan borrowed by one
M/s. Cold Extrusion Private Limited(for short 'borrower') and
accordingly deposited his title deeds in favour of the Karnataka
Bank Limited including 14 other documents. In the year 2004,
M/s. Karnataka Bank Limited, Sarakki Layout Branch, J.P.
Nagar, Bengaluru instituted O.A.No.150/2004 against M/s. Cold
Extrusion Private Limited(respondent No.3) and nine others for
recovery of money amounting to Rs.9.54 crores against
borrowers and guarantors, wherein Sri. Venkataswamy was
defendant No.8, and an interim order of injunction was passed
restraining all the defendants from encumbering the property.
Despite the order of injunction, the guarantor Venkataswamy
executed a Gift deed in favour of his daughter Smt. Shobha,
the petitioner herein, on 27.05.2005, though the property was
subject to mortgage with Karnataka Bank. The guarantor died
on 08.01.2006.
4. On 18.01.2006 under the assignment Agreement, debt
was transferred to respondent No.1-M/s. Assets Reconstruction
Company(India) Limited( for short 'ARCIL') under Section 5 of
the SARFAESI Act, 2002. On 22.05.2007, the legal heirs of
guarantor were brought on record and the petitioner was
arraigned as defendant No.8(d) in the said O.A. proceedings.
5. Said ARCIL brought the property for sale by publishing
a public notice in Hindu and local Newspaper on 20.10.2008
and under a public auction, mortgaged property was sold to
one Gaurav Panjwani(respondent No.2 herein) and sale
certificate was issued in his favour on 30.10.2010. On
02.01.2013, respondent No.2 in-turn sold the property to
respondent No.8, Karan Ramsisaria under registered sale deed.
On 04.03.2013, O.A.No.150/2004 was withdrawn by ARCIL.
6. On 04.03.2013, the petitioner Shobha filed an appeal
before the DRAT, Bengaluru in IR No.825/2013, alongwith an
application for condonation of delay of 1353 days in filing the
appeal, through her GPA holder Ms. Gayathri. On 23.12.2013,
an application to condone delay was dismissed by detailed
order under I.A.No.1020/2013 holding that there are no
sufficient grounds to condone the delay.
7. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner
preferred an appeal before the DRAT at Chennai in
I.A.No.339/2014, arising out of AIR(SA)-116/2014. On
04.03.2015, the DRAT, Chennai directed the petitioner to
deposit a sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/- to show her bonafide within
four weeks on or before 01.04.2015. Being aggrieved by the
said order, the petitioner filed this petition. On 10.04.2015, this
Court while passing an interim order directed the petitioner to
deposit Rs.25.00 lakh within a period of eight weeks from
10.04.2015. But, the petitioner has not deposited any amount
as ordered by this Court.
8. The petitioner has taken contention that her father -
Guarantor was arraigned as defendant No.8 in the aforesaid
proceedings, by concocting and creating the documents in
respect of the loan facilities said to have been borrowed by the
Principal borrower. The Karnataka Bank has mentioned various
scheduled properties pertaining to the Principal borrower in the
O.A. application, on the other hand, the Principal borrower
cheated the financial institution in collusion with the officials of
the bank and committed fraudulent acts by conspiracy, creating
and forging the documents. Hence, the petitioner has filed this
writ petition.
9. We have heard the arguments of learned counsel for
the petitioner and learned counsel for respondent Nos.1, 2 and
8.
10. Sri. Sunil S. Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner
vehemently contended that the auction sale conducted was
illegal and no demand notice was served upon the petitioner
and the possession notice was also not served upon her. The
petitioner was not accorded an opportunity to take appropriate
steps in defending the alleged notices. Further, respondent
No.1- ARCIL undervalued the property and fixed the reserve
price at Rs.1.40 crores and at that particular time, the market
value of the property was more than Rs.8.00 crores. The sale
notice dated 20.10.2008 was published at Mumbai, which is in
violation of mandatory provisions of SARFAESI Act. The
property was sold for Rs.96.00 lakh, which is less than the
reserved price stated in the sale notice, which amounts to
grave violation of the provisions of the Act. Further, the
petitioner has no source of income to deposit an amount of
Rs.1.00 crore. If the petitioner had the sources of income and
knowledge of the proceedings initiated by respondent No.1, the
petitioner could have made an attempt to put the proposal.
Now the petitioner is bonafidly praying to provide an
opportunity to challenge the measures adopted by respondent
No.1 and to contest the appeal before DRT, Bengaluru. In
support of his argument, he relied upon following decisions.
1. Srishti Arogyadham Pvt. Ltd., v. Punjab National Bank &
Anr., 2018 SCC Online Del 12716.
2. M/s. Akash Ganga Airlines Ltd., Vs. Debt Recovery
Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad and others in
W.P.No.3973(MS)/2015
3. Gopal Ji Gupta Vs. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal,
Allahabad through its Chairman and other, AIR 2013
Allahabad 175.
4. M/s., S.R. Forgoing Ltd and Another Vs. UCO Bank and
Ors, CWP No.10957/2012.
5. Mukerian Papers Ltd., and another Vs. Debt Recovery
Appellate Tribunal & Others, CWP No.9131/2012.
6. Poonam Manshani Vs. J & K Bank Ltd., & Another,
W.P.No.(C) No.13042/2009 .
7. Nathi Lal Rathore Vs. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal
& Ors., 2016 0 Supreme (ALL) 1232.
11. On the other hand, Sri. Paras Jain, learned counsel
appearing for respondent No.8 vehemently contended that
respondent No.1 ARCIL sold the property of the guarantor
under public auction dated 30.10.2010 in favour of respondent
No.2, who in-turn sold the property of the guarantor to
respondent No.8 under registered sale deed dated 02.01.2013.
In the mean-while, the petitioner filed an appeal before DRT,
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Bengaluru, same was dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches on 23.12.2013. Further, being aggrieved by the said
order, the petitioner filed appeal in AIR(SA).116/2014 before
DRAT, Chennai and the DRAT directed the petitioner to deposit
a sum of Rs.1.00 crore to show her bonafide within four weeks
or before 01.04.2015. But, the petitioner did not comply the
said order and has filed this petition. On 01.04.2015, this Court
directed the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs.25.00 lakhs
within a period of eight weeks from 10.04.2015, however, the
petitioner failed to deposit any amount as per the conditional
order passed by this Court. Therefore, he contends that the
petitioner cannot maintain the petition and accordingly, he
prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
12. In support of his contention, learned counsel has
relied on the following decisions:-
1. International Asset Reconstruction Co. of India Ltd., Vs.
Official Liquidator of Aldrich Pharmaceuticals Limited and
Others, (2017) 16 SCC 137.
2. S. Karthik and Ors. Vs. N. Subhash Chand Jain & Others,
AIR 2021 SC 4559.
3. Shakeena and Another Vs. Bank of India and Others,
(2021) 12 SCC 761.
- 11 -
4. Canara Bank Vs. P. Selathal & Others, (2020) 13 SCC
143.
5. Dwarika Prasad Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others,
(2018) 5 SCC 491.
6. V. Ganesan Vs. Canara Bank & Others, (2018) 14 SCC
212.
7. Smt. K. Padma Vs. K. Ramachandra & Others, AIR 2015
Karnataka 40.
8. Deenadayal Nagari Sahakari Bank Limited and Anr. Vs.
Munjaji & Others, (2022) 7 SCC 594.
13. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner
and learned counsel for respondent Nos.1, 2 and 8, the
questions that arise for our consideration are:
i) Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable
to a proceeding under Section 17 of the SARFAESI
Act, 2002 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal?
(ii) Whether notwithstanding the remedy of an appeal,
before the DRT, this Court could exercise
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India in the matter of condonation of delay in
filing an application under Section 17 of the
SARFAESI Act, 2002?
- 12 -
14. In the instant case, learned counsel for respondent
No.1 contended that the question whether Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is applicable to a proceeding under Section 17 of
the SARFAESI Act, 2002 came up for consideration before the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Atindra
Container Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Punjab National Bank and others
in writ petition No.23638/2023, where it refused to
entertain an application for condonation of delay filed along
with an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002
but granted liberty to the petitioner therein to file an appeal. He
therefore, contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any
relief in this petition but are to be relegated back to the remedy
of an appeal before the DRT.
15. We have considered the submissions made by the
learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for
respondent Nos.1, 2 and 8.
16. This Court is conscious of the judgment of the Apex
Court in the case of United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati
Tondon and others reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 as well as
the judgment in the case of Authorized Officer, State Bank
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of Travancore and another vs. Mathew K.C. reported in
(2018) 3 SCC 85 and the judgment in M/S. South Indian
Bank Ltd. and others v. Naveen Mathew Philip and
another reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 435, wherein the
Hon'ble Apex Court has held that, when a remedy of an appeal
is provided, the constitutional Courts under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India should refrain from exercising jurisdiction.
However, in none of the judgments referred above, the
question whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable
to a proceeding under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002
was considered. The Tribunals have been applying the law
declared by the Hon'ble Apex Court in matters relating to the
Act of 1996 unmindful of the applicability of Section 24 of the
Act of 1993 to proceeding before the DRT.
17. It is well settled that not entertaining petitions under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the face of an
alternative remedy is a rule of policy and a self- imposed
limitation and not a rule of law. However, in a matter where the
Tribunals and Courts apply law inappropriately in the absence
of a guiding precedent, the Constitutional Courts are not
denuded of the powers to set it right by charting the correct
course. Therefore, it is imminent that this Court exercises
- 14 -
power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to explain
the contours of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.
18. Section 17 of the Act of 2002 reads as follows:
"17. Application against measures to
recover secured debts.-(1) Any person (including
borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures
referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by
the secured creditor or his authorised officer under
this Chapter,[may make an application along with
such fee, as may be prescribed], to the Debts
Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter
within forty-five days from the date on which such
measures had been taken:
[Provided that different fees may be prescribed
for making the application by the borrower and the
person other than the borrower].
[Explanation.-For the removal of doubts it is
hereby declared that the communication of the
reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for
not having accepted his representation or objection
or the likely action of the secured creditor at the
stage of communication of reasons to the borrower
shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to
make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal
under sub-section].
[(1A) An application under sub-section (1) shall
be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within
the local limits of whose jurisdiction-
(a) the cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises;
(b) where the secured asset is located; or
(c) the branch or any other office of a bank or
financial institution is maintaining an account in
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which debt claimed is outstanding for the time
being.]
(2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider
whether any of the measures referred to in sub-
section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured
creditor for enforcement of security are in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and the
rules made thereunder.
(3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after
examining the facts and circumstances of the case
and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the
conclusion that any of the measures referred to in
sub-section (4) of section 13, taken by the secured
creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of
this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require
restoration of the management or restoration of
possession, of the secured assets to the borrower or
other aggrieved person, it may, by order,-
(a) declare the recourse to any one or more
measures referred to in sub-section (4) of
section 13 taken by the secured creditor as
invalid; and
(b) restore the possession of secured assets or
management of secured assets to the borrower
or such other aggrieved person, who has made
an application under sub-section (1), as the
case may be; and
(c) pass such other direction as it may consider
appropriate and necessary in relation to any of
the recourse taken by the secured creditor
under sub-section (4) of section 13.
(4) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares
the recourse taken by a secured creditor under sub-
section (4) of section 13, is in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder,
then, notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force, the secured
creditor shall be entitled to take recourse to one or
- 16 -
more of the measures specified under sub-section
(4) of section 13 to recover his secured debt.
(4A) Where-
(i) any person, in an application under sub-
section (1), claims any tenancy or leasehold rights
upon the secured asset, the Debt Recovery Tribunal,
after examining the facts of the case and evidence
produced by the parties in relation to such claims
shall, for the purposes of enforcement of security
interest, have the jurisdiction to examine whether
lease or tenancy,-
(a) has expired or stood determined; or
(b) is contrary to section 65A of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882; (4 of 1882); or
(c) is contrary to terms of mortgage; or
(d) is created after the issuance of notice of
default and demand by the Bank under sub-
section (2) of section 13 of the Act;
and
(ii) the Debt Recovery Tribunal is satisfied that
tenancy right or leasehold rights claimed in secured
asset falls under the sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b)
or sub-clause (c) or sub-clause (d) of clause (i), then
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
in any other law for the time being in force, the Debt
Recovery Tribunal may pass such order as it deems
fit in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(5) Any application made under sub-section (1)
shall be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal as
expeditiously as possible and disposed of within sixty
days from the date of such application:
Provided that the Debts Recovery Tribunal
may, from time to time, extend the said period for
reasons to be recorded in writing, so, however, that
- 17 -
the total period of pendency of the application with
the Debts Recovery Tribunal, shall not exceed four
months from the date of making of such application
made under sub-section (1).
(6) If the application is not disposed of by the
Debts Recovery Tribunal within the period of four
months as specified in sub-section (5), any part to
the application may make an application, in such
form as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal
for directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal for
expeditious disposal of the application pending
before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate
Tribunal may, on such application, make an order for
expeditious disposal of the pending application by
the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
(7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the
Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as may be,
dispose of application in accordance with the
provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks
and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and
the rules made thereunder.
19. Section 17 of the Act of 2002 mandates that an
application must be filed before the Tribunal within 45 days
from the date on which such measures are taken as provided
under Section 13 of the Act of 2002. Under Section 17(6) of the
SARFAESI Act, 2002 if an application is not disposed off by the
DRT within a period of four months, as specified in sub-section
(5), any party may file an application to the Appellate Tribunal
for expeditious disposal of the application pending before the
DRT.
- 18 -
20. The Tribunal for the purposes of the SARFAESI Act,
2002 is defined under Section 2(1)(i) which is as follows:
"2(1)(i) "Debts Recovery Tribunal" means
the Tribunal established under sub-section (1) of
section 3 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks
and Financial Institutions Act, 1993."
21. Insofar as the powers of the Tribunal constituted
under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993, Section 24 of the Act provides as
follows:
"24. Limitation.- The provisions of the Limitation
Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall, as far as may be,
apply to an application made to a Tribunal."
22. Therefore, a reading of Section 24 of the Act, 1993
makes it beyond doubt that the Tribunal has the powers of
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 not only in respect of an application filed under the Act of
1993 but also in respect of an application filed under the
SARFAESI Act, 2002. The provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002
have an over riding effect over all other laws which are
inconsistent with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.
However, the Act per se does not mandate that the provisions
- 19 -
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to a
proceeding under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.
23. Therefore, it can be concluded that the DRT also has
power to condone the delay by virtue of Section 24 of the Act
of 1993.
24. It is not in dispute that in pursuance of the order
dated 04.03.2015 passed by DRAT, Chennai, the petitioner has
not deposited a sum of Rs.1.00 crore to show her bonafide
within four weeks or on or before 01.04.2015. It is to be noted
that the order dated 04.03.2015 was self operative. On failure
on the part of the petitioner to deposit the amount of
Rs.1,00,00,000/- prior to 01.04.2015, the interim order stood
automatically vacated. It could thus be seen that even on this
occasion, the petitioner had an opportunity for redemption of
the mortgage and clearing her/their properties from
encumbrance. Even this Court while passing interim order
directed the petitioner to deposit Rs.25.00 lakhs, however, the
petitioner even during this period did not comply the order and
did not avail the opportunity.
25. Admittedly, from perusal of the pleading and
contention of the learned counsel for petitioner, it appears that,
- 20 -
petitioner has no source of income. The father of petitioner
stood as guarantor to the loan transaction and mortgaged his
property to the Bank. Since 2004, petitioner has not made any
effort to clear the loan of the borrower. The petitioner not made
any effort to take action against the borrower. If borrower or
guarantor failed to deposit the bank loans, it would likely result
in an increase in public debt, a greater risk of banks over
extending credit. This could de-stabilize the financial system.
Therefore, the guarantor's liability is joint and several, meaning
the lender can pursue the guarantor for the amount of loan. If
a guarantor refuses to pay, the bank can initiate legal
proceedings, accordingly, the bank initiated action against both
borrower and guarantor. The petitioner has not come up with
clean hands, as she never shown her inclination to comply the
order of DRAT or this Court, since 10 years. The petitioner has
slept over her right. In order to claim one's right, she must be
vigilant of her right/liability. The maxim "vigilantibus non
dormientibus jura subveniunt", literally means that, the law
aids the vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights.
26. In this case, the auction sale was conducted on
30.10.2010, wherein respondent No.1 sold the property under
public auction to respondent No.2. The bank had undervalued
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the property and sold to meager amount of Rs.96 lakhs. In
fact, the consequences of undervaluing a property and sold in
public auction, would be declared null and void, thus, same is
illegal act. Whereas, the petitioner has not placed any material
to substantiate that the subject property was undervalued, with
cogent evidence.
27. On 02.01.2013, respondent No.2 sold the property in
question to respondent No.8. Only thereafter, the petitioner
filed IR No.825/2013 before the DRT, Bengaluru, same was
rejected on the ground of delay and laches, thus she preferred
appeal before DRAT, Chennai in AIR(SA) 116/2014.
28. In the instant case, sale notice was published at
Mumbai. We have perused Annexure 'F'-Possession notice
dated 18.07.2008 issued by respondent No.1, to conduct
auction sale through paper publication in "The New Indian
Express". As per "public notice for sale", the place of office of
respondent No.1 is shown as "Mumbai", and no where it
indicate that, it was published at Mumbai, contrary to it,
Annexure-'G' clearly demonstrate that, it was published at
'Bengaluru' and not at Mumbai. Further, the petitioner has not
furnished the News paper publication to be issued by Press
- 22 -
Trust of India. Thus, in the absence of such material
particulars, we hold that, public notice was published at
Bengaluru. Thus, there is no merit consideration in the
contention of learned counsel for the petitioner.
29. Insofar as the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of J Rajiv Subramanyiyan and Another
Vs. M/s. Pandiyas and Others, reported in 2014 (5) SCC
651 is concerned, the said judgment relies on the judgment of
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mathew Varghese Vs. M.
Amritha Kumar and Others reported in (2014) 5 SCC 610.
However, on facts, the issue in the said case was different. In
the said case, the property was sold by respondent -Bank
through a private treaty. Hence, the Apex Court found that
there were no terms settled in writing between the borrowers
and the bank that the sale can be effected by a private treaty,
and as such, it was in violation of the provisions of Rule 8 (8) of
the said rules.
30. In the case of Vasu P. Shetty Vs. Hotel Vandana
palace and Others reported in 2014 (5) SCC 660, after the
first notice was issued, the same was challenged before the
High Court. Though the High Court did not grant stay against
- 23 -
the scheduled auction, it granted stay against the confirmation
of sale. It was the bank's case therein that in view of the partial
stay order by the High Court, nobody came forward to
participate in the auction and the exercise went to futility.
31. Whereas, the present case is totally on different facts.
Though, the petitioner had ample opportunities for redemption
of mortgage, she failed to avail of the said opportunities.
32. Even if we viewed from another angle, the claim of
the petitioner is not sustainable. The petitioner had right of
redemption, which is embedded in Section 60 of the Transfer of
Property Act, is available to the mortgager unless it has been
extinguished by the act of the parties. Only on execution of the
conveyance and registration of transfer of the mortgager's
interest by registered instrument, that the mortgager's right of
redemption will be extinguished. In the present case, the bank
proceeded under SARFAESI Act and assigned the process of
transfer to respondent No.1, who transferred the property of
guarantor under public auction in favour of respondent No.2.
Hence, in any case, the mortgager's right of redemption stood
extinguished on 30.10.2010.
- 24 -
33. After delay of 1353 days of the public auction and
confirmation of sale, the petitioner being the daughter of
guarantor filed an application before DRT, Bengaluru.
Therefore, the DRT has rightly dismissed the petition on the
ground of delay and laches.
34. The said order was challenged in AIR(SA) 116/
2014 before DRAT, Chennai. The DRAT, Chennai passed the
impugned order and accorded an opportunity to the petitioner
to deposit Rs.1.00 crore. Even the said order was not complied.
As such, the bank followed the provisions of SARFAESI Act and
took possession of the property of the guarantor and conducted
public auction in accordance with law.
35. If we look at the facts of the present case, it would
show that, every attempt has been made to frustrate the
purpose of the SARFAESI Act. The respondent Bank and
respondent purchasers were dragged to indulge in three rounds
of litigation, i.e., IR 825/2013 before Debt Recovery Tribunal,
Bengaluru, AIR(SA) 116/2014 before Debt Recovert Appellate
Tribunal, Chennai and writ petition before this court.
36. Though the auction purchaser emerged as the
successful bidder in the bid held on 30.10.2010 and though the
- 25 -
sale was confirmed and sale deed was registered in the name
of respondent No.1 and it was subsequently alienated in favour
of respondent No.8 on 02.01.2013, for twelve and half years,
the purchaser could not enjoy the fruits of the said sale. Now,
the ownership of said property vest in the auction purchaser
and subsequently respondent No.8.
37. In that view of the matter, we do not find any merit
insofar as the impugned order passed by DRAT, Chennai. Any
contentions raised by the petitioner that the auction was
conducted in contravention of the law, i.e., undervalued the
property, has no any force in view of any contra documents.
We do not find any merit in the said submission. The petition is
therefore found to be without merit and as such, is dismissed.
38. On 19.08.2025, the petitioner furnished two Demand
Drafts for a sum of Rs.25.00 lakhs, in compliance of the order
dated 10.04.2025, but, the production of Demand Drafts for a
sum of Rs.25.00 lakh in compliance of the order dated
10.04.2025, is not an actual compliance. The petitioner has
committed willful default in complying the order dated
10.04.2025. Hence, the Registry is directed to return the said
Demand drafts viz., 1) Demand Draft bearing No.190442 dated
- 26 -
16.08.2025 for Rs.20.00 lakh and 2) Demand Draft bearing
No.606398 dated 18.08.2025 for Rs.5.00 lakh in favour of the
petitioner on proper identification.
Pending IAs, if any, stand disposed of.
Sd/-
(D K SINGH)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VENKATESH NAIK T)
JUDGE
MN/-
CT: VR
