Karnataka High Court
Prem Shankar Pandey (39940) vs The Assistant General Manager on 6 October, 2025
Author: H.T. Narendra Prasad
Bench: H.T. Narendra Prasad
1 R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H. T. NARENDRA PRASAD
WRIT PETITION NO.3168 OF 2023 (S-RES)
BETWEEN:
PREM SHANKAR PANDEY(39940)
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS
RETD. SPECIAL ASSISTANT FROM
CANARA BANK, RESIDING AT 1112
GUJAR GHATI, CHOWK BAZAR
MATHURA, UTTAR PRADESH-281001.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. K R GANESH RAO, ADVOCATE)
AND
1. THE ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER
CANARA BANK, HRM SECTION
CIRCLE OFFICE, AGRA
RAJENDRA CENTRE, SECTOR 12A/CC1
AWAS VIKAS COLONY, SIKANDRA
AGRA PIN-282002.
2. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
CANARA BNK, HEAD OFFICE
J C ROAD, BENGALURU-560002.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. T P MUTHANNA, ADVOCATE FOR R1 & R2.)
THIS WRIT IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
2
CHARGE SHEET ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER BY THE
ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER AND DISCIPLINARY
AUTHORITY, CANARA BANK HRM SECTION, CIRCLE OFFICE,
AGRA, VIDE AGCO:HRM:DP:CHO39940 CS 04 2022 DATED:
29.10.2022 ANNEXED TO WRIT PETITION AS ANNEXURE-F AND
ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION, HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 25.09.2025, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT, THIS DAY, THE COURT, MADE THE
FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.T. NARENDRA PRASAD
CAV JUDGMENT
This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 &
227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the
Articles of Charges, dated 29.10.2022 vide Annexure-
F.
2. This Court, by order dated 13.02.2023,
passed the following order:
" The learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that the petitioner has retired from
service with the respondents - Bank in the year
2015 and he is presently issued with a charge
memo only because he was treated as hostile
witness in the pending proceedings before the
CBI Court. It is a settled that act of turning
hostile ipso facto would not amount to
misconduct. The charge memo is issued
without considering this aspect.
On perusal of the records, including the
petitioner's testimony before the CBI Court,
further proceedings pursuant to the impugned
charge memo is stayed until the next date of
hearing.
There shall be emergent notice to the
respondents."
3. Upon service of notice, the respondent - Bank
filed an interlocutory application, seeking vacation of
the interim order granted by this Court on
13.02.2023, and also filed statement of objections. In
its objections, the respondent - Bank raised a
preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of
the writ petition before this Court, on the ground that,
no part of the cause of action has arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, the parties
were heard on the question of maintainability.
4. The learned counsel for the respondents
contended that the petitioner joined the service of the
Bank on 23.11.1982 as a Clerk at the Agra Lohamandi
Branch, Circle Office, Agra, and superannuated from
service on 28.02.2015 from the Virandhavan Branch,
Circle Office, Agra. The entire service of the petitioner
was rendered in Agra, Uttar Pradesh, and therefore,
the matter falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the
High Court of Allahabad. This Court has no jurisdiction
as no cause of action has arisen within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court.
5. It is further contended that, when Sri
Damodar Chandore, the then Senior Manager working
at Mathura Main Branch from 21.07.2008 to
05.11.2011, there was a serious allegation of
misappropriation of money; hence, the Bank
registered FIR against Damodar Chandore, and the
matter was entrusted to the CBI Anti-Corruption
Branch, Ghaziabad. After the investigation, the CBI
submitted its report on 30.11.2020 against Damodar
Chandore and nine others. When the CBI recorded the
petitioner's statement under Section 161 of the
Cr.P.C., on 14-11-2017, he turned hostile. Therefore,
a departmental enquiry was initiated against him.
Since no part of the cause of action arose within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the writ petition is liable to
be dismissed. In support of his contentions, he relied
upon the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of
UNION OF INDIA vs. ADANI EXPORTS LTD.
reported in AIR 2002 SC 126 and in the case of
STATE OF RAJASTAN vs. M/S.SWAIKA
PROPERTIES AND ANOTHER reported in 1985(3)
SCC 217.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the petitioner
contended that, when the petitioner was working as
an Assistant at the Mathura Branch, Uttar Pradesh,
during the period from 06.08.2004 to 23.01.2011,
allegations were made against one Sri Damodar
Chandore, Senior Manager of the Bank, for
sanctioning Open Cash Credit facilities to selected
parties in contravention of Bank guidelines. The
petitioner was neither involved in the sanction of the
said loans nor did he collude with the said officer or
the parties. He had no duty or power to process or
sanction loans to the said parties. After his retirement
from service, the departmental enquiry was initiated
against him solely on the basis of a letter written by
the Chief Vigilance Officer, Canara Bank, Bangalore.
The CBI, Ghaziabad, intimated the Central Vigilance
Commission, Bangalore, that the petitioner had turned
hostile before the CBI Court. Based on this
communication, the Central Vigilance Commission,
Bangalore, directed the Disciplinary Authority to take
necessary action against the petitioner. Pursuant to
this, a departmental enquiry was initiated, and articles
of charges were issued. The action taken was also
communicated by the Bank to the Central Vigilance
Commission, Bangalore. Therefore, since the
departmental enquiry was initiated on the basis of the
letter issued by the Central Vigilance Officer,
Bangalore, a part of the cause of action has arisen
within the jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, the
writ petition is maintainable before this Court. It is a
settled position of law that even if a small part of the
cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the
High Court, the Court will have jurisdiction to
entertain the matter, by applying the doctrine of
forum convenience, as held by the Apex Court in the
case of KUSUM INGOTS & ALLOYS LTD. vs. UNION
OF INDIA AND ANOTHER reported in 2004 (6)
SCC 254, in the case of AMBICA INDUSTRIES vs.
COMMISISONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE reported in
2007(6) SCC 769 and in the case of NAWAL
KISHORE SHARMA vs. UNION OF INDIA AND
OTHERS reported in 2014 (9) SCC 329.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the writ petition papers.
8. The petitioner is a resident of Mathura City,
Uttar Pradesh. He joined the respondent - Bank as a
clerk on 23.11.1982, at the Agra Lohamandi Branch
and superannuated from service on 28.02.2015, from
the Vrindavan Branch, both under the Agra Circle
Office. Throughout his service, he worked in Agra.
When he was at the Mathura Main branch (2004-
2011), allegations arose against Senior Manager
Damodar Chandore regarding misappropriation of
funds and unauthorized sanctioning of open cash
credit. The Bank initiated a criminal case, and the
police registered an FIR and entrusted the matter to
CBI. The CBI investigated and filed a charge sheet
against Damodar Chandore and others under Sections
120B, 409, 420, 468 and 471 of the IPC and Sections
7, 12, 13(2) r/w. 13(1) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act.
9. The petitioner was a key witness in the case,
and his statement was recorded under Section 161 of
the Cr.PC. However, he turned hostile during the
investigation. The CBI informed the Chief Vigilance
Officer of Canara Bank, Bangalore (the bank's head
office), about the petitioner's testimony, by
communication dated 05.09.2022 vide Annexue R7.
Thereafter, the Assistant General Manager of Canara
Bank, Agra, issued a show-cause notice to the
petitioner. After the petitioner's reply, the Assistant
General Manager of Agra, who is a disciplinary
authority, initiated a departmental inquiry and issued
articles of charges vide Annexue-F. By going through
the records and pleadings, it is very clear that, no part
of the cause of action arose within the territorial
jurisdiction of this High Court, the writ petition is not
maintainable.
10. Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India
empowers High Courts to exercise jurisdiction in
relation to territories where the cause of action arises,
wholly or in part. The Apex Court has considered this
provision in several judgments.
11. In the case of M/S.SWAIKA PROPERTIES
(supra), the Apex Court considered Article 226(2)
and laid down the certain principles. The relevant
paragraphs are extracted below:
"7. Upon these facts, we are satisfied that the
cause of action neither wholly nor in part arose
within the territorial limits of the Calcutta High
Court and therefore the learned Single Judge
had no jurisdiction to issue a rule nisi on the
petition filed by the respondents under Article
226 of the Constitution or to make the ad
interim ex parte prohibitory order restraining
the appellants from taking any steps to take
possession of the land acquired. Under sub-
section (5) of Section 52 of the Act the
appellants were entitled to require the
respondents to surrender or deliver possession
of the lands acquired forthwith and upon their
failure to do so, take immediate steps to
secure such possession under sub-section (6)
thereof.
8. The expression "cause of action" is tersely
defined in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure:
"The 'cause of action' means every fact which,
if traversed, it would be necessary for the
plaintiff to prove in order to support his right
to a judgment of the court."
In other words, it is a bundle of facts which
taken with the law applicable to them gives the
plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant.
The mere service of notice under Section 52(2)
of the Act on the respondents at their
registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road,
Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of the
State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a
cause of action within that territory unless the
service of such notice was an integral part of
the cause of action. The entire cause of action
culminating in the acquisition of the land under
Section 52(1) of the Act arose within the State
of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the
Jaipur Bench. The answer to the question
whether service of notice is an integral part of
the cause of action within the meaning of
Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend
upon the nature of the impugned order giving
rise to a cause of action. The notification dated
February 8, 1984 issued by the State
Government under Section 52(1) of the Act
became effective the moment it was published
in the Official Gazette as thereupon the notified
land became vested in the State Government
free from all encumbrances. It was not
necessary for the respondents to plead the
service of notice on them by the Special
Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur
under Section 52(2) for the grant of an
appropriate writ, direction or order under
Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the
notification issued by the State Government
under Section 52(1) of the Act. If the
respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of
their lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to
challenge the validity of the notification issued
by the State Government of Rajasthan under
Section 52(1) of the Act by a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution, the remedy of
the respondents for the grant of such relief had
to be sought by filing such a petition before the
Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the
cause of action wholly or in part arose.
9. It is to be deeply regretted that despite a
series of decisions of this Court deprecating the
practice prevalent in the High Court of passing
such interlocutory orders for the mere asking,
the learned Single Judge should have passed
the impugned ad interim ex parte prohibitory
order the effect of which, as the learned
Attorney General rightly complains, was
virtually to bring to a standstill a development
scheme of the Urban Improvement Trust,
Jaipur viz. Civil Lines Extension Scheme,
irrespective of the fact whether or not the High
Court Court had any territorial jurisdiction to
entertain a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution. Such arbitrary exercise of power
by the High Court at the public expense reacts
against the development and prosperity of the
country and is clearly detrimental to the
national interest.
10. Quite recently, Chinnappa Reddy, J.
speaking for the Court in Assistant Collector of
Central Excise, W.B. v. Dunlop India Limited
[(1985) 1 SCC 260 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 75]
administered strong admonition deprecating
the practice of the High Court of granting ad
interim ex parte orders which practically have
the effect of the grant of the main relief in the
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
irrespective of the fact whether the High Court
had any territorial jurisdiction to entertain such
a petition or whether the petition under Article
226 was intended and meant to circumvent the
alternative remedy provided by law or filed
solely for the purpose of obtaining interim
orders and thereafter delaying and protracting
the proceedings by one device or the other
particularly in matters relating to public
revenue or implementation of various
measures and schemes undertaken by the
Government or the local authorities for general
public benefit. Although the powers of the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are
far and wide and the Judges must ever be
vigilant to protect the citizen against arbitrary
executive action, nonetheless, the Judges have
a constructive role and therefore there is
always the need to use such extensive powers
with due circumspection. There has to be in
the larger public interest an element of self-
ordained restraint. We hope and trust that the
High Court will determine the extent of its
territorial jurisdiction before making such
interlocutory orders."
12. Similarly, the Apex Court in the case of
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY AND ANOTHER
vs. VINAY ENGINEERING ENTERPRISES (P)
LIMITED AND ANOTHER reported in 1994 (4) SCC
710 has considered the jurisdiction issue. The
relevant portion is extracted below:
"2. We are surprised, not a little, that the High
Court of Calcutta should have exercised
jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely
no jurisdiction. The contracts in question were
executed at Aligarh, the construction work was
to be carried out at Aligarh, even the contracts
provided that in the event of dispute the
Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction. The
arbitrator was from Aligarh and was to function
there. Merely because the respondent was a
Calcutta-based firm, the High Court of Calcutta
seems to have exercised jurisdiction where it
had none by adopting a queer line of
reasoning. We are constrained to say that this
is a case of abuse of jurisdiction and we feel
that the respondent deliberately moved the
Calcutta High Court ignoring the fact that no
part of the cause of action had arisen within
the jurisdiction of that Court. It clearly shows
that the litigation filed in the Calcutta High
Court was thoroughly unsustainable.
13. In similar circumstances, in the case of OIL
AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION vs. UTPAL
KUMAR BASU AND OTHERS reported in 1994 (4)
SCC 711, the Apex Court held as follows:
"6. It is well settled that the expression
"cause of action" means that bundle of facts
which the petitioner must prove, if traversed,
to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by
the Court. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh [ILR
(1889) 16 Cal 98, 102 : 15 IA 156] Lord
Watson said:
"... the cause of action has no relation
whatever to the defence which may be set up
by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the
character of the relief prayed for by the
plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set
forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in
other words, to the media upon which the
plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a
conclusion in his favour."
Therefore, in determining the objection of lack
of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all
the facts pleaded in support of the cause of
action into consideration albeit without
embarking upon an enquiry as to the
correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In
other words the question whether a High Court
has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ
petition must be answered on the basis of the
averments made in the petition, the truth or
otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it
differently, the question of territorial
jurisdiction must be decided on the facts
pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question
whether in the instant case the Calcutta High
Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide
the writ petition in question even on the facts
alleged must depend upon whether the
averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22,
26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that
a part of the cause of action had arisen within
the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court."
14. Even in the case of KUSUM INGOTS AND
ALLOYS LIMITED (supra), the Apex Court has held
as follows:
"6. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The
material facts which are imperative for the
suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause
of action. Cause of action is not defined in any
statute. It has, however, been judicially
interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact
which would be necessary for the plaintiff to
prove, if traversed, in order to support his right
to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it
would mean that everything which, if not
proved, gives the defendant an immediate
right to judgment, would be part of cause of
action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For
every action, there has to be a cause of action,
if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the
case may be, shall be rejected summarily.
7. Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution
of India reads thus:
"226. (2) The power conferred by clause (1)
to issue directions, orders or writs to any
Government, authority or person may also be
exercised by any High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to the territories within
which the cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises for the exercise of such power,
notwithstanding that the seat of such
Government or authority or the residence of
such person is not within those territories."
8. Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure
reads as under:
"20. Other suits to be instituted where
defendants reside or cause of action arises.--
Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit
shall be instituted in a court within the local
limits of whose jurisdiction--
(a)-(b)***
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises."
9. Although in view of Section 141 of the Code
of Civil Procedure the provisions thereof would
not apply to writ proceedings, the phraseology
used in Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil
Procedure and clause (2) of Article 226, being
in pari materia, the decisions of this Court
rendered on interpretation of Section 20(c)
CPC shall apply to the writ proceedings also.
Before proceeding to discuss the matter further
it may be pointed out that the entire bundle of
facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of
action as what is necessary to be proved
before the petitioner can obtain a decree is the
material facts. The expression material facts is
also known as integral facts.
10. Keeping in view the expressions used in
clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, indisputably even if a small fraction of
cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction
of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in
the matter.
11. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh [(1887-88)
15 IA 156] it was held: (IA pp. 157-58)
"[The cause of action has no relation whatever
to the defence which may be set up by the
defendant, nor does it depend upon the
character of the relief prayed for by the
plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set
forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in
other words, to the media upon which the
plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a
conclusion in his favour."
12. This Court in Oil & Natural Gas Commission
v. Utpal Kumar Basu [(1994) 4 SCC 711] held
that the question as to whether the Court has
a territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ
petition, must be arrived at on the basis of
averments made in the petition, the truth or
otherwise thereof being immaterial.
13. This Court in Oil and Natural Gas
Commission case [(1994) 4 SCC 711] held that
all necessary facts must form an integral part
of the cause of action. It was observed: (SCC
p. 719, para 8)
"So also the mere fact that it sent fax
messages from Calcutta and received a reply
thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an
integral part of the cause of action."
14. In State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties
[(1985) 3 SCC 217] this Court opined that
mere service of a notice would not give rise to
any cause of action unless service of notice
was an integral part of the cause of action. The
said decision has also been noticed in Oil and
Natural Gas Commission [(1994) 4 SCC 711] .
This Court held: (SCC p. 223, para 8)
"The answer to the question whether service
of notice is an integral part of the cause of
action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of
the Constitution must depend upon the nature
of the impugned order giving rise to a cause
of action."
15. In Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engg.
Enterprises (P) Ltd. [(1994) 4 SCC 710] this
Court lamented: (SCC p. 711, para 2)
"2. We are surprised, not a little, that the
High Court of Calcutta should have exercised
jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely
no jurisdiction. The contracts in question were
executed at Aligarh, the construction work
was to be carried out at Aligarh, even the
contracts provided that in the event of dispute
the Aligarh court alone will have jurisdiction.
The arbitrator was from Aligarh and was to
function there. Merely because the respondent
was a Calcutta-based firm, the High Court of
Calcutta seems to have exercised jurisdiction
where it had none by adopting a queer line of
reasoning. We are constrained to say that this
is a case of abuse of jurisdiction and we feel
that the respondent deliberately moved the
Calcutta High Court ignoring the fact that no
part of the cause of action had arisen within
the jurisdiction of that Court. It clearly shows
that the litigation filed in the Calcutta High
Court was thoroughly unsustainable."
16. In Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd.
[(2002) 1 SCC 567] it was held that in order to
confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain
a writ petition it must disclose that the integral
facts pleaded in support of the cause of action
do constitute a cause so as to empower the
Court to decide the dispute and the entire or a
part of it arose within its jurisdiction.
17. Recently, in National Textile Corpn. Ltd. v.
Haribox Swalram [(2004) 9 SCC 786 : JT
(2004) 4 SC 508] a Division Bench of this
Court held: (SCC p. 797, para 12.1)
"12.1. As discussed earlier, the mere fact that
the writ petitioner carries on business at
Calcutta or that the reply to the
correspondence made by it was received at
Calcutta is not an integral part of the cause of
action and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court
had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ
petition and the view to the contrary taken by
the Division Bench cannot be sustained. In
view of the above finding, the writ petition is
liable to be dismissed."
18. The facts pleaded in the writ petition must
have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer
can be granted. Those facts which have
nothing to do with the prayer made therein
cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action
which would confer jurisdiction on the Court.
19. Passing of a legislation by itself in our
opinion does not confer any such right to file a
writ petition unless a cause of action arises
therefor.
20. A distinction between a legislation and
executive action should be borne in mind while
determining the said question.
21. A parliamentary legislation when it receives
the assent of the President of India and is
published in the Official Gazette, unless
specifically excluded, will apply to the entire
territory of India. If passing of a legislation
gives rise to a cause of action, a writ petition
questioning the constitutionality thereof can be
filed in any High Court of the country. It is not
so done because a cause of action will arise
only when the provisions of the Act or some of
them which were implemented shall give rise
to civil or evil consequences to the petitioner.
A writ court, it is well settled, would not
determine a constitutional question in a
vacuum.
22. The Court must have the requisite
territorial jurisdiction. An order passed on a
writ petition questioning the constitutionality of
a parliamentary Act, whether interim or final
keeping in view the provisions contained in
clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, will have effect throughout the territory
of India subject of course to the applicability of
the Act.
23. A writ petition, however, questioning the
constitutionality of a parliamentary Act shall
not be maintainable in the High Court of Delhi
only because the seat of the Union of India is
in Delhi. (See Abdul Kafi Khan v. Union of India
[AIR 1979 Cal 354] .)
24. Learned counsel for the appellant in
support of his argument would contend that
the situs of framing law or rule would give
jurisdiction to the Delhi High Court and in
support of the said contention relied upon the
decisions of this Court in Nasiruddin v. STAT
[(1975) 2 SCC 671 : AIR 1976 SC 331] and
U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v.
State of U.P. [(1995) 4 SCC 738] So far as the
decision of this Court in Nasiruddin v. STAT
[(1975) 2 SCC 671 : AIR 1976 SC 331] is
concerned, it is not an authority for the
proposition that the situs of legislature of a
State or the authority in power to make
subordinate legislation or issue a notification
would confer power or jurisdiction on the High
Court or a Bench of the High Court to entertain
a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
In fact this Court while construing the
provisions of the United Provinces High Courts
(Amalgamation) Order, 1948 stated the law
thus: (SCC p. 683, para 37)
"37. The conclusion as well as the reasoning
of the High Court is incorrect. It is unsound
because the expression 'cause of action' in an
application under Article 226 would be as the
expression is understood and if the cause of
action arose because of the appellate order or
the revisional order which came to be passed
at Lucknow then Lucknow would have
jurisdiction though the original order was
passed at a place outside the areas in Oudh.
It may be that the original order was in favour
of the person applying for a writ. In such case
an adverse appellate order might be the cause
of action. The expression 'cause of action' is
well known. If the cause of action arises
wholly or in part at a place within the
specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will
have jurisdiction. If the cause of action arises
wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is
indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would
have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If
the cause of action arises in part within the
specified areas in Oudh it would be open to
the litigant who is the dominus litis to have
his forum conveniens. The litigant has the
right to go to a court where part of his cause
of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect
to say that the litigant chooses any particular
court. The choice is by reason of the
jurisdiction of the court being attracted by
part of cause of action arising within the
jurisdiction of the court. Similarly, if the cause
of action can be said to have arisen part
within specified areas in Oudh and part
outside the specified Oudh areas, the litigant
will have the choice to institute proceedings
either at Allahabad or Lucknow. The court will
find out in each case whether the jurisdiction
of the court is rightly attracted by the alleged
cause of action."
25. The said decision is an authority for the
proposition that the place from where an
appellate order or a revisional order is passed
may give rise to a part of cause of action
although the original order was at a place
outside the said area. When a part of the cause
of action arises within one or the other High
Court, it will be for the petitioner to choose his
forum.
26. The view taken by this Court in U.P.
Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad [(1995) 4
SCC 738] that the situs of issue of an order or
notification by the Government would come
within the meaning of the expression "cases
arising" in clause 14 of the (Amalgamation)
Order is not a correct view of law for the
reason hereafter stated and to that extent the
said decision is overruled. In fact, a legislation,
it is trite, is not confined to a statute enacted
by Parliament or the legislature of a State,
which would include delegated legislation and
subordinate legislation or an executive order
made by the Union of India, State or any other
statutory authority. In a case where the field is
not covered by any statutory rule, executive
instructions issued in this behalf shall also
come within the purview thereof. Situs of office
of Parliament, legislature of a State or
authorities empowered to make subordinate
legislation would not by itself constitute any
cause of action or cases arising. In other
words, framing of a statute, statutory rule or
issue of an executive order or instruction would
not confer jurisdiction upon a court only
because of the situs of the office of the maker
thereof.
27. When an order, however, is passed by a
court or tribunal or an executive authority
whether under provisions of a statute or
otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at
that place. Even in a given case, when the
original authority is constituted at one place
and the appellate authority is constituted at
another, a writ petition would be maintainable
at both the places. In other words, as order of
the appellate authority constitutes a part of
cause of action, a writ petition would be
maintainable in the High Court within whose
jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the
fact that the order of the appellate authority is
also required to be set aside and as the order
of the original authority merges with that of
the appellate authority.
28. Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India
[AIR 1961 SC 532 : (1961) 2 SCR 828]
whereupon the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant placed strong reliance
was rendered at a point of time when clause
(2) of Article 226 had not been inserted. In
that case the Court held that the jurisdiction of
the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, properly construed,
depends not on the residence or location of the
person affected by the order but of the person
or authority passing the order and the place
where the order has effect. In the latter sense,
namely, the office of the authority which is to
implement the order would attract the
territorial jurisdiction of the Court was
considered having regard to Section 20(c) of
the Code of Civil Procedure as Article 226 of
the Constitution thence stood, stating: (AIR p.
540, para 16)
"The concept of cause of action cannot in our
opinion be introduced in Article 226, for by
doing so we shall be doing away with the
express provision contained therein which
requires that the person or authority to whom
the writ is to be issued should be resident in
or located within the territories over which the
High Court has jurisdiction. It is true that this
may result in some inconvenience to persons
residing far away from New Delhi who are
aggrieved by some order of the Government
of India as such, and that may be a reason for
making a suitable constitutional amendment
in Article 226. But the argument of
inconvenience, in our opinion, cannot affect
the plain language of Article 226, nor can the
concept of the place of cause of action be
introduced into it for that would do away with
the two limitations on the powers of the High
Court contained in it."
29. In view of clause (2) of Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, now if a part of cause of
action arises outside the jurisdiction of the
High Court, it would have jurisdiction to issue a
writ. The decision in Khajoor Singh [AIR 1961
SC 532 : (1961) 2 SCR 828] has, thus, no
application.
30. We must, however, remind ourselves that
even if a small part of cause of action arises
within the territorial jurisdiction of the High
Court, the same by itself may not be
considered to be a determinative factor
compelling the High Court to decide the matter
on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may
refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction
by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens.
[See Bhagat Singh Bugga v. Dewan Jagbir
Sawhney [AIR 1941 Cal 670 : ILR (1941) 1 Cal
490] , Madanlal Jalan v. Madanlal [(1945) 49
CWN 357 : AIR 1949 Cal 495] , Bharat Coking
Coal Ltd. v. Jharia Talkies & Cold Storage (P)
Ltd. [1997 CWN 122] , S.S. Jain & Co. v. Union
of India [(1994) 1 CHN 445] and New Horizons
Ltd. v. Union of India [AIR 1994 Del 126] .]"
15. Recently, in the case of STATE OF GOA vs.
SUMMIT ONLINE TRADE SOLUTIONS PRIVATE
LIMITED AND OTHERS reported in 2023 (7) SCC
791, the Apex Court reiterated the legal position. The
relevant paragraphs are extracted below:
"16. The expression "cause of action" has not
been defined in the Constitution. However, the
classic definition of "cause of action" given by
Lord Brett in Cooke v. Gill [Cooke v. Gill,
(1873) LR 8 CP 107] that "cause of action
means every fact which it would be necessary
for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order
to support his right to the judgment of the
court", has been accepted by this Court in a
couple of decisions. It is axiomatic that without
a cause, there cannot be any action. However,
in the context of a writ petition, what would
constitute such "cause of action" is the
material facts which are imperative for the writ
petitioner to plead and prove to obtain relief as
claimed.
17. Determination of the question as to
whether the facts pleaded constitute a part of
the cause of action, sufficient to attract clause
(2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, would
necessarily involve an exercise by the High
Court to ascertain that the facts, as pleaded,
constitute a material, essential or integral part
of the cause of action. In so determining, it is
the substance of the matter that is relevant. It,
therefore, follows that the party invoking the
writ jurisdiction has to disclose that the
integral facts pleaded in support of the cause
of action do constitute a cause empowering the
High Court to decide the dispute and that, at
least, a part of the cause of action to move the
High Court arose within its jurisdiction. Such
pleaded facts must have a nexus with the
subject-matter of challenge based on which the
prayer can be granted. Those facts which are
not relevant or germane for grant of the prayer
would not give rise to a cause of action
conferring jurisdiction on the court. These are
the guiding tests."
16. Applying the settled legal principles to the
present case, it is clear that no part of the cause of
action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of this
Court. The petitioner was working in Agra, resides in
Mathura, and the show-cause notice and Articles of
Charges were served in Agra. The communication of
the Articles of Charges to the head office in Bangalore
does not establish a nexus to the substantial cause of
action. It is only an internal communication between
Regional Office and Head Office.
17. Therefore, the petition filed by the petitioner
is not maintainable due to a lack of territorial
jurisdiction.
The writ petition is dismissed.
No costs.
Sd/-
(H. T. NARENDRA PRASAD)
JUDGE
Cm/-
