[Cites 11, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
Rafeeq Ur Rehman vs The State Of Karnataka on 28 November, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
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CRL.P No. 5806 of 2023
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 5806 OF 2023
BETWEEN:
1. RAFEEQ-UR-REHMAN
S/O LATE MR. ZIA-UR-REHMAN
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
R/AT NO 17,
4TH CROSS
NARAYANAPPA BLOCK,
MARAPPA GARDEN,
Digitally signed BANGALORE 560046
by NAGAVENI
Location: High
Court of ...PETITIONER
Karnataka
(BY SRI. SYED KHALEEL PASHA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
JEEVAN BHIMA NAGAR POLICE STATION
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CRL.P No. 5806 of 2023
HC-KAR
BENGALURU CITY
THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT
BANGALORE - 560 001
2. MUNESHWAR PSI
S/O DODDABASANNA
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
POLICE SUB-INSEPCTOR
J B NAGAR POLICE STATION
BANGALORE - 560 052
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. B.N. JAGADEESHA, ADDL. SPP)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482 OF CR.P.C BY THE
ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONER PRAYING THAT THIS HONBLE
COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO QUASH THE ENTIRE
PROCEEDINGS IN S.C.NO.1164/2010 U/S 338, 304A R/W
SECTION 34 OF IPC, WHICH IS PENDING ON THE FILE OF CITY
CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU (CCH-70).
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
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CRL.P No. 5806 of 2023
HC-KAR
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
ORAL ORDER
Heard the learned counsel Sri. Syed Khaleel Pasha,
appearing for the petitioner, Sri.B.N. Jagadeesha, learnead
Addl.SPP appearing for the respondents and have perused the
material on record.
2. The petitioner is before this Court, seeking the
following prayer:
"(a). quash the entire proceedings in SC No.1164/2010
under sections 338, 304 read with 34 of IPC, Which
is pending on the file of the LXIX Addl. City Civil
and Sessions Judge at Bangalore (CCH-70)
(b) Call for L.C.R
(c) and pass such other and further order or orders as
this Hon'ble court may deem fit and proper in the
circumstances of the case. "
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would
submit that the issue in the lis stands covered by the judgment
rendered by this Court in Crl.P.No.10866/2023 disposed on
28.11.2022, wherein it has held as follows:
" The petitioner is before this Court calling in
question the proceedings in S.C.No.1164/2010 (Crime
No.69/2010) (C.C.No.22563/2010) on the file of the
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LXIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru
(CCH-70) registered for offences punishable under
Sections 338 , 304 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
2. Heard Sri. T. Prakash, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner, Smt. K.P. Yashodha, learned
HCGP appearing for respondent No.1 and have perused
the material on record.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
submits that this Court qua several other accused have
quashed the proceedings against them, which arise out
of the very same incident.
4. The petitioner is accused No.7 in
S.C.No.1164/2010. the petitioner is also entitled to the
same relief that is granted to all the other accused and
for the very reasons rendered by this Court.
5. This Court in terms of its order dated
16.09.2022 in Crl.P.No.8556/2022 concerning the co-
accused has passed the passed following order:
"3. The learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner would submit that the issue in the
lis stands covered by the judgment of this Court
in Crl.P.No.4726/2012, disposed on 21.10.2021.
This Court has held as follows:
"7. The petitioner is accused No.18 in
S.C.No.1164 of 2010 pending before the
Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court-XV,
Bangalore. The reason for the petitioner being
arraigned as an accused is the incident that
occurred on 23-02-2010 when the fire broke out
in Carlton Towers, a commercial complex in the
City of Bangalore which took 9 lives and left 70
injured. The petitioner is arrayed as an accused
as he is the Director of the Company.
8. The Company which had its office in the
same Towers had entered into an agreement for
annual maintenance and house-keeping at
Carlton Towers with the Carlton Towers Owners
Association. The agreement was entered into on
01-05-2009 and it was an annual maintenance
contract. On 16-12-2009 M/s Shivaji Electricals
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was entrusted to rectify the defects in
compliance with the Electrical Inspector's report
who had found certain defects in electrification.
The defects were rectified by M/s Shivaji
Electricals on 17-12-2009 and the same was
communicated to the Electrical Inspector,
Bangalore East Division under whose jurisdiction
the building came.
9. After the said job being entrusted to M/s
Shivaji Electricals, the Carlton Towers Owners
Association also communicated to the Electrical
Inspector that the defects have been rectified by
M/s Shivaji Electricals. This communication was
sent on 15-02-2010. In the interregnum the
petitioner travelled abroad i.e., to the United
Kingdom on 31-01-2010 and returned to India
on 5-03-2010. A memo along with immigration
details is also placed on record which would
clearly depict that the petitioner was out of the
country from 31-01-2010 up to 5-03-2010.
10. The fire mishap occurred on 23-02-
2010. Admittedly the petitioner was not in the
country at that point in time. A FIR came to be
accused for offences punishable under Sections
338, 304(A) and 304 read with Section 34 of the
IPC. A report was called for from the Deputy
Chief Electrical Inspector with regard to the
incident. The Deputy Chief Electrical Inspector
submits his report on 1-03-2010 opining that if
electrical instruments had been maintained in a
sustainable condition when electrical arcing
occurred and paper, cloth pieces and other
material which are vulnerable to fire were not
dumped into the cable duct and also other
precautions had been taken the fire could have
been avoided. This had led to the fire mishap.
The report reads as follows:
"III C¥ÀWÁvÀzÀ §UÉÎ C©ü¥ÁæAiÀÄ:
vÀ¤SÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀĪÀ ªÀgÀ¢ ¥ÀæPÁgÀ ¸ÀzÀj PÀlÖqÀzÀ°è
ªÉÆzÀ®£Éà CAvÀ¹Û£À°è PÁAiÀÄð¤ªÀð»¸ÀÄwÛgÀĪÀ ªÉÄ: mÉPÉÆß«ÄPï
¸ÁܪÀgÀPÉÌ «zÀÄåvï ¸ÀgÀ§gÁdÄ PÀ°à¹gÀĪÀ 4 C + 50 Sq.mm
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aluminium Armoured calbe, PÉç¯ï qÀPïÖ£À JAnæ
¥Á¬ÄAmï¤AzÀ ¸ÀĪÀiÁgÀÄ 1 jAzÀ 2 CrAiÀÄ CAvÀgÀzÀ°è PÉç¯ï
C£ÀÄß J¼ÉAiÀÄĪÀ ¸ÀªÄÀ AiÀÄzÀ°è Internal conductor fracture
¤AzÀ CxÀªÁ conductor deterioration ¤AzÀ CxÀªÁ
abrasion ¤AzÀ QëÃt¹zÀÄÝ, PÁ®PÀæªÄÉ Ãt CzÀgÀ «zÀÄåvï
PÁåj¬ÄAUï ±ÀQÛAiÀÄÄ PÀrªÉÄAiÀiÁV «zÀÄåvï ¥ÀæªÀ»¸ÀÄwÛgÄÀ ªÀ vÀAw
ºÁUÀÆ ¥ÀPÀÌzÀ UËæAqÉqï ¯ÉÆúÀzÀ ¨sÁUÀPÌÉ (Cable Armour)
DQðAUï DV ¨ÉAQ GAmÁVzÀÄÝ, CzÉà ¸ÀAzÀ¨ÀsðzÀ°è PÉç¯ï
qÀPïÖ £À°è ±ÉÃRgÀuÉAiÀiÁVzÀÝ ¥ÉÃ¥Àgï ¦Ã¸ï UÀ¼ÄÀ , §mÉÖ vÀÄAqÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ,
ºÁUÀÆ EvÀgÉ ¸ÀÄ®¨sÀªÁV ¨ÉAQAiÀiÁV DºÀÄwAiÀiÁUÀĪÀ EvÀgÉ
ªÀ¸ÀÄÛUÀ¼ÀÄ ¸ÉÃjPÉÆAqÀÄ, ¨ÉAQAiÀÄ wêÀðvÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ºÉaѹzÀÄÝ, F
¨ÉAQAiÀÄÄ EvÀgÉ PÉç¯ïUÀ¼À E£ÀÄì¯ÉñÀ£ï UÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß ¸ÀÄnÖzÄÀ Ý, EzÀjAzÀ
CwAiÀiÁzÀ PÁ§ð£ï ºÉÆUÉAiÀÄÄ GvÀàwAiÀiÁVzÀÄÝ, F PÁ§ð£ï
ºÉÆUÉAiÀÄÄ PÉç¯ï ªÀÄÄSÁAvÀgÀ ºÉÆgÀUÉ ºÉÆÃUÀ®Ä CªÀPÁ±À«®èzÉ,
PÉç¯ï qÀPïÖ £À°è ±ÉÃRgÀuÉUÆ É ArzÀÄÝ, ºÁUÀÆ F ºÉÆUÉAiÀÄ
wêÀðvÉAiÀÄÄ eÁ¹ÛAiÀiÁV PÉç¯ï qÀPïÖ ¨ÁV®ÄUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß QvÀÄÛPÉÆAqÀÄ
ºÉÆgÀUÉ §AzÀÄ, ºÉÆUÉAiÀÄÄ J¯Áè ªÀĺÀrUÀ¼À®Æè «¹Ûj¹zÀÄÝ,
«±ÉõÀªÁV 6 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 7£Éà ªÀĺÀrAiÀÄ°è §ºÀ¼ÀµÄÀ Ö vÀÄA©PÉÆArzÀÄÝ,
PÀlÖqÀzÀ°èzÀÝ d£ÀgÄÀ EzÀ£ÄÀ ß £ÉÆÃr UÁ§j¥ÀnÖgÄÀ ªÀÅzÀjAzÀ F
CªÀWÀqÀPÉÌ PÁgÀtªÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
¸ÀzÀj PÀlÖqÀzÀ ¤ªÁðºÀPÀgÄÀ / ªÀiÁ°ÃPÀgÄÀ UÀ¼ÄÀ ¨ÉAQ
CªÀWÀqÀ ¸ÀA¨sÀ«¸À®Ä PÁgÀtªÁzÀ electrical Arcing GAmÁzÀ
¸ÀªÀÄAiÀÄzÀ°è «zÀÄåvï ¸ÀÄgÀPÁë G¥ÀPÀgÀtUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¸ÀĹÜwAiÀÄ°è ElÄÖ
PÁAiÀÄð¤ªÀð»¸ÀĪÀAvÉ £ÉÆÃrPÉÆArzÀÝgÉ ºÁUÀÆ PÉç¯ï qÀPïÖ
C£ÀÄß ¸ÀéZÀÒªÁV ElÄÖPÆ É ArzÀÄÝ, ¨ÉAQUÉ DºÀÄwAiÀiÁUÀĪÀAvÀ
¥ÉÃ¥Àgï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ §mÉÖ ¦Ã¸ïUÀ¼ÄÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ EvÀgÉ ªÀ¸ÀÄÛUÀ¼ÀÄ C°è
±ÉÃRgÀuÉAiÀiÁUÀzÀAvÉ £ÉÆÃrPÉÆArzÀÝgÉ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀÄÄ£ÉßZÀÑjPÉ PÀæªÀÄ
vÉUÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ J¯Áè vÀÄvÀÄð ¤UÀðªÀÄ£ÀzÀ ¨ÁV®ÄUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß vÉgÉ¢lÄÖ
ºÁUÀÆ PÁjqÁgï UÀ¼À°è ¸Áé¨Ás «PÀ UÁ½ ¨É¼ÀPÄÀ UÀ½UÉ ªÀåªÀ¸ÉÜ
ªÀiÁrzÀÝ°è F CªÀWÀqÀªÀ£ÄÀ ß vÀ¦à¸À§ºÀÄzÉAzÀÄ
C©ü¥ÁæAiÀÄ¥ÀqÀ¯ÁVzÉ."
After all the aforesaid events, charge sheet
is also filed by the Police in which the petitioner
is arrayed as accused No.18 and an additional
charge sheet is filed against one Sri Suresh
Kumar S.K., Proprietor of the Company
arraigning him as accused No.21.
11. It is not in dispute that among the
accused, one of them had approached this Court
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i.e., accused No.3 one Mr. T.G. Mandanna in
Criminal Petition No.769 of 2011 under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. This Court by its order dated
21-02-2011 holding that the petitioner therein
was not the owner of any of the units in the
building, allowed the petition by observing as
follows:
"3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner
submitted that though there are 20 persons
named in the charge sheet, the petitioner herein
was not the owner of any one of the apartments,
but on the other hand, he is the co-opted
treasurer of the Carlton Towers Owner's
Association. He further submits that nothing is
stated in the charge sheet filed against the
petitioner that he is the owner of the apartments
of the said building and is responsible for the
mishap that took place and as such, the question
of the petitioner being proceeded with does not
arise. Referring to the contents of the charge
sheet, submission made is that reason for the
fire said to have been not taking proper
precautions by the building owners and as such,
this petitioner is nothing to do with the
maintenance of the building as he was only the
treasurer who is looking after the account
matters.
4. Having thus heard the petitioner's
Counsel and after going through the charge
sheet material, though there are 20 accused
persons named in the charge sheet, except this
petitioner, others according to the petitioner's
Counsel are the owners of the building.
Therefore, having regard to the nature of the
incident that took place on the aforementioned
date and the charge sheet also putting the blame
entirely on the building owners being negligent
in taking necessary precautions to prevent the
occurrence of fire in the building, in my view,
continuation of proceedings as far as this
petitioner is concerned is not warranted as there
are no specific mention in the charge sheet
against this petitioner attracting the aforesaid
offence.
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5. For the above said reasons, petition is
allowed and proceedings against this petitioner
in S.C.No.1164/10 pending on the file of the
Presiding Officer, FTC-XV (Sessions), Bangalore,
stands quashed. But, however as regards the
other accused persons are concerned, i.e.,
accused Nos.1, 2 & 4 to 20, the trial court shall
proceed with the matter in accordance with law."
The subject petition has to be now
considered on the grounds that are urged by the
petitioner on the facts that are narrated
hereinabove.
12. It is not in dispute that the petitioner is
one of the Directors of the Company and the
Company is not arrayed as an accused. The
Company not being arrayed as one of the
accused and only the Director of the Company
being arrayed, the complaint cannot be
maintainable and the proceedings cannot be
continued in the light of the law laid down by the
Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case
of ANEETA HADA v. GODFATHER TRAVELS
AND TOURS PRIVATE LIMITED - (2012) 5
SCC 661. Therefore, the complaint against the
petitioner who is the Director of the Company
without arraigning the Company as a party was
not even maintainable.
13. The allegations against the petitioner in
the charge sheet are for offences punishable
under Sections 304 and 338 of the IPC. This
Court in identical circumstances in the case of
MELVIN KUMAR AND OTHERS v. K.S.
HARISHA AND ANOTHER (Crl.P.No.2619 of
2014 decided on 31st January 2019) which
concerned offences punishable under Section
304A read with Section 34 of the IPC against
several accused who were teachers of Mother
Theresa School who had taken the children
studying 3rd, 4th and 5th standards for a school
picnic at Residency Holiday Resort and the
students got drowned in the swimming pool, a
complaint was registered against the owner or
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the management, the Head Master as well as the
Manager of Residency Holiday Resort. The
teachers of the school who had been arrayed as
accused had approached this Court in Criminal
Petition No.2619 of 2014 for offences punishable
under Section 304-A of IPC. This Court after
considering the purport of Section 304-A of IPC
which deals with causing death by negligence
has held as follows:
"12. Viewed from another angle, in
order to fasten criminal liability for the
offence under section 304A of Indian Penal
Code, the prosecution is required to prove that
the act of the accused was the proximate and
immediate cause of death and that the death
was caused without the intervention of
another person's negligence. As held in SUSHIL
ANSAL's case, supra, it must have been the
causa causans; and not mere causa sine qua
non.
14. In Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli
Bangawalla's case, referred to supra, the
allegation against the appellant therein was
that he allowed the burners to be used in the
same room in which varnish and turpentine
were stored, which were alleged to be negligent
act and fire resulted because of the proximity of
the burners. But the said contention was not
found favour with the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
view of the above proposition of law.
.... .... .... ....
17. The law casts a higher degree of
care on the occupiers of the building or
premises wherein visitors or the licensees are
allowed to use the facilities provided therein.
What is the degree of care expected from
the occupiers of a Cinema building came up
for consideration of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of SUSHIL ANSAL, referred to
above. In paragraph No.95 thereof, it is
observed thus:
"What is the degree of care expected
from the occupier of a cinema is the next
question to which we must advert at this
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stage. Two fundamental principles must be
noticed at the threshold while answering that
question. The first is that the degree and
nature of care expected of an occupier
depends upon the fact situation in which the
duty to care arises. The second and equally
important principle at common law is that the
degree of care in a given fact situation would
depend upon whether the person to whom the
duty is owed is a contractual visitor, invitee,
licensee or trespasser. Of these the occupier
owes the highest degree of care to a
contractual visitor viz., a person who pays
consideration to be present on the premises for
some purpose; whatever that purpose be. At
common law there is an implied term in the
contract between the occupier and the visitor
that the occupier's premises shall be
reasonably safe. The occupier's duty must be
held to have been breached if any injury is
caused to a contractual visitor by any defect in
the premises apart from a latent defect." "
On the aforesaid reasoning, the criminal
petition was allowed and the proceedings against
those teachers were quashed.
14. In an yet another circumstance, this
Court in the case of M.SRINIVAS v. STATE -
(Criminal Petition No.9124 of 2016 decided on
15th February 2019) again considering offences
punishable under Section 304A of IPC in a case
where the allegations against the petitioner
therein who was a Supervisor-Engineer of M/s
Malu Constructions (India) Private Limited which
was executing works in terms of a work order
issued by the Bangalore Water Supply and
Sewerage Board pertaining to laying down of
water pipes had negligently left a heap of mud
on the road without taking precautionary
measures leading to accident which resulted in
death of a rider of a motorcycle and the
allegation against the said Supervisor Engineer
was for offences punishable under Section 304-A
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of IPC inter alia. This Court allowed the criminal
petition holding as follows:
"11. It is now well settled that in order to
constitute an offence under section 304A of
Indian Penal Code, the negligence imputed to
the accused must be gross in nature. Though
the term "gross" has not been used in section
304A of Indian Penal Code, in JACOB MATHEW
vs. STATE OF PUNJAB & Others in (2005) 6 SCC
1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while examining a
case of criminal medical negligence by a Doctor
under section 304A of Indian Penal Code, has
reviewed the case law on the subject and in para
48 thereof, has held as under:
"(5) The jurisprudential concept of
negligence differs in civil and criminal law. What
may be negligence in civil law may not
necessarily be negligence in criminal law. For
negligence to amount to an offence, the element
of mens rea must be shown to exist. For an act
to amount to criminal negligence, the degree of
negligence should be much higher i.e., gross or
of a very high degree. Negligence which is
neither gross nor of a higher degree may provide
a ground for action in civil law but cannot form
the basis for prosecution.
(6) The word 'gross' has not been used
in Section 304-A IPC, yet it is settled that in
criminal law negligence or recklessness, to be so
held, must be of such a high degree as to be
'gross'. The expression 'rash or negligent act' as
occurring in Section 304-A IPC has to be read as
qualified by the word 'grossly'."
12. xx xx xx xx
13. It is now well settled that, in order
to fasten criminal liability for the offence under
section 304A of Indian Penal Code, the
prosecution is required to establish that the act
of the accused No.1 was the proximate and
immediate cause of death and that the death
was caused without the intervention of another
person's negligence. As held in SUSHIL
ANSAL's case, supra, it must have been the
causa causans; and not mere causa sine qua
non.
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14. In the instant case, petitioner
herein is implicated in the alleged offence on the
allegation that he was responsible for causing
the accident by leaving heap of mud on the
accident site. In Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli
Rangawalla, supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
dealt with an identical situation. In the said
case, the allegation against the appellant therein
was that he allowed the burners to be used in
the same room in which varnish and turpentine
were stored, which were alleged to be negligent
act and fire resulted because of the proximity of
the burners. But the said contention was
negatived by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by
endorsing the view taken in EMPEROR vs.
OMKAR RAMPRATAP in (1902) 4 Bombay LR 679,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that,
"This view has been generally followed by
High Courts in India and is in our opinion the
right view to take of the meaning of S.304-A. It
is not necessary to refer to other decisions, for
as we have already said this view has been
generally accepted. Therefore, the mere fact
that the fire would not have taken place if the
appellant had not allowed burners to be put in
the same room in which turpentine and varnish
were stored, would not be enough to make him
liable under S.304-A, for the fire would not have
taken place, with the result that seven persons
were burnt to death, without the negligence of
Hatim. The death in this case was, therefore, in
our opinion not directly the result of a rash or
negligent act on the part of the appellant and
was not the proximate and efficient cause
without the intervention of another's negligence.
The appellant must, therefore, be acquitted of
the offence under S.304-A."
15. In the instant case also, the
proposition laid down in the above decision, in
my view, is squarely applicable to the facts of
this case. A plain reading of the charge-sheet
discloses that the material allegations
constituting negligence are directed only against
accused No.1. The material on record indicates
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that the deceased died on account of the rash
and negligent act of accused No.1 in hitting the
motorcycle driven by the accused. Therefore,
the act of accused No.1 was the proximate and
immediate cause of death of the deceased. The
act of the petitioner/accused No.2 in leaving
heap of mud on the road may amount to an
offence under section 134 of Indian Motor
Vehicles Act, but the same does not amount to
an act of negligence within the meaning of
section 304A of Indian Penal Code. Thus, on
consideration of all the above facts and
circumstances of the case, in the light of the law
applicable to the facts of this case, I am of the
clear opinion, that petitioner/accused No.2
cannot be proceeded for negligence in causing
the death of the deceased within the meaning of
Sections 304A and 279 of Indian Penal Code.
Consequently, the prosecution of the petitioner
being illegal, the same amounts to abuse of
process of Court.
As a result, the petition is allowed. The
proceedings initiated against the petitioner in
C.C.No.10878/2016 pending on the file of
Metropolitan Magistrate Traffic Court-III,
Bengaluru is hereby quashed.
Therefore, the offence of Section 304A of
IPC alleged against the petitioner who is the
Director of the Company and was not present at
the place of incident and the negligence
attributable to accused No.21, the petitioner
cannot be prosecuted or trial cannot be
continued against the petitioner for the said
offence of Section 304A of IPC. Section 338 of
IPC which is the other offence alleged against
the petitioner deals with causing grievous hurt
by act endangering life or personal safety of
others and reads as follows:
"338. Causing grievous hurt by act
endangering life or personal safety of
others.--Whoever causes grievous hurt to any
person by doing any act so rashly or negligently
as to endanger human life, or the personal
safety of others, shall be punished with impris-
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onment of either description for a term which
may extend to two years, or with fine which may
extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
The section makes it clear that whoever
causes grievous hurt to any person by doing any
act so rashly or negligently as to endanger
human life shall be punishable in terms of law.
There is no act committed by the petitioner
which attracts Section 338 of the IPC.
15. In the light of the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of ANEETA HADA and
the law laid down by this Court in the afore-
extracted judgments, the petitioner cannot be
held to be responsible for the act of other
accused. Therefore, continuance of the
proceedings against the petitioner would result
in miscarriage of justice and be an abuse of the
process of law.
16. For the aforesaid reasons, the Criminal
Petition is allowed and the proceedings in
S.C.No.1164 of 2010 pending on the file of the
Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court-XV, Bangalore
stand quashed qua the petitioner."
4. The learned HCGP representing
respondent No.1 would, however, submit that it
is a matter of trail for the petitioner to come out
clean but, is not in a position to dispute the
position as is laid down in the aforesaid
judgment."
In the light of the order passed by this Court
(supra) and for the reasons aforementioned, the
following:
ORDER
I. Criminal Petition is allowed.
II. Proceedings pending in S.C.No.1164/2010
(Crime No.69/2010) (C.C.No.22563/2010)
before the LXIX Additional City Civil and
Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-70) stand
quashed qua the petitioner."
- 15 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49609
HC-KAR
In the light of the order passed by this Court (supra) and
for the reasons aforementioned, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.
(ii) The proceedings in S.C.No.1164/2010 pending
before the LXIX Additional City Civil and Sessions
Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-70), stand quashed,
qua the petitioner.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
SJK
CT-SG
